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ABSTRACT 
Liberal theory depends for such coherence and consistency as it possesses upon the 
exclusion of human relationships from its theoretical structure. Classic social contract theory 
affirmed a contract between households, not individuals, each household being represented by 
its male head. This theoretical structure guaranteed a realm of private freedom to all (male) 
individuals and precluded the extension of legal principles to family life. To the extent that the 
premises of such theories are accepted, including the existence of a marital contract which pre-
existed the social contract and eradicated the civil capacity of women, a foundation was 
available for a coherent regime of family law affirming masculine interests. The relegation of 
human relationships to the private sphere enabled the affirmation of autonomy and, 
independence. The legal relationship between the head of the household and his wife and 
children was proprietary, and it was this proprietary connection upon which the doctrine of 
family privacy depended. 
Contemporary liberal egalitarian theorists such as Rawls and Dworkin face very 
different problems. While women are now fully part of civil society and rank equally as 
citizens, neither has considered the full implications of that recognition for the distinction both 
wish to sustain between the public and private spheres. Rather, they have introduced a new 
theoretical distinction and argue that they have broken with the pre-suppositions of classic 
liberal theory in seeking to offer an account of justice which is political merely and devoid of 
wider epistemological and metaphysical assumptions. By arguing that their account of the 
individual is entirely political, applies only to the individual as citizen, they seek to distance 
themselves from the traditional liberal account of the individual as autonomous and 
independent and defeat communitarian claims that liberalism is hostile towards certain 
conceptions of the good life. The compartmentalization implied by such an account of justice, 
its explicit denial that roles other than that of citizen are relevant to equality, renders it 
irrelevant to women. 
It is argued that to the extent that women of every social class remain less advantaged 
than their male counterparts, the foundation of their inequality lies in the gender roles 
characteristic of our culture and the normative role these play in legal and political institutions. 
Both Dworkin and Rawls tacitly assume the male gender role characteristic of late capitalist 
society as normative. This renders the inequality of women invisible, characterizes it as a 
product of individual choices in work, leisure and consumption. To the extent that the 
theoretical individual is recast in gender neutral terms, compelling recognition of the fact that 
the 'private responsibilities' associated with the female gender role form the foundation for 
economic and social inequality, the distinction between public and private is collapsed and an 
account of the just family becomes essential. When an account of the just family is 
constructed, using the premises of egalitarian theory as the foundation, it becomes essential to 
extend ordinary legal principles to the family. This move, in turn, compels acknowledgment of 
the fact that, at least with respect to women and the family, the concrete tastes and preferences 
liberalism seeks to affirm have their roots in the inegalitarian attitudes it deems illegitimate. 
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CHAPTER 1 
WOMEN AND JUSTICE - PRIVATE LIVES AND PUBLIC STANDARDS 
HUMAN RELATIONSHIPS AND JUSTICE 
All people spend a majority of their lives involved in more or less intimate 
relationships with others. Many of these relationships are conventionally subsumed under the 
rubric of family relationships. Within families obligations exist, goods and services are 
exchanged, and more or less complex social hierarchies govern relationships. Much 
contemporary political philosophy disregards such relationships in its analysis of the form and 
content of a just social order. By convention, it concentrates upon the relationships which are 
appropriate among relative strangers and seeks to define the principles which ought to govern 
these. Often, these strangers are simply referred to as citizens. Thus, political philosophy, by 
convention, concerns itself with just relationships among citizens and between individual 
citizens and the state. 
A central thesis in the arguments which will be presented subsequently is that the 
conventional approach is both inadequate and seriously misleading. These difficulties are 
particularly marked in non-utilitarian egalitarian accounts. 1 Today all adult family members, 
men and women alike, rank equally as citizens and are entitled to have their individual 
interests respected and secured by the state. It is important to remember that this is a 
comparatively recent phenomenon. Until very recently, women did not have a voice in the 
democratic political process, nor, if married, were their interests deemed to be independent of 
those of the male head of household. While, as a matter of political theory, women are fully 
citizens, and, as such, share equally in the responsibilities and benefits of citizenship, as a 
matter of practical social reality and the tacit conventions of family life, women remain 
profoundly disadvantaged. Cultural traditions which remain deeply entrenched in countries 
such as England, Australia and the United States assign women primary social responsibility 
for domestic labour and parenting. As a matter of popular ideology, the 'normal' family is 
comprised of a male breadwinner, a female homemaker and two or three children. Many 
women are, therefore, socially and economically disadvantaged because, irrespective of labour 
market participation, they remain disproportionately responsible for domestic labour. This 
1 	Contemporary examples of such accounts include, but are not limited to, those being 
developed by John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, Bruce Ackerman, and, perhaps, Michael 
Walzer. See, eg., J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Oxford, Oxford Univ. Press, 1972, and 
the more recent articles developing and further refining his basic theory noted in the 
Bibliography, R. Dworkin, esp. 'What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare', 10 
Phil. and Pub. Aff, 185 (1981), 'What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources', 10 
Phil. and Pub. Aff. 283 (1981),What is Equality? Part 3: The Place of Liberty', 73 
Iowa L.R. 1 (1987), and 'What is Equality? Part 4: Political Equality', 22 Univ. Of San 
Francisco L.R. 1 (1987), B. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State, New Haven, 
Yale Univ. Press, 1980, and M. Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and 
Equality, Oxford, Martin Robertson, 1983. 
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'double burden', in practice, frequently limits their access to resources through their 
participation in the labour market. Women who do not participate in the labour market 
typically lack independent access to resources altogether, and, under most current legal 
regimes have no entitlement to resources beyond those which the male breadwinner elects to 
make available.2 Effeciively, their access is derivative, not primary. Should the marital or 
quasi-marital relationship fail, this history of diminished, sporadic or effectively non-existent 
labour market participation ensures that they will remain disadvantaged unless they are both 
willing and able to secure the support of another male breadwinner. 
When family relationships are ignored by egalitarian political theories, the nature, 
pervasiveness, and persistence of these patterns of economic disadvantage are also 
disregarded. While egalitarian theorists recognize that, on a practical level, women 
disproportionately require redistributive assistance, their failure to address the justice of family 
relationships in general and of the economic structures which form a significant part of those 
relationships in particular, suggests that this is perceived as an unimportant, if unfortunate, 
fact. Given the pervasiveness of family structures, this inattention is remarkable. Because 
family members are al.o citizens, and because the distributive patterns within families and the 
hierarchies which are conventional within many families have a pervasive effect upon the 
resources available to family members and upon their public equality, both while particular 
families subsist and following their dissolution, egalitarian political theory can ill afford to 
exclude family relationships from its account of a just social order. During the analysis which 
follows, I shall apply the principles of distributive justice offered by two leading egalitarian 
theorists, Dworkin and Rawls, to basic human relationships and endeavour to determine the 
degree to which their application to family relationships creates tension within the theoretical 
structure as a whole. Central to the structure of this endeavour is an effort to establish 
whether present liberal egalitarian approaches to distributive justice have the capacity to 
secure just social and economic outcomes for women or whether, as seems likely, any attempt 
to apply them to women will collapse the boundary between private lives and public persons 
central to liberal theory. 
Issues of justice arise within the family as it is understood by our culture in three 
distinct dimensions. These dimensions are a consequence of our cultural conventions 
concerning the division of responsibilities within families and the particular social and 
economic role the family plays with respect to the wider society. Thus, in what follows, I shall 
primarily consider the particular forms of family life which have emerged in the late Twentieth 
Century, the internal structures of family life associated with such cultures, and the ways in 
which these family structures interact with wider cultural, social, legal, economic and political 
In Australia s. 72 Family Law Act 1975 has been interpreted as allowing the court to 
make an award of maintenance to the dependent spouse even though the parties to 
the marriage continued to live together. See Eliades and Eliades (1981) F.L.C. 91- 
022. 
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structures. The first dimension of justice with respect to families is wholly internal to family 
structures and deals with the conduct of family members with respect to other family 
members. From an egalitarian perspective, it is proper to question whether both the burdens 
and benefits of family life are equitably allocated among adult members. The ways in which 
responsibilities and entitlements are distributed within the family substantially determines the 
capacity of its members to participate in the structures of the wider society. Likewise, again 
primarily with respect to adult individuals, we must question whether individual family 
members enjoy equal autonomy and independence. Thus, we might ask whether decisions are 
made in a way which accords adult members equal decision making capability and authority or 
whether over-reaching occurs which constrains the decision making capability of one individual 
in an unjust manner. Finally, because normal individuals retain the capacity to grow and to 
change throughout their lives, we may ask whether family structures allow equal opportunities 
for personal development and self-realization to all family members. Another way of putting 
this last question is to ask whether all family members are allowed the opportunity to grow in 
all dimensions of human life - in their capacity to enhance and sustain caring relationships, in 
their capacity to achieve instrumental mastery of their political, social and economic 
environments, and in their capacity to attain control over the circumstances of their own lives. 
It is necessary to question whether family structures as they have evolved in England, Australia 
and the United States foster or impede the flourishing of the human individuals within them. 
The second dimension of justice within the family concerns the participation of family 
members in what is conventionally described as civil society. In assessing the justice of 
conventional family structures it is proper to ask how family membership and roles within the 
family influence the pariicipation of individual family members in the structures of civil society. 
Again, from an egalitarian perspective, the critical question is whether the advantages and 
disadvantages are equitably shared or whether burdens accrue disproportionately to certain 
roles while benefits accrue disproportionately to others. Important questions concern the 
effect that such relationships have upon employment opportunities and the economic and 
social rewards associated with these. Equally, many of the roles of civil society offer their 
occupants substantial opportunities to exercise leadership capability and to experience the 
personal growth which is conventionally argued to accompany the exercise of influence, power, 
and authority. It is proper to ask whether family roles enhance or constrain individual 
opportunities to achieve these benefits, and whether, or if, compensatory benefits are available. 
If such opportunities are, as is often suggested by contemporary egalitarian theorists, 
important to individual development and self-respect, access to them is an important aspect of 
substantive justice, and it becomes essential to develop an account of just family structures as 
the foundation for any account of the just society. It may, of course, be that opportunities 
available within the family are equally important to individual development. This, as well, 
raises distributive issues, and these too cannot be resolved unless and until justice within the 
family becomes as important to political theory as justice within civil society. 
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The fmal dimension of justice within the contemporary family concerns the legal 
consequences of family membership. Today, the equality of citizens before the law forms a 
fundamental tenet of liberal democracies. The earlier ascription of political status by gender 
role has been eradicated. Equally, despite the formal presumption of equality, it is clear that 
family status and membership presently alters legal rights and obligations in ways which seem 
incompatible with liberal egalitarian theory. The rules and principles applied to intra-familial 
violence and coercion continue to differ significantly from those applied to violence and 
coercion among relative strangers. While such differences may, in theory, simply recognize 
that family members are not relative strangers and that the mutual bonds and obligations 
extend well beyond those appropriate among relative strangers, they may also conceal 
something very different. Given increasing evidence of the violence within families, and the 
fact that women and children are to a disproportionate extent the victims of such violence, and 
given that intra-familial violence is significantly less likely to be severely sanctioned both by the 
law and by the community itself than violence among strangers, and indeed, in some cases is 
still not subject to any legal sanction, it is clear that family membership significantly diminishes 
certain fundamental legal rights, including the right to be secured against violence from others 
where those others are members of the same family. Acknowledgement of the problem of 
'private violence' is now commonplace in the popular media. Time magazine3 noted that while 
statistics on private violence vary wildly, and the exact extent is probably impossible to 
ascertain, 'it is beyond dispute, however, that extraordinary numbers of women and children are 
being brutalized by those closest to them.' In Sisterhood is Global it was suggested that in the 
United States 
approximately 2 million to 6 million women each year are beaten by the men 
they live with or are married to; 50-70% of wives experience battery during their 
marriages; 2000-4000 women are beaten to death by husbands each year; in 
1979 40% of all women who were killed were murdered by their partners; 25% 
of women's suicide attempts follow a history of battery; wife battery injures more 
U.S. women than auto accidents, rape or muggings; every 18 seconds a woman 
is beaten by her husband severely enough to require hospitalization. Police 
spend 1/3 to 1/2 of their time responding to domestic violence calls; 97% of 
spouse abuse is directed against wives. Battery is a cross-class, cross-race 
problem.4 
Where the state provides economic benefits to individuals, legal marriage alters 
individual entitlement to benefits in ways which differ markedly from the norms applied to de 
facto relationships, homosexual relationships, and alternative forms of shared living 
3 	5th Sept. 1983, 19. 
4 	See R. Morgan, (Ed.) Sisterhood is Global, Harmondsworth, Penguin, (1984), 704. 
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arrangements. The structure of these benefits incorporates many traditional presumptions 
concerning the appropriate incidents of family relationships - one of these being the 
presumption that altruism is the norm and economic dependence appropriate.5 Similar 
presumptions play an important role in the laws which govern individual obligations to the 
state, such as taxation obligations. Likewise, because the state establishes the norms and legal 
conditions governing marriage and divorce, it determines the sorts of relationship which can be 
legally recognized, the rights and obligations adhering to the married state, and the principles 
governing the termination of such relationships. The impact of rules such as these cannot be 
fully understood unless justice within the family is addressed on all three conceptual levels: 
with regard to internal family structure, with regard to the impact of family status upon 
participation in civil society, and with regard to the actual practical effect of the statist rules 
and norms which are applied to basic human relationships and their impact upon substantive 
equality. 
Conceptually, I believe non-utilitarian egalitarian liberalism has its roots in the social 
contract theory of Rousseau. Alone among early social contract theorists he recognized that 
political equality could not be sustained in the absence of substantive economic equality. 6 
Without economic equality, relationships of dependence would inevitably arise between 
citizens, and once such relationships became established, citizens would act from their need to 
secure the good opinion of others rather than from their own judgment. For Rousseau, this 
was sufficient to undermine the moral devotion to the common welfare which was essential to 
a just social order. While contemporary egalitarian theories differ significantly from that of 
Rousseau, and will be examined in some detail later, their emphasis upon the connection 
between economic justice and political justice forms a unifying theme. For contemporary 
egalitarians, as for Rousseau, substantive economic and social equality form cornerstones of 
the just republic. Without them, the liberty and personal independence liberalism set out to 
exalt remain illusory. 
Contemporary egalitarian liberalism is based upon a series of core propositions. The 
individual is treated as the fundamental unit of political society. Individuals are presumed to 
For example, de facto relationships are treated very differently from legal marriage in 
determining eligibility for AUSTUDY benefits. The income of a de facto spouse is 
disregarded for a period of two years after the inception of the relationship for the 
purpose of determining whether the applicant meets the income criteria for eligibility. 
The spouse's income becomes relevant immediately upon legal marriage. While this 
applies in a gender neutral way, it does reflect and reinforce the traditional 
presumption that economic dependence is appropriate within marriage. Affected 
individuals of either gender presently living within a de facto relationship would be 
well advised to postpone legal marriage, if it is contemplated, until expiry of the two 
year period, a curious outcome. Marriages are automatically presumed to be stable 
and lasting, de facto relationships must be shown to have enduring qualities. 
J.J. Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses, translated with an introduction by 
G.D.H. Cole, London, J.M. Dent & Sons, 1913. See specifically 'The Social Contract', 
58-59 and see also 'A Discourse on Political Economy', 267. 
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share certain fundamental characteristics in common, and this commonality makes it possible 
to devise an account of justice which is equally applicable to all individuals. Rawls describes 
citizens as free and equal moral persons, and each element in this description emphasizes one 
of these foundational presumptions. Citizens are free because they are able to form, pursue 
and revise a set of final ends or goals. They are equal because they all have the capacity to 
cooperate and engage in social life. They are moral because they have the capacity to act justly 
and to respect others.7 While other contemporary egalitarians offer accounts which vary in 
detail, the characteristics of freedom, equality and moral capacity form themes which are 
common to their accounts. 8 Liberal egalitarians argue that it follows from their description of 
the individual that the state ought not constrain the choices individuals make in the pursuit of 
their own plans and ambitions unless their choices are such as to be destructive of the equal 
right of others to do likewise. The choices individuals make in their private lives - choices such 
as religious beliefs, life-style and forms of relationship, conceptions of those things which make 
life worth living, and forms of individual expression and self-realization - reflect individual 
preferences and it is through these choices that social value is created. While, on an individual, 
or private, level, these ideally represent enduring commitments and are fundamental to 
identity, on the political, or public, level they are incommensurable and cannot be ranked for 
worth. They are choices the individual must make for himself or herself, choices which are 
made to further his or her interests as he or she perceives and defines them, choices whose 
worth only the individual can judge. Crucially, the liberal conception of the individual as freely 
choosing subject is formally presented as a non-gendered abstraction which is equally 
appropriate and applicable to men and women, and it is this presumption of universality which 
I shall challenge. I shall argue subsequently that just as our conventional language has 
traditionally assumed that the male represents the norm and the female a deviation from that 
norm, so too our inherited theoretical structures reflect the experiences and self-perception of 
men who perceive humanity and human needs in profoundly gendered ways. 9 
7 	These ideas have recently been refined and elaborated in J. Rawls, 'Justice as 
Fairness: Political not Metaphysical', Philosophy and Public Affairs, Summer 1985, 
223, 227. 
8 	See the theorists cited in n. 1. In what follows I shall primarily consider the work of 
Dworkin and Rawls, drawing upon points made by other scholars where and when 
relevant. 
9 	This last point has not been recognized by contemporary liberal thinkers, although 
there are a few notable exceptions. One such exception is James Boyd White. See 
J.B. White, Heracles' Bow: Essays on the Rhetoric and Poetics of the Law, Madison, 
Wisc., Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1985, where he notes at p. xv. 'The reader will see that 
I repeatedly and all too inelegantly struggle with the fact that traditional English speaks 
as the male were the norm, the female the exception. I know of no way to resist this 
insistence that is not itself awkward, but I hope that the reader's understandable irritation 
with my attempted resolutions will be seen to reveal not merely my own deficiencies of 
art but also this fact of our common language and culture.' Others have not yet dealt as 
directly with the impact of language upon our social structures. For example, in a 
recent article Dworkin simply comments that 'all singular pronouns are intended to 
represent both female and male, unless the context otherwise requires.' See Dworkin, 
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Because the justice of distributive outcomes within civil society and political society is 
impossible to assess without attention to the impact of basic human relationships upon 
opportunities and distributive outcomes a further question becomes unavoidable. It is 
necessary to ask whether full liberal social and economic equality for women can be secured 
without collapsing the boundary between private lives and public persons central to liberal 
political theory. Many of the existing inequalities within family structures are intimately linked 
with other religious and cultural norms and traditions which exert profound private influence. 
Often, such traditions presume that the husband and father exercises rightful authority over his 
wife and children and that he is both obligated to provide for their support and entitled to their 
obedience. Equally, participation in civil society is still frequently thought either inappropriate 
or unimportant for married women and women continue to find it comparatively difficult to 
attain full recognition in leadership roles in the political life of the community. Beliefs such as 
these form an important part of the individual beliefs concerning the substantive nature of the 
good life that contemporary liberal political theory argues should remain sacrosanct. Yet, 
examined closely, many of these private beliefs conflict profoundly with the egalitarian 
ambitions underlying such theories, and, I shall argue, nowhere is this conflict more marked 
than with respect to the family and the structure of family life, areas conventionally sheltered 
by the presumption of family privacy. All such beliefs are, to use the language of Dworkin, 
paradigmatically external preferences, preferences concerning the appropriate role for women 
both within the family and in civil society. 1° In theory, therefore, these are beliefs which the 
state must not respect, beliefs which violate the dignity and equality of the individual. Yet, 
absolutely critically, it is beliefs concerning the family and family roles which provide the 
foundation for the views of most individuals concerning a valuable life for themselves. 
Problems arise precisely because such beliefs are both fundamental components of the lives 
many people believe are appropriate and virtuous lives for themselves, and, inevitably, are 
inextricably linked to the choices and options open to others. Given this, it is essential to 
question whether family privacy and contemporary egalitarian liberalism can be reconciled. If 
they cannot, perhaps no aspect of life may truly be described as private. In this area, more 
than any other, even the conception of a personal preference appears nugatory. Any 
preference we may have concerning an appropriate life for ourselves necessarily implicates 
others, defines their roles with respect to us. Once we consider preferences more enduringly 
held than, let us say, a choice between a peanut butter sandwich and a ham sandwich, any 
preference which, when realized, alters the range of choices available to others becomes 
'The Place of Liberty', /oc. cit., 1. To the best of my knowledge, this represents the 
first time he perceived such a statement of intention to be necessary. 
10 	For development of the distinction between personal and external preferences, see R. 
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 3rd Impression, London, Duckworth, 1981, 234-275. 
For an account of the inherent difficulty in the distinction between personal and 
external preferences and a critique of Dworkin's insistence that only personal 
preferences can form a legitimate basis for policy making, see R. West, 'Liberalism 
Rediscovered: A Pragmatic Definition of the Liberal Vision', 46 Univ. of Pittsburgh 
L.R. 673 (1985), 714. 
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impossible to categorize simply as a personal preference. In that sense, all our preferences are 
external, and, it would follow, preferences the state ought not respect. 
In those egalitarian theories which accord equality the status of the primary value, the 
potential for conflict may be elided in two different ways. On the one hand, it may be argued 
that the principles appropriate to relationships between citizens have no application within the 
family. 11 On the other the conflict may be addressed by manipulating the concepts themselves 
and seemingly depriving equality of concrete content where family relationships are concerned, 
a curious outcome. Equal concern, interpreted as concern for the individual as concretely 
situated, may be manifested through paternalistic restrictions upon conduct which effectively 
deny equal treatment and which may be self-perpetuating, that is, effectively ensure that the 
individual thus restricted will continue to require paternalistic protection. 12 
I shall argue that this conflict remains largely unremarked with respect to the position 
of women because the liberal conception of the individual remains a gendered construct, one 
which represents an ideal theory abstraction of the male gender role conventional in capitalist 
industrial societies. The liberal individual, on an abstract level, may be described as a rational 
self-interested maximiser of his own interests, an individual who choses and consents to 
courses of action in order to further his own preferences and maximize his subjectively 
perceived welfare. Through his preferences, and the choices dictated by these same 
preferences, this individual constructs value, creates a life which he may call good. He is, in an 
important way, an unencumbered subject, one who stands apart from his relationships and 
must be considered independently of them. In a sense he is the man of the Enlightenment, a 
man whose station in society and whose access to goods and services depends upon his own 
11 	J. Rawls, 'The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus', 64 N.Y.U.L.R. 
(1989) 233, 242. 
12 	See R. Dworkin, Law's Empire, London, Fontana Paperbacks, 1986, 204-206. This 
approach is not, of course, restricted to women, and, indeed, is equally manifested in a 
variety of consumer protection measures. Thus disadvantaged consumers may be able 
to avoid contractual arrangements which exploit their inability to comprehend the 
implications of such arrangements. Equally, of course, the fact that such contracts 
may be avoided may make it more difficult for other similarly situated consumers to 
obtain credit, or, indeed, to secure the goods and services they require. Similarly, the 
restrictions upon the activities of women and girls commonplace in many families, 
restrictions upon their freedom of movement or upon the range of activities in which 
they may engage, restrictions which may well be thought essential to protect them and 
ensure their safety and well being, may also ensure that they lack the confidence which 
may come through independence and that they fail to develop their capabilities in 
many areas and thus are denied the opportunity to realize their full potential. One 
critical difference, of course, is that while consumer protection legislation seeks to 
restrain the capacity of the powerful to manipulate those less powerful than 
themselves, many measures thought necessary to protect women and girls restrain, not 
those who might take advantage of them, but the victims themselves. While the 
protections in both instances may be 'necessary' given prevailing social and economic 
structures, a project seemingly directed towards compensation for differences in order 
to moderate the inequity of social outcomes also has the capacity to further entrench 
and sustain the structures which necessitated compensatory measures. 
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energies and choices.. He is independent, both in the sense of being unencumbered by 
hereditary status and traditional role, and in the sense of being, at every moment, able to revise 
his choices and values and construct himself anew. Critically, he is psychologically, physically 
and economically independent of others, wholly self-sufficient. The female gender role 
conventional in these same societies and during this same period, it should be noted, is very 
different. I shall call the inhabitant of this role the invisible woman. The invisible woman is 
perceived, not as rational, but intuitive. By convention, she sacrifices her own interests to 
those of others, typically her husband and children. Her station in society and her access to 
goods and services typically depend, not directly upon her own energies and choices, but upon 
her relationships to others. Whereas, for the liberal individual, concrete social status depends 
upon occupational role, for the invisible woman, status depends upon her relationships to 
others. Dependence is the norm, economic and social independence the exception. Thus, I 
shall argue, egalitarian liberal theory remains both logical and internally consistent so long as 
the male gender role characteristic of capitalist industrial society remains the unacknowledged 
norm. To the extent that the liberal conception of the individual is legally applied to women, 
and, to an increasing extent, to children, and to the extent that families have ceased to be 
legally regarded as the property of a male head of the household 13, liberal egalitarianism must 
somehow reconcile the inegalitarian consequences of an assertion of family privacy with its 
own egalitarian ambitions or acknowledge theoretical collapse. 
Once family relationships could no longer be simply regarded as proprietary, as they 
were in early social contract theory, it became essential to construct an account of family 
relationships which acknowledged that husband and wife alike were equally citizens and 
entitled to be treated as such irrespective of any other roles they might fill. Contract, of 
course, was one option. Given that contemporary egalitarians no longer regard contract as 
sacrosanct, indeed argue than no individual may abrogate those rights to which he or she is 
entitled simply as a citizen, and given the prevalence of the belief that family relationships are 
of a wholly different character from the relationships of civil society, that affect and altruism 
prevail, contract seemed unacceptable as a foundation for marriage. 14 In contemporary 
legislative practice, marriages have effectively become simply affective relationships which 
subsist only so long as they further the preferences of the adult individuals involved. 
13 	This description has become commonplace in chronicles of the evolution of family law 
in England. Eg., HA. Finlay, Family Law in Australia, 2nd ed., Sydney, Butterworths, 
1979, 98-9, [4101. 
14 	Dworkin, for example, denies that contract is pivotal in associative relationships, be 
they familial, between friends or political. Instead, he offers an account of associative 
relationships which emphasizes that the concrete obligations which arise in such 
relationships arise out of the social practice itself and are inherent in it. The precise 
obligations present, therefore, depend upon the concrete relationships involved and 
seem likely, in pluralist societies at least, to be almost infinitely variable, making a 
coherent and workable universal regime governing marriage and divorce almost 
impossible to attain. Generally see Dworkin, Law's Empire, loc. cit., 202 ff. 
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If family relationships, at least with respect to adult individuals, are simply regarded as 
individual preferences, the tacit message conveyed by contemporary family law, when these 
relationships are dissolved the individuals concerned must be thought to have maximized their 
subjective well-being through their decisions. That is, they have chosen to terminate their 
relationship because it no longer serves their interests. Yet here contemporary legal practice 
conflicts with both theory and social fact. Under a regime allowing divorce at will, the choice 
facilitated by the legal system need only represent the willed choice of one individual. The 
view of the other adult involved is irrelevant. The essence of such a regime is its 
characterization of spousal relationships as non-obligatory. It endeavours to ensure that failed 
marriages can be terminated with a minimum of both conflict and formalities. Yet where, as is 
not infrequently the case, decision making is unilateral, the freedom of one party to realize his 
or her preferences is the denial of that same freedom to the other. In human relationships 
preferences for an appropriate life for oneself inevitably implicate others, and that remains 
true whether the decision is to sever a relationship or to foster it. 
Even more striking is the fact that, to a greater extent than with other relationships 
whose substance depends upon the existence of legal formalities, marital relationships are 
substantively defmed by the legal regime governing marriage and divorce. While choice exists 
in respect of entry into marriage and choice of marriage partner, this choice is limited at the 
outset by the requirement at the parties be biologically male and female and by the prohibition 
upon polygamous marriages. Likewise, legal conventions determine the economic substance 
of the marital relationship as viewed by the law, imposing a common legally recognized 
structure upon very different forms of economic relationship, thus denying the substantive 
premise of contemporary family law and, indeed, contemporary egalitarian theory, that such 
relationships further the preferences of the individuals involved. While the details of these 
regimes differ in different jurisdictions, they are relatively uniformly applied within them. One 
effect of this uniformity is to isolate legal reality from practical reality. For example, a couple 
may agree among themselves to maintain entirely independent financial relationships, but this 
independence need not be recognized in the division of property if dissolution occurs. 
Likewise, while a husband or wife who participates in the labour market may choose to provide 
that spouse who provides child care and associated homemaking services with a wage, that 
'wage' will not be recognized as such by the taxation authorities. In such circumstances, the 
relationship of husband and wife legally precludes considering an aspect of that relationship as 
one between employer and employee. Such recognition as is granted by the taxation 
department takes the form of a dependent spouse rebate, a rebate entitling the employed 
15 	Critical elements in contemporary family law in Australia and in many American 
jurisdictions include the concept of divorce at will and without the consent of the other 
party, the proclamation that fault is irrelevant both in establishing grounds for 
dissolution and in determining the allocation of property and the need for support, the 
policy decision to facilitate the dissolution of marriage and the resolution of property 
disputes in order to allow for the ratification of new unions. 
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spouse to reduced taxation in recognition of a relationship of dependence, but one which does 
not of itself entitle the ipouse who works at home to an independent income in recognition of 
the value of his or her labours. 16 It may therefore be said that much of the substantive law 
impacting upon family relationships implicitly denies the precise premise upon which 
contemporary regimes governing the dissolution of marriage depend, that the preferences of 
the individual are central. 
Many of these difficulties have arisen as a consequence of the gradual transition from 
a proprietary view of family relationships to the contemporary legal view of marriage as a 
relationship among two equal individuals, a transition which has largely remained unaddressed 
by theory. Under the older regime the family was defmed by reference to the male head of the 
household and the conception of privacy reinforced his legal authority over family members 
and family property. Under the present regime family privacy serves a very different function. 
It is invoked as the core of a demand that family relationships be sheltered from state 
intervention, that the structure of these relationships be determined by individual families in 
the way they find most appropriate. Family privacy seemingly symbolizes the essence of 
private freedoms, that one sphere 'within which individual decisions and choices remain 
unchallengeable. Because many of the concrete attitudes and preferences manifest within 
family relationships cannot be reconciled with the egalitarian premises of contemporary 
theory, these are preferences which a liberal state ought not respect. Family privacy, however, 
conceptually demands just that, the preservation of a realm which the state enters at its peril. 
It is the family, more than any other social institution, which sustains and nourishes gender 
based inequality. It is within the family that gender roles are learned and reinforced, just as it 
is the household division of labour which structures participation in the workforce and the 
political sphere. If family relationships remain private, and the state concerns itself with their 
justice only if pathological breakdown occurs, statist egalitarian programs will continue to 
leave the underlying causes of women's economic and social inequality untouched. In reality, 
women lack economic equality in marriage, frequently subordinating their career aspirations 
both to the demands of family life and to the career paths of their husband. Their culturally 
assigned responsibility for domestic labour frequently ensures that they will be disadvantaged 
in the marketplace, lack the opportunity to amass superannuation and increments based upon 
years of service, lack access to promotional opportunities based upon seniority. Theory, 
however, seemingly relegates these sources of disadvantage to individual choice, for example, 
characterizes them in terms of individual preferences concerning the optimum balance of 
16 	It should be noted that, under the Family Law Act 1975 s. 72 it was held in Eliades and 
Eliades (1981) F.L.C. 91-022 maintenance may be ordered paid to a dependent spouse 
in a subsisting marriage. To that extent, under contemporary family law in Australia 
(although not in England or the United States) a dependent spouse is entitled to be 
provided with resources by the independent spouse and is entitled to exercise control 
over the monies so provided. The independent spouse remains entitled to determine 
the appropriate quantum, indeed, in the case cited, the amount had been stipulated 
prior to the hearing. 
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work, leisure and consumption. 17 Such characterization, however, seems hardly apt to 
describe the concrete choices and decisions faced by many women. Critical questions remain 
unasked. How ought, for example, an individual decision to work part time or refrain from 
working altogether because home obligations and employment demands cannot be reconciled 
be characterized? Does such a choice reflect a preference for leisure over work? Why is it 
women who find it necessary to make choices of this kind? Why do men seldom confront this 
sort of conflict? If women who are confronted by a conflict between family responsibilities and 
career opportunities are seen simply to have chosen to subordinate their career aspirations to 
other goals, to have chosen the disadvantages which attend such choices, and their labour 
within the home and in parenting remains devalued, they may be deemed to have chosen 
disadvantage. In the arguments which follow, I shall endeavour to demonstrate that the 
accounts of distributive justice provided by Rawls and Dworkin 18 are inadequate to address 
the structural inequality of women because they depend upon the assumption that a coherent 
distinction can be drawn between the private pursuit of a life the individual finds satisfying for 
himself19 and the public pursuit of substantive equality. I shall argue that structural inequality 
can only be eradicated by structural change. To the extent that the existing division between 
private lives and political egalitarianism is sustained, egalitarian theories continue to assume 
that women whose actual lives and opportunities reflect the deep structure of a profoundly 
gendered culture can and ought simultaneously conform to the ideal subject of liberal theory. 
Assumptions such as these, it must be noted, place the onus for achieving equality squarely 
upon women. As a consequence, women can be and are being held responsible for their 
failure to realize full equality. 
These and related issues will be explored through examination of the contemporary 
legislative and judicial treatment of family relationships, both legal and de facto. Present legal 
norms will be explored from two distinct perspectives. First, it is essential to consider the 
model of family relationships assumed by these legal norms and to consider whether the 
present legal model is consistent with substantive equality for women and with the overt 
normative content of egalitarian theory. Second, I shall explore the models of family life 
traditionally assumed by liberal theory, and alternative models which appear more consistent 
with the ethical requirement of substantive equality. So doing, I hope to answer a number of 
distinct questions. First, I wish to explore the extent to which existing legislation and its 
interpretation can be reconciled with proclaimed liberal ideals, including equality for women. 
Second, I wish to explore whether the apparent shift towards liberal ideals in family law has 
increased or decreased the substantive equality of family members. Third, I wish to consider 
17 	Dworkin, 'Equality of Resources', /oc. cit. 
18 	Rawls, A Theory of Justice, loc. cit.; Dworkin, Equality of Resources, loc. cit. 
19 	R. Dworkin, 'Liberalism', in A Matter of Principle, Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 
1985, 181, 203. 
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what an authentic liberal egalitarian model of family relationships might look like. Finally, I 
wish to consider the adequacy and universality of the liberal concept of the individual as 
applied to family relationships, with particular attention to its historic and economic roots. 
Because it is impossible to move from an account of formal justice to an account of substantive 
justice without at least tacit reliance upon a comprehensive ontological account of human 
nature, the ontological claims of egalitarian accounts must be deconstructed if the implications 
of their substantive accounts are to be understood. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE FAMILY AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 
INTRODUCTION 
Perhaps the most remarkable characteristic of contemporary liberal political 
philosophy is the disappearance of basic human relationships, particularly families, from the 
ambit of its concerns. In and of itself, this is remarkable. Classical theories, beginning with 
Greece, dealt explicitly with the role and place of the family and with the nature of appropriate 
relationships within both the family and the household. Aristotle, in The Politics, devoted 
much of Book I to the household and to household management. Likewise, Plato, in The 
Republic, considered household and family relationships at length, and indeed, at least so far as 
his ruling class was concerned, argued that spouses and children ought to be held in common.' 
Similarly, many early liberal political and legal philosophers found it appropriate to address 
family relationships, often in considerable detail. Rousseau considered family relationships at 
length, both in Emile and in Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequality Among Men.2 
While both Hobbes and Locke tended to gloss over family relationships somewhat more 
briefly, both considered the issue. 3 It is instructive to compare the wealth of analytical 
material in both classical Greek and early liberal theories with the dearth in recent accounts. 
In his only direct references, Rawls notes that 'the principle of fair equality of opportunity can 
only be imperfectly carried out, at least so long as the institution of the family exists', and alludes 
to a theoretical connection between the difference principle and the principle of fraternity, 
which he suggests relates to the ideal conception of the family, but does not consider the 
implication of the varied forms of family life for distributive justice in any detail. 4 Similarly, 
Dworkin alludes to family relationships only rarely. He suggests that a patriarchal family may 
qualify as an egalitarian institution if the cultural narrative which supports it 'accepts the 
equality of sexes but in good faith thinks that equality of concern requires paternalistic protection 
1 	See Aristotle, The Politics, translated by TA. Sinclair, revised and re-presented by T.J. 
Saunders, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1981, 51-102 and Plato, The Republic, translated 
by D. Lee, 2nd ed. (rev.), Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1974. 
2 	See The Emile of Jean Jacques Rousseau, Selections translated and edited by William 
Boyd, New York, Teachers College Press, 1956, 117-168 and The Essential Rousseau, 
translated by Lowell Bair, New York, Mentor, 1974, 146-201. 
3 	See T. Hobbes, Leviathan, edited by C.B. MacPherson, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 
1968, 251-261 and John Locke: Two Treatises of Government, a critical edition with an 
introduction and apparatus criticus by Peter Laslett, New York, Mentor, revised 
edition, 1963, 345-374. See further generally the commentaries upon these and other 
theorists in S.M. Oki, Women in Western Political Thought, Princeton, N.J, Princeton 
Univ. Press, 1979 and J.B. Elshtain, (Ed.), The Family in Political Thought, Amherst, 
Mass., Univ. of Mass. Press, 1982. 
4 	Rawls, A Theory of Justice, loc. cit., 74, 105. 
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for women in all aspects of family hfe.'5 When this relative inattention is coupled with the 
increasing intervention of the state in almost every aspect of such relationships, it becomes the 
more remarkable.6 
The invisibility of the family represents a natural extension of political liberalism. 
While, privately, we live our lives as gendered subjects, and gender roles are among the 
cornerstones of social identity, the theoretical - structure of modern egalitarian political 
philosophy postulates a non-gendered ideal subject. Issues concerning gender roles, like other 
issues concerning human sexuality, become private choices, choices which have little direct 
bearing upon justice. Once the overtly patriarchal structure of early liberalism was rejected as 
untenable, liberals were faced with a critical, if unacknowledged, choice. Either the justice of 
family relationships ought to be open to analysis and criticism in the same manner and using 
the same standards as the justice of the relationships between relative strangers, or such 
relationships must be deemed apolitical, outside the realm where justice is relevant. Taking 
the former road must ultimately eradicate the private freedoms liberalism set out to secure. 
Taking the latter has left liberal theories open to a very different challenge. Contemporary 
egalitarian theories must demonstrate that gender neutral accounts of distributive justice 
could, if implemented as social practices, secure substantive justice for ordinary men and 
women in the context of their lives as a whole. 
TRADITIONAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE GENDERED SUBJECT 
The basic demand upon political theory is the requirement that it establish and justify 
the bounds of politics and political action. It must define the scope of its own subject matter. 
Meeting this requirement is a prerequisite to the existence of anything which it is proper to 
term political theory. Political theory, as a discrete discipline, depends upon the existence of a 
tenable distinction between those matters which are properly political and those which lie 
substantially outside the domain of politics7, a distinction which forms a critical part of the 
Dworkin, Law's Empire, loc. cit., 204-206. 
I refer here, not only to the obvious forms of regulation such as the Marriage Act 1961 
and the Family Law Act 1975 and such further legislation as the Adoption of Children 
Act (Tasmania) 1968, together with its parallels in other jurisdictions, but to the 
myriad subtle forms of regulation inherent in the power of the state to regulate 
education, to regulate child labour, to regulate the conditions and provision of extra-
familial child care, and so forth. Under appropriate circumstances, governmental 
agencies such as the Department of Communiiy Welfare, together with numerous 
private welfare agencies intervene in families which have been deemed dysfunctional, 
while further indirect regulation of human relationships occurs through bodies of 
legislation as diverse as the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936, the Social Security Act 
1947, the Student Assistance Act 1973. Indeed, the plethora of parliamentary 
regulation is increasingly supplemented by judicial legislation as de facto relationships 
possessing some of the attributes of legal marriage are increasingly assimilated to 
marriage, albeit inconsistently. 
This is particularly critical for contemporary egalitarian theorists. Rawls and Dworkin 
both insist that their accounts are political and do not depend upon wider moral and 
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accounts of contemporary egalitarians. Rawls makes such a distinction when he emphasizes 
that his account of justice is 'restricted to the basic structure of society' and emphasizes the 
necessity of distinguishing between our identity as citizens and our 'nonpublic identity'. 8 
Similarly Dworkin emphasizes that 'the liberal conception of equality is a principle of political 
organization that is required by justice, not a way of life for individuals'. 9 The distinction relied 
upon is that between public institutional decision making and private decisions and private 
choices. A division such as this suggests that individuals must partially or wholly segregate 
their public identities, their role as citizens, from their nonpublic identities, to borrow Rawls' 
phrase. As citizens our equality ought to be legally supported and guaranteed. As nonpublic 
individuals, we may act in ways which disturb equality but the extent to which this is 
permissible is constrained by the requirements of the basic structure. Rawls cites as examples 
the requirement that churches be constrained by 
the principle of equal liberty of conscience [and] the principle of toleration, [and 
the rights of parents] by what is necessary to maintain their children's physical 
well-being and to assure the adequate development of their intellectual and 
moral powers. 10 
The distinction relied upon by contemporary egalitarians, one which is familiar and 
intuitively appealing, is not, however, the only distinction which can be made. It is possible to 
argue that all relationships may be defined as political in which any individual exercises or 
attempts to exercise authority over any other individual, whether the source of that authority is 
cultural, religious, economic or governmental, and the exercise of that authority is deemed 
legitimate. On this definition no justification exists for excluding family relationships from the 
subject matter of political theory. The exercise of authority within families is commonplace, 
and its exercise is differentiated not only by age but by gender. Just as the power exercised by 
governments requires legitimation in both the form and manner of its exercise, that exercised 
within families requires legitimation. If substantive equality is a worthy aspiration, until and 
unless private relationships are, as a matter of justice, subject to egalitarian constraints to at 
least the same extent as those relationships presently defined as 'political', public 
egalitarianism will rest upon a fragile and unstable foundation. Those relationships presently 
deemed private are, because of their intimate nature and the privacy accorded them by cultural 
conventions, more likely to be subject to overreaching and abuse of power than 'political' 
relationships. 
philosophical considerations. See Dworkin, 'Liberalism', /oc. cit., 203, Dworkin, Law's 
Empire, loc. cit., 295-301 and J. Rawls, 'Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical', 
14 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 223 (1985). 
8 	Rawls, 'Justice as Fairness', /oc. cit., 247, 241. 
9 	Dworkin, 'Liberalism', /oc. cit., 203. 
10 	Rawls, 'Justice as Fairness', /oc. cit., 245, n. 27. 
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The present conception of the political as somehow separate and unique, distinct from 
other aspects of human life and endeavour, is one derived from Greek philosophy. In ancient 
Greece, the fundamental division was between the polls, or political community of equals, and 
the worlds of the household, of economics and commerce, of the non-citizens (and indeed non-
persons) who were essential to support it. Within the polls men who were also, and crucially, 
citizens debated the nature of the good life and sought to formulate public practices which 
would foster it. Politics was a branch of ethics and was distinct from the more mundane and 
limited concerns of the household and the market. While there were ethical standards 
appropriate to household and market relationships, they were appropriate to beings of limited 
rationality and, unlike those which governed the polis, non-egalitarian in character. Political 
decisions might, indeed must, regulate the activities of this non-political domain, but the 
function of such regulation was to ensure that the life of the citizen was supported and 
fostered. The relationships within the household and the marketplace were not political 
relationships. Their character was fundamentally non-political, defined by custom and 
tradition. Only through acting as a citizen could a man become truly human, realize his true 
nature as political man, the man of the city. Later, Christian philosophers separated the city of 
God and the cities of men. Only the city of God could be described as the proper end of 
mankind. While the cities of men might strive to emulate divine laws, at best, they were a poor 
imitation. Ordinary people ought to obey political authorities, to render unto Caesar, for their 
obedience marked their submission to the will of God who had determined their status and 
whose will dictated their earthly conditions. The earthly city was transitory and unimportant, 
simply a way station to the heavenly community. While contemporary society can return 
neither to the polis nor to the early Christian image of humility and submission to authority as 
dictated by God, these early Western accounts illuminate many of the same questions with 
which modern theorists struggle. 
Certain issues are central. First, and most important among these, in discussing 
political theory, is the nature of citizenship, what it means to speak of men and women as 
citizens. The question is not only who are to be citizens, although this concept was critical 
earlier, but what it should mean to be a citizen, a man, or woman, of the city. Specifically, 
that question is a demand that society address the issue of what individual men and women are 
entitled to simply by virtue of being citizens, members of political society. It might seem that if 
people can resolve this question they will have resolved the core of the debate, but this is not 
the case now, if indeed it ever was. Indeed, this second question leads on to further puzzles. 
We need to know, not only what it means to be a citizen, but, more importantly, the way in 
which our identity as citizens can and should be integrated with other aspects of our lives. 
None of us are simply citizens. I am a citizen, and a woman, a wife, a mother, a scholar, a 
friend, a lover. I am not first one, then another, today a citizen, tomorrow a scholar, perhaps 
on alternate Mondays a friend or one who loves animals. Neither am I some abstract entity 
11 	Eg. Aristotle, /oc. cit., 167-172. 
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behind these various roles, as if a faceless I donned first one mask and then another. If we are 
to remain integrated as individual men and women we cannot isolate ourselves from the roles 
we fill. The manner in which we fill those roles constitutes our identity as human beings for 
ourselves and for others. 
THE LIBERAL PARADIGM 
The basic division made by the Greek model between the rationality of political 
debate and action and the sphere of necessity, one revived in modern times by Arendt 12, 
emphasizes the basic distinction between the life of the mind and of political action and the 
mundane sphere of biological existence. With the development of political liberalism the 
ruling paradigm apparently underwent a profound revision, although I shall argue that this 
alteration is ultimately cosmetic, one aimed at maintaining the existing paradigm rather than a 
serious attempt to reconstruct and reformulate the terms of the debate. 
The real contribution of liberal theory was to change forever the balance between the 
rational world of public deliberations and the private domain of the household and the market. 
Whereas, in Greek culture, it was clear that it was the polls which was important and 
represented the pinnacle of true human achievement, and the household which occupied a 
subordinate and inferior role, early liberal theories sought to account for this division in a 
different way. Crucially, the dichotomy between public and private was never in question. 
What was sought was a new justification for this fundamental division and a new and different 
role for the public world of political society. Hobbes, for example, saw Leviathan as the means 
to the end of forestalling conflict and thus making possible private satisfaction. 13 This at once 
comprehensively downgraded the moral status of the political realm and maintained the 
traditional division intact. Whereas, for the Greeks, the household and the market existed to 
enable man to take his rightful place as citizen, existed to enable him to realize his potential as 
a rational being, for Hobbes, Leviathan was called into existence to make the satisfactions of 
the household and the marketplace stable, possible, and orderly. 14 Similarly, Locke saw 
political institutions as the means to the ultimate end of the protection of private property. 15 
The public domain existed in order to enable men to seek private satisfaction without fear of 
interference by other men. 
12 	H. Arendt, The Human Condition, Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1958. 
13 	Hobbes, /oc. cit., 188, 223, 264. 
14 	Hobbes' chilling description of life in the 'state of nature' expresses well the purpose 
for which men seek the protection of laws administered by a sovereign. Ibid., 188. 
15 	See Locke, /oc. cit., 395 where he states: The great and chief end therefore, of Mens 
uniting into Commonwealths, and putting themselves under Government, is the 
Preservation of their Property.' [Emphasis in the original.] 
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Several extremely important shifts in perception are hidden by this seemingly simple 
alteration in the role of political society. Within the classical paradigm, human nature was 
seen as determinate. Man realized his species nature most fully as a citizen and because this 
could only be attained through his participation in the polis, action within the polls represented 
an ethical imperative. Early liberal thinkers such as Locke and Hobbes saw things very 
differently. The idea of a determinate human nature had been abandoned. The Greek 
emphasis upon the connection between conceptions of human nature and fixed and 
determinate status had been comprehensively rejected. 16 Early liberal theorists formulated 
the role of the state and the nature of political theory in very different terms, emphasizing the 
problem of order. For them, the paramount question to be answered by political theory was 
why men would willingly abandon their natural liberty and consent to the restrictions upon 
liberty inherent in political society. 17 Consent was perceived to be critical. All early liberals 
emphasized the natural equality of men and their lack of binding obligations to one another. 
Contract seemed the archetype of a consensual relationship among equals, and it followed that 
political relationships ought to be based upon contract. The life of the citizen was perceived, 
not as the most perfect realization of man's nature, but as a restriction upon his freedom of 
action, a restriction which would be intolerable unless the benefits realized through a system of 
law and government outweighed the restrictions upon individual freedom entailed. 18 In place 
of an ontology which emphasized the perfection of one's human nature through specified 
forms of conduct, a new, vastly less determinate ontology emerged. In its rudimentary, 
Hobbesian form, individuals sought to maximize satisfaction and avoid pain, but the specific 
nature of both the satisfactions and the pains depended upon the preferences of the individual, 
were inherently private, not communal. Similarly, for Locke, the drive to amass property was 
central, the problem was securing property against others who were equally acquisitive. 19 
Given the linked presuppositions of natural liberty and the drive to maximize well being and 
avoid pain, and the presumption of scarcity which ensured competition for goods and 
resources, the problem of order emerged. Without laws, without political institutions capable 
of resolving disputes and protecting property, life was inherently uncertain, perhaps even 
dangerous. Rational individuals dedicated to maximizing their own satisfaction would, 
16 	Women were, of course, an exception in this regard. 
17 	Hobbes, /oc. cit., 188, Locke, ibid. Kant emphasized the necessity for coercion to 
ensure the sanctity of contract and the protection of property. I. Kant, The Philosophy 
of Law: An Exposition of the Fundamental Principles of Jurisprudence as the Science of 
Right, translated by W. Hastie, B.D., Clifton, NJ., Augustus M. Kelley, reprinted 1974, 
121-122 For all these thinkers, contract and property depended upon the coercive 
power of the state for security. Rousseau adopted a subtly different perspective. 
While he also acknowledged the role of the state in the generation and protection of 
property interests, the primary benefit of civil society was moral freedom. Rousseau, 
The Essential Rousseau, loc. cit., 20-21. 
18 	Locke, ibid., 395; Hobbes, ibid., 223. 
19 	Hobbes, ibid., 118-130; Locke, ibid., 374-75, 395. 
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therefore, consent to restrictions upon their liberty in exchange for the protection of their 
persons and property by the state. Political society was no longer an end in itself, an institution 
essential if man was to realize his human nature fully, but a means of protecting his property 
and his person against the depredations of others and of ensuring that he could further his 
private interests through contractual arrangements enforced by the state. 20 
When Rousseau and Kant sought to restore the ethical dimension of the political 
realm, sought to reinstate man as the zoon politikon, man of the polis, they confronted a major 
barrier. Once perspective had been altered, and the city existed to protect and secure the 
world of the household and the market, the moral impetus behind citizenship had to be 
rediscovered and reconstituted. In many ways, their solution was fundamentally Greek in 
character, but with one critical difference. Both Rousseau and Kant idealized citizenship, 
idealized public decision making and debate, the relationship between privileged and wholly 
independent men as citizens, but, simultaneously, having idealized rational deliberations, they 
left these deliberations suspended, fundamentally without purpose. While Rousseau 
celebrated the 'general will' and proclaimed it indestructible and devoted exclusively to the 
common security and well-being, and longed for the simplicity of a state in which the common 
good was apparent to all, its nature remained virtually unexpressed. Perhaps all that can be 
said with any degree of certainty is that the common good demanded the establishment of 
those conditions essential to ensure that man depended only upon the state or upon himself 
and never upon the vagaries of other men. The greatest benefit bestowed upon the individual 
by civil society was moral freedom, the capacity to be ruled by self-given law.21 
Kant, far less republican, believed that a just society was one constituted in accord 
with underlying principles of right, but subordinated this to the further principle that 
it is the duty of the People to bear any abuse of the Supreme Power, even then 
though it should be considered to be unbearable. And the reason is, that any 
Resistance of the highest Legislative Authority can never but be contrary to the 
Law. 22 
Unlike Rousseau, Kant did not distinguish between a 'general will' and the aggregate force of 
the particular wills of individuals.23 Williams comments: 
See the passages cited in n. 14-19, inclusive. 
See Rousseau, The Essential Rousseau, loc. cit. At p. 85 Rousseau emphasizes the 
indestructibility of the general will, while at pp. 20-21 he makes the critical connection 
between moral freedom and civil society. 
Kant, loc. cit., 177. 
This view is supported, although not fully established by the references to 'Public 
Opinion' and the 'Opinion of the People', ibid., 184-5. Likewise, Kant emphasizes that 
men's duties towards one another are not in any way altered by the transition from the 
natural state to the civil state. The civil union simply coordinated the activities of 
equals. Ibid., 156-7. Kant described 'right' as comprehending 'the whole of the 
20 
21 
22 
21 
The State is no more important than the freedom and law it provides within 
civil society, it does not represent a universal interest which can be ruled to be of 
greater significance than the individual's lawful pursuit of his own interest. . . . 
Kant takes, for the most part, a non-interventionist view of the State. He sees it 
as its role to preserve a common interest which is no more than an aggregate of 
the individual interests of the members of society. The general will which the 
sovereign represents is one which respects and indeed, helps foster the 
competing private claims of individuals. 
Williams' interpretation highlights one aspect of the contemporary liberal predicament. Once 
a determinate conception of human nature was abandoned, and the protection of man's liberty 
to pursue his own private interests became, effectively, the central purpose for which men 
established governments, it becomes very difficult to provide a positive criteria for the 
substantive content of the laws enacted. Their form, clearly, can be regulated using criteria 
such as equality and publicity, however this suggests merely how laws ought to be framed and 
promulgated, not the substantive issue of what laws ought to be framed and promulgated. 
Kant, if Williams is correct, falls back upon an almost utilitarian conception, suggesting that 
the state ought where possible enact laws which will maximize the capacity of individuals to 
pursue private purposes. The specific content of the laws was dictated by that required to 
protect proprietary interests including contractual rights. Kant emphasized that the duties 
among men did not alter with the transition from the 'non-juridical' to the 'juridical' state. 
Rather, in the 'juridical' state, such duties could be enforced. 24 The critical benefit of the civil 
union was the introduction of law, a power outside of the individual which possessed the 
capacity to authoritatively determine his entitlements. The satisfactions of the household and 
the market were clearly subordinate25, representing a major departure from the earlier 
accounts of Hobbes and Locke, but the deliberations of citizens no longer focused upon the 
perfection of man's human nature as the man of the city. Rather, Kant idealized liberty. For 
Kant, 
RIGHT. . . comprehends the whole of the conditions under which the voluntary 
actions of any one Person on be harmonized in reality with the voluntary 
actions of every other Person, 46 
and it was to secure and enforce this harmony that the state was constituted. That state was 
ideally constituted which most nearly maximized individual liberty. Only through liberty might 
conditions under which the voluntary actions of any one Person can be harmonized in 
reality with the voluntary actions of every other Person, according to a universal Law of 
Freedom.' Ibid., 45. 
24 	H.L. Williams, Kant's Political Philosophy, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1983, 164. The 
passages cited in n. 24 suggest that William's interpretation is correct in its 
fundamentals. 
Kant, /oc. cit., 173 where Kant notes that the welfare of the state ought not be 
confused with the well-being or happiness of the citizens. 
Kant, /oc. cit., 45. 
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men become moral, learn to act from duty alone. The concrete nature of individual actions 
and the motives which activated them were irrelevant. Rather, so long as those actions were 
both self-determined and could co-exist without interference with the actions of every other, 
the individual is wronged if hindered in their performance. Man was both fundamentally and 
deeply the polls animal, morally realized and complete only as a citizen, and as citizen without 
any uniquely public purpose. 
Rousseau differed profoundly in this regard. The supreme test of the well-being of 
the state was the willingness of its citizens to set aside their private interests and cares and join 
together to deliberate the form and content of the laws. 27 Private interests and commercial 
pursuits distracted individuals from their obligations as citizens. To the extent that these came 
to predominate, individual freedom was irrevocably compromised because the pursuit of 
private interests and purposes inevitably brought men into conflict with one another and 
allowed relationships of dependence to arise, compromising the freedom of the individual and 
his capacity to participate in the moral aspect of the state. Likewise, to the extent that private 
advantage predominated public deliberations were corrupted and the expression of the general 
will frustrated because men voted their private individual interests and allowed these to take 
precedence over the well being of the state. Yet Rousseau seems profoundly ambivalent as 
regards the nature of the common good. On the one hand, he identified the common good 
with freedom and equality28 while on the other he emphasized specific and substantive 
purposes dependent upon the particular character of the nation.29 Yet the substantive 
purposes mentioned, religion, trade, virtue, seem particularized, and as such, divisive. At the 
point at which specific substantive purposes become determinative of the common good, the 
totalitarian state becomes a reality, and freedom and equality rhetorical flourishes. 3° 
Inevitably such purposes must be imposed upon those who do not acknowledge them, denying 
them the freedom and equality promised and compelling them to serve the will of others.31 
Another element entered as well, one which reflected both the disappearance of the 
ideal of man as striving to realize himself as a species being and the wholly Greek vision of 
citizens as truly and fundamentally equal. Here, Rousseau, profoundly egalitarian, and Kant, 
less so, differed. Rousseau, foreshadowing the demand for equality implicit in the French 
27 	Rousseau, The Essential Rousseau, 78. 
28 	Ibid., 45. 
29 	Ibid., 46. 
30 	Cf. Rawls, 'Social Unity and Primary Goods', /oc. cit., 182- 183. Rawls comments at p. 
182 that 'in a democratic society. . . the one good must be conceived as subjective, as 
the satisfaction of desire or preferences'. 
31 	This may, of course, be true of any push for substantive equality as well. Certainly, as 
I shall argue subsequently, substantive equality demands far greater political 
intervention than contemporary egalitarians acknowledge if it is truly to apply to all. 
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revolution, welcomed all men (but no women) as citizens, spoke of forcing them to be free, to 
engage in rational disputations, was prepared to subsume the marketplace to the demands of 
citizenship. In the world of Rousseau, the market was potentially of public concem. 32 Indeed, 
he accepted the possibility of wholly radical redistributive taxation to enforce his neo-Grecian 
vision of citizens deliberating as equals. Kant, confronting the same problem, resolved it by 
banishing (as had the Greeks) those unfit for active citizenship to the nether world occupied by 
women and those who worked for wages. These dependent beings, beings whose economic 
and social dependence upon others disqualified them from participation in the deliberations of 
civil society, served both citizens and the state, but were not themselves fully citizens. 33 They 
were the metics and slaves of the Enlightenment. Again, this was hardly new. Those who 
depended upon others for their livelihood and well-being were perceived also to lack moral 
independence. They must consult the will and the interests of those whom they were bound to 
serve, rather than the interests of the state, and this plurality or confusion of interests 
disqualified them. Their social and economic condition deprived them of the capacity to act of 
their own free will, and this meant they could not participate in the ethical aspect of the state, 
the capacity to rule themselves through laws they had given themselves. 
THE RISE OF THE BUREAUCRATIC SOCIAL WELFARE STATE 
In these different approaches to a single problem, the nature of man as a citizen and 
the relationship between public and private established thereby, the same problems and 
divisions which plagued Greek theorists continued to dominate debate. Clearly, citizens do not 
exist as abstract beings suspended in ether, whether this is called the polls or the noumenal 
realm. Man may be the only rational animal however mind requires body to support its 
existence in the present and to ensure the possibility of a future. In political terms, given that 
people are more deeply biological and social beings (beings who depend upon food, upon 
shelter, upon relationships with others of their own kind) than rational and independent 
beings, the debate has been forced to confront the extent to which the needs of their hearts 
and bodies are properly the concern of the state. 
Modern egalitarian theory and the parallel development of the bureaucratic social 
welfare state has forced political theory to confront the parameters of this debate in a far more 
32 	See, for example, in Rousseau, The Social Contract, loc. cit., the remarks at p. 57 in 
which Rousseau emphasizes that a democracy cannot survive without a high degree of 
equality in rank and wealth together with little or no luxury. See generally also 'A 
Discourse on Political Economy', in Rousseau, The Social Contract, loc. cit., 249-287. 
33 	Kant, /oc. cit. Kant, at pp. 166-169, made a distinction between active and passive 
citizenship, and specifically denied apprentices, servants, women generally, and all 
those who work for wages and cannot offer the products of their labour for public sale 
full civil personality. While, as subjects of the laws they must be equal in the formal 
sense, they are denied any active role in lawmaking. The equality with which Kant is 
concerned reflects his profound philosophical dualism. As moral and rational beings, 
parties to the social contract, all people are equal, as empirical, sensuous beings this is 
clearly not the case. Cf. the discussion in Williams, /oc. cit., 60-61, 69-74, 137-149. 
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dramatic way than was necessary in the past. There are several reasons for this. The most 
significant of these is the view that government and political decision making are not activities 
which enable men to realize their humanity, but structures or frameworks within which private 
individuals may pursue their own destinies and realize their own ends. contemporary 
egalitarian, given that the state serves a facultative role, the central question has become the 
degree to which it is obliged to ensure that, so far as possible, individuals are equally placed to 
realize their own goals. Formal equality, clearly, is inadequate. Differences in ability, in 
access to resources, in education, leave some individuals disadvantaged. Whatever their goals 
may be, such individuals are handicapped in their efforts to realize them. Thus, if substantive 
equality has become the goal, political intervention is essential, and the manner and form of 
this intervention becomes central. Two decisions must be made. It is essential to decide, not 
merely which differences warrant compensation but how substantive equality ought best be 
attained. The questions which would arise if substantive equality for women became the 
critical issue and centre of debate illustrate the tensions inherent in any push for substantive 
equality. Individual women, clearly, are disadvantaged in many of the same ways as other 
disadvantaged individuals, lacking the capabilities, the resources, and the education needed to 
realize their goals. In addition, women are socially disadvantaged because conventional roles 
within the family handicap them in the pursuit of other ends. The first group of disadvantages 
is shared with other disadvantaged individuals and groups. The second is characteristic of the 
female gender role and is not shared. Disadvantages of the first sort might be categorized as 
'morally arbitrary' or as a consequence of 'brute luck' rather than 'option luck'. The female 
gender role, particularly the role of wife and mother, is seldom thought to be morally arbitrary. 
To a substantial extent, women continue to be expected to assume such roles and to manifest 
the behaviours associated with them. Women's family roles are perceived both as morally 
obligatory and as fundamental to the survival of society. The conventional egalitarian answer 
is to regard the structure of gender roles, both male and female, as reflecting preferences, as 
simply a matter of choice, and as such, irrelevant to questions of distributive justice. Yet it is 
not clear that, to the extent that the work associated with these roles is both socially necessary 
and productive of profound disadvantage, such an approach is sustainable. 
Among early social contract theorists Hobbes, Locke and Kant, but, significantly, not 
Rousseau, accepted the instrumental role of the state. For them the state existed to constrain 
and regulate private competition in a manner which was formally or procedurally fair to all its 
While this is particularly clear in the recent writings of Rawls, especially in J. Rawls, 
'The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus', (1987) 7 Oxford J. of Leg. Stud. 1, echoes of 
this same theme abound in writers as diverse as Dworkin and Walzer. See Dworkin, 
Law's Empire, loc. cit., 297-312 where he describes his preferred account of equality, 
equality of resources, as providing a method for mediating between competing 
preferences and values. Walzer attempts in Spheres of Justice, loc. cit., to reconcile 
pluralism and substantive equality, arguing that different social goods require different 
patterns of distribution and that these are, at least in part, historically and culturally 
determined. 
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citizens. The security and stability ensured by the coercive force of the state, in turn, facilitated 
planning and made private reliance and trust possible. This ensured that individual citizens 
would be able to act so as to maximize their own perceived private interests. Great emphasis 
was placed by such thinkers upon the importance of the security of private contracts or 
agreements. Kant emphasized that the mere acceptance of a promise provided no security or 
guarantee. Something further was required, being 'the means of Compulsion that enable [the 
acceptor] to obtain what is his own.' Williams comments that 
contract with Kant epitomizes the uncertainty and lack of trust which exists in 
the empirical relations of men in civil society. From an empirical point of view 
there are no compelling reasons for honouring a contract if it is not in our 
interests to do so. This is why contract requires the positive support of law if it 
is to work in civil society. . . . Where all else fails coercion must have the last 
word to ensure that contract is a reality. 35 
The role of the state was to secure and facilitate private transactions, enabling the individual to 
advance his interests as he perceived them. 
Rousseau saw the matter differently, distinguishing the general will which the state 
ought strive to promote quite sharply from the aggregate force of the competing private wills 
of individuals. Whilst he believed that, even as individuals, our will was always for our own 
good, he also recognized that men being what they were they were often deceived about their 
own interests. If the common good were to be sought out of the shifting balance of private 
interests, it could never be attained. The outcome would inevitably be to give one faction 
dominion over others, and this would breed dependence and vice. For Rousseau, as for 
contemporary egalitarians, the state had a profoundly interventionist role, however his 
justification took a very different form. According to Rousseau, the interventionist role of the 
state was mandated by the need to sustain man's independence and autonomy. The truly 
independent individual, for Rousseau, was that individual who had no need to depend upon the 
opinions, resources or even the help of others to meet his needs. Inequalities of wealth and 
position inevitably destroyed independence - the poor being dependent upon the good will of 
those better off, and the wealthy being dependent upon the labours of the poor. 36 
Contemporary egalitarian thinkers seemingly desire to fuse the insight of Rousseau 
into the pernicious effects of economic and social inequality with an account of the role and 
nature of government which owes far more to Locke, Hobbes and Kant. For them, the force 
behind egalitarian demands arises, not from concepts such as independence and autonomy, but 
from fairness. People ought not be compelled to serve an institution which effectively denies 
them benefits it makes available for others. Through this demand for fairness the marketplace 
35 	Kant, /oc. cit., 121-122. See Williams, /oc. cit., 113-114. 
36 	For a detailed analysis of the nature and role of independence in Rousseau and of the 
reasons he concluded that inequality of wealth and position destroyed independence 
and made virtue impossible, see Ch. 8. 
26 
has become a matter of intense public concern, as consumer protection legislation seeks to 
mitigate inequality of bargaining power and concepts of unconscionability or unjust enrichment 
become critical in contract law. Yet underlying these shifts, the emphasis remains upon 
private pleasures, private consumption, private pastimes as the modality through which 
individuals construct the good life for themselves. Government exists to ensure, that, so far as 
is possible, citizens share equally in the capacity to attain a life they deem good, whatever, in 
substance, its content may be. The specifically contemporary image is one of equal citizens, 
the emphasis being upon their equality under the rule of law rather than upon their 
participation in political activity. 37 While participation is important and must be guaranteed in 
equal measure to all, its realization remains one choice, one goal, among many. Participation 
has become one more private decision. 
The Greek ideal of equality in the public action which was the essence of citizenship 
has been expanded to include an increasing emphasis upon substantive equality in the 
individual capability to attain those things necessary if the individual is to construct a life which 
is meaningful for him. Contemporary egalitarians seek an earthly state in which citizens are 
equally empowered to pursue their private destinies even as they acknowledge that these 
private visions of the good life are incommensurable. Man realins himself, not as citizen, but 
as private individual. Likewise, the heavenly city, so far as it may be attained, is to be found in 
our private lives on earth. Increasingly, the emphasis is upon access to social goods and 
resources, access to those things deemed necessary if we are to construct meaningful lives for 
ourselves. Thus Rawls offers the 'thin theory of the good', a list of the basic social goods 
essential if the individual is to define and realize a life which is good according to his own 
lights. He identifies them as follows: 
(i) The basic liberties (freedom of thought and liberty of conscience etc.) are the 
background institutions necessary for the development and exercise of the 
capacity to decide upon and revise, and rationally to pursue, a conception of the 
good. Similarly, these liberties allow for the development and exercise of the 
sense of right and justice under political and social conditions that are free. 
(ii) Freedom of movement and free choice of occupation against a background 
of diverse opportunities are required for the pursuit of final ends as well as to 
give effect to a decision to revise and change them, if one so desires. 
(iii) Powers and prerogatives of offices of responsibility are needed to give scope 
to various self-governing and social capacities of the self. 
(iv) Income and wealth, understood broadly as they must be, are all-purpose 
means (having an exchange value) for achieving directly or indirectly a wide 
range of ends, whatever they happen to be. 
(v) The social bases of self-respect - are those aspects of basic institutions that 
are normally essential if citizens are to have a lively sense of their own worth as 
37 	These remarks ought not be taken to suggest that political participation is considered 
unimportant by contemporary theorists. Dworkin argues for a specific conception of 
democracy which emphasizes participatory or agency goals in 'Political Equality', /oc. 
cit., while Rawls emphasizes what he terms the fair value of the basic liberties in J. 
Rawls, 'The Basic Liberties and Their Priority' in S.M. McMurrin (Ed.), The Tanner 
Lectures on Human Values, Vol. III, Salt Lake City, Univ. of Utah Press, 1982, 1, 40- 
46. 
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moral persons and to be able to realise their highest-order interests and advance 
their ends with self-confidence. 38 
Rawls suggests that any meaningful conception of justice must 
allow for a diversity of general and comprehensive doctrines, and for the 
plurality of conflicting and indeed incommensurable, conceptions of the 
meaning value and purpose of human life (or what I shall call for short 
"conceptions of the good") affirmed by the citizens of democratic societies. 
It is noteworthy that Rawls, like other contemporary thinkers, explicitly eschews even 
reliance upon traditional liberal foundational concepts such as independence or autonomy as 
too determinate. He seeks a liberalism appropriate for a socially and morally pluralistic 
society, a set of principles upon which agreement is possible. 39 The egalitarian goal is that of 
economic, political and social equality on earth, of relatively equal access to the ,goods and 
resources needed to enable individuals and groups to realize, to the greatest extent possible, 
their private visions and dreams. The pluralist democratic state mediates between these 
conflicting and incommensurable forms of life and ensures that the consensus holds. 
Justice, called by Rawls the first among virtues 40, ideally provides a framework within 
which private men may realize themselves as equals, and, in the process of doing so, create a 
public good. Because such thinkers have abandoned the classic Greek and Christian view that 
man by virtue of his nature has certain proper ends, that the given for man is to strive to 
realize the perfection of his nature - whether this is thought of as the rational life of the citizen 
or as realization of the city of God - questions of the public good both assume paramount 
importance and become questions of ineradicable difficulty. 
Both their importance and their difficulty are well recognized by contemporary 
theorists. Governments must both make decisions and put those decisions into practice, and 
because of their power, the character of their decisions shapes the social environment. 
Dworkin argues that there are two distinct categories of political decisions, those which are 
choice-sensitive and those which are choice-insensitive. Choice-sensitive issues are those in 
which the justice of the decision depends upon the character and distribution of preferences 
within the community. In choice-insensitive issues, he cites capital punishment and racial 
discrimination in employment as examples, the correct decision does not depend upon the 
distribution of preferences within the community. Of course, as he acknowledges, there 
38 	J. Rawls, 'Social Unity and Primary Goods' in A. Sen & B. Williams (Eds.) 
Utilitarianism and Beyond, Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1982, 159, 165-166. 
39 	This conception is most fully developed ibid., esp. 161-164. Cf. Rawls, 'The Idea of an 
Overlapping Consensus', /oc. cit., 4. 
ao 	Rawls, A Theory of Justice, loc. cit., pp. 3-4. 
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inevitably will be deep disagreement over whether a given issue is choice-sensitive, however 
that `second-order' question is itself choice-insensitive.41  Despite the changed terminology the 
same fundamental question remains. How ought, in justice, public decisions be made? What 
substantive goals ought to be established and how may we determine them? 
Because modern thinkers give a greatly enhanced emphasis to human choice and 
human freedom, and the affirmation of communal ends has often been used to deny freedom 
and equality to any who dare to dissent, social goals often seem less a matter of positive 
direction than a shifting and ultimately formless compromise between competing perspectives 
and conflicting ambitions. More and more, interest group politics move to the forefront, as 
smaller, more internally cohesive groups advance specific goals and argue that these ought to 
be the goals of the body politic as a whole. Likewise, cohesive and discrete groups within the 
wider community often demand that they be exempted from some requirement otherwise 
imposed upon citizens as a whole or that they be granted privileges not available to the wider 
community. Rousseau not only recognized the theoretical problematic inherent in pluralism 
but recognized as well the way in which the conflicts engendered by it frustrated the capacity of 
the wider community to form and implement communal goals.. 42 Contemporary theorists 
attempt in various ways to reconcile the social fact of pluralism with their theoretical 
ambitions. Dworkin relies upon the language of rights to protect individuals and groups 
against the imposition of majoritarian preferences and prejudices. Rawls relies upon the 
notion of an overlapping consensus to mediate between competing factions, arguing that all 
such groups will, if they adopt the appropriate standpoint, recognize that they must grant those 
liberties to others they would desire for themselves. Indeed, Rawls comments that 
faced with the fact of pluralism, a liberal view removes from the political agenda 
the most divisive issues, pervasive uncertainty and serious contention about 
which must undermine the bases of social cooperation: 13 
Nozick, despairing of any reconciliation, fuses a nightwatchman state with diverse 
homogeneous micro-communities or utopias, while Walzer celebrates pluralism and envisions 
a community in which no social good is distributed in a way which enables one group to 
41 	Dworkin, 'Political Equality, /oc. cit., 24 ff. Cf. the distinction between personal 
preferences and external preferences discussed in Ch. 1 and the distinction between 
issues of policy and issues of principle which played a significant role in Taking Rights 
Seriously, loc. cit., 22-28, 90-100. The core distinction appears to be between those 
issues which ought to be determined through the political process and those which 
may be affected by judicial review in a constitutional democracy. 
42 	Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses, loc. cit., 25-26. Rousseau's analysis of 
the dangers created by factional divisions and private associations is prophetic. In the 
modern pluralist state, instances abound, ranging from the bombing of abortion clinics 
by Right to Life Groups in the United States, to the present spate of threats against 
the life of Salman Rushdie following the publication of The Satanic Verses. 
43 	Rawls, 'The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus', /oc. cit., 17. 
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exercise pervasive power over another. Other legal and political theorists as well have 
explored these concepts. In drawing a distinction between imperial community and paideic 
community, Robert Cover highlighted the central problematic in pluralism, the fact that our 
relationship to the imperial state is ultimately grounded in its coercive power, whilst we are 
bound to more intimate religious, ethnic, and local communities by deep emotional bonds. I 
shall argue subsequently that an important way (surely not the only way) that such conflicts are 
mediated and defused is through the private family, and, in particular, through its role in re-
legitimating the inequality of women.'" 
Pluralism is, paradoxically, both central to contemporary egalitarian demands for 
liberty and equality, and in continual tension with those demands. Freedom of association, for 
example, is critical to liberal ideals, yet freedom of association carries within itself a right not 
to associate, to exclude. Thus, at various times and for various reasons, individuals have 
regularly been excluded on the basis of race, ethnicity or sex from participation in various 
public and private associations. Today, racial discrimination is legally barred in countries such 
as the United States, Britain and Australia, although very often the applicability of the laws 
depends upon whether the association possesses a public connection: 45 Likewise, freedom of 
religion has become axiomatic, although debate continues over whether particular groups 
qualify as religions. Other questions are less frequently asked, and no clear answers have yet 
emerged. Where religious organi7ations also act as employers, for example, are such 
organizations entitled to make reference to moral or gender based criteria in employment 
decisions? If so, other cohesive groups ought, for the same reason, be entitled to apply their 
own internal standards in employment. A trade union with, as has often been the case in the 
United States, a tradition of ensuring that the sons and nephews of members receive union 
cards and thus become eligible for certain employment opportunities, would be entitled to 
continue this practice, a practice which contributes to cohesiveness among the membership 
and forms part of the ethos of the group even as it diminishes opportunities for others. If such 
criteria are disallowed, it may be argued that the state is attempting to destroy the internal 
integrity of the group through the destruction of its values. Yet, fair equality of opportunity 
44 	For the role of rights in Dworkin's theory see Taking Rights Seriously, loc. cit., 131-290. 
A recent major article by Rawls, 'The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus', ibid., was 
devoted to exploring the ways in which pluralist communities might attain a 
cooperative and stable public life as equals. Nozick, rejecting equality altogether as a 
political ideal, devoted the final section of Anarchy, State and Utopia to affirming that 
the sole appropriate role for the state was to provide a framework in which particular 
private communities could explore divergent forms of social practice in intimate, face 
to face communities. See R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, Oxford, Basil 
Blackwell, 1974, 297-334. The entirety of Walzer, Spheres of Justice, loc. cit., is 
devoted to attempting to structure a workable theoretical account of pluralist equality. 
See R. Cover, 'Foreword: Nomos and Narrative' 97 Harvard L.R. 4 (1983), esp. 11-20. 
45 	This is most readily done where there is reliance in whole or in part upon public funds 
derived from taxation. 
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demands, at a minimum, that those equally placed with regard to the particular concrete 
aptitudes required by a particular position have equal access. 
At the core of existing social beliefs and practices, even, perhaps, to a greater extent 
than the political ideals alluded to earlier in the last paragraph, is the institution of the family. 
In our traditions, the family epitomizes privacy and autonomy. Indeed, the privacy and 
autonomy of the family remain pre-eminent among our settled convictions. Despite or 
because of this, debate concerning family structures and roles, concerning political intervention 
in the family, and concerning the role of the state with respect to 'family values' is endemic. 
Here public agnosticism is impossible to sustain. We can, it seems, neither refrain from direct 
or indirect intervention, nor justify our choice. More than any other single issue, issues directly 
or indirectly concerned with the form and character of family relationships are intractable. 
Indeed, it may be suggested that issues concerning the family typify those Rawls argued ought 
to be removed from the political agenda as catastrophically divisive. is, however, precisely 
this aspect of pluralism which social and economic equality for women compels us to confront. 
The various cultural and religious traditions present within pluralist societies constitute, to a 
greater or lesser extent, discrete forms of life. Within such communities, forms of family 
structure, and the gender roles characteristic of them are often at the core of their value 
system, and these beliefs are largely determinative of the opportunities and choices available to 
family members. 
Although different interpretations have been advanced by different modern theorists, 
most modern accounts focus upon the idea that the machinery of politics exists to enable 
individual persons to realize private satisfactions, to reali7e their own aims and their own 
ambitions as fully as is possible. These diverse accounts are united by the conception that the 
just society is that society which enables all those within it to realize a life which they may call 
good. In so far as the idea of a public good remains meaningful, its content has best been 
expressed by Rawls. Rawls characterizes a society which approaches the ideal of justice as 'a 
social union of social unions', and argues that 
a democratic society well-ordered by the two principles of justice can be for each 
citizen a far more comprehensive good that the determinate good of individuals 
when left to their own devices or limited to smaller associations. Participation 
in this more comprehensive good can greatly enlarge and sustain each person's 
determinate good. 47 
He compares such a society to an orchestra, in which the talents of diverse musicians unite to 
create a whole to which no individual musician could aspire. 
46 	Rawls, 'The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus', /oc. cit., 17. 
47 	Rawls, 'The Basic Liberties and Their Priority' /oc. cit., 34. For a more general 
discussion of the idea of a social union of social unions and the way in which 
participation in a society ordered in this way creates a comprehensive social good, see 
pp. 30-39. 
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Tolerance, respect for diversity, are the ideal theory hallmarks of liberal justice. A 
true public good, it is argued, emerges out of mutual cooperation and respect between those 
whose private values are conflicting and incommensurable. The ultimate civic virtues are 
tolerance and cooperation, indeed, Rawls notes that 
when these virtues . . . are widespread in society and sustain its political 
conception of justice, they constitute a very great public goo4 part of society's 
political capital.' 
In many ways, although the motivation behind the account is wholly different, this simply 
reiterates the fundamental Greek distinction between the world of the polls and the private 
spheres of the household and of the marketplace. In their public lives, citizens set aside 
private differences, meet in a spirit of tolerance and cooperation to pursue the common 
welfare. As private individuals, they pursue divergent common ends, create life-styles and 
communities dedicated to the realization of these life-styles, pursue divergent determinate 
goods. The difference, of course, is that while, for the Greeks, the polis represented the end or 
perfection of human nature, for us, political institutions are simply created structures or 
artifacts which enable us to further private purposes. This reversal of emphasis raises a 
question which would have been unintelligible to Greek theorists. Given that political 
authorities exist to protect and foster the capability of individuals to realin private purposes, 
to what extent ought such authorities interfere with the private activities and relationships of 
individual men and women, and the way in which, as private individuals, their communities are 
structured? This makes it necessary to distinguish between activities which are somehow 
public in character, belong properly to the city, the domain of citizens, and activities which are 
private, simply a matter which can be left to individual preferences and choices, preferences 
which are, by definition, a matter of personal choice. Ought, for example, private communities 
respect the liberty and equality of their own members as must the state? Note that here the 
question is not the issue of tolerance and cooperation between such private communities. 
Rather, having assumed that the consensus holds, that divisive issues have been removed from 
the political agenda, to what extent can and ought private associations, including the family, be 
compelled to respect the liberty and equality of their members? This question is very 
different. 
Arguendo, let us accept that publicly tolerance and cooperation prevail within a liberal 
pluralist democracy, that mutual public respect flourishes and individuals set aside their private 
differences. Even this strong counterfactual assumption provides no necessary and sufficient 
reason to assume that the same conditions obtain privately. There are several reasons for this. 
First, membership in such associations is among those ends (adult) individuals are 
axiomatically at liberty to revise. Individuals may, with what they perceive as good and 
sufficient reason, consent to private inegalitarian relationships, although, unless consent is 
48 	Rawls, 'The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus', /oc. cit., 17. 
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taken to be both necessary to the legitimacy of the relationship and sufficient for it, this does 
not answer the further question of whether they ought to do so. Second, not all private 
communities can meaningfully be described as voluntary. Pre-eminent among these are 
families and ethnic communities. Third, where such institutions cannot simply be described as 
voluntary, as an end one is at liberty to revise, respect for the actual or potential liberty and 
equality of individuals becomes critical. 49 It seems reasonable to suggest that, the more 
socially and emotionally costly and tenuous escape from a given relationship becomes, the 
more critical justice becomes within it. The principles which form the basis for the public 
account of justice are necessary, but not necessarily sufficient. Rawls comes closest to 
addressing this issue, although he draws back from exploring its full implications and simply 
suggests that the good of social union can be realized by all those whose determinate 
conceptions of the good are compatible with the two principles of justice. He does not, 
therefore, address other than tangentially the possibility that the structures and values which 
inform and reinforce many of the families, ethnic communities, and religious groups within the 
social union are not compatible with the full implications of the two principles of justice if they 
must be applied within them and not merely among them. Crucially, he does not at any time 
consider in detail the full significance of the distinction drawn above, that between the public 
relationships between the various groups in a pluralist liberal state, and the private 
relationships within such groups. 
Classical liberal thinkers both recognized the potential for conflict and addressed it in 
various ways. It was most frequently resolved by a combination of two quite different ideas. 
The first of these, harking back to Greece, removed by fiat certain individuals from 
consideration as liberal citizens, notably women. 5° The second, and related idea, was that the 
interests liberal society was concerned to advance were those of citizens as such. While only 
Rousseau spelled out the structure of domestic society fully his arguments were intended to 
justify the sharp distinction between the rational society of men and the private and 
sentimental world of the family and domestic relationships. According to Rousseau, just as 
men attained moral freedom by submitting their judgment to the general will, to a vision of 
public society in which all decisions were realized through the general will, women attained 
their own moral and spiritual perfection through submitting their individual wills to the 
particular will of their husbands. Each household became, in this way, a miniature 
commonwealth, formed by the submission of the will of the wife to that of her husband, and 
49 	Precisely because of the intimacy of family relationships, it may be, although I do not 
argue the point fully here, that respect for the potential liberty and equality of family 
members is more critical and central than concern for their welfare. See Ch. 6. 
50 	Here, I want to emphasize that, whatever the latent or overt misogyny of theorists as 
diverse as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Kant, their affirmation of the patriarchal 
family had the signal benefit of ensuring that a sphere of life remained essentially 
outside the reach of the law. Within the family, the writ of the King did not run, and 
this both protected the private freedoms of (male) citizens and ensured that issues of 
justice had no relevance to family relationships. 
33 
these micro-commonwealths together, through submission to the general will, became the 
state.51 
WOMEN IN EARLY SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY 
At this point it is essential to foreshadow arguments which will be presented in detail 
in later chapters52 and to look at some of the reasons women might have been excluded from 
the social contract and the theoretical advantages obtained from this exclusion. Although 
many early social contract theories purported to be universal, to represent the agreement of all 
individuals to establish political institutions with those powers necessary and proper to the 
furtherance of such aims as the protection of property or the realization of truly rational 
activity as citizens, members in good standing of civil society, the rational agreement of which 
they spoke was an agreement explicitly of men. The limits agreed to were limits deemed 
necessary for the protection of private property, the maintenance of order, the enforcement of 
contracts. The only relationships which were properly the concern of the state were 
contractual relationships and these were to be enforced according to their terms. Family 
relationships were different. The family preceded civil society, stood outside even the idea of a 
social contract. Such relationships, even if they originated in contract as Locke thought, were 
not strictly rational relationships, but sensuous, emotional, affective relationships whose proper 
end was the procreation and nurturing of children. They were governed, not by reason, but by 
emotion. The problem was not how families or kinship groups came to exist, because this was 
established by the natural drive towards procreation, but how and why political society came to 
be. However the relationships within the family might be characterized, they were not political 
relationships, nor, even when believed to be entered by contract, were they part of civil society. 
They could be banished from political theory. 53 The critical transition, particularly for 
Hobbes, Locke and Kant, was that from kinship to civil society. Kinship and family structures 
might be taken as given. 
The question which concerned political theory, then, was not how families emerged 
and were internally structured, but how families united to form the state. The interests of the 
family units of which private society was comprised were represented by the male head of each 
family. As Hobbes explicitly noted, a family could have but one head, and only the head of 
each family could properly represent it within the commonwealth. Like Rousseau, Hobbes 
51 	On Rousseau's ideal of domestic bliss, see generally, Emile, loc. cit., 130-165. 
Rousseau complains, at p. 132, that Plato, having abolished the family did not know 
what to do with women so he set about making men of them. At p. 160 Rousseau 
emphasizes the connection between marriage and citizenship, for the man, stating: 
'When you become the head of a family, you become a member of the state.' 
52 	See Chapters 7 & 8. 
53 	For a good account of the problems see, M.L. Shanley, 'Marriage Contract and Social 
Contract in Seventeenth-Century English Political Thought' in Elshtain (Ed.), /oc. cit., 
80. 
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recognized that in any postulated 'state of nature', that is, prior to the development of the laws 
of civil society, paternity was uncertain. The argument critics such as 0lcin 54 have suggested is 
missing or elided, that is, Hobbes justification for the progression from equality of the sexes in 
the state of nature to inequality in civil society, the reason given being that 'for the most part 
Common -wealths have been erected by the Fathers, not the Mothers of families,' is, in fact, not 
absent at all. Rather, it is implicit in his acceptance of the uncertainty, indeed, potential 
irrelevance, of fatherhood in the state of nature. 55 I believe the actual argument to be as 
follows. Recognizing the plight of the state of nature, no property, no dominion, no mine and 
thine distinct in Hobbes' well known litany, and recognizing as well his denial that male and 
female parents could ever equally exercise dominion over the child, no man being able to obey 
two masters, it was logical, first, that fathers rather than mothers should establish 
commonwealths since they had most to gain thereby, and second, that once civil society was in 
place, the family (as a part of the property over which man's dominion was protected) must be 
represented by its male head.56 For the father, civil society was critical. Given the total 
absence of binding moral obligations in the state of nature, and given the moral psychology 
advanced by Hobbes, neither men nor women had any non-contractual reason to refrain from 
sexual encounters pleasing to them. For the man this was critical. Women were naturally 
certain that any children they bore were their own, and their certainty did not depend upon the 
actions of any other. Men, on the other hand, could only be certain of paternity if women 
remained faithful to them, refrained from sexual relationships outside marriage. Because 
Hobbes' moral theory left no conceptual space for obligations other than those which followed 
from contract, both marriage and paternity depended wholly upon contractual obligations. 
Further, any authority men might attempt to exercise over their children was legitimate only if 
the mother had, by contract, ceded her natural dominion to her husband. His dominion over 
his children, like his dominion over his wife, depended upon contract, and no contract was 
enforceable in the absence of law.57 It followed that men needed the power of the law far 
more fundamentally than did women, and for that reason had far more to gain from the social 
contract. This reasoning was both logical and eminently sensible. It offered a firm contractual 
54 	Oldn, Women in Western Political Thought, loc. cit., 98. 
55 	For an argument that the 'marriage contract' of classic social contract theory was 
indistinguishable from a slave contract, see Ch. 7. The classic account assumed that 
men appropriated women prior to entry into the social contract and that this 
proprietary relationship could then be enforced by the state. The manner and form of 
the appropriation was irrelevant. 
56 	On the equality of the sexes in the state of nature, the need for dominion to be vested 
in one individual, and the statement that commonwealths tend to be established by the 
fathers of families, see Hobbes, /oc. cit., 253. On life in the 'state of nature', see p. 
188. For a clear acknowledgement that, unless the situation is altered by contract, 
dominion is and remains in the mother, see p. 254, where the further point is made 
that the father's dominion over the child depends upon his having dominion over the 
mother. 
57 	Ibid. 
35 
foundation for family relationships, one which could be enforced by law and which ensured 
that men's dominion over their wives and children would be secure. Further, by excluding 
women from those whose individual and particular interests ought to be represented by 
political theory, it ensured the continued existence of a dimension of life which was wholly 
private and outside political control, a sphere where law and justice ideally had no role to play. 
Men governed the family as the sovereign governed the state. Within the family, the husband's 
will was law. Its privacy and autonomy were secure. 
The family on the one hand represented natural pre-political society. Women and 
children remained outside the social contract even as the contract by which women accepted 
the dominion of their husbands and ceded to him their natural dominion over their children 
was enforced by the state. Given the virtual unanimity of such thinkers concerning the 
uncertainty and lack of trust which must prevail without positive law, and given their 
perception of the problem of order, the need for coercion to ensure that men honoured their 
agreements, the family presented a major problem if it were to be seen in political terms. The 
account of human nature shared to a substantial degree by Hobbes, Locke, Kant and Rousseau 
suggested that uncertainty and strife must prevail within the family as in civil society if husband 
and wife were each thought possessed of independent interests which they were equally 
entitled to pursue. A later liberal thinker, Bentham, in the course of a scathing attack upon 
the notion of natural rights, and in particular the Declaration of the Rights of Man, 
commented: 
So, again, in the case of husband and wife. Amongst the other abuses which 
the oracle was meant to put an end to, may, for aught I can pretend to say, have 
been the institution of marriage. For what is the subjection of a small and 
limited number of years in comparison of the subjection of a whole life? Yet 
without subjection and inequality no such institution can by any possibility take 
place; for of two contradictory wills both cannot take effect at the same time. 58 
Bentham is to be commended for his honesty both concerning the nature of marriage during 
his times and concerning the incompatibility of an egalitarian, trusting, non-hierarchical 
relationship with liberal beliefs concerning human (male?) nature. Given the intimate and 
ongoing nature of family life, the possibility that either husband or wife might invoke the 
coercive power of the state to resolve conflicts between them on an ongoing basis could not be 
reconciled with the deeply held belief that the family represented a haven from the 
competition and strife which threatened civil society. 59 Absolute authority in the husband and 
58 	See J. Bentham, 'A Critical Examination of the Declaration of Rights', in J. Bowring 
(Ed.), The Works of Jeremy Bentham, New York, Russell & Russell, 1962, 498. 
59 	Macfarlane emphasizes that in England at least as far back as the middle of the 
Seventeenth Century correspondence of the period emphasized that the 'central 
advantage of marriage was the mutual society and companionship, the identity of 
interests in an otherwise competitive and individualistic world'. See A. Macfarlane, 
Marriage and Love in England: Modes of Reproduction 1300-1840, Oxford, Basil 
Blackwell, 1986, 157 and the references cited therein. Locke also emphasizes mutual 
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father seemed the answer. The power of the state regulated competition in civil society, 
ensured that contracts were honoured and breaches penalized. If the state regulated the 
conflicting interests of family members on an ongoing or routine basis, treated family 
relationships as wholly contractual, relationships within the family must ultimately be 
assimilated to other contractual relationships in civil society. Only if authority was firmly 
established at the outset of family life and exclusive decision making power irrevocably vested 
in one individual could the family be reconciled simultaneously with the Hobbesian account of 
human nature and the problem the state was established to resolve, the problem of order. 
Early liberal theorists did not acknowledge the possibility of a binding and ongoing 
egalitarian relationship between two adult individuals in which decisions were made under 
conditions of full mutuality and in which neither individual was entitled to exercise authority 
over the other to resolve conflicts. quotation from Bentham cited earlier puts the point 
well. Thus the most important question with respect to the family concerned who ought to 
have dominion over the household, and was thus entitled both to define its interests and to 
represent those interests in civil society. The state regulated the intercourse between family 
groups, each represented by its head, but not the relationships within them. Not only did these 
relationships pre-exist politics, their nature was authoritatively determined by the head of the 
household. The state represented the political union of male heads of families, each 
concerned to protect his property (which in theory included his wife and children) against his 
fellows. Given that the aim of civil society was to ensure that men would not be subjected to 
domination by others, and the belief that the family pre-existed civil society and remained 
outside it, the total sequestration of women was both logical and inevitable. If, as early liberal 
theorists such as Locke, Hobbes and Rousseau apparently thought, 'the family was a private 
association that preceded civil society.. . [it followed that] the state had no right to intrude upon 
or into it.'61 From the perspective of the male head of household the family was both a private 
association under his protection and subject to his rule and a form of property. His rights over 
the family were in this way guaranteed by the state and their proprietary character protected 
the family against political intervention. Certainly, Rousseau in 'A Discourse on the Origin of 
Inequality' makes it clear that the kinship represents the first natural community, and that, as 
kinship groups adopted settled habits, wider social groups formed. It was competition among 
these wider groups, and the inevitable conflict over property together with the development of 
support and companionship and community, indeed, identity of interests. Locke, /oc. 
cit., 365. For a discussion of the role and function of the family in Rousseau, see Ch. 
8. 
60 	See Hobbes, /oc. cit., 253; Locke, /oc. cit., 364; Kant, /oc. cit., 112. For a full account of 
the stance taken by Rousseau, see Ch. 8. 
61 	Shanley, /oc. cit., 94. 
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envy which necessitated the emergence of civil society and, indeed, the social contract. 62 
Hobbes as well clearly regarded the family as a pre-existing social institution. 63 
An interesting and parallel expansion did occur. Because the aim of political society 
was to enable citizens to realize their interests as fully as was compatible with the demands of 
collective life, and because the interests which might be recognized by political society were 
those of citizens, family members were deemed to be represented by the male head of the 
family, the citizen. Because of this identity of interests, because the interests of the male head 
incorporated the interests of his wife and children, the division between man's public identity 
as citizen and the private satisfactions and pursuits political authorities were thought to protect 
and make possible remained clear. In theory, each man represented the interests of the 
household of which he was the titular head. Relationships within the household were devoid of 
political content, and, for that reason, had no public existence and might be safely disregarded. 
Only two spheres remained, the public world of the state and the private world of the 
marketplace. The state existed to serve the marketplace, to enforce the terms of contractual 
arrangements and facilitate the alienation of property. Although the distinction between 
public and private served purposes very different from those thought proper in ancient Greece, 
the division was identical. Men, acting as citizens, contracted to establish those rules deemed 
proper and needful to protect and preserve the integrity of the family (where man satisfied the 
needs of his biological nature and ensured the continuation of his name) and to enforce the 
agreements of the marketplace where he satisfied his desire for independence and his urge 
towards competition and acquisitiveness. 
While, in many ways, the protection of man's capacity to realize private satisfactions 
had replaced the earlier image of man as fully man of the city, as citizen (except in Rousseau) 
and the role of civil society had been transformed, the persistence of the tripartite division 
between the domestic sphere of reproduction and sentiment, the rational and commercial 
world of the marketplace, and the political world of the state demonstrates its critical 
importance. Particularly in the rationalist theories of Kant and Rousseau, public life was 
thought to call forth capabilities which were different in character from those which dominated 
in private activities. As citizens, in an echo of Greek thought, men set aside private interests 
and needs and served wholly public purposes. These private interests, including all human 
relationships, threatened the rational and objective character of public debates. A man who 
heeded his private interests had not given over his particular will fully to the general will, to his 
duty as a citizen. Indeed, Rousseau noted that the individual's private and self-interested will 
coexisted with his capacity to participate in the general will. The refusal of any individual to 
subordinate his private will to the general will justified the body politic in forcing him to be 
free. He noted further 
62 	Rousseau, The Social Contract, loc. cit., 210-238. 
63 	Hobbes, /oc. cit., 253-255. 
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there is often a great difference between the will of all and the general will. The 
latter looks only to the common interest, while the former looks to private 
interest and is only a sum of individual wills. 
His concern that the general will be clearly expressed led him to the conclusion that no partial 
societies ought to be allowed within - the state. Private interests ought to be regulated by 
agreement and by law to the extent necessary to ensure that each citizen should know what was 
properly his. The ultimate goal of political society was to leave private men free to make 
choices and satisfy their ambitions in ways which did not threaten the public structure which 
made this possible.64 As citizens, men were, in theory, equal, rational participants in public 
deliberations. As private individuals, they were acknowledged to be competitive, acquisitive 
beings, each seeking to set himself above his fellows and secure the greatest possible portion of 
what he wanted. With the clear exception of Rousseau, early liberal thinkers assumed that the 
equality demanded was equality before the law. Williams suggests that Kant believed that both 
natural and economic inequalities were socially beneficial, fostering competition among 
individuals. For Kant, as for most other early liberals, competition was essential to progress, 
and inequality is a part of the price we pay for private ownership of property. Williams 
comments that, for Kant, 
the a priori principle of equality is not undermined by what happens in civil 
society. It may well be that the "welfare of the one depends very much on the 
will of the other (the poor depending on the rich), the one must obey the other 
(the child its parents or the wife her husband), the one serves (the labourer) 
while the other pays etc. Nevertheless, they are all equal as subjects before the 
5 law. 
Reasoning such as that above established several basic divisions. The most 
fundamental was that between the state, the public world of reason and equality, and civil 
society, the world of commerce and of private affairs. With this distinction in place, a second 
distinction was inevitable. The marketplace was marked by competition and acquisitiveness. 
In the marketplace, men sought to set themselves above their fellows, to secure for themselves 
the goods and services they required. Here, goods were bought and sold, and, increasingly, 
produced. The household (in male-stream theory) was a place of harmony, a place where 
unity of interests prevailed. The marketplace produced goods and services to meet the 
demands of household groups. It was the source of social wealth. The household consumed 
the wealth produced by the marketplace. Effectively, despite the fact that the very existence of 
the marketplace depended upon the households which met the needs of entrepreneurs and 
workers alike, such attitudes and beliefs diminished further the status of the family. Not only 
64 	The parameters of this sphere of private freedom might be drawn broadly or 
narrowly. Cf. the very different approaches of Kant and Rousseau discussed earlier in 
this chapter. 
65 	Cf. Williams, /oc. cit., 137-144. See esp. pp. 139-40. 
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were the individuals within the family politically invisible, subsumed within its male head, the 
family itself had become economically unimportant and unproductive. Thus, a further division 
identified the marketplace as public, with respect to the family, and the family as wholly and 
irrevocably private. Production belonged to the marketplace, consumption to the household. 
Production engendered wealth, and was valued for its capacity to increase the store of goods 
available. The household, as a matter of ideal theory, serviced the physical and reproductive 
needs of legal persons but produced nothing of commercial value. 66 
See D. Gittens, The Family in Question, London, MacMillan Publishers Ltd., 1985, 49- 
50 for a discussion of the family ideology associated with the hegemony of social 
contract theory. A wife's utter lack of legal existence was emphasized by the fact that 
as late as 1873 a judicially separated or divorced wife seeking custody of or access to 
the children of the marriage was required by s. 1 of the Custody of Infants Act 1873 
(36 Vict., cap. 12) to sue through her 'next friend', clearly assimilating her to infants 
and other legal incompetents. At p. 206 Gittens discusses the development of the cult 
of domesticity and the associated push towards consumerism and the appropriate 
feminine role. In particular, note the rise of ideal of the graceful and cultivated 
woman of 'leisure'. Gittens also notes the connection these developments and the 
elaboration of housework at 121-123. She notes the connection between the 
proliferation of household gadgets and the increase in the time occupied by domestic 
tasks as the ideal of the permanently immaculate home gained in strength. The more 
affluent the family, the greater the emphasis upon cleanliness. The critical 
development was the link between creating a beautiful, sparkling atmosphere to be 
'consumed' within the home by the male breadwinner, and the corresponding 
disappearance of home production of goods for exchange. For a particularly clear 
account of the ways in which images of the feminine ideal were constructed during the 
• Victorian era, see L. Nead, 'The Magdalen in Modern Times: The Mythology of the 
Fallen Woman in Pre-Raphaelite Painting' in R. Betterton (Ed.), Looking On: Images 
of Femininity in the Visual Arts and Media, London, Pandora, 1987, 73, esp. 75-82. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE SHRINKING PRIVATE REALM 
INTRODUCTION 
In the first two chapters we examined some of the attempts to sustain and support the 
division between public and private. We came to recognize that while the justifications 
tendered by classic Greek theory and early social contract theory differed profoundly, the 
division they sought to defend and sustain was identical. A further similarity emerged as well, 
the fact that in both cases the division depended quite fundamentally upon the exclusion of 
certain individuals, notably women, from the public sphere. Now it is time to consider the 
social, political and economic changes which led to the development of contemporary 
egalitarian theories and look at some of the ways in which these contemporary theories 
attempt to sustain the traditional distinction between public and private while simultaneously 
guaranteeing a substantial measure of social and economic equality to all adult individuals, 
men and women alike. 
As the egalitarian ambitions of liberal political theory extended beyond the formal 
demand for a government of laws and not men, for laws which (at least formally) fell upon all 
male citizens in the same way, and as the market came increasingly to be regulated and 
controlled, the old distinctions began to crumble. Labour laws, increasing control of those 
goods which might be placed on sale, and finally, of the terms of sale themselves, diminished 
the scope of private choices and decisions, while increasing political regulation and the rise of 
political bureaucracies made a mockery of the image of free market competition and private 
entrepreneurial freedom. If freedom remained the liberal creed, its home was no longer to be 
found in the marketplace. Equally, the ideal of the unity of interests within the family came 
under attack. With the acknowledgment that women might be recognized as citizens, be 
counted among those with the full formal capacity to act as public persons, irrespective of 
marital status, and the persistent demands of women that they be allowed to move into many 
areas of the marketplace which powerful interests had fought to maintain as an exclusively 
masculine preserve, several traditions were threatened. The first was the conception that the 
family represented a unity of interests, that it might be disregarded in theorizing. The second, 
a change which has not yet been acknowledged by modern theorists, is that relationships 
between men and women can no longer be relegated to the domain of private choice. These 
relationships are entered by fully public persons and have profound public consequences, 
consequences felt at all levels of society. So long as male citizens represented the interests of 
private family units (their interests being equated to those of the family) the state needed only 
to involve itself in human relationships where this was necessary to regulate competition 
among men. Laws concerning marriage and divorce met this need, 'protected, until quite 
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recently, the husband's interest in the chastity of his wife and in the legitimacy of his heirs. 1 
Indeed, the contractual image of marriage and divorce, replete with property settlements and 
allocation of fault, emphasized the gender roles characteristic of the Victorian era. 
Once, potentially, it was acknowledged that each family member might have interests 
of his or her own, and was entitled to assert these interests in the public domain, the 
privatisation of the family and of women became much more difficult to reconcile with basic 
liberal premises. Legally, women now have full contractual capacity, increasingly participate in 
the marketplace and public affairs. If women and children are acknowledged to have interests 
which are distinct from and rank equally with those of men, the legal basis of male dominion 
over women and children is also challenged. While this change is most evident in family law, it 
is also gaining recognition in tort and criminal law. If a social contract was the theoretical 
foundation of political society, women must now be acknowledged to be parties to that 
contract and their interests served by it to the same degree and in the same way as those 
defined from a masculine perspective. Specifically, if political authorities are constituted to 
protect men and women against domination by others, and if, as modern egalitarians argue, 
social and economic domination open the door to political domination, no rational basis exists 
for excluding any human relationships, including marriage, from the political domain. There is 
absolutely no reason to suppose that social and economic domination do not occur within 
marriage, and every reason to suppose that they form a substantial part of the traditional 
conception of the marital relationship. That conception is one in which the wife's public status 
is derivative, dependant upon that of her husband, and, equally, one in which her economic 
survival depends, in whole or in part, upon his labour and the resources he is able and willing 
to provide.2 A woman who remains bound to her husband because leaving him means a life of 
penury for herself and her children, a scenario replayed in many Western nations, is as surely 
subject to domination by others as a worker compelled to accept whatever wage is offered to 
avoid starvation. Both may be said to have consented, but, egalitarians must acknowledge, in 
1 	When a statute permitting divorce was, for the first time, enacted in England, for 
example, it specifically entitled the husband to petition for divorce upon the ground 
that his wife had committed adultery. Adultery alone was not a sufficient ground for a 
wife's petition. See Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act 1857 (20 & 21 Vict., cap. 85), 
s 27. Perhaps more significantly, because it clearly reveals the political nature and 
structure of the family, it is noted in Blacicstone's Commentaries that the killing of a 
husband by a wife constituted the crime of petit treason, for which the prescribed 
punishment was to be drawn and burnt. See R. M. Kerr, LL.D., The Commentaries 
on the Laws of England of Sir William Blackstone, Knt., Adapted to the Present State of 
the Law, Vol.I-IV, Fourth Edition, London, John Murray, 1876, Vol. I, 203. The 
converse, of course, could amount to no more than murder. This offence was 
abrogated by 30 Geo. 3, cap. 48, ss. 1 & 3 effective 5th June, 1790. 
Debate is still current concerning such issues as the effect, if any, upon the class 
position of the household where the wife as well as the husband engages in waged 
labour. Likewise, substantial effort has recently been expended upon an attempt 
integrate domestic labour into existing class analyses. For a representative group of 
essays dealing with this topic see, R. Crompton & M. Mann, Eds., Gender and 
Stratification, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1986. 
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both cases the purported consent may be said to have been unjustly obtained. If liberal theory 
is to make good on its individualistic premises, it must find a way of reconciling its public 
individualism with the reality of fundamental human relationships and their social and 
economic consequences. 
Women now compete in the marketplace in increasing numbers, demand equal pay 
and equal opportunities for advancement, demand the public provision of child care facilities 
and of maternity leave. Equally, with the increasing view of marriage and family life as a 
means to individual self-realization and satisfaction, as an institution to be valued for the 
satisfactions it provides and rejected when these satisfactions diminish or fail, the social 
welfare state is increasingly confronted by the impoverishment of women. Following the 
dissolution of marriage or the breakdown of a long term relationship women whose dependent 
status and lack of access to resources had previously been concealed by statistics focusing upon 
household income routinely become dependent upon social welfare for survival. This, in turn, 
has led to new recognition of the long term costs of dependence. Such changes reflect the 
changing economic function of the family. As women and children gradually ceased to be 
recognized as economic assets and became economic liabilities the family itself became 
increasingly marginal. No longer perceived as a fundamental productive unit to which all 
family members contributed their skills and energies, events within the family seemed of 
marginal importance compared with those in the marketplace and the state. As Rowland 
notes 
the result of industrialization was an increased separation of home and work 
spheres; the development of dependence on wages for survival; a gradual 
entrapment of women within the home area; and a gradual devaluing of 
women's traditional skills. . . . Women had become the dependents of men in a 
new economic way and "this ,dependency had become embedded in the 
workings of the larger economy"? 
As views of marriage gradually changed, so that marriage was no longer thought to be a 
cooperative economic relationship essential to the survival of all family members and more 
significantly perceived as an affective and supportive relationship between husband and wife, 
one which emphasized the home as a respite from the rigours of the workday world, the 
ideology of the affective family emerged. Its hallmarks include the belief that marriage is the 
culmination of a romantic relationship between husband and wife, the further belief that 
marriage ought to contribute to the full development and self-realization of both husband and 
wife, the relatively recent suggestion that marriage is an egalitarian relationship, the death of 
the family as the essential productive unit, and the view that individuals are entitled as of right 
3 	R. Rowland, A Transdisciplinary Perspective on Women's Identity, Melbourne, Oxford 
Univ. Press, 1988, 101. 
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to depart from unsatisfactory marital relationships and form new, hopefully more pleasurable, 
relationships.4 
The affective family is ideologically, psychologically and spatially isolated from other 
social institutions. Ideologically, the family is idealized as conflict-free, loving, supportive, 
altruistic, an institution based upon sharing, indeed, it epitomizes everything the market is not. 
In practice, of course, in at least one quarter of families this image bears little resemblance to 
the reality of family life. The dichotomy between ideology and reality is emphasized by 
American statistics which suggest that a minimum of 25-30% of wives are battered at least 
once during their marriages. Note also the soft nature of statistical information in this area. 
Many, possibly most, episodes of physical and emotional abuse are never reported to 
authorities, or, alternatively, do not come to the attention of authorities for many years. While 
anecdotal evidence may be available in some instances, victims frequently conceal the fact that 
they have been abused out of shame. Epidemiological studies in the United States emphasize 
that wife abuse occurs at all socio-economic levels and among all ethnic groups. 5 It may be 
that the spatial isolation of the nuclear family contributes to these difficulties. Given the rise in 
geographic mobility, wider kinship networks are gradually diminishing in importance, 
contributing to what may be described as the closed nuclear family and forcing it inwards upon 
its own resources. Geographically, the family is distanced from workplaces and from wider 
social institutions providing services. 
While some of the conceptual origins of the affective family are apparent in the work 
of J.S. Mill6, his ideal of egalitarian friendship bears little resemblance to the contemporary 
popular ideal of romantic love. Indeed, the popular conception seems much more 'liberal', 
with its emphasis upon the satisfaction of desires or preferences. Marriage is entered for the 
satisfactions it brings, and, it follows, ought to be abandoned when these satisfactions diminish 
4 	For a sociological discussion of the ideology of the family and the profound 
discrepancy between popular ideology and social reality see G. Allan, Family Life: 
Domestic Roles and Social Organization, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1985, especially Ch. 
5, 87-99. 
5 	See M.D. Pagelow & P. Johnson, 'Abuse in the American Family: The Role of 
Religion', in A.L. Horton & J.A. Williamson, (Eds.), Abuse and Religion: When 
Praying Isn't Enough, Lexington, Lexington Books, 1988, 1, 2. For an account 
emphasizing the statistical difficulties see M. Straus, R. Gelles & S. Steinmetz, Behind 
Closed Doors: Violence in the American Family, Garden City, Anchor/Doubleday, 
1980. See also L. Radford, 'Legalising Woman Abuse' in J. Hamner & M. Maynard 
(Eds.), Women, Violence and Social Control, Atlantic Highlands NJ., Humanities 
Press International, 1987, 135. All these accounts emphasize the cross-class nature of 
the problem. 
The conception I have termed the 'affective family' has its conceptual roots in the 
writings of John Stuart Mill. See J.S. Mill, 'The Subjection of Women' in J.S. Mill & 
H. Taylor, Essays on Sex Equality, edited by A. Rossi, Chicago, Univ. of Chicago 
Press, 1970. While Mill did not foresee the form legal implementation has taken, he 
emphasized a bond constituted by mutual sentiment and one in which the relationship 
was substantively egalitarian. 
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or fail; Yet, given that the economic role of women has gradually been confined to the family, 
given that women continue to bear primary responsibility for nurturing children and for 
domestic labour, and given that even those women who work outside the home are likely 
either to be employed in traditionally female and economically marginal areas of the labour 
market or to have subordinated their career development to that of their husbands, the move 
to the transitory affective family seems likely to accelerate the trend towards female poverty. 
While, undeniably, many women are responding to this recognition by attempting to sustain 
labour market participation, the social infrastructure essential to facilitate this is not yet in 
place. Women are less likely to amass resources such as superannuation and other forms of 
employment related property within marriage, and, given their greater longevity, more likely to 
be impoverished in later life. Likewise, when marriages fail, women are more likely to suffer a 
severe diminution in economic resources, both because of interrupted labour market 
participation and because they are presumed to be capable of attaining economic self-
sufficiency.7 
This change in social attitudes is, in turn, attended by increasing demands that the 
state meet the needs of those who find themselves unable to survive on their own. As parties 
to the social contract, women increasingly demand that their particular voices be heard, that 
their needs be met, that, effectively, they receive what they bargained for, in Rawlsian terms 
their fair share of the benefits of cooperation. These changes, and the newly public individuals 
whose presence augured them, have led on one hand to demands for the re-emergence of the 
wholly unfettered marketplace and the denial that duties exist which are not fully contractual 
in character, and to demands on the other hand for the expansion of the bureaucratic social 
welfare state and the extension of full social, political, and economic equality to all who now 
rank as citizens. They necessitate a total re-examination of the division between public and 
private together with the rationale upon which this dichotomy was based. Any liberal theory 
which aspires to be both egalitarian and individualistic must address itself to a changed 
context. The distinction traditionally relied upon between public decisions and private 
freedoms must be given a new theoretical foundation or relinquished and a replacement found. 
The family and all it symbolizes can no longer be treated as private and autonomous as once it 
7 	It has been suggested that two-and-a-half times as many women over 65 as men over 
65 live in poverty in the United States, about 20% of all women over 65. See H. Scott, 
Working Your Way to the Bottom: The Feminization of Poverty, London, Pandora 
Press, 1984, 19. Likewise, statistics abound which illustrate that women are, to a far 
greater extent than men, economically disadvantaged by marital breakup. One of the 
more remarkable features of the feminization of poverty in recent years is the extent 
to which its victims are women of the middle class and above. For recent Australian 
statistics see P. McDonald (Ed.), Settling Up: Property and Income Distribution on 
Divorce in Australia, Sydney, Prentice Hall of Australia, 1986, 102-105. American 
discussion of the same points may be found in R.T. Eisler, Dissolution: No-Fault 
Divorce, Marriage, and the Future of Women, New York, McGraw Hill, 1977, 20-40. 
Generally see Li. Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution: Unexpected Social and 
Economic Consequences for Women and Children in America, New York, The Free 
Press, 1985. 
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was, for the liberal rationale for both its privacy and its autonomy depended upon the denial of 
personhood to women and upon the concomitant view that the family was the property of the 
head of the household. 
CONTEMPORARY LIBERAL POLITICAL THEORY: A FAILURE OF IMAGINATION? 
The profound theoretical difficulties heralded by the social and political changes of 
recent times have not, as yet, been addressed in any comprehensive way by political theory. As 
the theories of Dworkin and Rawls demonstrate, these issues continue to be subordinated or 
disregarded while new variants on a traditional liberal framework are deployed and refined. 
Dworlcin's account of equality of resources deals with the problems posed by human 
relationships by ignoring them, a difficult manoeuvre for an egalitarian. He argues that 
political institutions must devote an equal share of resources to each individual life, but does 
not move beyond this and consider how such a principle can be applied equitably in a world in 
which individuals have relationships of various sorts and are both separate individuals and 
members of various social units and in which their actual equality is at least as dependent upon 
their social roles as upon their individual choices in resource utilization. 8 While it may seem 
that individual choices and social roles are inextricably linked, or in liberal terms, that social 
roles are a consequence of the pattern of individual choices over time, a critical question for 
egalitarian theory is masked by this 'natural linkage' and by the emphasis upon choice. Certain 
social roles, those constitutive of the female gender role in particular, are also linked to 
pervasive patterns of disadvantage. Within nation states such as Australia and the United 
States women are seriously disadvantaged in economic terms 9, and this economic disadvantage 
arises both from the devaluation of traditional female occupational roles and from the cultural 
assignment of nurturing and homemaking roles to women. Put in liberal terms, women choose 
occupational roles which perpetuate disadvantage just as they choose marriage and 
childbearing. If these roles disadvantage them in economic terms, and, further, if their 
perceived commitment to family roles significantly contributes to their lack of political power, 
they have, in effect, chosen to be disadvantaged. Yeatman makes a similar argument in 
suggesting that 
That he clearly recognizes the problem involved and its intrinsic relationship to the 
public/private boundary is shown in passages from Dworkin, Law's Empire, loc. cit., 
297-312. A particularly clear statement occurs at p. 300 where he argues that 'the 
division between public and private responsibility in property draws a crucial distinction 
between the responsibilities individual citizens have on two kinds of occasions: first, 
when they decide how to use what the public scheme of property has clearly assigned 
them and, secon4 when they must decide what it has assigned them.' 
Even those women who chose non-traditional occupational roles tend to remain 
comparatively disadvantaged. For example, recent surveys have shown that in 
Australia the average male lawyer earned $73,885 while the average female lawyer 
earned $48,757. See 'At $74,000 lawyers nudge top rung', The Mercury, Thursday, 
Dec. 21, 1989, 5. 
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in the bracketing out of any specific dependencies of the individual and of the 
specific content of his individuality, the family is inevitably bracketed out of the 
civil conception of society. The family is consigned to the "private life" of these 
individuals, whereas "society" concerns their publicly manifest, abstract and 
nonspecifically disclosive individuality. The logic of this is to surest that 
whatever specific dependencies the family may involve, they are structured or 
determined by the wills of these auto-determined individuals. . . . 
She goes on to argue that this places the family outside the morality of civil society. 113 
Women's location within the family, and specifically, their biological sex and the 
gender roles perceived as compatible with it both by themselves and by others are, it seems, 
incompatible with full participation in civil society. In a very real sense, to the extent that 
women make choices which enhance the well-being of family members, and which, in the long 
term, significantly increase the risk of economic disadvantage either following dissolution of 
marriage or in old age, they behave in ways which are incompatible with the implications of the 
liberal model. West suggests that 
the liberal claim that human beings consent to transactions in order to 
maximize their welfare may be false. If it is, then the liberal claim that social 
value is created through facilitating choice will be false as well. But 
furthermore, women may be "different" in precisely the way which would render 
the empirical assumptions regarding human motivation which underlie the 
liberal's commitment to the ethics of consent more false for women than for 
men. Thus, it may be that women generally don't consent to changes so as to 
increase our own pleasure or satisfy our own desires. It may be that wonzen 
consent to changes so as to increase the pleasure or satisfy the desires of others. 
. . . For if women consent to changes so as to increase the happiness of others 
rather than to increase our own happiness, then the ethic of consent, applied 
even-handedly, may indeed increase the amount of happiness in the world, but 
women will not be the beneficianes. 11  [Emphasis in original.] 
In this section I have suggested that contemporary egalitarian theorists have failed to recognize 
the theoretical significance of the social and political changes of this century, and that, as a 
consequence, their accounts of distributive justice may be inadequate to address the inequality 
of women. Now it is time to begin to examine those accounts in some detail, and to evaluate 
the critical resources they make available. 
EOUALITY OF RESOURCES: EQUALITY. EFFICIENCY AND THE MARKET 
Dworkin's account of resource equality adopts as a theoretical ideal an atomistic and 
competitive world, one in which independent adult individuals who bargain at arm's length 
10 	See A. Yeatman, 'Despotism and Civil Society: The Limits of Patriarchal Citizenship' 
in J.H. Stiehm, (Ed.), Women's Views of the Political World of Men, Dobbs Ferry, 
Transnational Publishers, 1984, 151, 155-165. The quoted passage may be found at p. 
157. 
11 	R.L. West, 'The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique 
of Feminist Legal Theory', 3 Wisc. Women's L.J. 81, 92 (1987). 
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calculate the costs involved in their preferences and satisfy those same preferences in isolation. 
Of necessity, his account assumes that they make their decisions in resource choice and 
resource utilization to further their subjective well-being. While such individuals are 
compelled to consider the preferences of others in the course of the cost benefit analysis 
which, in ideal theory, guides their decisions, this is only because the relative scarcity of and 
demand for resources determines the price they will be required to pay. Equality of resources 
relies upon a classic state of nature image. Castaways upon a desert island agree to an equal 
division of the available resources and accomplish this by means of a Walrasian auction which 
determines the 'prices' at which all of the available resources clear the market given the 
preferences of the castaways for different resources. Dworkin argues that if individuals were, 
counterfactually, equal in their natural capacity to make use of the available resources, this 
mode of allocation would enable them to satisfy their preferences as fully as possible, given the 
preferences of others. Following the division, again assuming equal natural endowments, while 
individuals will come to differ greatly in 'bank account wealth' because of different choices 
regarding work, leisure and consumption, equality will be maintained because these 
differences are a consequence of choice. Some individuals will prefer to devote the bulk of 
their time to work, while others will prefer leisure. Likewise some will be content with baked 
beans on toast, while others will require fme wines and rare and special foods to maintain a 
minimal level of contentment. While individuals may come to envy the 'bank account wealth' 
of others, they do not envy the lives of those others taken as a whole. n The model used 
makes it clear that, presuming an initial equal division of resources in accord with the 
collective preferences of the group, the bench-mark for equality is whether or not individuals 
would envy one another's lives, taken as a whole. So long as they would not have chosen to 
lead those lives, preferred them for themselves, the mere fact that they might, at some point in 
time, prefer the monetary consequences of another's life does not signify inequality. 
Following dissolution of marriage, for example, the fact that former husbands tend to 
be economically advantaged by their bundle of life choices, and former wives, particularly 
those who have either interrupted their labour market participation to bear and nurture 
children or have subordinated their career pathways to those of their former husbands, 
economically disadvantaged by their bundle of life choices, seems unlikely to constitute 
inequality within the framework provided by equality of resources. If we assume that the life 
style of the couple was fundamentally middle-class, that both partners at the outset of the 
relationship had comparable education and talent, then if the former wife chose to subordinate 
her labour market participation to her family responsibilities, she has simply preferred one set 
of rewards above another and has no cause for complaint even if he continues to enjoy a 
middle-class lifestyle and she requires redistributive payments to support herself and their 
children. Seemingly, the model proposed systematically rewards self-directed choices and 
12 	See generally, Dworkin, 'Equality of Resources', /oc. cit. The arguments summarized 
in the text may be found at pp. 284-290 and 304-308. 
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penalizes other-directed choices, at least where the content of the good life for the individual 
implicitly incorporates the freedom to opt out of existing relationships and seek other avenues 
for self-realization. Dworkin's ideal theory account of equality of resources apparently offers 
few conceptual tools which are fully adequate for the resolution of issues of this sort. Many 
questions which are central have yet to be asked. What, for example, has she in fact chosen? 
How do we characterize her choice? Has she preferred leisure above work, a characterization 
which appears plausible if 'work' is equated to income producing activity? Has she, perhaps, if 
we recognize child care and household labour as work, chosen to devote her time and efforts 
to activities which community preferences deem of little economic value? Does the fact that 
homemakers do not, in our culture, receive wages for child care and housework signal a 
market failure or a legal failure, or is it a consequence of deeply embedded cultural traditions 
which have shaped both the law and the marketplace? Is the real problem the increasing 
prevalence of divorce, or is the problem our cultural expectation of marriage itself? 
Although, for Dworkin, human relationships are clearly not simply individual choices, 
and his account of associative obligations generally attempts to demonstrate that voluntariness 
and choice have but limited roles to play in human associations 13, including political 
associations, his attempt to reconcile private permissiveness with public egalitarianism remains 
unsatisfying. Historically, inequality has been reinforced and enhanced by private decisions 
concerning resource acquisition and allocation, and nowhere is this more saliently illustrated 
than in the present feminization of poverty, a phenomena well advanced in the United 
States.14 While Dworkin models his account of political obligations upon the sorts of 
obligations which arise among family members, this seems more a device which is adopted for 
simplicity of exposition than a serious attempt to come to grips with the moral and social 
reality of human relationships and their economic consequences. 15 His individualistic account 
of resource equality, an account which dominates his account of distributive justice and 
supports his account of common law adjudication 16, emphasizes calculation, emphasizes the 
cost of preferences, emphasizes the role of choice in decision making. Little effort is made to 
reconcile the individualism mandated by his account of resource equality with the almost 
communitarian emphasis of his account of associative obligations generally. Rather, he 
introduces a reformulation of the public-private distinction and asserts that while governments 
have an obligation to treat their citizens as equals, this obligation does not always carry over as 
13 	Dworkin, Law's Empire, loc. cit., 195-216. 
14 	See, generally, Scott, /oc. cit. 
15 	Dworkin, Law's Empire, loc. cit., 195-202. 
16 	Ibid., 301-312. 
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a general duty of private life. 17 As private individuals we are entitled to adopt a permissive 
self-interested attitude unless it is unclear what our precise entitlements are. 
Despite the individualism of his account of resource equality, Dworkin also insists that 
the best defence of political legitimacy . . . is to be found, not in the hard terrain 
of contracts or duties of justice or obligations of fair play that might hold among 
strangers, where philosophers have hoped to find it, but in the fertile ground of 
fraternity, community, and their attendant obligations. Political association, 
like family and friendship and other forms of association more local and 
intimate, is in itself pregnant of obligation. 18 
The question which must be asked is why he supposes that individuals such as those in his 
theoretical account of equality of resources could or would see themselves and their 
communities in this way. Whatever else one might wish to say concerning the castaways who 
figure in his ideal theory account of equality of resources, it is difficult to conceive of their 
forming a community. Rather, in a classic social contract image, they are isolated, pre-social 
individuals who seek to allocate the available resources in a way which will minimize present 
and future conflict among people devoid of existing social bonds. If these individuals form a 
community at all, it might best be termed an accidental community. Clearly, he hopes to 
reconcile a communitarian account of political obligations with an individualistic account of 
resource equality19 through yet another variant upon the public-private distinction. This is 
reemphasized by his assertion that 
our familiar convictions, which require government to treat people as equals in 
the scheme of property it designs but do not require people to treat others as 
equals in using whatever the scheme assigns them, assume a division of public 
and private responsibility. They suppose we have a duty in politics that does not 
carry over as any general duty of private life. . . . This argues, if we take the 
division of responsibility to be important and fundamental, for a compatible 
rather than a competitive conception of equality as defining public responsibility 
because compatible conceptions explain the division naturally and 
systematically, while competitive theories can explain it at best only artificially 
and improbably. 20 
What is sought is an account of equality which is compatible with private ambitions, private 
decision making, irrespective of whether or not these appear, superficially, to diminish equality 
overall.21 As Dworkin notes, 
17 	Ibid., 299. 
18 	Ibid., 206. 
19 	For an extended argument that this fails, see Ch. 6. 
20 	Ibid., 299. 
21 	Ibid., 174, 298. 
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if government succeeds in securing for each citizen a genuinely equal share of 
resources to use as he wishes in making his life successful according to his 
lights,. . . his choices will give effect to rather than corrupt what government has 
done?2 
There is a problem here. Dworkin assumes both that political authorities must treat people as 
equals in the scheme of property they design, and that as private citizens we are entitled to act 
in ways which seemingly disturb that distribution, for example by favouring those close to us.23 
Yet if the example given above rings true, one important cause of the pervasive inequality of 
women in contemporary societies is that they frequently act in ways which enhance the life 
chances, as individuals, of those near to them, and that those same actions are profoundly 
disadvantageous to their own life chances, again strictly as individuals. Structurally, the 
opportunities open to women are frequently curtailed by the responsibilities they are 
conventionally assigned. The same is not true to the same extent of the majority of men. 
THE DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE: THE LEAST ADVANTAGED GROUP 
In many ways, Rawls is both more radical and more wholly traditional than Dworkin. 
His distributive model focuses upon groups, rather than individuals, enabling him to elude 
altogether any need to consider the effects of human relationships upon the model of 
distributive justice he proposes. Rawls emphasizes that the least advantaged, in terms of the 
difference principle, 'are defined as those who have the lowest index of primary goods, wizen their 
prospects are viewed over a complete 11fe.' 24 He further emphasizes that, at least for the 
purposes of establishing a just distribution, group membership is viewed as fixed and that 
social mobility is not considered a primary good. Equally, he clearly considers social groups 
such as families a part of private society. Like religious groups, clubs, and various cultural 
groups and associations, they are internally structured, pursue ends of their own. Such groups 
are to be supported, to the end that the most disadvantaged among them ought to be the 
beneficiaries of any improvement in the lot of the more fortunate, but the equality aspired to is 
a relative equality among the smaller groups and associations of which the political community 
is composed, rather than more deeply individualistic in character. In this way, by offering a 
principle of equal liberty which directly addresses individuals and their independence, and a 
redistributive principle which acknowledges the reality of social groups, Rawls attempts to 
22 
23 
24 
Ibid., 299. 
Ibid., 298. It is significant that Dworkin has at no time addressed intergenerational 
questions. Thus, he has not confronted the question of how we are to favour those 
close to us, for example, our own children without increasing inequality generally. He 
has also not confronted the intimate connection between a strong preference for 
saving, for example, and the desire to provide one's children with enhanced resources 
in later life. He does, however, allude to the similarity in this respect between his 
account and libertarian accounts, emphasizing that both are compatible with private 
choices and decision making. 
Rawls, 'Social Unity and Primary Goods', ioc. cit., 164. 
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establish a balance between the moral demand for independence, a demand he believes to be 
intrinsic in the nature of citizenship, while recognizing as well that independence is only 
possible under circumstances where all people are guaranteed an adequate share of social and 
economic resources. Both the recognition of the connection between social and economic 
well-being and personal independence and the lexical priority of the principle of equal liberty 
emphasize the difficulty of the task undertaken. Rawls wishes both to ensure the continued 
existence of private choices and freedoms (preserving the privacy and the integrity of the 
smaller groups of which political society is comprised) and to ensure that these are extended to 
all those who now rank as citizens. 
Rawls' emphasis upon social groups, rather than individuals, in developing his account 
of the difference principle is disturbing. While, clearly, a significant reason for this choice is 
the degree to which it facilitates the use of economic indicators, and he does, in fact, tentatively 
identify the least advantaged group with unskilled workers, both his emphasis upon social 
groups and his clear concern with sustaining the integrity of the smaller groups of which the 
nation state is comprised suggests a failure to consider with sufficient clarity the 'nested' 
character of these groups. If, for example, following Rawls, we assume that the least 
advantaged group is comprised of unskilled workers, and it is the members of this group who 
must benefit from any increase in the well-being of the most advantaged, we must also 
recognize that while, on one level, this group is comprised of individuals who presumably 
benefit equally from redistribution, on another level, these individuals are themselves part of 
further social groups, most particularly families. An improvement in the well-being of 
labourers as a group may lead to a corresponding improvement in the well-being of their wives 
and children, but there is scant reason to assume that this is in fact the case. While more 
resources may enter any given family under the difference principle, the allocation within it 
need not reflect this. Certainly, in the recent past, studies have shown that increased wages for 
the husband are not generally reflected in increased housekeeping money for the wife.25 
Rawls fails to consider that, for the most part, the members of his least advantaged group are 
not simply individuals, but members of families, and, given this, also fails to acknowledge that 
distribution within families is at least as significant as distribution to families. Just as we 
cannot simply assume that existing political and economic arrangements are just within the wider 
society, we cannot assume that existing arrangements within families are just, nor can we assume 
that justice is inappropriate within families. Such assumptions must be justified and supported by 
argument, and the arguments essential to sustain and support them have yet to be advanced. 
25 	See Rowland, /oc. cit., 98. Rowland cites British studies demonstrating that increased 
wages to the husband were not generally reflected in the provision of increased 
housekeeping to the wife. See also the studies to the same effect cited in M. Eichler, 
The Double Standard: A Feminist Critique of Feminist Social Science, London, Croom 
Helm, 1980, 38. 
52 
While Rawls' alternative identification of the least advantaged group with those 
individuals with less than half the median income and wealth eludes some of these difficulties, 
it poses problems of its own. Unlike class position, this measure of disadvantage is unlikely to 
remain stable throughout the individual life if women are considered. Thus, for example, while 
a young professional woman in full-time employment is clearly advantaged26, should she leave 
paid employment for a period of years to raise a family, unless she has, while working, 
amassed substantial wealth thus providing an ongoing income and independent resources, it 
would appear that she becomes disadvantaged during this period irrespective of the economic 
position of the household of which she is a part. The alternative, of course, is the empirical 
assumption that she shares equally in family resources and in decision making concerning the 
utilization of these resources. Should her marriage end after a number of years, while she may 
receive a relatively equal share of existing family assets, she is unlikely to fully regain her 
advantaged position, even assuming that the employment disadvantages currently experienced 
by women with family responsibilities can be legally eradicated. Given Rawls' emphasis upon 
relative position over the whole of the human life, even if many women remain above the least 
advantaged group, the fact that when we compare men and women of comparable 'natural 
advantages' women remain disadvantaged by comparison to their male counterparts at all 
economic levels and throughout their lives is surely of more than passing significance. 
Rawls may, of course, assume either that 'the family' will gradually cease to exist or 
that the disadvantages which arise from family membership and family roles are irrelevant to 
the principles governing the basic structure. The former assumption might be thought to arise 
from his view that equality of fair opportunity can only be imperfectly realized so long as the 
institution of the family continues, however, contextually interpreted, this refers not to gender 
roles but to the advantages and disadvantages conferred by family background. 27 The latter 
supposition seems the more likely, particularly since Rawls explicitly identifies two further 
empirical assumptions, first, that power and authority are correlated with income and wealth 
so that only the latter two need be considered in the formulation of the difference principle, 
and, second, that once the basic structure of society has been regulated justly, other 
inequalities which arise as a consequence of the voluntary choices of individuals may be 
disregarded.28 This latter supposition, of course, emphasizes the distinction noted elsewhere 
between the institutional structure of society and the consequences of private choices and 
private decisions. Yet this supposition, as well, seems profoundly at variance with the 
empirical conditions of women's lives. Even if, counterfactually, the institutional structure 
throughout society rigorously eliminated all structural barriers to equality for women, even if 
26 	Under existing social and economic arrangements she is likely to be somewhat less 
advantaged than her male counterpart, however, again, I assume, arguendo, that 
appropriate legislation can alter this. 
27 	Rawls, A 77:wry of Justice, loc. cit., 74, 300 ff. 
28 	Ibid., 95-100. 
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employers were required at all levels to disregard biological sex in employment, in training and 
in opportunities for advancement, to the extent that women remain disproportionately 
responsible for domestic labour and emotional servicing, existing patterns of disadvantage may 
be mitigated but will not be eliminated. That Rawls might find this sort of continuing 
disadvantage acceptable is supported by his observation that 
primary goods are not, however, to be used in making comparisons in all 
situations but only in questions of justice which arise in regard to the basic 
structure [and that therefore] it is another matter entirely whether primary goods 
are an appropriate basis in other kinds of cases.29 
Rawls emphasizes that the concept of a need is always relative to the concept of a social role, 
and that the only role with which he is concerned is that of citizen. 30 Yet this remains  
unsatisfying, incomplete. If, as is the case for many women in contemporary communities, 
their other social roles effectively deprive them of a fair share of those goods they require to 
participate as equals in public life, they are deprived as citizens. While, as wives or mothers 
they may well have other needs, these are additional and ought not be thought to substitute for 
their needs as citizens. Unless we are prepared to ensure that families are themselves 
structured on just principles and to consider precisely what is required, we must, I believe, 
consider all the individuals within them simply as citizens and as entitled, as such, to a fair 
share of social goods. 
Rawls emphasizes the internal integrity and continued existence of the social groups 
within the pluralist nation state together with the normative structures which ensure their 
continued vitality in recent writings. Indeed, he characterizes a well-ordered community 
constituted according to just principles as constituted by an overlapping consensus among 
smaller internally cohesive communities sharing common ends. He notes that 
faced with the fact of pluralism, a liberal view removes from the political agenda 
the most divisive issues, pervasive uncertainty and serious contention about 
which must undermine the bases of social cooperation:31 
Such issues include the truth of all general and comprehensive theories, be they religious, 
moral, philosophical, or political. Rawls cites as examples utilitarianism, perfectionism, 
idealism and Marxism, as well as the comprehensive liberalisms of Kant and Mill. 32 Likewise, 
concrete views concerning the nature of the good life and the appropriate modes for its 
realization have no role to play in a political conception of justice. Issues touching on these 
29 	Rawls, 'Social Unity and Primary Goods', /oc. cit., 163. 
30 	Ibid., 172. 
31 	See generally Rawls, 'The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus', /oc. cit. The passage 
quoted may be found at p. 17. 
32 	Ibid., 2-8. See also the discussion in Ch. 2. 
54 
are, so far as is possible, to form no part of the public agenda. Their truth or otherwise lies 
beyond or outside of politics. Rawls argues that since no public agreement on disputed 
questions of this sort can reasonably be expected, an alternative basis for a stable public 
consensus must be found. To this end, he argues further that, 
just as a political conception of justice needs certain principles of justice for the 
basic structure to specify its content, it also needs certain guidelines of enviry 
and publicly recognized rules of assessing evidence to govern its application.'" 
These comprise the socially shared methods of common sense and the public knowledge 
available to common sense, together with the non-controversial procedures and conclusions of 
science, the basic procedures of science being presumed to be value-neutral, an issue which is 
itself controversial. Rawls comments that, 'in a pluralist society, free public reason can be 
effectively established in no other way.' remains difficult to understand, given the fact of 
pluralism, what issues remain a part of the public agenda and which have been ruled out. 
Rawls suggests that controversial issues remaining on the public agenda include such issues as 
where to establish the boundary between church and state and the interpretation of the 
requirements of distributive justice. Yet it may well be that issues concerning justice within 
families, and indeed, full consideration of the implications - of distributive justice for women, 
are, at present, as deeply divisive within pluralist societies such as England, the United States 
and Australia as those, such as the truths of religion and the possibility of reinstituting serfdom 
and slavery, which Rawls clearly rules off the public agenda. Given that beliefs and values 
concerning the nature and structure of family life, the role of women within the family, and, by 
necessary implication within the wider community, and the 'rights' of parents in respect of 
their children and the nature of their socialization and education are fundamental to most of 
the ongoing communities of which the consensus is to be comprised, form the foundation of 
their beliefs concerning the good life, and given that, at this time, such issues remain profoundly 
controversial and deeply divisive, their place upon the political agenda remains open to 
question. 
Rawls comes closest to addressing these issues in a brief passage concerning the 
education of children and the impact of public requirements on religious sects who have 
chosen to remain apart from modern culture. He comments that a purely political conception 
of liberalism such as his would not allow the state to impose requirements designed to 
inculcate the values of autonomy and individuality. Rather, it would limit public requirements 
to ensuring that children were aware of their constitutional and civic rights in order to ensure 
that they were aware that freedom of conscience existed and apostasy was not a crime, thus 
protecting their future interests. Likewise, the state would be entitled to require that their 
education prepare them to be self-supporting and to be fully cooperating members of society 
33 	Ibid., 8. 
34 	Ibid. 
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committed to the public virtues of tolerance and mutual respect and cooperation.35 Rawls is 
attempting to demonstrate that the charge that political liberalism is arbitrarily biased against 
certain conceptions of the good is based upon a misunderstanding of its requirements, 
requirements which are substantially less stringent than those inherent in the comprehensive 
moral visions of earlier theorists, even while admitting that these requirements themselves may 
diminish the continued viability of such commtmities.36 He concludes by noting that 
the state's concern [with the education of children] lies in their role as future 
citizens, and so in such essential things as their acquiring the capacity to 
understand the public culture and to participate in its institutions, in their being 
economically independent and self-supporting members of society over a 
complete life, and in thgir developing the political virtues, all this from within a 
political point of view. 3 
This passage, together with the arguments in which it is embedded, raises more questions than 
it resolves if girls and women are made the centre of analysis. It has already been argued that 
culturally conventional gender roles are fundamental to the inequality of women, not 
peripheral to it, that these gender roles are not innate, but socially constructed and learned, 
and that these same roles make it profoundly unlikely that many women will become 
'economically independent and self-supporting members of society over a complete life'. Many 
cultural groups regard economic independence as inappropriate for women, as antithetical to 
their values and beliefs. For such groups, the sort of education which would emphasize values 
such as economic independence and self-sufficiency as equally appropriate and desirable for 
girls, which would emphasize equivalent career options and life chances, and, crucially, would 
view such emphasis as the state's proper concern, might well be seen as profoundly invasive. 
Would Rawls' political conception of liberalism require this? He argues that his conception is 
one appropriate to politics, and not to the whole of the human life, and that the ideas of the 
good included must be specifically political ideas, ideas derived exclusively from his conception 
of citizens as free and equal moral persons, 
so that we may assume (1) that they are, or can be, shared by citizens regarded 
as free and equal; and (2) that they do not presuppose any particular fully (or 
partially) comprehensive [moral] doctn•ne. 38 
Yet if women and girls are central to analysis, not peripheral, it may be either that his 
35 	J. Rawls, 'The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good', 17 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 251, 267 
(1988). 
36 	I note in this context that under the Rawlsian conception, the United States Supreme 
Court decision in Wisconsin v Yoder 406 U.S. 205 (1972) would have been reversed. 
In that case, Amish parents were allowed to remove their children from the education 
system after Grade 8, a decision which, given American conditions, would render such 
children unable, as adults, to support themselves within the wider community. 
37 	Rawls, 'The Priority of the Right and Ideas of the Good', /oc. cit., 268. 
38 	Ibid., 253. 
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conception presupposes just such a doctrine, or, perhaps, that, extending its principles fully to 
girls and women and ultimately to the family would destroy the foundation for the overlapping 
consensus of which he speaks and threaten the existence of the private sphere he wishes to 
protect. 
CIVIL SOCIETY AND HUMAN NEEDS 
While the accounts of Dworkin and Rawls differ in structure, both accounts offer a 
distinctively liberal response to the legal and political changes involved in the development of 
the social welfare state and outlined earlier in this chapter. Both theorists rely upon curiously 
similar accounts of the liberal individual, or citizen, offering as their model rational adult 
individuals who perceive themselves as independent and seek a just division of social resources 
to ensure that they will remain so. This arises in part because egalitarian accounts, however 
different they appear, necessarily share certain features in common. They must attempt to 
reconcile the postulated rational public order with their knowledge that all individuals share 
certain social and biological needs. Thus, they aspire to offer an account of political society 
with the capacity to make good on the fundamental promise of liberal theory, that of securing 
citizens against the possibility that they will be subjected to domination by others. Earlier 
liberal theorists argued that because men naturally acted to maximize their own satisfaction 
and because, in general, men sought the same things, those who were stronger would be able 
to take advantage of others. Competition unrestrained by laws was likely to be ruthless, and 
no man could be secure in the possession of goods which others desired. By substituting the 
rule of law for the rule of men, and by ensuring that all men were formally equal before the 
law, men would be protected against the unrestrained self-interest of others. No man could 
achieve unjust dominion over his fellow citizens because they would all be subject in the same 
way to the rule of law. Because, in general terms, the law imposed limits upon the means men 
might use to obtain those things they wanted but did not dictate what men ought to want, men 
remained free. The classic liberal creed became the belief that men's freedom of action ought 
be curtailed only where their actions issued in concrete harm to others. 
Contemporary egalitarians have cast their theoretical net more widely. They 
recognize that social conditions such as poverty and prejudice place many people in situations 
where they cannot look after their own interests adequately, perhaps are unable to identify 
those interests they have. They acknowledge that people do not choose to be poor any more 
than they choose to lack the basic skills needed to protect themselves in an increasingly 
complex social world. They do not choose to belong to minority religious or racial groups 
which are subject to majority prejudice, nor are they necessarily responsible for choosing their 
sexual preferences. The biological accidents of race or sex, the disadvantages imposed by 
limited ability or physical handicaps are factors over which individuals have no control. Yet 
morally arbitrary differences such as these enable some individuals to dominate others. 
Government, therefore, is obliged to protect its less favoured citizens in the same way as it 
protects those more favoured in the natural lottery. Modern liberal theorists recognize that if 
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this is to be done, a new division must be established and justified between the powers and 
prerogatives of political and legal authorities and the private satisfactions of ordinary social 
life. Egalitarians acknowledge that men and women may be dominated by circumstance and 
by misfortune as readily as by force or fraud and that they are entitled to be secured against 
this possibility so far as is possible. Yet, it is not clear how this may be done if any aspect of 
human life is to remain immune from political intervention and supervision. 
Many of the factors which make some people more vulnerable and less able to 
compete effectively in the marketplace and less able to protect their legal rights and 
entitlements also make them more vulnerable in ordinary social life. Often, entrenched social 
and cultural beliefs reinforce this vulnerability, suggest that it is natural or appropriate, and 
such beliefs effectively disable those about whom they are held from asserting and defending 
their rights. What I am saying here is very simple, but all too often overlooked. Those who 
are vulnerable and constrained by their vulnerability to submit in one area of social life are 
profoundly unlikely to have the independence and the self-esteem to adequately protect their 
interests in others. They have learned to be victims, learned to accept as appropriate their 
status as victims, and this is often sufficient to ensure that they will be effectively unable to 
assert their rights in other contexts. 39 Simply assuming that life within families and other 
small groups and associations will be rich and satisfying as does Rawls provides no answer at 
all. Like other assumptions, it is open to factual challenge, and, in the case of family groups, 
presumes the resources provided both can and will be shared equitably within the group and 
that adult family members perceive themselves as equally entitled to make decisions and 
choices and thus to act autonomously. It is no longer adequate for a theory of justice to 
assume that the distributive consequences of basic human relationships are irrelevant to 
justice. If that area of human life which is, on a personal and individual level, most pervasive 
and significant, is to be consigned to the natural and pre-political, it is necessary both to justify 
the separation of our lives into political and pre-political realms, and to demonstrate that the 
barrier thus created can be rationally defended by argument, not simply asserted or assumed, 
nor argued for upon the basis of existing social and historic conditions, including the fact of 
pluralism. 
A PUBLIC ETHIC OF CARE AND RESPONSIBILITY: THE INDIVIDUALISTIC 
RESPONSE  
39 	The difficulties faced by women trapped in abusive relationships are illustrative. 
Many such women perceive themselves as unable to extricate themselves from such 
relationships precisely because they are socially responsible for maintaining and 
preserving relationships. They perceive themselves as to blame for the abusive 
character of the relationships in which they find themselves, and this is frequently 
reinforced by social and cultural attitudes which hold women responsible for 
maintaining relationships and view it as their duty to endure abuse. Likewise, those 
women who have experienced abusive relationships in childhood are least likely to 
extricate themselves from abusive adult relationships. See C.F. Swift, 'Surviving: 
Women's Strength Through Connection' in M.B. Straus, Abuse and Victimization 
Across the Life Span, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1988, 153, esp. 161. 
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Now it is time to examine much more closely contemporary egalitarian attempts to 
justify a public ethic of care and responsibility within the constraints of liberal ideology. 
Because this difficulty is most pronounced in a wholly individualistic account we will turn first 
to Dworkin's attempt to reconcile a public commitment to substantive equality with an 
individualistic theoretical structure. As he has argued, while, as individuals we do not believe 
that we are individually obligated to treat all our fellow citizens with equal concern, we do 
believe that our government has such an obligation to its citizens. The question, of course, is 
what equal concern demands, and when we, as individuals, also have such an obligation. 
Another way of putting these questions is simply to ask upon what occasions and under what 
circumstances we ought to consider ourselves to be responsible for one another's well-being. 
When must we reason, not simply in terms of rights and entitlements, but in terms of 
responsibilities and preserving and sustaining ongoing relationships, in terms, in short, of an 
ethic of care? When must we, as individuals, demonstrate equal concern for our fellows? 
An egalitarian account of distributive justice which endeavours to remain 
individualistic, as does that offered by Dworkin, must either account for the place of human 
relationships directly, or acknowledge that the ideal it offers will not survive any attempt to 
translate it into practice. As we saw earlier, he theoretically defines equality of resources as 
that set of social outcomes which would follow if, counterfactually, all members of the 
community were equal in natural endowments and if all the resources available within the 
community were allocated in such a way that no individual envies the bundle of resources held 
by any other individual. The critical assumptions are as follows. In a situation of relative 
abundance, if approximately equal individuals have equal capacity to secure those resources 
which they desire, they will seek to further their interests so far as is possible given their 
preferences and the preferences of others. The test for whether an egalitarian distribution has 
been attained he calls the 'envy test'. That is, we may assume an egalitarian distribution has 
been reached if no individual envies the bundle of resources available to any other individual. 
Under free market conditions, where individuals are thereafter at liberty to utilize and 
exchange their bundles of resources as they see fit subject to the rule of law, the distribution 
will remain equal so long as individual endowments remain equal. So long as the envy test is 
met, so long as no individual envies either the initial bundle of resources allocated to another 
or the entire bundle of life choices and decisions involved in their utilization the demands of 
equality are met.' ° A question one might wish to ask here is what might be said of those 
Dworlcin's utilization of 'envy' in assessing whether or not an egalitarian distribution 
has been attained is extremely interesting. For his account of the structure and role of 
the 'envy test' see Dworkin, 'Equality of Resources', /oc. cit., 285-288, 304-309. His 
use of envy in this context demonstrates some affinity with Rousseau, although, unlike 
Rousseau, Dworkin is careful to distinguish envy of what another has, which he 
identifies with an unjust distribution, and envy of what another is, which is a moral 
flaw. In 'Discourse on the Origin of Inequality Among Men' Rousseau identified envy 
as one of the social evils leading men to surrender their freedom. Likewise, in 'A 
Discourse on Political Economy' he emphasized that one of the most important roles 
of government is to ensure that extreme inequality of wealth does not arise among 
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women who would prefer the bundle of life choices generally available to men in our culture, 
or who might wish that their children were male simply because men do not characteristically 
confront many of the conflicts faced by women, such as that between ambition or achievement 
and parenthood. What of the women who do envy the bundle of life choices open to men, 
including the lack of conflict between parenthood and ambition?41 
A model such as this places many women in a parlous position in the long term. 
Consider the case of an educated woman who has married, bore two or three children, and 
subordinated her labour market activities to nurturing her children and maintaining a home 
for her family. If, as is becoming commonplace, her marriage breaks down after a period of 
eight or ten years, her particular bundle of choices in resource utilization and life activities are 
likely to have placed her in a significantly disadvantaged position. Any professional 
qualifications she may have obtained before marriage are likely to be much less valuable than 
they would have been had she followed an uninterrupted career path. Both her years out of 
the labour market and her socially defined status as mother make her a less valuable employee 
in comparison to the recently qualified and to those whose workforce participation has not 
been interrupted. She is unlikely to have maintained benefits such as superannuation and she 
may well find it necessary to rely upon redistributive payments to survive, at least in the short 
term.42 If she is asked whether she would have been willing to forego having children, or 
alternatively, to have foregone the years spent at home nurturing those children and 
maintaining a home for her family she is likely to deny this. The envy test is satisfied, that is, 
she does not envy the lives led by those women who have pursued uninterrupted career paths 
or who have combined professional careers with bearing and rearing children, nor does she 
citizens because, where this is present, injustice is inevitable. See Rousseau, The 
Social Contract, loc. cit., 212-221 & 267-287. See also Rawls, A Theory of Justice, loc. 
cit., 530-541. Rawls explicitly excludes envy from the motivations which operate in the 
original position and notes that 'a rational person is not subject to envy, at least when 
the differences between himself and others are not thought to be the result of injustice 
and do not exceed certain limits.' Ibid., 538. The distinction implied by this passage is 
very close to that adopted by Dworkin. Cf. the discussion in Nozick, /oc. cit., 239-246. 
Nozick suggests that social attempts to eradicate envy along one dimension will simply 
encourage it to flower along another. That is, Nozick believes that we have a 
fundamental propensity towards envy, and that to the extent that one area of social 
life is structured so as to remove any cause for envy, that sphere of life will become 
unimportant, no longer relevant to our self esteem. If equality of resources could be 
realized, if, in fact, society did devote an equal share of resources to the lives of each 
one of us, relative wealth and associated concepts would become socially unimportant. 
From that perspective, it may be that a part of the strategy of equality of resources is 
to make wealth irrelevant as a source of self-esteem. See Dworkin, 'Equality of 
Resources', ibid., 331-3. 
41 	See Ch. 11 for a discussion of treating this form of disadvantage as a consequence of 
culturally embedded prejudice which is illegitimate and must, therefore, be 
eradicated. 
42 	In Australia, 90% of sole parents are women, 70% of all sole parents relied in whole 
or part upon a sole parent's pension, and 95% of these pensioners were women as of 
June 1988. Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet Office of the Status of 
Women, Women's Budget Statement, Canberra, A.G.P.S., 1989, 208. 
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envy the life led by her former husband. She may, however, point out with some justice that 
the particular set of choices involved are so intimately connected with gender and gender roles 
and with the obligations associated with these roles as to seem an artificial basis upon which to 
construct any account of the meaning of equality. These bundles of choices are peculiar to 
women, and the problems women face in dealing with them, through time, are also unique to 
women, indeed unique to women in contemporary industrialized societies. Indeed, she might 
also, with some acerbity point out that she most certainly did not choose to exist upon a 
subsistence level income nor would she have done so. To a substantial extent, she simply 
complied with social and cultural expectations concerning the life choices and options 
appropriate to a woman of her background and status. If, in Dworlcin's terms, she has 
gambled and lost, the gamble was one she was socially and culturally encouraged to take, and 
one of which she may have been unaware at the point at which certain critical choices were 
made.43 She may, that is, simultaneously not regret having devoted her time to her family 
responsibilities, and regret profoundly her failure to protect and further her own interests. 
She, as well, is entitled to question the social choices which confront women in our culture. 
One of the very real difficulties in attempting to apply an ideal theory account in 
which all choices operate against the background of resource utilization in which preferences 
concerning work, leisure and consumption interact to produce distributive outcomes lies in the 
acontextuality of the account itself. The choices described in the paragraph above are choices 
intelligible only within a particular social context. They are choices which are constrained by 
moral and social obligations which have arisen as part of social practices, not in isolation from 
them.44 Within the framework of equality of resources, given its economic discourse of 
choices regarding work, leisure and consumption, it is not clear how such choices are to be 
characterized. Has she preferred leisure, for example, in abandoning the career for which she 
was trained, or is it simply that she has chosen to use her talents in work which may be 
personally rewarding and socially valuable but which presently commands no economic rent? 
In either case, it would appear she has chosen disadvantage. Did she perceive herself as 
having a choice, or did she perceive her obligations to her husband and children as overriding 
the existence of choice? If the latter, can we then describe her position following the failure of 
her marriage as the consequence of her choices? At the point at which her marriage failed 
what real choices, if any, were available to her? 45 Within Dworkin's framework does the 
43 	For further discussion of the possibility that women gamble on marriage while men 
invest in it, see Ch. 10. 
44 	We might, following Dworkin, term them associative obligations. For an extended 
discussion and an attempt to reconcile equality of resources and associative 
obligations, see Ch. 6. 
45 	For a detailed exploration of these issues and particularly the discrepancy between 
abstractly defined freedom of choice and the constraints which operate when choice is 
contextually evaluated, see Ch. 6. 
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absence of choice in this sense even matter? In the real, real world, unlike the world of ideal 
theory, choices are multidimensional, not unidimensional. 
If, as Dworkin asserts, the fundamental obligation of political authorities is to ensure 
that equal resources are available to each individual for him to use as he will in advancing his 
life plans, he must demonstrate that an account based upon the perfect market of economic 
theory possesses the flexibility to acknowledge the economic rent of household labour and 
parenting and to ensure that its 'true' value is received by those individuals responsible for its 
performance. If we recall the scenario above, her problem arose, not because she preferred 
leisure above economic activity, but because she chose to channel her available energies into 
homemaking and nurturing labour and because such work commands neither economic rent 
nor public sphere recognition. Indeed, we might well suggest that she chose to honour her 
obligations to her husband and children rather than to pursue her economic interests. Does it 
make moral sense to suggest that those who choose to honour moral obligations are, in effect, 
choosing disadvantage? Does it not make more sense to suggest that, to the extent this is and 
remains the case, basic social and political structures are fundamentally flawed? A very real 
problem here, of course, is the meaning of terms such as work and leisure. Is leisure simply 
time which is not devoted to income earning activity, or is it that time available to the 
individual for wholly discretionary use, time when one is free from obligatory activities 
generally? This distinction is critical to any attempt to address the position of women, however 
the very acontextuality of Dworkin's ideal theory account seemingly obviates any necessity 
which might otherwise arise to establish precisely the meaning of terms such as these. To the 
extent that 'private sphere' labour presently exists in the public eye, it exists as part of the 
ideology of the family, and this ideology dictates both that the labour involved is a labour of 
love (which is true in many cases) and that its worth would be denigrated were it to be seen in 
economic terms. The latter may also be 'true', but as a consequence love (unlike sex) has no 
exchange value in civil society. In the Dworkinian framework, it would appear, the simplest 
option would be to acknowledge the economic rent of such activities, including childbearing, as 
part of the on-going market he envisions on the ideal theory level, to treat its cultural absence 
as a market failure. Even if this were to be done, however, if one adopts the wages currently 
available to those who provide domestic services and child care in the marketplace as a guide 
to community preferences, her choice might still be described as choosing a less productive 
occupation in economic terms.' 6 
It is difficult to know how Dworkin would respond to the scenario offered above. The 
only remark in his account of equality of resources which seems immediately relevant is this: 
I should note here that with respect to `women's work' we may be confronted by 
market failures all the way down. For an analysis of other available options and an 
argument that equality of resources is incomplete without a companion theory of 
equality of responsibilities see Ch. 11. 
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Equality requires that those who choose more expensive ways to live - which 
includes choosing less productive occupations measured by what others want - 
have less residual income in consequence. 
Bearing and raising children might well be described as choosing a more expensive way to live 
in our present culture.47 It requires the substantial expenditure of both labour and resources 
without a substantial return on either. Equally, of course, it may be said that she has in fact 
complied with the desires and expectations of a majority of those within the community, but 
that those same desires and expectations have meaning only within a social practice whose 
traditions insist that perceiving what she does in terms of money or money's worth is 
inappropriate. Put very simply, perhaps the community as a whole prefers both that she 
remain at home to care for her husband and children and that she expect no tangible economic 
reward for doing so. Put in this way such preferences seem utterly indistinguishable from the 
inegalitarian attitudes Dworkin argues political liberalism must condemn. Does Dworkin's 
liberalism condemn such arrangements? 48 Perhaps, in a bizarre sense, a market in household 
labour and parenting and perhaps even childbearing does exist, one which is in large part 
unregulated and in which the 'true cost' of a wife's services is precisely that amount her 
husband chooses to make available to her for her use. If this is the case, divorce may be 
interpreted as dissatisfaction either with the quality and quantity of the services provided or 
with the wages and working conditions on offer. 
Yet elsewhere49 in discussing the ways in which individuals ought to adjust their plans 
to take account of the interests of others and their degree of responsibility where their plans 
cause injury to the interests of others in the 'real, real world' Dworkin notes that where 
individuals do have a continuing relationship each particular decision ought to be treated 
as part of a continuing series of linked decisions . . . [and therefore] if I forego 
an opportunity in one case, because the relative loss to you would be greater, 
this should be entered to my credit in a moral ledger against the next decision I 
(or you) have to make. 
While these remarks were made in the context of establishing that equality of resources 
offered an attractive model for negligence and nuisance adjudication, they do suggest an 
alternative model for viewing family relationships. In many respects, marriage and family life 
represent the paradigm case of intersecting life plans. Returning to the hypothetical scenario 
above, and reinterpreting it in the context of this passage, the husband and wife might properly 
47 	See Dworkin, 'Equality of Resources', /oc. cit., 327. 
48 	Superficially, it would appear not to. His only direct mention of family relationships 
occurs in the course of an attempt to demonstrate that a patriarchal family might none 
the less impose genuine obligations upon its members if the group assumed that such 
practices were consistent with equal concern. Dworkin, Law's Empire, loc. cit., 204- 
205. 
49 	Dworkin, Law's Empire, loc. cit., 305 -306. 
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be said to have made a series of chained or linked decisions which, taken as a whole, have 
resulted in significant disadvantage to her life chances. 50 Viewed in this light, it becomes 
critical to attempt to ensure that the parties are relatively equal in decision making power, for 
if they are not the decision making process is likely to reflect, not negotiation and mutual 
decision making aimed at preserving a reasonable balance between competing interests, but 
the relative power of the individuals concerned. If, for example, such a decision was made 
because the cost to the family unit involved in her foregone opportunities was less than the cost 
in foregone opportunities involved in feasible alternative decisions, this passage suggests that 
she may have amassed a substantial credit to her 'moral ledger'. 51 It would seem to follow 
that, should the marriage fail, she ought to be compensated for those foregone opportunities. 
A rough approximation of the cost could be obtained by first, calculation of economic returns 
already lost by withdrawal from the labour market and those likely to be lost in the future as a 
consequence, and second, by reducing the figure obtained in that manner by the economic 
benefits received during the course of the relationship.52 One ought, of course, also note that 
her husband has, through his choices, sacrificed opportunities to participate in family life and 
in the nurturing of their children, however these lost opportunities do not necessarily diminish 
the economic resources at his disposal, indeed, in the long term, they are likely to enhance 
them. It may well be that her services in the home have substantially freed him to pursue 
career opportunities not otherwise available and she may have provided services directly 
related to his career and which enhance his earning capability. Further, he has received the 
benefit of her services in the home, including childbearing and parenting services, and, in our 
culture, is conventionally entitled to determine their value autonomously. 
50 	Women's Budget Statement 1989-90, loc. cit., 76. Australian government studies 
indicate that the average woman forgos over $300,000 in lost earnings for a first child, 
while a second and third lead to further loses of $50,000 and $35,000 respectively. The 
estimated opportunity cost of these decisions calculated upon the basis of investing the 
earnings at 5% was $929,000, $1,059,000 and $1,145,000 respectively. 
51 	This also tends to suggest that a fundamentally utilitarian analysis is appropriate 
within families. I would, however, argue that within families, as elsewhere, we must 
take seriously the differences between persons. 
52 	It is important to note here that implementation of such a scheme of compensation 
might significantly increase pressure upon women to remain in relationships because 
the cost of terminating them would be prohibitive, an extremely important 
consideration in inegalitarian or abusive relationships. Any threat to leave would be 
likely, given a legal regime which presently makes no attempt to guarantee access to 
resources within marriage, to provoke violence, thus indirectly reinforcing imbalances 
in power and defeating voice. Whether such a scheme would, overall, enhance voice 
within such relationships and attempt to ensure that marital power was more evenly 
distributed than at present is a very different question. Certainly it might significantly 
deter formal marriage, increasing pressure to extend it to de facto relationships. 
Dworkin's account of associative obligations makes no distinction between formal and 
informal relationships, or at least none which could be said to depend upon the 
presence or absence of legal regulation. Rather, associative obligations arise in the 
context of social practices. See the figures in n. 51 above. 
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What can be said about ongoing relationships on such a model? At the level of social 
policy this interpretation of equality of resources treats marriage and family relationships as a 
special instance of intersecting life projects, and similar in that way to the conflicts between 
long time neighbours familiar in negligence or nuisance law. How might a government 
dedicated to equality of resources ensure that equality was not disturbed thereby? As a 
prophylactic measure a government dedicated to realizing equality might well find it appealing 
in the long term to design legislative programs aimed at minimizing the likelihood that the 
'moral ledger' would become imbalanced in this way, rather than to resort to compensatory 
measures which would be both draconian, and, in other than wealthy families, nugatory. 
While, in the short term, compensatory measures would be essential, in the long term, it might 
be more appropriate to encourage, through taxation advantages and non-transferable leave 
provisions, role sharing, and to eliminate so far as possible existing provisions which effectively 
contribute to such an imbalance, such as the rebate presently available for a dependent spouse, 
which, under existing taxation regimes frequently discourages labour market participation, 
including participation on a part-time basis. Likewise, such a government might find it 
appropriate to ensure that employment opportunities were routinely available on a part-time 
basis which carried benefits and opportunities proportionally equivalent to those attached to 
equivalent full time employment. The aim of such programs, however, might be described in 
two quite different ways. Such programs might simply be described as aimed at, insofar as 
possible, sustaining equality of resources in the particular context of ongoing relationships in 
the sense of ensuring that economic disadvantages did not accrue disproportionately to one 
individual while economic advantages accrued to the other. They might also, however, be 
described very differently. Implicit in a program such as that sketched above is an effort to 
alter existing patterns of social choice by making certain choices which are presently socially , 
attractive comparatively unattractive while making other choices substantially more attractive 
than they are at present. Thus, fully developed programs of this sort would, in pursuit of 
equality of resources, pursue two linked but distinct goals, the first encouraging men to play a 
more active and ongoing role within the family, and the second encouraging women to play a 
more active and ongoing role in the marketplace than is presently the case. What is at stake, 
clearly, is not simply a set of choices concerning the allocation of resources, but rather a set of 
choices implicating in a significant way beliefs fundamental to many individuals about a 
valuable sort of life for themselves, beliefs which Dworkin strongly suggests ought to be 
sacrosanct. Such programs, in other words, would actively seek to alter private sphere choices 
in pursuit of public equality. Within the framework Dworkin is seeking to develop, such would 
be legitimate only if existing practices can be shown to be fundamentally inegalitarian, a 
consequence of prejudice, and the preferences flowing from them corrupt. 
Given that, as discussed earlier, Dworkin emphasizes that equality of resources is a 
principle of political organization required by justice and not a way of life for individuals, it is 
proper to consider in passing whether the 'moral ledger' alluded to in these unfortunately brief 
remarks is a principle of political equality derived from equality of resources or whether it 
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reflects moral obligations between individuals which are not politically enforceable, given that 
he also comments that 'we must rely on the hypothesis that if everyone treats such decisions as 
isolated cases, this will work out roughly fairly for everyone in the long run'.53 Dworkin's 
language suggests that while individuals ought, in their dealings with one another, take special 
account of maintaining a fair balance in ongoing relationships, decision makers must assume 
that treating such decisions as isolated cases will produce the fairest results overall. In 
matrimonial law, of course, such a hypothesis is wholly unworkable, and 'moral ledgers' 
routinely become increasingly imbalanced during the course of a long relationship. Yet 
Dworkin also suggests that the principle of comparative financial harm at work in the concept 
of a moral ledger must be qualified to take account of individual rights and that a 
straightforward test such as comparative financial harm is unlikely to provide a satisfactory 
basis for legislation. Unlike judges, legislators are not required to make policy choices which 
produce 'the allocations of rights and obligations that would have been negotiated by the parties 
specially affected'.54 The clear distinction between judicial responsibility and legislative 
responsibility made in these passages suggests that while judges ought to take such balancing 
into account in resolving disputes over marital property within an existing statutory framework, 
legislators must treat such issues as one aspect of overall social policy considerations in 
designing schemes of property, including marital property, and those decisions are likely to be 
most accurate, and therefore most just, if they reflect the distribution of preferences in the 
community as a whole unless those preferences are fundamentally inegalitarian, and 
illegitimate for that reason. 55 
CONNECTIONS NOT MADE - SOCIAL PRACTICES AND INEOUALITY 
As noted earlier, the attempted fusion of an ethic of care with traditional liberal 
premises has altered the scope of egalitarian theory in ways as yet unacknowledged by liberals. 
Any adequate egalitarian theory must address the intimate connection between the economic 
inequality of women, the cultural assignment of responsibility for domestic labour and 
nurturing to women, and the way in which women's private sphere roles have both shaped and 
curtailed their public sphere participation. To the extent that they fail to do so they also fail to 
recognize that many social practices which have become normative are unjust. When human is 
tacitly equated to adult male, issues such as childbearing and the value of nurturing and 
domestic labour vanish from the agenda. They simply do not exist, seem irrelevant to equality. 
The connection between gender roles and economic inequality is blurred as well, assumed to 
reflect lingering prejudices which can be addressed by conventional means. The fact that the 
increasing workforce participation of women has not been accompanied by any parallel 
53 	Dworkin, Law's Empire, loc. cit., 306. 
54 	Ibid., 311. 
55 	Dworkin, 'Political Equality', /oc. cit., 23 ff. For a discussion of the role of prejudice, 
see Ch. 11. 
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increase in the participation of men in domestic and nurturing labour disappears altogether. 56 
While a wholly individualistic account such as that of Dworkin ought to address these issues 
directly - at least if women are eligible to be considered as individuals - a more sophisticated 
account, such as that of Rawls, must demonstrate that its recognition of the necessity and 
vitality of various smaller social groups including families does not also carry with it tacit 
acceptance of private relationships of domination and submission, relationships which are 
hierarchical in character. Finally, because egalitarian theory advocates a public ethic of care 
and social responsibility as a central obligation of the political structure57, this development 
must be reconciled with the apparent conflict between an ethic of care and an ethic of 
independence in other areas.58 
The intrusion of the ethic of care into the public domain poses a major challenge to 
the theoretical structure of liberalism. While both Rawls and Dworkin have sought to 
demonstrate that massive public provision of social insurance can be accounted for entirely as 
a rational outcome of self-interested choices by independent and mutually disinterested 
56 	In this context it should be noted that according to Women's Work is Never Done', 
The Mercury, 6th February, 1989, new Australian Bureau of Statistics figures showed 
husbands whose wives worked spent no more time doing housework than those whose 
wives did not. One example given was that working wives spent on average 42 
minutes per day on laundry, while their husbands spent on average two minutes per 
day. The study referred to was J. Wilson, Information Paper: Time Use Pilot Survey, 
Sydney, May - June 1987, Sydney, Australian Bureau of Statistics. See also G. Allan, 
ibid., 84-92. A summary of American statistics may be found in P. Voydanoff, 
Women's Work, Family, and Health' in Industrial Relations Research Association 
(Editorial Board K.S. Koziara, M.H. Moskow, L.D. Tanner) Working Women: Past, 
Present, Future, Washington D.C., The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. 1987, 69, esp. 
76-84. The author notes, p. 77, that 'employed women spend approximately 50 percent 
less time in family work (housework and child care) than fill-time homemakers. Since 
husbands and children do not compensate for the lower amount of time spent by 
employed women, families with working wives spend less total time on family work. . . . 
Employed wives spend more total time in paid work and family work than nten and fill-
time homemakers.' See also the studies cited therein. Significantly, some of these 
studies have also shown that 'working wives have higher levels of marital power than 
full-time homemakers, especially in the area of financial decision-making.' 
57 	Here I note that what I have termed the 'ethic of care' in egalitarian theory extends 
well beyond the redistributive role of government. Modern egalitarians seemingly 
advocate other public measures such as affirmative action programs to enhance the 
access of disadvantaged groups to educational and professional programs and 
measures protecting consumers against onerous contractual terms etc. Collectively, 
the emphasis of such egalitarian' programs is upon political responsibility for the 
protection of weaker members of the community and for securing to them social 
benefits often taken for granted by the more favoured. 
58 	Dworkin characterizes the nature of this conflict very precisely when he notes that 
most of us believe that our governments have a responsibility to treat us as equals but 
that this responsibility is not one which carries over into any private responsibility. 
See Dworkin, Law's Empire, loc. cit., 299. Put another way, we expect our government 
to simultaneously insist upon substantive public equality and protect our private 
independence in using the resources available to us even where this seemingly 
diminishes equality overall. 
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individuals, such arguments are, I believe, difficult to sustain. At a minimum, such arguments 
rely upon a series of assumptions concerning rationality, concerning the motivations underlying 
individual choice, and concerning the nature of value. For both Rawls and Dworkin, to be 
rational is to choose the most efficient and appropriate means for attaining the ends desired. 
Individuals make choices on the basis of interests which are in themselves, and therefore 
subjectively defined, choosing that which will most nearly satisfy their desires given the 
preferences of others. Value is defined by reference to the outcome of these same choices. 
Thus, as we saw earlier, Rawls, in establishing the basis for a shared conception of rational 
advantage, argues that all individuals require certain basic social goods, whatever their more 
comprehensive and subjective ends may be, and, because these are needed for any specific 
conceptions of the good they may desire to pursue, rational individuals will prefer a greater 
rather than lesser share of these goods. Similarly, Dworlcin's account of equality of resources 
commences from the assumption that if individuals were equal in talents and differed only in 
preferences or values, a just distribution would be one in which no individual would prefer the 
total bundle of resources possessed by any other individual to that he has acquired for himself. 
Again, the worth of any given resource to the individual is defined by his or her preferences, 
and individuals are presumed to make their choices to further their own interests. 
The real question is whether people do in fact make their choices upon this basis, or 
whether, in reality people as often make choices based on other factors, their obligations to 
others, their need to meet the expectations of others, perhaps even their recognition that 
choices which are profoundly attractive to them, as individuals, may do harm to others. While 
such choices, choices based upon obligations, or expectations, or a desire to avoid harm are 
indeed choices, and on one level might be said to further our preferences, on quite another 
level they lack the direct connection with the object of choice which seems necessary for the 
coherence of the argument as a whole. If, within the community as a whole, a substantial 
number of individuals make decisions based upon obligations, or the expectations of others, or 
a desire to avoid harm to others, while other individuals make choices which do in fact further 
their own interests as they perceive them, social outcomes are unlikely to accurately reflect the 
distribution of preferences within the community as a whole. These two types of choices are 
quite fundamentally distinct. Choices based upon obligations or fulfilling the expectations of 
others are choices made, not on the basis of the subjective desirability of the object of choice, 
but on the perceived value of the human relationships involved. The sorts of choices which 
predominate in equality of resources, on the other hand, must reflect the preferences of the 
individual for the goods or services themselves. To the extent that they do not an egalitarian 
distribution has not been attained. 59 If, for example, two individuals are involved in an 
ongoing relationship, and one of them tends to make choices based upon his or her perceived 
- 59 	To adopt the language used by Dworkin in 'The Place of Liberty', /oc. cit., 34-36, such 
choices lack authenticity, in that they have not been formed under circumstances 
appropriate to using an auction as a test of equality of resources. See, further, Ch. 11. 
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obligations to the other, or in order to fulfil the expectations of the other, while the other 
makes choices upon the basis of the outcomes he or she actually prefers, the outcomes in 
terms of resource utilization, in terms of consumption and, perhaps even in terms of the 
allocation of work and leisure are likely to be distorted, particularly if this pattern recurs in 
many households. One consequence may be that, over time, the preferences of other-directed 
individuals are discounted because they have little impact upon market outcomes, while the 
preferences of self-directed individuals have a significant impact upon market outcomes. All 
that is required for this sort of distortion to become established is the assumption that a 
substantial number of other-directed individuals make the market decisions they do to further 
the interests of self-directed individuals. 
The ontological assumptions underlying the liberal account of choice and decision 
making are undeniably appropriate at an asocial level. On such a level, whether characterised 
in terms of Rawls' original position or Dworkin's ideal theory account of equality of resources, 
this account of decision making is reasonable, indeed, represents the only plausible 
description. The account is constructed to ensure that no other grounds for decision making 
exist. Such difficulties as do arise reflect the fact that choices and decisions in a social context 
are seldom if ever so unitary or clear cut. While both Rawls and Dworkin attempt to divorce 
their arguments entirely from contentious ontological and epistemological assumptions 60 , 
effectively arguing that they wish to offer a 'political' account devoid of broader foundational 
assumptions, this argument itself raises the question of why we ought to assume that an 
account constructed from the perspective of acicnowledgedly mythical beings has anything to 
tell us about the structure of a just community. In evaluating the justice of real institutions in a 
fully social context such an account invites us to compare the choices and decisions made in 
the real world with those which would have been made had the strictures of ideal theory been 
met. Thus, returning to the hypothetical account offered earlier, we are invited to compare 
her choices and the social outcomes attending those choices with the choices and the outcomes 
which would have obtained had her choices been made under ideal theory conditions. 
Under ideal theory her choices in work, leisure and consumption would apparently 
have been made without regard to human relationships, most particularly her relationships with 
her husband and children and her obligations to them. She would simply have sought to satisfy 
her own preferences in terms of work, leisure and consumption as fully as possible, given the 
preferences of others. We are, after all, using as a theoretical model the choices which would 
In Rawls, 'Justice as Fairness', /oc. cit., Rawls argues that, given the nature of modern 
constitutional democracies it is essential that 'the public conception of justice should 
be, so far as possible, independent of controversial philosophical and religious doctrines,' 
that we must, in effect, 'apply the principle of toleration to philosophy itself.' See p. 223. 
Dworkin makes the same point when he asserts that 'liberalism does not rest on any 
special theory of personality, . . . . the liberal conception of equality is a principle of 
political organization that is required by justice, not a way of life for individuals. . . See 
Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, loc. cit., 203. 
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have been made by adult castaways seeking to divide resources fairly among themselves. Had 
her choices actually been made upon this basis, she would have no cause for complaint. When 
we compare hypothetical ideal theory outcomes with real world outcomes, however, she 
remains significantly disadvantaged. A further problem which arises in bridging the gap 
between ideal theory and the real real world and is the fact that, in the real world, both men 
and women do, on the whole, prefer to engage in relationships with others and to have 
children, yet when these facts are reintroduced at the ideal theory level, the problems which 
the ideal theory account was designed to circumvent reappear. The important and difficult 
issues concerning the structure of a just community arise precisely because our choices in the 
real world and the choices at ideal theory level seem incommensurable. When this difficulty is 
linked with the basic egalitarian presumption that all individuals (irrespective of race, class, 
gender or role) ought, in principle, to have their interests equally considered and represented 
in political society, the public-private distinction is stretched to the breaking point. 
The problem with such accounts is not their reliance upon an artificial account of 
human nature and motivation coupled with an inadequate set of assumptions concerning what 
we know about ourselves and about others, but the way in which these assumptions reinforce a 
highly questionable distinction between our private and public lives, between the catalogue of 
public virtues we regard as fundamental to justice, and the concrete forms of life our beliefs 
concerning truth and the status of values lead us to strive to realize. It is not being suggested 
that such an account is sceptical or indifferent to truth, nor that in striving to avert conflict 
upon questions in respect of which political agreement appears unlikely it becomes merely 
prudential although this second issue will be addressed subsequently. Rather, it is argued that 
until such assumptions are re-examined, and reasoning proceeds upon the basis that the 
requirements of justice are the minimal requirements of a sociability which respects our real or 
potential equality in all contexts, not merely political life, and wider and more comprehensive 
moral theories add to and elaborate upon these acicnowledgedly minimal requirements, little 
progress will be made. 
Initially, Dworkin attempted to address the proper role of preferences or beliefs about 
the nature of the good life in political decision making through a distinction between personal 
preferences - a desire that certain goods or services be available for one's own enjoyment - and 
political or external preferences - preferences that social goods or services be either denied to 
or provided to others. Against the background of public decision making roughly based upon 
preference utilitarianism, he argued that despite the egalitarian appearance of decisions made 
in this way they were actually profoundly anti-egalitarian, in that if external preferences were 
taken into account equally with purely personal preferences 
the chance that anyone's preferences have to succeed will then depend, not only 
on the demands that the personal preferences of others nzake on scarce 
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resources, but on the respect or affection they have for him or for his way of 
hre.61 
While Dworkin acknowledges that often (I would suggest always) 'personal and external 
preferences are so inextricably tied together, and so mutually dependent'62 that coherent 
discrimination between them is impossible, he uses this further elaboration to suggest that 
upon issues where this is likely, majoritarian decision making is impermissible. 
Recently, he has offered an intimately related distinction based, not upon preference 
utilitarianism, but upon his own theory of equality of resources. He now argues that political 
decisions fall into two distinct types or classes, 'those involving mainly . . . choice-sensitive 
issues, and those involving mainly choice-insensitive issues. ,63 Choice-sensitive issues are 
those in which, as a matter of political morality, the right answer depends upon consideration 
of the character and distribution of communal preferences, whereas choice-insensitive issues 
are those such as the availability of the death penalty or those concerning racial discrimination 
in which, again as a matter of political morality, preferences ought not be taken into account. 64 
I conclude from this elaboration, albeit tentatively, that he may have concluded that the 
distinction between personal and external preferences is unworkable. If I read his current 
arguments correctly, in areas in which decision making is choice-sensitive what is relevant is 
the character and distribution of the preferences actually held. Whether those preferences are 
personal or external is irrelevant, perhaps because the distinction is too fragile to do the work 
required of it.65 Where an issue is potentially choice-insensitive, however, this question is 
likely in and of itself to be a matter of controversy within the community. Dworkin argues that 
the question of whether or not a particular issue ought to be treated as choice-insensitive is 
itself choice-insensitive, and that it is precisely these issues which, in a constitutional 
democracy, ought to be determined by judicial review rather than by some variant on the 
democratic process. Whereas judicial review is profoundly anti-democratic if used to set aside 
political decisions which ought, for the sake of accuracy, to depend upon the nature of 
preferences within the community, it furthers the goals of democracy where it has the capacity 
to improve the accuracy of political decisions, as in choice-insensitive issues. This group of 
61 	Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, loc. cit., 235. More generally see pp. 234-239. 
62 	Ibid., 236. 
63 	Dworkin, 'Political Equality', /oc. cit., 24. 
64 	While Dworkin offers us little concrete help in characterising issues as falling into 
either group, his overall use of the distinction strongly suggests that issues of 
distributive justice are fundamentally issues of social policy and therefore choice-
sensitive, while issues such as racial or religious discrimination and capital punishment 
are choice-insensitive. See 'The Place of Liberty', /oc. cit., 51-52 and the further 
discussion of this distinction in Chapter 11. 
65 	For a cogent appraisal of the problematical nature of the distinction between personal 
and external preferences, see West, 'Liberalism Rediscovered', /oc. cit., 714-722. 
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political decisions, Dworkin argues, are characteristically issues of principle, and on such issues 
the preferences of a majority ought to be irrelevant. An accurate decision upon such matters 
ought not depend in any significant way upon the attitudes and preferences actually present in 
the community. 
The political agnosticism advocated by Dworlcin's liberalism is in that way stringently 
limited. While certain decisions ought, as a matter of political morality, depend substantially 
upon the distribution of preferences within the community, others depend, not upon the 
distribution of preferences, but upon the concrete content of the basic requirement that 
government treat all its citizens with equal concern. Dworkin initially identified the 
fundamental obligation of government as one of treating its citizens with equal concern and 
respect, however, in more recent writings the references to respect have been dropped.66 It 
may be that Dworkin now perceives that distinction to have been superseded by the division 
between choice-sensitive and choice-insensitive issues. If recognition of the capacity for 
forming and acting upon intelligent conceptions of a worthwhile life for ourselves once 
identified with equal respect is best acknowledged by accurate determination of choice-
sensitive issues and a political process which distributes political impact approximately equally 
in respect of such issues, this might be the case. 67 
Despite this, questions remain. As Dworkin acknowledges, determination of whether 
a given issue is choice-sensitive or choice-insensitive will itself be controversial. Dworkin 
suggests that choices concerning whether public resources ought to be expended on freeway 
construction or on a sports centre epitomize choice-sensitive issues. These are policy 
decisions, decisions concerning the proper allocation of scarce public resources given broad 
communal goals. On similar reasoning, choices between funding for business development 
66 	In this context, it is critical to note that whereas in Taking Rights Seriously, loc. cit., 
esp. Ch. 6 & 9, Dworkin emphasized a 'right to equal concern and respect' in more 
recent writings, including Law's Empire, loc. cit., esp. 195-206, and 'Political Equality', 
/oc. cit., he refers explicitly to a right to equal concern only. I believe the alteration to 
be of some significance, given that in Taking Rights Seriously, ibid., 272, Dworkin 
explicitly identified the right to equal concern with our human capacity for suffering 
and frustration, and the right to equal respect with our capacity for forming and acting 
on intelligent conceptions of how our life should be lived. See the discussion to be 
found in Ch. 6 & Ch. 11 of the ways in which equality of resources attempts to 
distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate preferences. 
67 	I must note, however, that Dworkin's apparent abandonment of equal respect, an 
abandonment particularly noticeable in his account of associative obligations, seems 
to me to weaken substantially the egalitarian impact of his overall theory. Cf. his 
account in Law's Empire, loc. cit., 204-205 of the possibility that a patriarchal family 
which sincerely believed that women were equal might, nonetheless, also believe that 
equal concern required paternalistic protection for girls and women in all aspects of 
family life. Even were such attitudes consistent with equality of concern, the kind of 
paternalism involved explicitly denies that girls and women are entitled to equal 
respect. Their capacity for forming and acting on intelligent conceptions of how their 
lives should be lived appears to be irrelevant. See the detailed discussion of this issue 
in Ch. 6, and, further, in Ch. 11. 
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grants, construction of day care centres and shelters for the victims of family violence would 
also seem to be choice-sensitive. As Dworkin notes, though such decisions involve a wide 
variety of issues, ranging 
from issues of distributive justice to . . . sound environmental policy, 
information about how many citizens want or will use or will benefit directly or 
indirect4, om each of the rival facilities is plainly relevant, and may well be 
decisive. 
Despite this, it may well be that the need for more and more adequate day care centres and 
the need for more accessible and adequate refuges for victims of domestic violence are 
implicated in a fundamental way in the broader question of substantive equality for women 
and are issues in which the apparently abandoned distinction between personal preferences 
and external preferences may be directly relevant. Communal attitudes toward increased 
funding for day care centres, for example, may well be profoundly dependent upon attitudes 
concerning working mothers, beliefs concerning traditional family roles, assumptions regarding 
the need of young children for constant maternal attention, and attitudes concerning the 
impact of women in the workforce upon male employment. Likewise, attitudes concerning 
increased funding for women's refuges may well depend upon beliefs concerning the 
prevalence and nature of domestic violence, the responsibility of victims of such violence for 
provoking or instigating it, and still extant beliefs that a married woman has a duty to remain 
with her husband irrespective of his violent conduct. 69 Ought such issues then be perceived as 
choice-insensitive, as comparable to a decision concerning the legitimacy of capital punishment 
or racial discrimination in employment? If the connection drawn between the distinction 
Dworkin currently draws between different types of political decisions and his earlier 
distinction between personal and external preferences is correct it would appear so. If, on the 
other hand, this interpretation is flawed, if political morality requires that this sort of choice, 
one which seemingly involves a decision about which policies would offer the greatest benefits 
to the community as a whole, be made, at least in part, on the basis of community preferences, 
irrespective of whether these preferences are personal or external, it may be that policy 
decisions such as this, together, perhaps with a policy decision to restructure the taxation 
system to encourage greater market participation by women and greater family participation 
by men must depend upon altered community attitudes concerning appropriate ways of 
structuring family responsibilities and family life. All our preferences, even those as 
apparently individual and personal as, for example, sexual preferences, are inextricably linked 
with our view of our own positions and with how we wish to relate to others, how we see 
ourselves with respect to others. Preferences are neither formed in isolation nor can they be 
68 	Dworkin, 'Political Equality ', /oc. cit., 24. 
69 	Women's Budget Statement 1989-90, loc. cit. 20 notes that one-fifth of Australians 
condone male violence against partners and one-third regard domestic violence as 
private and outside the scope of community responsibility. 
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realized in isolation. Rather, they are an expression of the ways we wish to live in company 
with others. It follows, of course, that, to the extent that social policy issues such as those 
canvassed above are characterized as choice-sensitive issues, Dworkin has not successfully 
eliminated the difficulties raised by the earlier distinction between personal and external 
preferences. Many communities might well prefer that scarce resources be devoted to 
recreational facilities or to a concerted effort to eradicate violent street crime, rather than to 
the provision of adequate child care or protection for women against violence in the home. 
The real problem is very simple. Within the framework advocated by Dworkin, most 
legislative decisions are fairly clearly policy decisions, and this group includes many decisions 
which appear vital to attaining some measure of distributive justice for women. Dworkin does 
argue that 
people have a right, against this type of collective justification, that certain 
sources or types of preferences or choices not be allowed to count in that way. It 
insists that preferences that are rooted in some form of prejudice against one 
group can never count in favor of a policy that includes the disadvantage of that 
'10 group. 
This clearly prohibits policy decisions which disadvantage women and which can only be 
justified on the basis of communal attitudes arising out of prejudice or stereotype. It does not, 
however, seem to go beyond this and insist upon positive programs designed to ameliorate a 
social and legal history of profound disadvantage. 
Attempts to justify the social welfare state depend fundamentally upon the assumption 
that a coherent distinction can be made between disadvantages which arise from the 
circumstances of the individual and for which he or she has no personal responsibility and 
those which reflect individual choice. It appears in many different guises, in Dworlcin's 
distinction between a person and his circumstances which 'assigns his tastes and ambitions to 
his person and his physical and mental powers to his circumstances' and even more significantly 
in the argument that the distribution of resources must be ambition-sensitive, must reflect the 
cost or benefit to others of the choices people make, but not endowment-sensitive, in that it 
must not reflect differences of ability as between people with similar ambitions. A similar 
logic is at work in Rawls' emphasis upon the need to compensate for differences which are 
arbitrary from a moral point of view. 71 What is, perhaps, not quite fully understood is the 
Dworkin, Law's Empire, loc. cit., 386. For a full discussion of the critical tools equality 
of resources makes available for such distinctions, see Ch. 11. I believe that 
Dworkin's current distinction is much more narrowly drawn than the distinction 
between personal and external preferences. 
The quoted passage may be found in Dworkin, 'Equality of Resources', /oc. cit., 302, 
the distinction between an ambition-sensitive distribution and an endowment-sensitive 
distribution at pp. 311-314. Rawls develops the idea that natural advantages and the 
advantages bestowed by family wealth and tradition are morally arbitrary in Rawls, A 
Theory of Justice, loc. cit., 100-108. See also Rawls, 'The Priority of the Right and 
Ideas of the Good', /oc. cit., 257 n. 7 where Rawls suggests that leisure might be 
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relationship between these contemporary formulations and the traditional mind-body 
distinction. Our ambitions, our preferences, our choices are characterized as willed, as, at 
some level, conscious and rational decisions for which we ought to be accountable. Dworkin 
emphasizes this when he states that 
we want to develop a scheme of redistribution . . . that will neutralize the effects 
of differential talents, yet preserve the consequences of one person choosing an 
occupation, in response to his sense of what he wants to do with his life, that is 
more expensive for the community than the choice another makes. 72 
I have no quarrel with the moral point Dworkin is making. He is quite correct, individuals 
ought to be held accountable for the consequences to the community of their freely willed 
decisions. While I question the degree to which it is proper to describe many of our choices as 
freely willed, and would argue that certain significant fife-choices and decisions are at least as 
significantly a by-product of our gender roles, I do not dispute the emphasis upon moral 
responsibility. This description seems utterly inadequate, even bizarre, when we consider the 
occupational choice made by a woman who chooses devote a period of eight or ten years to 
nurturing children and to domestic labour. Is this, somehow, a more expensive choice than 
others she might have made? Certainly, from her perspective, particularly if her marriage 
fails, the costs are immense. In the long run, through increased social welfare costs, etc., her 
choice may well be vastly more expensive for the community as a whole. It may even be that, 
when we consider the resources expended upon education and training, her failure to utilise 
her education and training to its full imposes a significant cost when communal 
underutilisation of human resources is considered. On the other hand, the work she has done 
may well be more valuable than that done by Wilt Chamberlain - to use Nozick's famous 
example. The problem seems to be, not that the work she actually has done is not valuable, 
but that the structure of equality of resources has difficulty in capturing its value. It may well 
adequately account for the 'value' of the services provided by movie stars, star basketball 
players, and captains of industry, but it cannot begin to account for the 'value' of those services 
which have been provided `costlessly' within the confines of the household, in part because it 
relies upon a competitive market in which the interaction of the preferences of the entire 
community determines the true cost of goods and services. This, in turn, becomes both critical 
and problematical when we recognize that this particular difficulty in assigning value is 
inextricably linked with our social construction of gender and gender roles, with deeply 
embedded cultural traditions which have shaped and continue to shape the preferences 
expressed. If those traditions and norms themselves situate men and women very differently, 
and that difference is productive of profound disadvantage, we must confront the possibility 
that the preferences flowing from them are inadmissible in an egalitarian context, 
included among the primary goods, and that the extra leisure enjoyed by those who 
choose not to work would disentitle them to support from public funds. 
72 	See Dworkin, 'Equality of Resources', /oc. cit., 313. See Dworkin's discussion of this 
example, ibid., 336-7. 
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fundamentally corrupt, a conclusion which ultimately calls into question many, perhaps most of 
the preferences held by individuals. 
A further difficulty arises from the ambiguity of the account provided. Dworkin is 
dearly addressing goods and services offered within the institutional framework of a 
competitive economic market. There is no market in the ordinary sense for services provided 
within the home in the context of an ongoing relationship, indeed, Dworkin's account of 
associative obligations seemingly renders treating such (ideally mutual) decisions as 
childbearing, childrearing and the allocation of domestic responsibilities as in any way 
contractual irrational. Neither alternative suppliers nor alternative purchasers are readily 
available, and, perhaps as a consequence, bargaining becomes profoundly difficult, often 
illusory. One issue which becomes critical in this context concerns the role of bargaining in 
establishing a 'true community' and the place of bargaining within such a community. 73 The 
last paragraph emphasized the 'costs' involved in the domestic role, both on a personal and 
communal level. This is not, however, the only interpretation available within the framework 
of equality of resources. If focus shifts to those women who have chosen dual careers, who are 
committed to workforce participation and also bear and rear children, this as well might, from 
a quite different perspective be characterized as a 'more expensive choice'. It may be that dual 
commitments can also be characterized as more expensive choices in the sense that workplace 
efficiency may be compromised, that communal provision for dependents, including children, 
the disabled and the aged, becomes essential, and that the home environment may be less 
palatable, particularly where domestic servicing remains the responsibility of the woman. That 
choice as well might, on this interpretation, be characterized as one which is more expensive 
for the community. 
Even Dworkin's attempted distinction between 'endowments' and the choices in 
utilizing these talents conceals far more than it reveals. Our 'endowments', the bundle of 
talents and abilities each individual possesses, reflect, at least for Dworkin, not our choices but 
our physical beings, our personal resources. Despite this, Dworkin himself acknowledges that 
talents and ambitions are reciprocal, our ambitions depending significantly upon our perceived 
talents, and our realized talents depending to some extent upon our ambitions 74, but addresses 
only tangentially an issue which seems even more fundamental. The conception of a talent is a 
social conception, a bundle of developed and structured capabilities which is valued by a 
73 	Dworkin is at pains to deny that associative community is, in any sense, contractual, 
indeed, in discussing friendship he specifically notes that if the reciprocity between 
community members becomes too specific and concrete, if the precise nature of the 
obligations between friends ceases to be an open question and a matter of 
interpretation friendship would be possible only between people who shared a detailed 
conception of friendship and would become automatically more contractual and 
deliberative than it is. .. ' Law's Empire, loc. cit., 198. See Ch. 6 for further arguments 
concerning this issue. 
74 	Ibid., 313. 
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particular community at a particular point in its history. Talents do not exist in the abstract. 
The real question is whether the 'talents' presently rewarded by our acicnowledgedly imperfect 
market ought to be rewarded in the ways in which they presently are, or whether other talents 
and potentialities which are presently devalued ought to be recognized and rewarded to a 
much more substantial extent than present preferences would allow. Dworlcin's closest 
approach to this quite different issue occurs when he notes in discussing cases where the envy 
test seems not to be met that 
the desires and needs of other people provide Adrian but not Claude with a 
satisfying occupation, and Adrian has more money than Claude can have. 
Perhaps nothing that can be done, by way of political stnicture or distribution, 
to erase these differences and remove the envy entirely. [sic] We cannot, for 
example, alter the tastes of other people by electrical means so as to make them 
value what Claude can produce more and what Adrian can produce less. 15 
The formula used by Dworkin suggests that the preferences which interact to yield the 
'true' value of goods and services ought not be disturbed without some argument, form 
unspecified, which is independent of any given individual's relative position. We must maintain 
an agnostic stance with regard to the outcome of the interaction of community preferences 
unless this can be done. As he notes, the 'immigrants chose an auction, sensitive to what people 
in fact wanted for their lives, as their primary engine for achieving equality' because any other 
alternative might demand that changes with unforeseeable consequences be set in train. 76 
Dworkin notes that any social decision to alter the financial rewards available to the movie star 
might well alter the entertainment available to the entire community, thus disadvantaging 
those who prefer the fare now available. Equally, such changes are unpredictable and 
multidimensional, 
affect the prices and scarcity of different goods and opportunities that members 
of any particular class . . . will value very differently from one another. 77 
All such decisions are likely to generate profound changes in relative economic positions, 
changes which are both unpredictable and likely to produce unforeseen consequences for 
others. This does not, of course, prohibit such alterations out of hand, but any arguments 
made must not depend upon the particular position of any individual. The social and 
economic disadvantages with which I am concerned, which seem consequential upon the 
rhetorical glorification of the role of wife-and-mother and the profound economic and social 
devaluation of this same role, are implicated in a fundamental way in the structure of existing 
social, economic and political institutions. Any change would demand that we reimagine our 
75 	Ibid., 308. 
76 	Ibid., 330-331. 
77 	Ibid. 
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existing institutions, and reject much of our cultural and legal history as unworthy, as a 
consequence of attitudes which are, in and of themselves profoundly inegalitarian. This, in 
itself, as Dworkin emphasizes, is not sufficient to prohibit such changes, but arguments 
supporting them must be sustainable quite apart from any evidence concerning the relative 
disadvantage of particular individuals, unless their disadvantage stems from prejudice or other 
inegalitarian attitudes.78 
Attempting to think about such changes within the constraints of a market model 
seems arational, because the point of employing a market model lies in its capacity to 
accommodate the interaction of existing preferences and the division made between 
commercial and non-commercial activities. This is its strength and the reason it appeals to 
egalitarian liberals. Effectively, the market exists simply to facilitate the satisfaction of our 
preferences. Labour within the family is excluded from the marketplace by entrenched 
cultural and religious traditions, and the logic behind that exclusion reflects both our sense of 
what a market is and what it measures and our perception of what a family is. Are cultural 
attitudes such as these simply the concrete expression of deeply rooted prejudices, or is 
something else at work? Surely part of the appeal of the market model is the privileged place 
it accords competition, our sense that it rewards/ought to reward performance. One problem 
with extending a market model to the family is an equally strong sense that (whatever may 
have gone on in the 'marriage market' prior to the formation of a new family) family members 
ought to be pulling together, not competing. Equally, part of the appeal of the idea of market 
rewards for talent is the idea that more productive individuals ought to be rewarded for their 
productivity, that we can compare them because on some level they are competing with one 
another. Wilt Chamberlain has amassed his wealth because people are willing to utilize more 
resources to see him play basketball than they are willing to utilize to see other players. 
Nothing remotely like this occurs/is likely to occur with respect to household labour. The 
problem is not that work done within the home cannot be assigned an economic value, derived 
from the value of commercial analogues. Rather it is that a profound cultural antipathy exists 
78 	See Chapter 11 for a discussion of the difficulties inherent in categorizing the 
disadvantages inherent in present gender roles as simply the result of prejudice. 
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towards equating homemaking services with commercial analogues. 79 Our social practices, 
those Dworkin desires at least in part to affirm, deny that this connection is tenable. 
Issues such as those raised in the paragraphs above emphasize the critical importance 
of the public/private distinction. Dworkin's account of equality of resources is designed to 
show what an egalitarian distribution would be like if decision making depended solely upon 
the resources available and individual preferences for their utilisation. In the real world, of 
course, decisions are more complex. There choices are more often based upon our 
relationships with others, upon our attitudes, and upon obligations and responsibilities which 
seem not to figure in Dworlcin's hypothetical. Thus, we need to ask whether the auction itself 
anticipates these sources of distortion and attempts to ensure that they do not corrupt the 
outcome which follows or whether adjusting for externalities such as these is wholly a second 
order task. Dworkin specifies that even on the ideal theory level a number of constraints must 
be implemented if the auction is to measure true opportunity costs. First, all resources must 
be offered in as undifferentiated a form as possible to ensure maximum flexibility and respect 
for individual plans. Second, no constraints can be allowed which can be justified only upon 
grounds of religion or personal morality. Third, constraints upon freedom of choice may be 
79 	The problems involved are highlighted by the efforts of courts to find a workable 
formula for damages for injuries impairing the capacity of a wife to perform domestic 
services in jurisdictions such as England and N.S.W. where the husband's common law 
action for loss of consortium has been abrogated by statute. Trindade & Cane note 
with respect to the action for loss of consortium, an action available only to the 
husband save in South Australia where S. 33 of the Wrongs Act 1936-75 extends it to 
the wife, that the action reflects the traditional legal perception that the husband had 
a proprietary interest in his wife and that the action is explicitly for the 'loss of 
housewifely services and society.' See F.A. Trindade & P. Cane, The Law of Torts in 
Australia, Melbourne, Oxford Univ. Press, 1985, 405. The difficulties with the new 
approach, one which centres upon the loss of a capacity in the victim, are evident in 
the conflicting decisions. In Griffiths v Kirlaneyer [1977] C.L.R. 161 Gibbs J. noted at 
168-9 that a two stage inquiry was needed. The court must consider both whether the 
services were reasonably necessary, that is whether their loss would necessitate their 
replacement at a cost were they not gratuitously provided by family members, and 
second, 'is the character of the benefit which the plaintiff receives by the gratuitous 
provision of the services such that it ought to be brought into account in relief of the 
wrongdoer?' Subsequently, the N.S.W. Court of Appeal in Burniele v Cutelli [1982] 
N.S.W.L.R. 26 held that the commercial value of the services once provided by the 
plaintiff and now provided by other members of her family could not be recovered, 
Glass J. dissenting; while the Federal Court of Australia held in Hodges v Frost (1984) 
53 A.L.R. 373 that such compensation was proper where the need went beyond minor 
rearrangements. Kirby J., delivering the judgment of the Court, explicitly noted that it 
was impossible to disentangle those services referable solely to the husband's needs 
from those which benefited the household as a whole. See p. 391. Similarly, Allan has 
noted that household labour is structurally differentiated from paid work in precisely 
the three characteristics which signify 'real' productive work. Within the household 
the distribution of material rewards is divorced from the wage form, no clear 
boundaries of space and time exist between work and non-work, and work is not fully 
socialized in that it need not be coordinated with the work activities of others. See 
Allan, /oc. cit., 32. Dworkin apparently shares this antipathy. See Ch. 6 for a 
discussion of the difficulties which arise when we attempt to integrate equality of 
resources, which pushes us inexorably towards a contractual account of marriage, and 
associative obligations, which attempts to escape the contractual paradigm. 
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implemented to correct for externalities in a way which attempts to even out the windfalls 
which result. Fourth, a principle of authenticity would ensure that individuals had the 
maximum possible freedom to 
engage in activities crucial to forming and reviewing the convictions, 
commitments, associations, projects, and tastes they bring to the auction, and 
after the auction, to the various decisions akRut production and trade that will 
reform and redistribute their initial holdings.' 
Finally, the principle of independence would rule out any baseline constraints which could only 
be justified upon the grounds of prejudice and would put in place systematic constraints 
designed to place the victims of prejudice in the position they would occupy if prejudice did not 
exist.81 In Chapter 11 I argue for one possible constraint, a stipulation that an egalitarian 
distribution would treat responsibility for necessary household labour and parenting as equally 
shared and would assume that individuals exercised their preferences in respect of the 
appropriate balance of work, leisure and consumption against this baseline constraint. 
THE CHANGED ROLES OF FAMILY AND STATE 
The bureaucratic social welfare state of egalitarian theory has in significant respects 
upended the classical relationship between the family and the state. It has usurped to an 
increasing extent the traditional roles of the household, at least as these were perceived in 
classical theories, and undertaken to meet the economic and social needs of citizens. 
Traditionally, the household was the basic economic unit, had virtually exclusive responsibility 
for the socialization and education of children, provided basic medical care, and care for the 
disabled and the aged. Today, the household is no longer a productive unit, but consumes 
goods and services produced elsewhere, and has lost much of its responsibility for the 
education of children. Its roles in the provision of medical care and support services for the 
disabled and aged are gradually being displaced. The social welfare state as family ought to 
treat its citizens as equals, enact schemes of education to mitigate the discontent which arises 
from the differential rewards accruing from market competition and employ redistributive 
taxation to mitigate the financial disadvantages of competition. Our rationality is to be 
expressed through the exercise of preferences in the marketplace, the family, the political 
sphere. As citizens we are autonomous, and must be treated with equal concern. As private 
individuals, we remain free to reject autonomy and independence, seek alternate avenues to 
personal fulfilment. One of the reasons egalitarian theories seem unable to come to grips with 
inequalities which seem to arise not from lack of talents or background opportunities or even 
overt prejudice but from social patterns and roles which are believed to be naturally ordained 
80 	Dworkin, 'The Place of Liberty', /oc. cit., 35. 
81 	Dworkin discusses the various baseline constraints essential to ensure that the auction 
reflects true opportunity costs ibid. 25-37. See also the detailed exploration of these 
concepts in Ch. 11. 
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is precisely that agnostic stance. While attempting to both liberate us from the necessity to 
adhere to any particular tradition and set of traditional lifeways and ensure that our own views 
of the good life remain open to revision, it has also diminished our capability to recognize that 
our lives ought to be lived as wholes, that what transpires in the family sets bounds to what can 
transpire in the market and in the city, just as the events of the market and the city constrain 
the possibilities within the family. Once reason and evaluation have become private, we have 
the paradoxical position that the state assumes responsibility for our bodies, but our minds are 
left to the mercies of the smaller communities and associations to which we owe our primary 
loyalties. This point has been particularly well made by MacIntyre. He comments that the 
liberal claim was to provide a political, legal, and economic framework in 
which assent to one and the same set of rationally justifiable principles would 
enable those who espouse widely different and incompatible conceptions of the 
good life for human beings to live together peaceably within the same society, 
enjoying the o,rame political status and engaging in die same economic 
relationships.' 
In the public arena, all that may be permitted is the expression of preferences, and it is for this 
reason that the ability to bargain has become crucia1. 83 MacIntyre notes that to be a liberal is 
to be committed to the belief that there can be no overriding good, but rather only a range of 
goods pursued in compartmentalized spheres - political, economic, familial, artistic, athletic, 
scientific - the list is MacIntyre's. Rawls' attempt to define and defend a political conception 
of justice and his insistence that his account concerns the public institutional structure of 
society epitomizes this compartmentalization.84 The critical point, then, is that 
the liberal self is one that moves from sphere to sphere, compartmentalizing its 
attitudes. The claims of any one sphere to attention or to resources are once 
again to be determined by the summing of individual preferences and by 
bargaining. 
The critical importance of communally acceptable rules for bargaining becomes 
obvious, epitomized by Rawls' emphasis upon 'free public reason', guidelines for public inquiry 
and rules for assessing evidence based upon common sense and the (non-controversial) 
A. MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, Notre Dame, Univ. of Notre Dame 
Press, 1988, 335-336. 
Cf. Dworkin's discussion of choice-sensitive issues in both 'The Place of Liberty' and 
'Political Equality', /oc. cit. Dworkin's account emphasizes the importance of accuracy 
in deciding choice-sensitive issues, and most particularly, the need to ensure that 
bargaining is not distorted. 
See Rawls, 'Social Unity and Primary Goods', /oc. cit., 173 ff. for an account of the 
difficulty of interpersonal comparisons in questions of justice and, in particular his 
comment that, 'in a democratic society, then, the one good must be conceived as 
subjective, as the satisfaction of desire or preferences' at p. 182. 
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procedures and methods of science.85 Similarly, Dworkin devotes much of his recent work on 
equality of resources to attempting to establish appropriate ground rules or constraints upon 
bargaining in what he terms choice-sensitive issues. 86 Maclntyre is right, and right in a way 
which reveals a great deal about the underlying reasons for the reluctance of liberal theorists 
to consider the inequality of women and the concrete social reasons for their inequality. If 
women are to be considered two options seem available. Either egalitarian ideals must be 
implemented sphere by sphere, and inegalitarian preferences deemed illegitimate in every 
sphere, or the prevailing compartmentalization must be broken down. Either way we 
ultimately collapse the distinction between public and private. The real difference is one of 
method, not outcome, and in Chapter 6 I endeavour to apply the former method to Dworkin's 
theory and the latter to that of Rawls. Whether we attempt to define the demands of equality 
sphere by sphere or whether we acknowledge that the demands of equality apply equally to 
every sphere we must confront the fact that what happens in the home constructs the range of 
possibilities which the market and political society can make available, that the wares purveyed 
in the marketplace at least partially construct the ways in which individual men and women 
may be perceived, and therefore, the possibilities open to them in other areas. No normal 
individual is capable of living by one set of values within the family, by another within the 
marketplace, and by yet another within the political community. The bottom line must be the 
same for each. Likewise, because we form one community, because our practical choices and 
decisions, our ways of life, shape the practical texture and fabric of that community and the life 
forms possible within it, decisions ought to be taken in full knowledge of that fact and that 
demands the evaluation of both means and ends. Doing that mandates the exercise not merely 
of instrumental rationality, the selection of appropriate means given our ends, but practical 
reasonableness, the conscious discrimination between possible ends by reference to our 
collective judgment concerning the sort of community we hope to become, and risks ruling 
many preferences out of order, destructive of our lives in common. In order to do that, we 
must first acknowledge that we have lives in common, in community with one another, and that 
we must accept responsibility for the community which we construct, not simply in terms of the 
principles it espouses but in terms of the ends which may be pursued within it. As MacIntyre 
correctly notes, the real power in any liberal order lies, not with those who express 
preferences, whether in the home or in the market, but with those who determine the 
alternatives available and the ways in which those alternatives are presented.87 
85 	Rawls, 'The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus', /oc. cit., 20. A very similar theoretical 
approach forms the basis for Dworkin's distinction between choice-sensitive and 
choice-insensitive issues discussed earlier in this chapter. 
86 	Dworkin, 'Political Equality', /oc. cit. 
87 	MacIntyre, /oc. cit., 337. More generally, for supporting arguments see ibid., Ch. 17, 
326 ff. and note Maclntyre's perspicacious comments upon the connection between 
the role given preferences and the nature of power in the liberal order at p. 345. 
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A PUBLIC ETHIC OF CARE AND RESPONSIBILITY: THE GOOD OF SOCIAL UNION 
As we saw in the last section, the underlying logic of egalitarian liberalism is clear. 
The provision of welfare rights, of judicial and political protection for those whose incapacities 
place them at a disadvantage in the marketplace, address the needs and infirmities of 
biological man. The provision of economic and social resources is aimed at meeting basic 
biological and social needs, needs which arise because people are both social and animals. 
Equally, protection for whose who are unable to defend and protect their own interests in 
competition for goods and resources addresses facts about people as natural and biological 
beings. The justification offered by Rawls is that only if these needs are socially met will 
individuals be able to realize the fundamental benefits of political and civil rights and liberties. 
The social structure ought to be ordered in a way which will enable all citizens to realize the 
worth of basic modern political guarantees. In many ways, this is very similar to the tone and 
structure of Greek theories - that these benefits are essential if man is to realize himself as a 
citizen, a man who is fully of the city. Effectively, having sought to develop a framework which 
acknowledges that all within the community are entitled to take their places as citizens, Rawls 
argues that fundamental social needs must be met if man is to realize himself as a moral 
person. He argues that the primary goods 88 ought to be interpreted as those 'things generally 
required, or needed, by citizens as free and equal moral persons' and emphasizes that needs 
differ from 'desires, wishes and likings'. Needs are objective in a way in which desires are 
not.89 Without adequate access to these goods the social background conditions and means 
essential if individuals are to pursue other, more personal ends are lacking. Rawls emphasiies 
that 'the principles of justice view citizens as responsible for their ends'9° and presume that, given 
a fair share of these goods, citizens have the capacity to adapt their own conceptions of the 
good to their anticipated collection of these goods and moderate the claims they make on 
social institutions.91 Rawls argues that although political liberalism denies the possibility of 
one overriding good, 'while justice draws the limit, the good shows the point'. 92 Thus, although 
the forms of life which may be realized within a well -ordered society are necessarily limited by 
the priority of the right, 'a political conception of justice must leave adequate room for fonns of 
88 	The primary goods include the basic liberties, freedom of movement and free choice 
of occupation against a background of diverse opportunities, powers and prerogatives 
of offices and responsibilities, income and wealth, and the social bases of self-respect. 
See Ch. 2 for a full account of the primary goods and the reasons for their choice. 
The list and the discussion in that chapter are taken from Rawls, 'Social Unity and 
Primary Goods', /oc. cit., 168. 
89 	Ibid., 172. 
90 	Ibid., 169. 
91 	Ibid., 171-172. 
92 	Rawls, 'The Priority of the Right and Ideas of the Good', /oc. cit., 252. 
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life citizens can affirm'.93 In addition, and significantly, Rawls argues that a well-ordered 
community governed by the principles of justice possesses distinctive values of its own, 'the 
virtues of fair social cooperation such as civility and tolerance, reasonableness and the sense of 
faimess'.94 Thus he argues that a well-ordered society is good in two distinctive ways. First, it 
is good for individual human beings in that it permits them to exercise the moral powers and 
secures to them justice and the social bases of mutual self-respect. Second, whenever a shared 
final end emerges a social good is realized through the cooperation and joint activity of citizens 
who recognize that they depend upon the cooperation of others. 95 While emphasizing that 
even conceptions of the good which are compatible with the basic structure may be unable to 
endure in a well-ordered society and that fact is cause for regret and for a sense of loss 96 , he 
also emphasizes that no social world is without loss. 
Several features of Rawls' structure are significant. First, he couches his account in 
representative form. The principles of justice affirmed are those which would be chosen by 
rational and indistinguishable representatives, representatives Rawls suggests ought to think of 
themselves as heads of family lines.97 Whilst Rawls intends this to suggest the 
intergenerational aspects of justice, and in particular, the responsibility of those deliberating 
the form and content of a just social order to consider those who will follow after them, the 
allusion is disquieting. In our culture, one which, until about the turn of the century, was 
patriarchal98 in legal form, social and family structures, and political attitudes, the image 
employed suggests an agreement among male heads of families to regulate competition among 
themselves for mutual benefit and for the benefit of their descendants. Conventionally, 
although this is gradually changing, women are expected/required to assume the name of their 
husband upon marriage. Cultural conventions dictate that children (other than those born 
93 	Ibid. 
94 	Ibid., 263. 
95 	Ibid., 270-271. 
96 	Given the context it may be that Rawls is acknowledging that the traditional lifeways 
of communities such as the Amish or Shakers and those of indigenous peoples are 
unlikely to survive in a well-ordered community, even if those lifeways appear 
compatible with justice. 
97 	In Rawls, 'Justice as Fairness', /oc. cit., 236-239 Rawls discusses and defends his use of 
the original position as a device of representation. The suggestion that we ought to 
view ourselves as 'heads of family lines' may be found in Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 
loc. cit., 128, and is expanded upon and elaborated at p. 292. While Rawls emphasizes 
that it is not necessary for us to think of ourselves as heads of family lines to attain the 
perspective needed to address questions of intergenerational justice, he notes that, in 
general, he prefers to follow this interpretation. 
98 	By this I mean simply that men exercised power within the political structure, within 
the economic structure, and within the family and that power in all three spheres was 
effectively reserved for men. 
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outside legal marriage) assume the name of the male parent." In a real sense, head of the 
family signifies male head, precisely because the family is gendered and the woman/family link 
hidden. It has been suggested the 'families' referred to on a theoretical level are not families 
,100 at all. 'Rather they are almost invariably the wives, mothers and sisters of such families. . . 
What is lost in the usage of the term family is the significance of the family designation, the 
degree to which an expression such as heads or representatives of family lines signifies not only 
intergenerational continuity mediated by ties of sentiment but also a particular relationship 
between the public person or head and the woman/family unit whose interests are thereby 
served. Certainly this image is explicitly supported by Rawls' acknowledgment that the 
principles appropriate to political society may be inapplicable on the micro level. Within 
political society, justice is first among virtues. 101 Within the smaller groups and structures of 
which political society is composed, justice is not only not first among virtues, but not 
necessarily a virtue at all. On the macro level, the state ought to be constituted by rational 
principles subject to the constraints of reasonableness. On the micro level affection and 
altruism predominate. 102  These virtues, the one appropriate to the city, the other appropriate 
to the household, seem mutually exclusive and on one level this is undeniably appropriate. 
Few would wish to see any return to political nepotism and its attendant social evils. On 
another level, however, given Rawls' conception of individuals as free and equal moral persons, 
it may well be that unless justice is installed as the first virtue of all human associations, the 
99 	The residual strength of such conventions has been illustrated in a series of cases 
concerning the surnames of children where the biological parents have been divorced. 
As recently as 1962 an English court held that only the father was competent to 
change the surname of an infant. See Re T (otherwise H) (an infant) [1962] 3 All E.R. 
970. In one of the more recent Australian cases, whilst the mother was allowed to 
enrol the children in school under the name of their step-father, their legal name 
remained that of their natural father and this fact was required to be noted on all 
school records. See Parkes v Parkes (1982) F.L.C. 91-231. The present Australian 
position apparently is that, if the biological parents cannot agree, only the court is 
competent to effect a change of surname. Both parents are incompetent to act 
unilaterally by virtue of the presumption of joint custody and guardianship embedded 
in the Family Law Act 1975, leaving the underlying cultural convention tacitly in place. 
100 	See G. Allan, /oc. cit., 16. 
101 	While the limitation of Rawls' theory to the macro-structure of society was implicit 
throughout Rawls, A Theory of Justice, loc. cit., it is much more explicit in Rawls, 
'Justice as Fairness', /oc. cit., where Rawls explicitly states that his is a political theory 
merely, without application to wider metaphysical or ontological debates. Cf. the 
extended discussion on this point in Nozick, /oc. cit., 204-206. 
102 	This is particularly clear in recent writings where Rawls emphasizes the distinction 
between the political and the personal and familial, which, he notes, 'are affectional 
domains, again in ways which the political is not.' Rawls, 'The Domain of the Political 
and Overlapping Consensus', /oc. cit., 242. Rawls conceives of his view of the political 
as free standing and insists that his 'aim is to specify the special domain of the political 
in such a way that its main institutions can gain the support of an overlapping 
consensus.' 
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other virtues believed characteristic of families and of other associations will become 
profoundly distorted, indeed may never flourish in any meaningful sense. 
If Rawls endeavours, through the difference principle, to incorporate in attenuated 
form something of the affection and altruism characteristic of his ideal family into the 
distributive arrangements of the well-ordered state 103, he fails to acknowledge that for the 
needs which motivate the parties and lead them to develop the difference principle to be 
defensible as fundamental they must be relevant to every area of human social life. As is well 
known, Rawls argues that, under the conditions imposed by the original position, while 
individuals are unaware of their actual social positions and goals, they nonetheless identify 
certain basic social goods as fundamental. He argues further that rational individuals would 
prefer a greater rather than a lesser share of these goods, and thus would agree that the basic 
institutional structure of society ought to be arranged to secure to the least advantaged 
individuals the greatest possible share of these goods, given equal basic liberties and fair 
equality of opportunity. In recent writings, Rawls emphasizes that 'the primary goods are 
certain features of institutions or of the situation of citizens in relation to them'. 104 These goods 
provide a basis for interpersonal comparison when dealing with questions of social justice. 
Rawls explicitly argues that the primary goods are relevant only in questions of justice dealing 
with the basic structure, and that their appropriateness in other circumstances is not to be 
assumed.105 This apparently follows from his acknowledgment that 
they are not what, from within anyone's comprehensive doctrine, can be taken 
as ultimately important: they are not, in general, anyone's idea of the basic 
values of human life. 106 [Rather, they are all-purpose means,] necessary 
conditions for realising the powers of moral personality. 07 
Leaving Rawls' acknowledgment that these goods cannot be taken to embody 
fundamental human values aside for the moment, it remains essential to question his 
reluctance to suggest wider application. He states that the conception of a fair share of the 
primary goods is intended to specify those claims which individuals may legitimately make on 
103 	Rawls explicitly notes that 'the difference principle. . . does seem to correspond to a 
natural meaning of fraternity: namely to the idea of not wanting to have greater 
advantages unless this is to the benefit of others who are less well off. The family, in its 
ideal conception and often in practice, is one place where the principle of matinzizing the 
sum of advantages is rejected. Members of a family conznzonly do not wish to gain 
unless they can do so in ways that fitrther the interests of the rest. Now wanting to act on 
the difference principle has precisely this consequence.' Rawls, A Theory of Justice, loc. 
cit., 105. 
104 	Rawls, 'Social Unity and Primary Goods', /oc. cit., 163. 
105 	Ibid. 
106 	Rawls, 'The Priority of the Right and Ideas of the Good', /oc. cit., 258. 
107 	Rawls, 'Social Unity and Primary Goods', /oc. cit., 166. 
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public social institutions. They represent, at the level of ideal theory, that which individuals 
and associations are entitled to expect. Rawls makes a further distinction in this context which 
is crucial. He argues that the public conception of justice includes a social division of 
responsibility. It follows that 
society, the citizens as a collective body, accepts the responsibility for 
maintaining the equal basic liberties and fair equality of opportunity, and for 
providing a fair share of the other primary goods for everyone within this 
framework while citizens (as individuals) and associations accept the 
responsibility for revising and adjusting their ends and aspirations in view of the 
all-purpose means they can expect, given their present and foreseeable 
situation. 108 
As was made clear earlier in this chapter, I have no wish to dispute the status of these 
goods as needs, nor is it here appropriate to question the structure of the difference principle. 
Rather, my concern centres upon the compartmentalization inherent in offering a political 
conception of justice, and Rawls' consequential reluctance to extend the applicability of his 
account beyond the basic structure of political society. Surely among those associations 
responsible to adjust ends and aspirations in light of the expected means available are families, 
given that some form of family structure appears to be a universal in human cultures. Equally, 
of course, the earliest and most persistent social division of labour is biologically based, 
specifically that between men and women. Given that, and given Rawls' acknowledgment that 
the social division of labour in the general sense must continue to exist, and his explicit 
statement that it is impossible that, even in a well-ordered society, 'everyone might filly realize 
his powers and that some at least can become complete exemplars of humanity' 109, it follows 
that justice within such associations is critical. While, in extant, relatively unjust societies such 
as our own, the biological division of labour11° and the economic division of labour 111 
together provide diminished access for women to at least two, and more probably three, of the 
five general categories of primary goods, 112 it does not follow that these social practices may 
108 	Ibid., 170. N.B. the strong parallel with Dworkin's account of the division between 
public and private responsibility, Law's Empire, loc. cit., 295-312, and the intimate 
connection between what Dworkin identifies as the community personified and Rawls' 
reference to the citizens as a collective body. 
109 	Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 529. 
110 	Women are both biologically responsible for child bearing and socially responsible for 
child rearing and other forms of domestic labour. 
111 	Occupations socially coded female as a group provide diminished economic returns 
and opportunities to develop and exercise leadership skills as well as limited 
opportunities for advancement. 
112 	Women as a group have disproportionately limited access to the powers and 
prerogatives of offices and positions of responsibility and to individual access to 
income and wealth. Concerning whether this comparative disadvantage carries over 
to the social bases of self-respect raises a more difficult issue, however the respect and 
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be called just. Given the fact of the (universal) social division of labour, and given that within 
many families this continues to dictate that the husband is either the sole or the primary 
breadwinner while the wife accepts primary responsibility for domestic labour, the need for a 
just distribution theoretically resolved within public institutions reappears. 
At this juncture, it becomes essential to consider Rawls' account of the information 
available to the parties in the original position. Rawls argues that not only do the parties not 
know particular facts about themselves such as their place in society, their natural abilities and 
so on, but also they are unaware of the particular circumstances of their own society including 
its economic or political situation. They are, however, presumed to know general facts about 
human society including an understanding of 
political affairs and the principles of economic theory . . . the basis of social 
organization and the laws of human psychology . . . . [together with] whatever 
general facts affect the choice of the principles of justice. 1i" 
It apparently follows from this that information concerning specific social forms particular to 
advanced industrial societies such as the radical separation of the sphere of production and the 
sphere of consumption together with the destruction of the productive functions of the 
household would be unavailable to the parties. Likewise, culturally specific information 
concerning the gendered division of labour conventional in our society would be unavailable. 
General information such as the biological division of reproductive labour and the role of 
family groups in providing socialization and nurture for succeeding generations would be 
available as would basic scientific information concerning the prolonged neotony of the species 
and the probable effect of this fact upon human social structures. What follows from this? It 
seems to follow that behind the veil of ignorance the parties must be aware that human 
individuals live in families, although their form and membership is variable, that human 
children require regular care and supervision for a prolonged period, and that the allocation of 
the labour involved in the care and nurture of succeeding generations forms a fundamental 
part of the social division of labour, although the concrete forms this takes may vary. What is 
equally significant is that, given this general information, nothing in either Rawls' account of 
basic social needs114 or in the structure of the two principles of justice reflects this knowledge. 
mutuality shown us by others is intimately associated with our leadership roles and 
our perceived status, and for that reason I would suggest that women are also 
comparatively disadvantaged in that respect. I should note also that in abusive 
relationships women are, not infrequently in social practice, if not theory, denied 
access to all the primary goods. 
113 	Rawls, A Theory of Justice, loc. cit., 137. The basic knowledge available strongly 
suggests that they are adult members of an intellectual elite. 
114 	It would, after all, seem reasonable to suggest that the need for nurture, one which 
arises inevitably in childhood, and at other times in the normal life cycle, is 
fundamental. Indeed, in our culture this need is primarily provided by the 
monogamous family (read woman), which Rawls has identified as one component of 
the basic structure. 
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This relative inattention is the more remarkable because Rawls emphasizes that a 
critical part of the justification for the veil of ignorance is that as a consequence of this 
rigorous restriction on the information available in determining the principles of justice 
no one knows his situation in society nor his natural assets, and therefore no 
one is in a position to tailor principles to his advantage) 
Surely, given the knowledge reasonably available to the parties, and given that the parties do 
not know their places in the social division of labour, including the labour involved in nurturing 
succeeding generations, they would wish to ensure that the socially necessary labour involved 
did not affect in any way their entitlement to a fair share of the benefits of cooperation. That 
is, an individual who was unaware whether or not he or she would bear responsibility for the 
primary care of a succeeding generation, but knew that a very large number of persons in each 
generation would have such responsibility, would wish to ensure that this would be irrelevant 
to his or her entitlement to a fair share of the benefits of cooperation, should it happen that 
such responsibility was his or hers. A relatively simple means for ensuring this would be to 
insist that the requirements of justice form a minimum standard for the conduct of social life 
generally rather than being restricted to the public institutional structure of society. 116  If 
access to the basic goods is a prerequisite for the full development of the social bases of self-
respect Rawls suggests are critical to moral personality and provide the support necessary for 
the individual to participate with zest and confidence in the activities of social cooperation, and 
if as Rawls states, 'only in the activities of social union can the individual be complete' 117 they 
must be relevant to all the various aspects of the individual life and to all the stages of the 
individual life cycle. Needs do not cease to be needs because discourse concerns the family 
rather than the city. When discourse is constricted in the way Rawls suggests, not only does 
justice forfeit much of its conceptual force, the concept of needs, and, in particular, Rawls' 
attempt to give his account of basic social needs objective status, becomes unpersuasive. The 
structural advantages of deeming these needs, rather than mere desires or preferences, lie in 
their foundational status, in the fact that Rawls presents them as the foundation which is 
necessary if we are to pursue our private ends, whatever those may happen to be. They 
represent the background conditions essential if the social bases of self-respect are to develop, 
and self-respect surely is a precondition for any meaningful form of social life. 
115 
116 
117 
Ibid., 139. 
An alternative approach, one which suggests that it may be appropriate to 
characterize women, or certain sub-groups of women, as the least advantaged group 
will be canvassed in Ch. 11, as will the effect of incorporating recognition at the 
theoretical level that responsibilities in respect of subsequent generations ought be 
equally shared as one of the burdens of social cooperation. See Ch. 6. 
Rawls, 'The Basic Liberties and Their Priority', /oc. cit., 36. 
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In many ways, Rawls' attempt to offer a specifically political conception of man and of 
justice appears Greek in character. By attempting to identify the virtues essential to 
citizenship and the material conditions essential if these virtues are to flower, and by 
disclaiming all foundational epistemological and ontological assumptions Rawls seeks to retain 
the undoubted theoretical advantages of a determinate conception of human nature without 
the traditional disadvantages, including the demand for an empirical foundation. Justice both 
retains its position as first among virtues and seems ultimately less a moral stance than a 
regulatory mechanism to secure to all the benefits of social cooperation precisely because of 
Rawls' insistence that he offers an account of political justice merely. Whilst Rawls places 
great emphasis upon the fact that his account of men as free and equal moral persons is a 
specifically political conception, and that the forms of moral character and moral virtues 
affirmed characterize the 
ideal of a good citizen of a democratic state - a role specified by its political 
institutions [he also emphasizes] that the political virtues must be distinguished 
from the virtues that characterize ways of life belonging to comprehensive 
religious and philosophical doctrines, as well as from the virtues falling under 
various associational ideals. .. and those appropriate to roles in family life and 
to the relations between individuals)-18 
Yet, given the critical importance to all forms of egalitarian social life of such virtues 
as civility and tolerance, reasonableness and a sense of fairness, and given the inherent appeal 
of a conception of human beings generally as free and equal moral persons capable of 
cooperating with others over an entire life, it remains difficult to understand why these 
undeniably important virtues ought not be acknowledged as fundamental principles applicable 
to all forms of social organi7ation. Certainly, I can think of no better foundation for family life 
than those virtues and that understanding of ourselves as persons. While, undeniably, there 
ought be much more to family life than these virtues suggest, without such a foundation, 
understood and affirmed by all, there is likely to be very much less, perhaps nothing at all 
worth preserving. It is this reluctance to affirm a wider basis, indeed, abandonment of the 
hope that a wider basis can be found, given what Rawls terms the social fact of pluralism, 
which leads me to conclude that despite Rawls' sustained attempt to demonstrate the existence 
of distinctively political goods, his attempt to establish that his overlapping consensus is not a 
mere modus vivendi fails. 
Just as the instrumental state has replaced the polis, an instrumental view of private 
relationships increasingly predominates over an ethical view. Political relationships and 
political justice exist, not because these are profoundly worthy goods in and of themselves, but 
because they secure the socially cooperative relationships essential if men and smaller 
communities are to pursue their own ends. So too with the family. The exclusion of family 
118 	Rawls, The Priority of the Right and Ideas of the Good', ioc. cit., 253. 
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relationships from the relationships and requirements of civil society explicit in early liberalism 
has become axiomatic in Rawls. Seemingly, and perhaps as a necessary consequence, all such 
relationships are among those conceptions of the good we are at liberty to decide upon and to 
revise in accord with our plans of life. When this is combined with the blanket of privacy with 
which family relationships are conventionally shrouded, and which Rawls apparently has no 
wish to disturb, the ultimate effect is that the state dictates the terms of birth of the legal 
family and signs its death certificate while simultaneously attempting to deny that issues of 
justice arise within its domain. Certainly, in Rawls' only direct references to the political 
significance of family groups, while he acknowledges that the family is a barrier to attaining 
fair equality of opportunity, he also notes that he does not believe this to be significant so long 
as justice obtains between family groups. 119 In that, perhaps, he may be thought to give away 
too much, to betray his own best instincts. Surely the abolition of families on the one hand and 
reconciliation to the (unalterable?) conditions of human life on the other are not the only 
alternatives. We might, after all, strive to realize just families as well as justice among them, 
indeed might recognize that unless we can secure justice within families it is profoundly 
unlikely that we will attain just institutions within the wider community. It is, after all, within 
our families that we become free and equal moral persons, if, indeed, we ever do. 
Perhaps of equal concern is the fact that the interests given credence in his structure 
are clearly those of adult individuals who perceive themselves to be independent. While their 
role as representatives suggests that they may be responsible for others, that is, have others 
who depend upon them, they themselves are fully independent and attempt to secure for 
themselves a fair share of social goods and resources in part at least to enable themselves to 
remain so. They are individuals whose needs qua citizens can be met by the provision of 
certain goods, and, by implication, are competent to secure whatever other goods they may 
119 	Rawls, A Theory of Justice, loc. cit. 74, and esp. 511-12. In acknowledging that the 
family may be a barrier to attaining equality of fair opportunity, Rawls emphasizes the 
variation between families in terms of social and moral training and the inevitable 
influence of these upon motivation and the development of natural aptitudes. He 
does not, however, acknowledge the role of gender and, perhaps, other forms of 
preferential treatment in modelling the aspirations and ambitions of individuals, even 
within the same family. Rawls observes at pp. 511-12 that while the idea of equal 
opportunity suggests the need to abolish the family, 'within the context of the theory of 
justice as a whole, there is much less urgency to take this course. . . . the 
principles of fraternity and redress are allowed their appropriate weight, the natural 
distribution of assets and the contingencies of social circumstances can more easily be 
accepted. We are more ready to dwell upon our good fortune now that these differences 
are made to work to our advantage, rather than to be downcast by how much better off 
we might be had we had an equal chance along with others if only all social barriers had 
been removed. The conception of justice . . . seems more likely than its rivals . . . to 
reconcile us to the disposition of the natural order and the conditions of human life.' 
Rawls, it seems to me, gives away far too much in these passages, particularly in 
seeing the only alternatives as abolition and acceptance. To reform the family, to 
encourage the realization of just families as a basis for a just social order, seems a 
reasonable (and rational) alternative (in his sense of those words) to both abolition 
and resigned acceptance. 
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require for a full life unaided. What, one might ask, of those who cannot? Is justice not due 
them as well? Are they not also citizens, entitled to a fair share of basic social goods including 
120 the good of the social bases of self-respect? - 
THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DISTINCTION IN CONTEMPORARY THEORY 
We have, in looking at the theories of both Rawls and Dworkin, recognized that both 
assume, essentially without argument, a fundamental distinction between the public and 
private spheres. Both argue for public responsibility, for redistribution to ensure that all 
(adult) individuals have adequate resources to meet their needs and to participate fully in their 
community. Both simultaneously argue for private freedom, for a sphere of life, epitomized by 
the family, in which individual choices and decisions depend solely upon the preferences of the 
individual. Yet, not only does the foundation for the distinction between public and private 
becomes elusive once political structures are committed to meeting basic social needs, but also 
we are forced to confront the social fact that, even within the family, the freedom of one 'free 
and equal moral person' may involve the denial of that freedom to one or more others. It 
becomes necessary to re-evaluate what this distinction signifies in our culture, explore what we 
seek to protect by this division and whether it is worthy of protection. In Greek theory, as we 
saw, the division between public and private spheres was thought to mirror that between mind 
and body, between man realizing himself as a rational being and man satisfying various 
biological and emotional needs. The paradigm shift heralded by the emergence of liberal 
theories maintained the division between public and private intact, but explained it in very 
different terms. Ideas of human excellence had changed, as had the symbolic significance of 
rationality. Debate, public deliberation among equals and political action had diminished in 
importance. Classic liberal theorists such as Hobbes and Locke emphasized, not civic virtue, 
but contract and market competition. The equality sought was not the equality of citizens 
deliberating together to chart a course for their community, but that of market actors each 
seeking to satisfy his wants as efficiently as possible. The state existed to regulate competition 
within the marketplace and to protect property interests, thus contracting the role of politics. 
Man as a political animal was replaced by man as an economic animal. His nature was most 
fully realized in competitive relations within the market, in the exercise of instrumental 
rationality. The market, not the city, became the sphere of freedom. If the state was 
conceptualized as public, civil society including the market had become the sphere of private 
freedom. The household had gradually been stripped of its economic functions and 
reconceptualized as a site of leisure presided over by wife/mother. It stood outside both state 
120 	This possibility is, of course, addressed by Rawls in his principle of paternalism. 
Rawls, A Theory of Justice, loc. cit., 248-251. Curiously, Rawls, in his discussion of 
paternalism, fails totally to consider the possibility that nurture is a basic human need. 
See Ch. 6 for a comprehensive discussion of the principle of paternalism, and, in 
particular, an argument that, fully applied to, for example, family life and the 
education of children, it as well has the capacity to shatter the distinction between 
public and private. 
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and civil society, had become private in a new and different sense, present to the state and civil 
society only through its relationship to the male head of household. 
The emergence of the modern social welfare state, and the development of egalitarian 
liberal ideologies signal yet another paradigm shift. Once public authorities engage in the 
provision of private needs, the state is authorized to assume many of the traditional functions 
of both the household and the marketplace. Specifically, the state meets needs, facilitates and 
regulates the distribution of goods and services, attempts to ensure that the allocation is fair. 
Nowhere is this collapse of the public - private distinction more marked than in the increasing 
assumption of responsibility by the state for the social and economic well-being of single 
parent families, particularly those headed by women)' Effectively, with the disintegration of 
many traditional family and communal groups, the state is being compelled to assume financial 
(and, in some cases, moral and social) responsibility for the aged, for children, for women 
whose personal and employment backgrounds render them unable to compete in the 
marketplace. 
A further difficulty arises because of the nature of egalitarian ideals. The move from 
formal equality to substantive equality, together with the collapse of the idea that the members 
of the smaller groups and associations within any community necessarily possess an identity of 
interests, so that the interests of any one individual may be equated with the interests of the 
group, has highlighted the importance of the work of theorists such as Rawls who postulate 
basic social goods as common interests of all citizens. He argues that because these basic 
interests are essential means to all more particular ends it is proper to view them as common 
to all citizens. He argues further that it follows that because a rational individual (one who 
seeks to further his own interests to the greatest extent possible) would prefer that he have 
more rather than less of these goods, individuals who are also reasonable and who realize that 
social cooperation is essential to the well being of all would recognize that they can only expect 
the willing cooperation of others upon terms which are fair to all. This account of fundamental 
interests, interests derived from, as Rawls emphasizes, a particular conception of the individual 
as a free and equal moral person emphasizes two powers, 
the capacity to honor fair terms of cooperation and thus to be reasonable [and 
the] capacity to form, to revise, and rationally pursue . . . a conception of what 
we regard for us as a worthwhile human life [and thus to be rational]. 122 
Rawls argues that 'the primary goods are necessary conditions for realizing the moral powers >123 
and emphasizes that their characterization does not rest upon historical or social fact. Hence, 
121 	Women's Budget Statement 1989-90, loc. cit., 208. 
122 	See generally Rawls, 'The Basic Liberties and Their Priority', /oc. cit. The quotations 
may be found at p. 16. 
123 	Ibid. 22. 
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the primary goods emphasize the basic liberties, freedom of movement and free choice of 
occupation, the powers and prerogatives of offices and positions of responsibility, income and 
wealth, and the social bases of se1f-respect. 124 The primary goods delineate those social and 
material conditions needed if individuals are to participate in public life with zest and 
confidence. Rawls fails to acknowledge as equally foundational those 'private goods', for 
example, care and nurture, essential if we are to become public persons and the effect their 
provision may have upon the access of some individuals to the primary goods. While he 
undoubtedly recognizes the importance of love and care in the development of the moral 
sentiments, and ultimately of a sense of justice, 125 his failure to analyse private social 
arrangements leads him to disregard the effect of family arrangements upon the access of 
individual family members to the goods he deems basic. We are here dealing with a political 
conception of the person rather than a wider moral conception. The primary goods reflect the 
interests of individuals who construe themselves as independent and see themselves as able to 
secure the cooperation of others upon fair terms, that is, terms which enable them to maintain 
their independence within cooperative public relationships based upon mutual respect. Yet, if 
the primary goods form the social and material base for just political relationships, 
relationships based upon cooperation and mutual respect, it is difficult to understand why 
Rawls is so reluctant to suggest a wider moral basis. Given that Rawls explicitly identifies 
guaranteed access to the primary goods with realizing our moral powers, and given that our 
lives as citizens represent but a small fragment of our lives as a whole, it can be argued that, on 
the basis of his own analysis, they are critical to all aspects of our lives in community. Surely, 
as important as cooperation and mutual respect undoubtedly are within the well-ordered 
community, they are yet more important within smaller and more intimate associations where 
the dangers of abuse and overreaching are much greater. If we are not free and equal moral 
persons within our families and do not receive the care and nurture essential if we are to 
become such, the likelihood that we will act as such within the wider community is slim indeed. 
Whilst we may well be much more than this model suggests, on no account ought we be less. 
Yet nothing approaching this model has ever, in theory or in practice, been applied to the 
relationships within family groups, whether formal or informal. If Rawls is right (and I believe 
he is) about the connection between a fair share of the benefits of social cooperation and full 
realization of our moral powers, surely it is of critical importance that none be excluded. Fair 
terms within a traditional family would seemingly require that the homemaker enjoy access to 
resources equivalent to that presently enjoyed by the breadwinner together with the freedom 
and leisure time to permit access to what Rawls characterizes as the powers and prerogatives 
of offices and positions of responsibility. In families in which both parents worked, the terms 
would be different. The message is this. As Rawls recognizes, independent access to certain 
124 	Ibid. 22-23. See also Rawls, 'Social Unity and Primary Goods', /oc. cit., and Rawls, A 
Theory of Justice, loc. cit., 92-95, 142-145, 253, 260 and 433-439. 
125 	Rawls, A Theory of Justice, loc. cit., 462-479. 
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social and material goods is critical to full participation in contemporary society and the moral 
and social benefits attendant upon this. These goods are not optional extras, but 'necessary 
conditions for realizing the moral powers'. 12'6  Those who lack this access are deprived of much 
more than simply a shopping list of social goods, they are deprived of some of the means 
essential if they are to realize themselves as free and equal moral persons. 
Despite the clarity of Rawls' justification for asserting that representative individuals 
reasoning from the appropriate position would endeavour to maximize their access to the 
primary goods, and his recognition that the basic structure of society favors some starting 
places over others in the division of the benefits of social cooperation', he also argues that only 
two positions are relevant, 'that of equal citizenship and that defined by [the individual's] place 
in the distribution of income and wealth.'127 He makes two further assumptions, that other 
positions are entered into voluntarily, and that income and wealth are sufficiently correlated 
with power and authority to avoid indexing problems. The first of these assumptions is 
theoretically problematical and will be addressed later, the second is an assumption of fact 
which is open to challenge. Indeed, a part of the intent of this thesis is to challenge this 
particular factual assumption with respect to women. 
FtAWLS AND PARTIAL COMPLIANCE 
When addressing the issue of partial compliance, the application of just principles to 
an unjust social order, Rawls for the first time acknowledges that other positions may, under 
some circumstances, need to be taken into account, as when unequal basic rights are allocated 
on the basis of biological characteristics such as sex. With regard to this possibility he notes 
that 
if men are favored in the assignment of basic rights, this inequality is justified by 
the difference principle only if it is to the advantage of women and acceptable 
from their standpoint. 128 
There is an inherent, and interesting, ambiguity in this passage. Earlier, Rawls explicitly 
identified the basic rights with the principle of equal liberty and that of fair equality of 
opportunity.129 Interpreted in the light of those remarks this passage suggests that where 
unequal political rights are attached to biological characteristics the resultant inequality can be 
justified using the difference principle. That is, where biological characteristics are used to 
126 	Rawls, 'The Basic Liberties and Their Priority', /oc. cit., 22. 
127 	Rawls, A Theory of Justice, loc. cit., 96. 
128 	Ibid., 99. 
129 	Ibid., 97. I note here a certain lack of clarity in the term 'basic rights'. I take Rawls to 
mean 'those rights and liberties required by the principle of equal liberty and the principle 
of fair equality of opportunity', which p. 97 would suggest. 
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assign unequal political rights130, it will no longer be sufficient to view the justice or otherwise 
of the social order simply in terms of the position of equal citizenship and that defined by the 
individual's position in the distribution of income and wealth. Rather, in determining whether 
or not diminished access to the basic rights is acceptable, the difference principle is invoked. 
Diminished basic rights can be justified only if such can be shown to be to the advantage of the 
disfavoured group and acceptable from their perspective. Richards has commented with 
respect to this passage that 
it does seem to be one indication of the intuitive acceptability of this criterion of 
justice that men havejor centuries been justifying the subjugation of women on 
exactly this principle.' 
While Richards apparently misinterprets Rawls' qualification, in that her remark suggests that 
it is the perspective of the advantaged which is to be given weight, on another level her remark 
addresses a fundamental difficulty in Rawls' text. While economic indicators can be used to 
measure advantage in the context of the distribution of income and wealth, what form of 
similarly objective indicators are available in the context of basic political rights, and, far more 
critically, who is to be empowered to determine what constitutes an advantage given the 
absence of any form of objective index of relative advantage? Basic common law texts 
purported for some centuries to show that diminished access to basic rights was, in fact, 
positively to the advantage of women 132 and that the legal restrictions imposed were for their 
benefit. In this context, advantage becomes a very slippery concept. It is difficult to 
comprehend how, under reasonably stable conditions, diminished access could ever be to the 
advantage of those whose access was diminished thereby. 
The logic of the difference principle is more difficult to apply in the context of basic 
rights than in an economic context. While, in terms of the distribution of income and wealth, it 
may be reasonable to assume that, under the constraints provided by the difference principle, 
enhanced economic activity and development on the part of the most advantaged group will 
result in a 'larger pie' and thus advance the well being of the least advantaged group 133, it is 
130 	The explicitly political rights include freedom of thought and conscience, freedom of 
association, that freedom defined by the liberty and integrity of the person and by the 
rule of law, the political liberties, freedom of movement and free choice of 
occupation, and fair equality of opportunity. 
131 	See J.R. Richards, The Skeptical Feminist, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980, 
98. N.B. the arguments put at pp. 98-120. As Richards notes, it is never enough 
merely to prove that women are disadvantaged in comparison to men, it must also be 
shown that this is unjust. 
132 	'Even the disabilities, which the wife lies under, are for the most pan intended for her 
protection and benefit. So great a favourite is the female sex of the laws of England.' 
Kerr, Vol. I, 421. 
133 	Rawls himself makes it clear that this must be argued to justify economic inequality 
under the difference principle. See A Theory of Justice, loc. cit., 78. 
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not clear that the basic rights and liberties are 'scarce' in the same way. It is difficult to 
construct a situation in which diminished access to the basic rights would actually rebound to 
the advantage of women in the sense that equality of access to such rights would, in and of 
itself, worsen their actual position. To suppose this presupposes social conditions such that it 
would be impossible to simply extend political rights, freedom of conscience and association, 
and other basic rights to women. Rather, it seems necessary to assume that the move from 
diminished access to an equal division would result in less adequate protection for the basic 
liberties of all individuals, including the least advantaged group, a condition which might obtain 
where extension of equal rights was likely to precipitate civil or religious war or where such 
group was so disadvantaged overall that they might become a danger to themselves or to 
others, a curiously Hobbesian scenario, and one which, I would suggest, rules out the 
possibility that such a society could be characterized as nearly just. 134 
Rawls may also be suggesting that restricted access to the basic rights might under 
such circumstances be compensated for by other social advantages. This seems unlikely given 
that he elsewhere argues that liberty is to be restricted only for the sake of liberty. 135 The 
possibility remains open, however, when addressing partial compliance and is, for that reason, 
important to explore. On this interpretation, it becomes extraordinarily difficult to establish 
the appropriate perspective in the qualification 'and acceptable from their perspective'. While 
'their perspective' clearly signifies the perspective of the least advantaged group, equally 
clearly, in addressing these non-ideal theory problems one might think that we have left the 
abstraction of the original position far behind. Rawls indicates that acceptability is to be 
established by the constitutional convention or by the legislature, which suggests that the 
advantaged are empowered to establish what the least advantaged group would deem 
acceptable, and in the context of the basic rights I believe that this remains so despite Rawls' 
insistence that its members are to adopt the perspective of the least advantaged. 136 We are, 
after all, talking of basic rights, including political rights, and the relevant inequality may 
include total lack of access to the political process. The absence of any form of 'objective 
index' enhances this difficulty, indeed, foreshadows a collapse into subjective reasoning. 
Under such circumstances, I must insist that acceptability is not in fact defined from the 
perspective of the least advantaged group, but rather from that position which the 
134 	I cannot escape a sense of disquiet at a line of reasoning which suggests that where 
justice is most urgently required it is also most open to compromise. 
135 	On this interpretation Rawls would essentially be returning to what he terms a more 
general conception of justice, that is, 'all social values - liberty and oppommity, income 
and wealth, and the bases of self-respect - are to be distributed equally unless an unequal 
distribution of any, or all, of these values is to everyone's advantage.' Ibid., 62. The 
second approach may be found at p. 250. He acknowledges that the priority of liberty 
is only required under 'reasonably favorable conditions' and if conditions such as those 
described in the last paragraph prevail, this condition may well not be met. Rawls, 
'The Basic Liberties and Their Priority', /oc. cit., 11. 
136 	Rawls, A Theory of Justice, loc. cit., 248. 
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comparatively advantaged assume to represent the perspective of the least advantaged group, 
in which case Richard's critique is valid. 
If, on the other hand, the relevant perspective is the actual perspective of those whose 
liberties are curtailed, it may well be that within any given non-ideal community a substantial 
number of women might find that social advantages derived, for example, from marriage, 
provided ample compensation for a diminution in basic rights. It is well to recall that many 
advantaged women bitterly opposed the suffrage movement in England and the United States. 
Once we descend from the abstraction of the original position to perspectives characteristic of 
specific communities, perspectives which are socially created and both class and period 
specific, a reference group must be defined. The use of women as a reference group on the 
non-ideal level is problematical because women are divided by class, by status, by background 
and by training, and their interests qua women may well be a function of their relative position 
within the hierarchies designated by those other factors. Identifying a 'representative woman' 
appears almost impossible given the absence of objective criteria. Likewise, returning to the 
suggestion that the threat of religious or civil war and consequential diminished rights for all 
might make unequal basic rights to the advantage of women generally, women might well, 
under those conditions, find diminished rights preferable to the consequences of war both for 
themselves and their children, however this moves us well beyond the conditions which might 
be said to exist in a nearly just society seeking to order its institutions in accord with the 
principles of justice. Rawls' text is ambiguous, in that he asserts that the basic liberties may be 
constrained only for the sake of the equal liberties themselves when discussing a diminution in 
the basic liberties overall, but fails to reiterate this condition precedent in discussion of the 
possibility of unequal distribution of the basic liberties. Rather he alludes to the potential 
long-term benefits of temporary inequality, and the need for unspecified compensatory 
advantages for the deprived group, emphasizing that the various liberties are not all on a par, 
liberty of conscience and the rights defining the integrity of the person taking priority over the 
political liberties and fair equality of opportunity. 137 There is a very real difficulty here, one 
which, to my knowledge, has never been considered by Rawls. Even if he is correct in 
suggesting that the various liberties are not all of equal significance, once any group is 
excluded both from the political process and from fair equality of opportunity, it is difficult to 
understand how other social roles might be said to be voluntarily assumed, and this difficulty 
is, I believe, absolutely critical. 138 
137 	Ibid., 247. 
138 	See C. Hamilton, Marriage as a Trade, Detroit, Singing Tree Press, 1974, being a 
facsimile reprint of the 1909 edition published in New York by Moffat, Yard & Co. 
Hamilton argues that in marriage a woman exchanges her person for the means of 
subsistence, and further, to the extent that marriage represents the primary trade 
open to women, it is akin to slavery. In this context, Rawls' clear concern with 
stability and with the possible may well have blinded him to the real implications of 
his remarks. 
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A further theoretical difficulty arises in considering partial compliance because on 
Rawls' own argument what is actually being diminished is the social conditions necessary if we 
are to develop and exercise our moral powers to the same extent as others similarly situated, 
and surely this particular disadvantage signals a deprivation sufficient to eradicate the 
possibility of any advantage, other, perhaps than in a utilitarian sense. Rawls himself 
acknowledges that 'if the equal basic liberties of some are restricted or denie4 social cooperation 
on the basis of mutual respect is impossible.' 139 The basic rights are important, not as ends in 
themselves, but because they define the political and social conditions essential for the 
realization of the moral powers, and given their priority, play a more critical role than do 
income and wealth. The structure of the principles of justice emphasizes the priority of the 
basic liberties and Rawls clearly believes that inequalities in respect of them can only be 
justified if they represent an unavoidable stage in moving towards full compliance. Under 
unfavourable circumstances we must be concerned with the art of the possible and the 
acceptable, with maintaining social stability and responding to the problem of order. 
The ambiguity follows from the awkward transition from ideal theory to non-ideal 
theory with the attendant problem of partial compliance. Having accepted that reasoning must 
proceed on the non-ideal level and that we are reasoning in terms of partial compliance, 
however, it also seems deeply linked to Rawls' insistence that 'the public conception of justice 
should be, so far as possible, independent of controversial philosophical and religious 
doctrines'. 14 When we are discussing problems of partial compliance, and, in particular, 
contemplating social and historical conditions under which unequal rights are assigned on the 
basis of biological characteristics, we are contemplating profound controversy within society, 
indeed, dispute and division so profound that the extension of equal basic rights would likely 
lead to civil disorder. One set of social conditions which might 'justify' diminished basic rights 
for women would arise where the consequence of assuring equal rights would be a full scale 
civil or religious war with a consequential degradation of the rights of all. Given the 
Hobbesian alternative, the conditions for the operation of the difference principle might well 
be fully met. That is, a lesser liberty would rationally be preferred to the probable outcome of 
severe civil conflict together with the attendant risks and the likelihood of further deprivation 
for all. The problem of partial compliance arises, in this context, in a situation in which 
insistence upon equality of basic rights would result lead to a breakdown in social cooperation 
and deny institutions which are, perhaps, 'reasonably just' 141, the support they require to 
139 	Rawls, 'The Basic Liberties and Their Priority', /oc. cit., 53. 
140 	See Rawls, 'Justice as Fairness', /oc. cit., 223. 
141 	It is, of course, difficult to know what reasonably just means in this context. 
Institutions which are reasonably just from the perspective of those who enjoy the 
basic rights are not necessarily reasonably just from the perspective of at least some of 
those deprived of them. Justice appears, in these passages, almost to slide into a 
curious form of moral relativism. 
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survive and to approach more closely the ideal of a well-ordered society. Rawls' aim, as he 
acknowledges, is a political conception which is practical, one which deliberately filters out 
divisive issues and those concerning which there is ineradicable dispute. 142 As Rawls notes, 
one of the great virtues of justice as fairness, is that, given the 
mutual good of mutual justice [it shows howl a modus vivendi with the content 
of a liberal conception of justice might gradually develop over time into an 
overlapping consensus 143 
and thus, on the non-ideal level, its institutions might more nearly approximate the content of 
justice as fairness. In this context I note MacKinnon's comment that 
Objectivity is liberal legalism's conception of itself It legitimizes itself by 
reflecting its view of existing society, a society it made and makes by so seeing it, 
and calling that view, and that relation, practical rationality. If rationality is 
measured by point-of-viewlessness, what counts as reason will be that which 
corresponds to the way things. are. Practical will mean that which can be done 
44 without changing anything. 1  
MacIntyre, working within a very different frame of reference, has put fundamentally similar 
arguments. He suggests that 'the overriding good of liberalism is no more and no less than the 
continued sustenance of the liberal social and political order'. 145 While Rawls acknowledges 
that citizens may lack the capacity to see themselves apart from contentious moral, religious 
and philosophical convictions, and indeed; apart from enduring attachments and loyalties, 
'these convictions and attachments are part of what we may call their "nonpublic identity".' 146 
Even in a society such as our own, one which might, perhaps, be characterized as 
'nearly just', difficulties remain and these difficulties become central when we consider gender 
roles and the structure of the family and the impact of these institutions upon our access to the 
social bases of self-respect. In filtering out divisive philosophical, moral and religious 
questions, Rawls also filters out issues concerning the family and the inequalities attendant 
upon gender roles. We earlier saw this at work in the structure of the original position, and, in 
particular, in the fact that nothing in Rawls' account of social goods suggested that in the 
original position the universality of family structures and the prolonged dependence of children 
was taken into account in determining legitimate claims upon social institutions. Our deeply 
held convictions and attachments are private, and precisely because convictions concerning the 
142 	Ibid., 230. Cf. Rawls, 'The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus', /oc. cit. 
143 	Rawls, 'The Priority of the Right and Ideas of the Good', /oc. cit., 274. 
144 	C.A. MacKinnon, 'Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State' 8 Signs: Journal of 
Women in Culture and Society 635, 644-645 (1983). 
145 	MacIntyre, /oc. cit., 334-348, esp. 345. 
146 	Rawls, 'Justice as Fairness', /oc. cit., 241. 
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primacy of the family and of family life, the 'naturalness' of the woman/mother/family 
equation, and the ways in which it is appropriate for women to negotiate the public/private 
division are among the most central and deeply held moral convictions in contemporary 
society, and because, more than ever, they have become the subject of profound dispute, they 
apparently remain apart from our identity as citizens, and have little relevance to justice. 
These comprise our non-public identity. The critical assumption here, one emphasized by 
Rawls, is that apart from the two positions which are relevant to political justice, equal 
citizenship and that defined by the distribution of income and wealth, 
other positions are entered into voluntarily [and therefore] we need not consider 
the point of view of men in these positions in judging the basic smicture. 
[Rather,] in judging the social system we are to disregard our more specific 
interests and look at our situation from the standpoint of these representative 
men. 147 
Given Rawls' failure to address the universality of family structures and the impact of the 
biological division of labour upon social and economic equality, it would appear that his 
representative men are also biologically and socially male. 
The difficulties encountered in locating women within the structure of justice as 
fairness make it clear that the core presuppositions of liberal theory remain dedicated to 
sustaining the traditional division between public and therefore open to rational public dispute, 
deliberation, and political decision making, and private and therefore concerned with those 
enduring convictions, attachments and loyalties which lie beyond or outside of politics. 
Reasoning which commences from mutual disinterest emphasizes independent entities 
advancing claims upon one another rather than interdependent men and women 
acknowledging pre-existing social bonds and attempting to explore their legitimacy and their 
limits. Indeed, Rawls emphasizes this by indirection when he notes that 
normally we do not have anything like a filly comprehensive religious, 
philosophical, or moral view . . . . [which] means that the goods internal to 
political life. . are more likely to win an initial allegiance that is independent 
of our comprehensive views and prior to conflicts with them. 148 
Despite the fact that justice as fairness represents a political conception merely, our role as 
citizen is conceptually prior to our affirmation of specific and comprehensive religious, 
philosophical or moral views. That is, insofar as children have been educated to meet the 
minimum requirements of citizenship, have come to understand that all citizens accept and 
mutually acknowledge the same principles of justice, that the public institutional structure of 
their society is known or believed to satisfy these principles, and that their fellow citizens have 
a normally effective sense of justice, their allegiance to political society will to some extent 
147 	Rawls, A Theory of Justice, loc. cit., 96-97. 
148 	Rawls, 'The Priority of the Right and Ideas of the Good', /oc. cit., 274. 
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shape their more comprehensive views when and if conflicts arise.149 Rawls emphasizes that 
, 
unlike our role as citizens our other social positions, including our family relationships, are 
entered voluntarily, and that in choosing to fill them we are acting to further our final ends as 
we perceive them. 15° As citizens, we are bound to respect one another as free and equal 
moral persons and to realize the civic virtues in respect of our conduct towards one another. 
As private men and women, we remain free to withdraw from the modern world and its 
culture, seek lifeways appropriate to our comprehensive conceptions of the good, provided that 
they do not require the political repression or degradation of others as was the case with 
slavery or require politically enforced religious intolerance in order to survive. So long as the 
rights of those who may wish to withdraw their allegiance are protected so far as is practicable, 
we remain free to pursue more comprehensive ideals within our private communities. 
Unfortunately, the issue of distributive justice for women cannot be separated from their roles 
within these private communities. The critical issue is the integration of the public and private, 
not a further justification for ensuring that they remain apart. 
149 
150 
Ibid., 267-271. 
I should note that while I accept that this may be true to a significant extent of many 
concrete social positions, it is not in any sense true of our perceptions of appropriate 
gender roles, given that the essentials of these roles are internalized long before we 
can in any sense be said to voluntarily occupy a position. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CONTEMPORARY CONCEPTIONS OF THE DIVISION BETWEEN PUBLIC AND 
PRIVATE 
INTRODUCTION 
In the first three chapters we looked at various conceptions of the division between 
public and private and sought, particularly in the last chapter, to emphasize the degree to 
which addressing the nature and pervasiveness of women's inequality compels us to confront 
the basis for this distinction and the justifications which can be offered for it. It has been 
argued that the pervasive economic and social inequality of women is a consequence of their 
private roles, and that, to the extent that contemporary egalitarian theories offer accounts of 
distributive justice which fail to address the relationship between private roles and public 
inequality they risk becoming substantively irrelevant to distributive justice for women. Now 
we must begin to look more closely at the ways egalitarian theory attempts to negotiate the 
division between public and private and the relationship between these attempts and the 
distinction between the right and the good. So doing, we shall examine traditional liberal 
concepts such as autonomy, and explore the relationship between the public/private distinction 
and what have, in recent feminist theory, been characterized as two distinct modes of moral 
reasoning, the morality of the ladder and the morality of the web. 
The traditional public-private distinction has been subtly reformulated by egalitarian 
liberals. Modern egalitarians accept that government is entitled to regulate the marketplace, 
set, at least to some extent, the terms of production and exchange. Every citizen ought to be 
entitled to expect that his basic needs will be met, that he will receive a sufficient share of 
social resources to enable him to remain independent. These are defined as public activities, 
functions which it is proper that government carry out. This acknowledgment provides a point 
of entry, involves political authorities of various kinds in the internal functioning of the sphere 
of production and in the affairs of the household.' While the aim of this intervention is to 
1 	This appears in various forms. With respect to the market, consumer protection 
legislation in various jurisdictions, including, but not to be taken to be limited to the 
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth.), the Consumer Credit Act 1981 (N.S.W.), the Chattel 
Securities Act (1981) (Viet.), the Goods (States and Leases) Act 1981 (Vict.), and the 
Consumer Transactions Act 1972-1980 (South Australia) significantly curtails 
contractual freedom within the marketplace. Equally, the employer/employee 
relationship has been significantly altered by legislation such as the Sex Discriniination 
Act 1984 (Cth.) and the Affirmative Action (Equal Opportunity for Women) Act 1986 
(Cth.), to name but a few instances of legislative intervention. Many Australian states 
have comparable legislation in force. Of particular note are the provisions in the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 dealing with sexual harassment. Within what is 
conventionally thought of as the private sphere, legislation such as the Child Welfare 
Act 1960 (Tas.), the Children (Care and Protection) Act 1987 (N.S.W.), the Community 
Welfare Services Act 1970 (Vict.) both provides badly needed services for children 
whose home conditions are inadequate and provides a point of entry into the private 
household for public agencies. While laws dealing with the protection of children 
provide the most obvious point of entry, increasingly legislative attempts to address 
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ensure that all persons have the resources needed to act as citizens, to undertake public roles, 
this must be balanced against the competing demand for moral independence 2, for a sphere of 
decisions and choices in which individuals are responsible solely to themselves for their own 
conduct. 
The acknowledgment that economic domination is a public reality, a matter of 
political concern, and, equally, a matter for political redress, has expanded the frame of 
reference of the debate. The radical character of this step, at least within the context of liberal 
political and legal theory, is not fully acknowledged. , Fundamentally, this alteration accepts 
that, in the real world, unless each one of us is guaranteed access to those things all of us need 
to survive and to realize other ambitions, we will be forced to submit to the authority and the 
demands of others in order to survive on a physical level. Still more importantly, it recognizes 
that people take advantage of their fellows in subtle ways, and that all too often wealth and 
power are used to provide the semblance of authority and justification. The positions people 
occupy with respect to others, positions within the sphere of production and the household, 
provide the basic substructure for political domination as well. In this way, albeit by 
indirection, egalitarian theory acknowledges that how people are perceived by others and how 
they come to perceive and understand others indirectly reinforces differences in status and 
power and opens the way for political subordination. Crucially, no formal acknowledgment 
has yet been made, on a theoretical level, that precisely the same conditions apply to family 
relationships as to the relationships which obtain within the marketplace and within political 
society. 
The acknowledgment made by egalitarian theorists of the reality of social and 
economic domination has been weakened by their failure to extend the same critical gaze to 
basic human social structures, particularly families, and by their reluctance to consider the 
adequacy of conventional models of thought and analysis. In accepting, apparently without 
serious analysis, the traditional division between the rational world of political thought, the 
productive domain of the marketplace, and, in post-Enlightenment theorizing, the domestic 
and private sphere of affect and consumption, such theories seemingly accept as well the 
domestic violence also do so. Equally, in most jurisdictions in the United States, 
access to welfare benefits is contingent upon the recipient providing access at any 
reasonable hour, with or without prior appointment, to the residence of the recipient 
of the benefits. Ostensibly, the visits are to ensure continued eligibility. In fact, they 
are to assess conditions within the home, the level of child care provided, and, 
frequently, whether or not the recipient has entered into any relationship with a man 
such as might lead to the supposition that he has become responsible for supporting 
her and her children. 
An issue which seems relevant here, but which is not explicitly addressed by 
contemporary theorists, is the connection between moral independence and economic 
independence. I suspect that, in company with Kant and Rousseau, they view 
economic independence as a prerequisite for moral independence. In practice, of 
course, the political provision of resources has, historically, been accompanied by 
intervention and control, leaving open the question of the attainability of this goal. 
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gender roles reflected by these divisions. Traditionally the world of politics and political 
thought epitomized reason and justice, the resolution of conflicts by means of objectively 
applied standards, and that world was, until recently, wholly reserved for men. Men and 
masculinity have long been associated with rationality and objectivity, with the resolution of 
conflicts through rules, and with the surmounting of particular ties to render such decision 
making possible. Women, on the other hand have long been associated with the emotional, 
the subjective, the denial of conflict and the preservation of relationships, often at all costs. 
Like politics and law, the market, in theory though never in reality, was reserved for men. The 
competition of the marketplace where preferences are satisfied and goods and services 
exchanged epitomized action and the struggle for survival, the inevitable competition for scarce 
resources, while the home and the woman within it came to epitomize stability and security, 
the absence of struggle and achievement, indeed the negation of both. These multiple 
distinctions and divisions are epitomized by the prevailing distinction between the public and 
the private spheres, and by the cultural conventions which continue to associate the public 
sphere with reason, with competition, with achievement and recognition and with masculinity, 
even while they associate the private sphere with emotion, with harmony, contentment and 
altruism, and with femininity. Prevailing conventions concerning the meaning of objectivity 
and independence, ruling definitions of productive work, work which attains value because it 
complies with the preferences of the community as expressed through the marketplace, have 
come to represent, not the views of an historically situated and culturally defined gender role 
which occupies a position of relative political and economic power, but universal human 
standards. Thus, a focus upon independence, upon deliberation and resolution by abstract and 
objective standards is identified as rational. A mature and rational individual is defined as one 
who is able to comply with these standards. What is at stake is nothing more or less than what 
it means/ought to mean to be an autonomous individual. The meanings which dominate legal 
and political culture are not 'givens', but essentially contested concepts open to multiple 
interpretations. 
THE ROLE OF AUTONOMY IN CONTEMPORARY THEORY 
The ambiguity inherent in the concept of autonomy plays a central role despite 
attempts by modern theorists to downgrade its importance. Pitkin suggests that 
autonomy. .. evokes a wide range of meanings, some personal, interdependent, 
but also in mutual tension. And at every level and in every sense, the idea of 
autonomy is itself problematic, implying both a connection and a separation: a 
separation that challenges, denies, or overcomes a connection. Thus, autonomy 
may be conceived either as a kind of sovereign isolation or, paradoxically, as the 
rightful acknowledgment of interdependence. 
Pitkin suggests that the problematic of autonomy, while present in any human life or 
community is, in a sense, specifically characteristic of modernity. To the extent that 'autonomy 
concerns the question of how and to what extent I (or we) have become or can become a separate 
self (or community)', it is relevant in every epoch and for every human life. To the extent that 
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autonomy is construed as the condition of being free (but also forced) to make [one's] way in 
life', reliant exclusively upon one's own abilities, its importance heralds the emergence of a 
particular modernist perspective, one which views dependence as contemptible and autonomy 
as the only proper goal for the truly human life.3 This tension or ambiguity dominates the 
modern egalitarian theories discussed earlier. 
What Piticin characterizes as 'a kind of sovereign isolation' governs the formal 
structure of such accounts, epitomized by the 'original position' of Rawls and Dworkin's adult 
castaways. In the original position we are mutually disinterested representatives, heads of 
family lines rather than members of families.4 We strive to maximize access to those basic 
social goods essential to the development of our moral powers, and would be unwilling to 
assent to ongoing cooperative relationships unless this could be guaranteed. 5 Rawls 
characterizes the 'rational autonomy' of the parties is expressed 
by their being at liberty to agree to any conception of justice available to them as 
prompted by their rational assessment of which alternative is most likely to 
advance their interests. 6 
At the same time, and more ambiguously, they recognize that their natural advantages and the 
advantages which accrue from family background and social good fortune are in some sense 
'common assets' which ought to be used to their mutual advantage as a community. The 
notion of 'common assets' surely implies an interdependence which goes well beyond the 
merely superficial. Were they not willing to acknowledge, at a quite fundamental level, that 
interdependence, acknowledge that talents and natural advantages are dependent upon and 
can only be realized in the context of a shared community, no conception of common assets 
H.F. Piticin, Fortune is a Woman: Gender and Politics in the Thought of Niccolo 
Machiavelli, Berkeley, Univ. of Calif. Press, 1984, 8. See also the general discussion 
pp. 3-22. 
There is a gender issue here as well. Men are more likely to perceive themselves and 
be perceived by others as heads of family lines, women more likely to perceive 
themselves and be perceived by others as members of families. 
Rawls emphasizes that in the original position 'we may describe the parties as either the 
representatives (or trustees) of persons with certain interests or as themselves moved by 
these interests.' He notes that 'it makes no difference either way'. See J. Rawls, 
`Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory' 77 Journal of Philosophy 515, 524-525 
(1980). 
Ibid., 524. More generally see the discussion of rational and full autonomy therein, 
pp. 515-535. 
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could arise.7 What remains lacking, is what Pitkin characterizes as yet another meaning of 
autonomy, 
the shared public freedom, that is, participation in the political activity by which 
the community makes decisions and shapes its collective principles and way of 
life, its nomos.8 
Individual liberty, political rights there are in abundance, but shared 'public' freedom, 
communal shaping of a way of life, a nomos in Pitkin's terms, remains out of reach. While the 
outcome of our interaction, the conflict between or balancing of our preferences, undeniably 
shapes our way of life, our moral agency in this regard is less than clear. We seem, in some 
respects, to express particular preferences, but seldom if ever to make choices in full 
knowledge and recognition of their consequences for ourselves and others, and our 
responsibility for those consequences. Rawls' ideals of a social union of social unions and a 
well-ordered community offer a theoretical vision of a communal way of life, but whether this 
vision is one which is consciously and collectively created by us or whether it is simply the 
outcome of our interaction in pursuit of our private ends is never clear. 
Rawls explicitly denies that his conception of justice relies in any way upon traditional 
liberal ideals such as autonomy and individuality. As he notes, 
persons can accept this conception of themselves as citizens and use it when 
discussing questions of political justice without being committed in other parts 
of their life to comprehensive moral ideals often associated with liberalism, for 
erample, the ideals of autonomy and individuality. The absence of 
commitment to these ideals, and indeed to any particular comprehensive ideal, 
is essential to liberalism as a political doctrine. The reason is that any such 
ideal, when pursued as a comprehensive ideal, is incompatible with other 
conceptions of the good, with forms of personal, moral and religious life 
consistent with justice and which, therefore, have a proper place in a democratic 
society. 9 
7 	Rawls introduces the conception of our natural advantages as a common asset in 
Rawls, A Theory of Justice, loc. cit., 101 where he states that 'the difference principle 
represents, in effect, an agreement to regard the distribution of natural talents as a 
common asset and to share in the benefits of this distribution whatever it turns out to be.' 
See also p. 179. This approach has been sharply criticized by Nozick, /oc. cit., 228-231. 
Cf. the detailed analysis of Rawls' conception of common assets to be found in Mi. 
Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1982, 
77-82. See also pp. 175-183. Sandel argues that the construction of the difference 
principle and, in particular, its reliance upon the notion of common assets commits 
Rawls to 'an intersubjective conception of the self', to an account of the subject which 
implies that in certain moral circumstances we view ourselves not as separate 
individuals but as members of a community who can only realize their nature in social 
union. See p. 80. 
8 	Pitkin, /oc. cit., 7. 
9 	See Rawls, 'Justice as Fairness', /oc. cit., 245. 
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Yet, as we shall see shortly, even this raises questions, questions which go to the core of the 
egalitarian conception of the individual. 
In this context, the distinction made by Cover between what he terms paideic 
community and what he terms imperial community is both useful and extremely revealing, and 
may be used to explore the implications of Rawls' position. Cover suggests that the 
universalist virtues associated with liberalism and exemplified by the attempts of modern 
theorists to develop a political conception of justice exist and 'are justified by the need to ensure 
the coexistence of worlds of strong normative meaning.' [Emphasis in the original.] Cover 
describes paideic community as characterized by 
(1) a common body of precept and narrative, (2) a common and personal way 
of being educated into this corpus, and (3) a sense of direction or growth that is 
constituted as the individual and his community work out the implications of 
their law. . . . Interpersonal commitments are characterized by reciprocal 
acknowledgment, the recognition that individuals have particular needs and 
strong obligations to render person-specific responses. . . . The second ideal-
typical pattern, which finds its fullest expression in the civil community, is 
"world maintaining." I shall call it "imperial." In this model, norms are 
universal and enforced by institutions. They need not be taught at all, as long 
as they are effective. Discourse is premised on objectivity - upon that which is 
external to the discourse itself. Interpersonal commitments are weak premised 
only upon a minimalist obligation to refrain from the coercion and violence that 
would make impossible the objective mode of discourse and the impartial and 
neutral application of norms. 10 
Cover explicitly acknowledges the possibility central to my argument, that authentic moral 
commitment to even weak universalist norms must ultimately mandate a direct challenge to 
the values and beliefs of the smaller communities of which the social union is comprised. 11 
This is particularly true when the principles implicit in our settled convictions are extended in 
directions which conflict with some elements of traditional lifeways. The possibility of 
demanding, or even actively encouraging, full substantive equality for women is precisely in 
point. Theorists such as Rawls and Dworkin apparently assume that we may become, as 
citizens, free and equal moral persons, even while, as private individuals, we perceive ourselves 
very differently, affirm very different conceptions of self and identity. 12 
10 	See Cover, /oc. cit., 12-13. 
11 	As we saw in the last chapter Rawls acknowledges this as well, explicitly rejecting the 
idea 'that only unworthy forms of life lose out in a just constitutional regime'. See 'The 
Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good', 266 n. 25. The arguments put at pp. 266-268 
operate explicitly in the context of the education of children and the values taught. 
Rawls argues that political liberalism is not entitled to foster values such as autonomy 
and independence as ideals to govern human life, but rather ought limit its 
educational program to ensuring awareness of constitutional and civic rights, the 
capacity for self support and encouragement of the political virtues. 
12 	For further discussion of this point see Chs. 6, 9, 10, 11. 
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The downgrading of the need for authentic interpersonal commitments, shared 
loyalties, raises a further, perhaps even more serious question, that of whether, in the absence 
of a personal sense of responsibility and commitment, commitment to the moral imperative 
inherent in egalitarian theory can ever, as Rawls acknowledges it must, move beyond the 
merely prudential.° Rawls believes that within a society constituted by the principles of 
justice, a well-ordered community in his terms, 
not only do citizens have a highest-order desire, their sense of justice. . . but 
they understand these principles as issuing from a construction in which their 
conception of themselves as free and equal moral persons who are both 
reasonable and rational is adequately represented. By acting from these 
principles, and affirming them in public life, as so derived, they express their full 
autonomy. 14 
Now this is quite close to another traditional liberal conception of autonomy, the idea of 
obedience to self-given law, but a very long way from the interdependence implicit although 
never fully explicit in the justification for the difference principle. The critical transition is that 
from the original position to the well-ordered community. What it is crucial to understand 
about this transition is that the principles chosen under conditions of rational autonomy are 
those affimied as a regulative ideal under conditions of full autonomy. 15 We choose principles 
of justice behind the veil of ignorance, principles which we believe will maximize our capacity 
to attain our final ends, whatever they may happen to be and whomever we may discover 
ourselves to be. Under conditions of full knowledge we affirm our commitment to those 
principles and strive as citizens to act in ways which reflect our commitment to the political 
virtues of tolerance and civility, reasonableness and a sense of fairness. The desire to honour 
the principles thus chosen is 
• the desire to be a certain kind of person specified by the conception of fully 
autonomous citizens of a well-ordered society. 16' 
Yet this remains problematical precisely because, as emphasized earlier, Rawls denies that 
commitment to autonomy as a moral conception or comprehensive ideal can be an essential 
component of liberalism as a political doctrine. As a political ideal, we must desire to be fully 
autonomous citizens in a well-ordered society, as individual men and women we may reject the 
13 	See the discussion in Rawls, 'Justice as Fairness', /oc. cit., 246-247. Rawls deals with 
this problem at length in 'The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good', /oc. cit. 
14 	See Rawls, `Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory', /oc. cit., 532. More generally, 
see the discussion of full autonomy at pp. 528-535. 
15 	The idea of rational autonomy in Rawls is epitomized by the construction of the 
original position, particularly the idea of the veil of ignorance. Full autonomy, on the 
other hand is represented by the reasoning of citizens qua citizens under conditions of 
full knowledge in the well ordered community. 
16 	Ibid., 533. 
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ideal of autonomy as incompatible with our own final ends. 17 The price, it would seem, is a 
self divided and at war against itself, multiple personality in the true sense.18 
IDEAS OF THE GOOD AND THE NATURE OF MORAL REASONING 
Rawls' insistence that liberalism is not to be understood as a comprehensive moral 
doctrine, but rather as a framework within which various comprehensive moral doctrines have 
the opportunity to flourish and to seek and gain adherents becomes particularly significant 
when contemporary accounts of the nature and structure of moral reasoning are examined. 
The trace or suggestion of a divided self discussed in the last section is clarified when we 
consider contemporary accounts of the nature of moral development. Rawls himself describes 
three general stages of moral development: these being the morality of authority, the morality 
of association and the morality of principles. The most developed stage of the morality of 
authority is characterized, Rawls notes, by certain characteristic virtues, among them being 
essentially unquestioning obedience, humility and fidelity to authority. In the morality of 
association, virtue is identified with the faithful embodiment of particular statuses or roles. 
Rawls comments that our moral understanding increases as we come to occupy different roles, 
such as those of good friend, or of good husband or wife, or good citizen, ultimately enabling 
us to move beyond the content of the roles themselves and aspire to universal ideals such as 
those of cooperation and fairness. In the most advanced stage, the morality of principles, 
17 	Rawls assumes that within a just basic structure, one which affirms the basic liberties 
and mutual toleration, comprehensive views affirming a wide range of conceptions of 
the good can and will flourish. He argues that the charge that liberalism is unjustly 
biased against religious or communal values could be sustained only if associations 
affirming these ideals could not flourish. Rawls, 'The Priority of Right and Ideas of 
the Good', /oc. cit., 266-268. His basic argument is that such associations require the 
content of the liberal conception to survive in a pluralist society, that political 
liberalism provides the background conditions essential for them to flourish. The only 
alternative would be for such an association to itself attain hegemony and politically 
impose its ideals upon those who do not share them thus denying to others the 
freedom it would claim for itself. 
18 	MacIntyre's comments on the problem of self in liberal society are relevant here. See 
MacIntyre, /oc. cit., 346-347. MacIntyre notes that 'the problem of the self in liberal 
society arises from the fact that each individual is required to formulate and to express, 
both to him or herself and to others, an ordered schedule of preferences. Each 
individual is to present him or herself as a single well-ordered will.' Yet this effort 
implicitly requires that conflict within the self be repressed. Rawls is remarkable in 
the degree to which he makes a problematic implicit in liberal ideals explicit and 
critical to liberalism as a political conception. Behind the veil of ignorance we strive 
to formulate principles which will maximize our access to certain social goods, 
whoever we may discover ourselves to be. Within the just community, we utilize our 
guaranteed share of these goods to further individual or associational final ends, ends 
desired in and of themselves. As a well-ordered community we strive to attain the 
final end of supporting just institutions and dealing justly with one another. 
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moral attitudes are no longer connected solely with the well-being and approval 
of particular individuals and groups, but are shaped by a conception of right 
chosen irrespective of these contingencies. 19 
There are two very different ways of looking at these stages when one is considering the 
question of justice and women. On the one hand, one might question a culture and a social 
structure which has both historically and in the present applied very different standards to men 
and to women. If one looks at the matter in this way, one asks why it is that women continue 
to be judged primarily in terms of their capacity to embody certain of the roles characteristic of 
the morality of association, most particularly those of wife and mother, even when such roles 
are clearly irrelevant to their other roles. 2° What is at issue on this account is not the moral 
development of women. Rather this question raises the very different issue of why women are 
conventionally judged, not as ends in themselves, but as more or less adequate embodiments of 
the concrete roles conventionally associated with femininity. 
A second, very different question, is raised by recent feminist scholarship in moral 
development. Gilligan and others have argued that the conventional morality of the morality 
of association, Rawls' intermediate stage, provides the basis for the development of two 
different meta-ethical perspectives, a morality of principles in which the primary emphasis is 
upon the rights of others and non-violation of those rights, and a morality of responsibilities in 
which the primary emphasis is upon our responsibility to take into account the needs of others 
while simultaneously retaining self respect and sense of self-worth as a person and having 
regard to our own interests.21 The first meta-ethical perspective, epitomized by Rawls' 
account of justice, emphasizes autonomy, independence, the capacity to reason in terms of 
hierarchically ranked principles or standards, for example, the priority of the principle of equal 
liberty over the difference principle. The second, epitomized by Gilligan's work, argues that 
morally appropriate decisions are necessarily context dependent, that relationships must be 
taken into account in reasoning and that the moral problem is to preserve relationships and 
the integrity of the self simultaneously, to seek resolutions in which we become ends in 
ourselves while fulfilling our responsibilities to others. Gilligan argues that most mature 
individuals are able to reason equally successfully using either perspective, and to shift from 
19 	Rawls discusses this at pp. 462-479 in Rawls, A Theory of Justice, loc. cit. His 
reference to the general correspondence of the stages described with the account of 
moral development given by Kohlberg may be found at p. 460 n. 6 and p. 461 n. 8. See 
L. Kohlberg, The Philosophy of Moral Development, San Francisco, Harper and Row, 
1981. 
20 	One might, of course, also question the degree to which the public culture enforces a 
sexualized view of women, whether through the media or through the sexualized 
workplace. , 
21 	Generally see D.T. Meyers, 'The Socialized Individual and Individual Autonomy' in 
E.F.K. & D.T. Meyers (Eds.), Women and Moral Theory, Savage, Md., Rowman & 
Littlefield, 1987, 139. 
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one to the other in resolving moral dilemmas, suggesting that synthesis may be possible and 
desirable. 
Building upon Gilligan's work, feminist scholars have characterized the morality of 
principles as the 'morality of the ladder'. It is characterized by a 
morality of rights and a hierarchy of rules that regulated the contest between 
highly competitive, independent individuals. It is a morality based on principles 
of non-interference with the rights of others. • Justice is best served by the 
least interference with the autonomy of others!' 
Rawls' overriding concern with those minimal assumptions essential to constrain bargaining 
within a stable consensus, and his emphasis upon tolerance epitomizes this. The alternative 
conception, termed the 'morality of the web', emphasizes fulfilling responsibilities to other 
people in particular circumstances, [and for this reason] justice becomes a contextual concept.' 23 
The former approach focuses upon resolving conflicts between separate and independent 
22 	K.E. Mahoney, 'Obscenity, Morals and the Law: A Feminist Critique', 17 Ottawa L.R. 
33, 35 (1984). The metaphor of the morality of the ladder, a pattern or form of moral 
reasoning associated primarily, but not exclusively with men, and its complement 'the 
morality of the web', a pattern or form of moral reasoning associated primarily, but 
not exclusively with women originates in the work of C. Gilligan. See, generally, C. 
Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development, 
Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1982. In a similar vein to the passage cited in the 
text, but issuing from a wholly different perspective, MacIntyre has noted that 'the 
rules of distributive justice are both to set constraints upon the bargaining process, so as 
to ensure access to it by those otherwise disadvantaged, and to protect individuals so that 
they may have freedom to express and, within limits, to implement their preferences.' 
See MacIntyre, /oc. cit., 337. 
23 	Mahoney, /oc. cit., 34-35. I note also, however, the criticism levelled at Gilligan's 
affirmation of reasoning based upon responsibilities. Cf. CA. MacKinnon, Feminism 
Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law, Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1987, 38- 
40. MacKinnon argues with some force that the 'different voice' perceived by Gilligan 
is simply the voice of the oppressed, and that 'women think in relational terms because 
our existence is defined in relation to men. Further, when you are powerless, you don't 
just speak differently. A lot, you don't speak.' See p. 39. Elsewhere, MacKinnon 
commented that 'when we understand that women are forced into this situation of 
inequality, it makes a lot of .sense that we should want to negotiate, since we lose 
conflicts. It makes a lot of sense that we should want to urge values of care, because it is 
what we have been valued for. We have had little choice but to be valued this way.' See 
DuBois, Dunlap, Gilligan, MacKinnon & Menkel-Meadow, 'Feminist Discourse, 
Moral Values, and the Law - A Conversation', 34 Buffalo L.R. 11 (1985), 27. The 
point remains, however, that our being valued in the abstract as nurturers and care-
givers has produced negligible concrete rewards. There is a good deal to be said for 
demanding that socially powerful institutions translate that value into concrete 
rewards, and according equal standing to the 'morality of the web' is essential to that 
effort. Another way of putting this last point is to suggest that the fundamental 
presumption of equality underlying the theories of Rawls and Dworkin is incomplete 
without the incorporation of assumptions concerning distribution of responsibilities. 
To become free and equal moral persons, to share fully in the benefits of social 
cooperation, we must also accept our responsibility to share in the burdens of social 
cooperation, including wholly individualized responsibility for subsequent generations. 
Otherwise men are likely to continue to realize a majority of the benefits while women 
carry a majority of the burdens. See Ch. 11 for extended arguments on this point. 
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individuals in such a way that their independence is reaffirmed and supported, the latter 
emphasizes resolving conflicts between individuals in a way which affirms and protects the 
value of interdependence while affirming also the needs of individuals to exercise independent 
decision making and responsibility to self within those relationships. It emphasizes that 
choices and opportunities cannot be interpreted acontextually, that they can be evaluated only 
when the circumstances of the choice and the options which are realistically available are 
understood. A web approach to the inequality of women, for example, might well argue that 
if women currently tend to assume primary responsibility for childrearing . . . we 
should figure out how to assure that equal resources, status, and access to social 
decision making flow to those women (and few men) who engage in this 
socially female behaviour. . . . [The aim] is to make gender differences, 
perceived or actual, costless relative to each other, so that anyone may follow a 
male, female, or androgynous lifestyle according to their natural inclination or 
choice without being Rrished for following a female lifestyle or rewarded for 
following a male one. h's 
Such an approach emphasizes that to the extent that the lifestyles associated with prevailing 
gender roles are not costless relative to each other, it is impossible to determine the extent to 
which a lifestyle choice represents an actual preference for a particular lifestyle, a response to 
a socially constructed expectation, a preference for the rewards which accrue to a particular 
lifestyle as opposed to a preference for the lifestyle as an end in itself, or even an untidy and 
internally conflictual mixture. While the concrete example given was that of childrearing, a 
classic private sphere function, the thrust of a web morality would demand that this alteration 
in existing patterns of social rewards applies equally to the realms of politics, the marketplace, 
and the home. The aim is to emphasize the need for an alteration in perceptions of the social 
worth of choices which have been socially constructed as appropriate to different gender roles, 
not a privileging of any particular activity or any particular gender role. 
Despite the apparent opposition of the morality of the ladder and the morality of the 
web it is critical to recognize that neither is adequate in and of itself. If the morality of the 
ladder has often found it difficult to account for interdependence and for the place of human 
relationships, a difficulty epitomized by the efforts of the social contract tradition to account 
for the political order in contractual terms, the morality of the web finds it equally difficult to 
account for individuation and for the place of responsibility to self and self-development. In a 
real sense, the division between the morality of the ladder and the morality of the web tracks 
and reinforces the division between public and private, the dichotomy emphasized by both 
Rawls and Dworkin between public and non-public identities. As citizens, we are to 
understand ourselves as free and equal moral persons, as fully autonomous individuals whose 
final ends are always open to revision. As private individuals we may understand ourselves in 
this way, however we need not, indeed may understand our identities in terms of the values of 
relationship and community. The priority of the right over the good symbolizes the hegemony 
24 	CA. Littleton, 'Reconstructing Sexual Equality' 75 Calif L.R. 1279 (1987). 
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of the morality of the ladder over that of the web. 	claims we may legitimately make 
upon our public institutions are those established by the morality of the ladder. Perhaps, at 
least in part, this helps explain why nothing in Rawls' identification of basic social needs as the 
motivation for reasoning about justice reflects basic facts about human social life such as how 
concrete responsibility for the actual (as opposed to theoretical) well-being of subsequent 
generations ought to be rewarded and shared. 26 Such contextual questions with their 
emphasis upon relationships and responsibilities seemingly belong to the morality of the web, 
although I shall argue subsequently that the exclusion of such questions is not truly necessary, 
but rather suggests that Rawls (and Dworkin) have thus far failed to confront the full 
implications of their own egalitarian principles and the extent to which these principles, 
rigorously and ruthlessly applied have the capacity to shatter irrevocably the division between 
public and private.27 What is lacking is recognition that neither the conception of the self 
prior to its ends which predominates in the accounts of Rawls and Dworkin nor the conception 
of self in terms of its social roles and relationships together with the responsibilities entailed by 
this perception which predominates in 'web reasoning' offer an adequate foundation for 
accounts of justice any more than they offer adequate guides for human life. What is required 
is a conception which emphasizes that people are simultaneously autonomous and 
interdependent, both self-defining individuals and individuals who cannot be considered apart 
from the social worlds in whose creation they participate. Every assertion of rights is at the 
same time the assertion of an entitlement to participate in the shaping of a social world, to 
engage in the project of world-creation and self-creation. We need to recapture a sense of the 
true value of what Piticin terms our shared public freedom, together with the responsibilities 
that conception of autonomy entails. 
Contemporary egalitarian theorists seek, not to make difference costless, nor to 
recapture shared public freedom in Piticin's sense, but to compensate for the disadvantages 
arising from those differences which seem unchosen, morally irrelevant, differences such as 
race, family background and natural capacity. This follows from their relegation of contextual 
questions to the domain of the good. The distinction is epitomized by Dworldn's insistence 
that equality of resources be ambition-sensitive but endowment-insensitive. Where differential 
25 	It is perhaps significant that Dworkin emphasizes contextual reasoning and the 
importance of our concrete and specific social positions in a recent discussion of 
ethics and the criteria of a life which is good in what he terms the critical sense. See 
R. Dworkin, 'Liberal Community', 77 Calif. L.R. 479 (1989), esp. 502-4. See also the 
fuller discussion of this concept in Ch. 9. 
26 	Rawls does address the question of intergenerational justice in terms of the just 
savings principle, but this addresses the question of how the burden of capital 
accumulation and the preservation and advancement of culture is to be distributed 
between generations, not the very different question of the concrete care and nurture 
required by each member of every new generation and how the social costs of that 
care are to be met. See Rawls, 'A Theory of Justice, loc. cit., 284 ff. 
27 	See Ch. 6 & 11. 
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outcomes reflect, not a lack of the natural endowments needed to realize socially rewarded 
outcomes, but social choices made by individuals with approximately equal endowments, 
inequality, in the liberal sense, often seems to have been defined out of existence. What 
remains are gender roles, behaviours socially deemed 'male' or 'female', and a reward 
structure which pervasively accords socially male behaviours higher worth than socially female 
behaviours.28 Equality prevails so long as biologically female individuals are enabled to fill 
socially male roles and biologically male individuals are enabled to fill socially female roles. If, 
on the other hand, we sought to make difference costless, we might 
insist that women and men who opt for socially female occupations, such as 
child rearing be compensated at a rate similar to those women and men who 
opt for socially male occupations, such as legal practice. Alternatively, such 
occupations might be restructured to make them equally accessible to those 
whose behaviour is culturally coded "male" or 'female.' 
The critical distinction between these approaches lies in the information which is relevant to 
decision making in terms of distributive justice. Where we focus on natural endowments and 
the advantages or disadvantages conferred by social background, we focus entirely upon 
matters which appear outside the control of the individual and argue that these ought to be 
irrelevant to a fair share of the benefits of cooperation. When we focus upon contextual issues, 
upon the obligations and responsibilities which arise out of social practices and roles, we 
perceive individuals in the context of their social relationships, as people whose concrete 
choices and preferences are, at least in part, inseparable from those relationships. The former 
line of reasoning epitomizes the morality of the ladder, the latter, the morality of the web. If 
we are to escape this apparent impasse, as we must if we are to address the question of justice 
for women, we must attempt to fuse these perspectives. We must, that is, insist both that 
women (and children and men) be considered first and foremost as individuals to whom social 
and economic equality is due as individuals, and recognize that, at least under existing social 
and economic conditions, this cannot be done unless we evaluate their position in terms of the 
social practices and contexts which have generated advantage and disadvantage. This suggests 
that it is essential to examine the ways in which gender roles and social reward structures 
interact and the moral legitimacy of the preferences involved in this interaction. When the 
central theoretical focus is upon the manner in which socially female behaviours are 
compensated, whether women value care-giving and nurturing roles because, in an 
androcentric economic and social structure they have been valued for those roles30, and, as 
28 	C. Cockburn, The Gendering of Jobs: Workplace Relations and the Reproduction of 
Sex Segregation', in S. Walby, (Ed.) Gender Segregation at Work, Stony Stratford, 
Open University Press, 29, 1988. See also Ch. 9 for an argument that feminine roles 
are characterized by limited access to the new property and limited security of tenure, 
both in the workplace and in the family. 
29 	Littleton, /oc. cit., 1301-1302. 
30 	Cf. n. 22 and the material by MacKinnon quoted therein. 
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women, only for those roles, or whether women value care-giving and nurturing roles because 
their moral development is experienced in terms of sustaining and fostering connection, rather 
than in terms of individuation and autonomy31, becomes irrelevant. Rather, examination 
centres, as it should, upon the extent to which behaviours are rewarded or penalized, and the 
social practices within which this occurs. 
A focus upon socially female behaviours, and the private and economic roles 
associated with them and the rewards they make available provides a very different perspective 
from which to examine the social and political significance of the public/private distinction, 
and highlights the way in which it operates to reinforce the provision of intangible but 
ideologically significant rewards for socially female behaviours in the traditional family. 
Equally significantly, the same behaviours are penalized in female headed households and 
within the marketplace. Because the market is the realm of production and the household the 
realm of consumption, market activities command both public and private value. Household 
work and the labour involved in birthing and parenting are systematically devalued by the 
marketplace. They are necessary to support the marketplace, but lack the proof of worth 
(money) that market activities command. By analogy, market activities which parallel private 
caring activities presently categorized as women's work, activities such as nursing, the teaching 
of young children, and other service occupations, are conventionally devalued because they are 
regarded as women's work. The difficulty encountered in recruiting men for the teaching of 
young children and for nursing ought to be contrasted with the vehemence with which men 
have traditionally defended the practice of professions such as architecture, medicine and law 
as an exclusively masculine preserve. This is not simply an issue of the economic rewards 
available although surely this is significant. Rather, because these occupations continue to be 
seen as women's work, reflect socially female behaviours, any man engaging in them is 
effectively diminished in the eyes of his (male) peers, and this in turn ensures continuation of 
diminished economic rewards.32 
31 	Cf. Gilligan, /oc. cit., and n. 22 and the accompanying text. 
32 	On the differential reward structures presently existing for work socially coded male 
and that socially coded female see the essays in Koziara, Moskow & Tanner, /oc. cit. 
More generally on the way in which the labour of women is comprehensively excluded 
from conventional economic indicators, see M. Waring, Counting for Nothing: What 
Men Value and What Women are Worth, Wellington, Allen & Unwin, 1988. In Ch. 11 
I argue that these reward structures may themselves be seen as inegalitarian and the 
preferences manifested by them fundamentally corrupt by egalitarian standards. 
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CHAPTER 5 
LIBERALISM AND THE FAMILY - CONTRACT, STATUS OR ASSOCIATIVE 
OBLIGATION? 
INTRODUCTION 
In the last chapter, we explored the theoretical connection between the public/private 
distinction and other conceptions central to the development of contemporary egalitarian 
liberalism. We noted the ways in which the quite traditional liberal ideals of autonomy and 
independence continued to play a central role in the structure of egalitarian theory. Likewise, 
we identified a critical connection between such concepts and the forms of moral reasoning 
which dominate their theoretical structures. It was argued that the priority of the right over 
the good tracks and mirrors the distinction between public and private. It was argued further 
that to the extent that liberal theories emphasize an exclusively political account of justice their 
theories will fail to address the inequality of women precisely because women's inequality is a 
consequence of the interaction of public and private and the relationship between them. To 
the extent that the responsibilities and obligations which deny women the opportunity to 
compete on an equal footing in the public sphere are conceptualized as private choices, as 
pertaining to the domain of the good rather than of the right, the social and economic 
inequalities which attend these choices will continue to be ignored. In this and succeeding 
chapters we will look at liberal theories, both classic and contemporary, in greater detail, and 
explore the resources which they make available to address marriage and family life. 
Liberalism in all its forms seeks to establish and defend a sphere of individual liberty, 
a sphere of life in which the autonomy of the individual is almost unquestioned. In modern 
egalitarian theory, those spheres of life within which such ideals remain most central and most 
fully developed have become the sexual and the familial, those spheres Rawls identifies as the 
personal and the familia1. 1 Family relationships are often characterized as natural, and by 
inference, non-political, indeed Rawls is at pains to emphasize the gulf between the political 
and the familial and the values appropriate to each. Within the political, relationships are or 
ought to be governed by rationally chosen principles reflecting the freedom and equality of 
citizens. Within the family, affect and inequality predominate. 
Despite the astounding variety of forms which have developed in different cultures 
and within the same cultural traditions at different times and among different groups, family 
relationships are conventionally believed to be ordained by the biological conditions of human 
existence. Regardless of this presumed naturalness and despite attempts to insist that the role 
differentiation within household groups and the allocation of separate spheres of responsibility 
to men and to women is ordained by the laws of nature (or of God), the demarcation of these 
1 	Rawls, 'The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus', /oc. cit., 242. 
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spheres is neither unquestioned nor constant. Only one division of labour can be described as 
natural. While men beget children and while, for men, reproduction may be described as an 
isolated and discrete act, for women, reproduction can only be described as a process 
commencing with sexual congress and concluding with the labour involved in bringing forth a 
c.hild.2 The transitory and instrumental character of the masculine role in reproduction, its 
inherent uncertainty, has often played a significant role in the power relationships between 
men and women. Because, for men, sex is temporally and conceptually isolated from the birth 
of a child, reproduction has often been perceived as something which must be brought under 
masculine control. The link between the act of creation and its product must be politically and 
socially established precisely because it is not naturally evident. This is most readily done 
through establishing masculine power over women. Through control of the mother, paternity 
may be made (relatively) certain, and it becomes possible for men to attempt to ensure that 
they do not expend labour and resources upon children which are not biologically theirs. 
While not all cultures deem masculine control over reproduction important, it 
represents a major theme in our culture and was inherent in early liberal theories. Hobbes 
explicitly states 
if there be no Contract, the Dominion is in the Mother. For in the condition of 
meer Nature, where there are no Matrimoniall lawes, it cannot be known who is 
the Father, unless it be declared by the Mother: and therefore the right of 
Dominion over the Child dependeth on her will and is consequently hers." 
For early liberals, the problematic nature• of paternity necessitated patriarchal control of the 
family. Without patriarchal control, enforced by the laws of the state, fatherhood was 
irrelevant. The alternative, unthinkable in their terms, was a declaration of paternity by the 
mother, which left the father, as is clear from the foregoing passage, dependent upon her 
(essentially arbitrary) will. Rousseau expressed the same point even more forcefully. 4 An 
alternative, of course, is trust, but trust demands that the man be prepared to acknowledge 
that his certainty depends upon the choices and decisions of another individual and freely 
accepts that this is so. The inequality of the initial positions of man and woman makes this 
more difficult than appears on the surface. The woman knows what the man must take upon 
Here I adopt the arguments to be found in M. O'Brien, The Politics of Reproduction, 
London, Routledge, 198L 
Hobbes, /oc. cit, 254. 
Rousseau, Emile, trans. by B. Foxley, Melbourne, Everyman's Library, 1911, 
reprinted with a new introduction, 1974, 324-325. Rousseau comments 'She to whom 
nature has entrusted the care of the children must hold herself responsible for them to 
their father. No doubt every breach of faith is wrong and every faithless husband. .. is 
cruel and unjust; but the faithless wife is worse; she destroys the family and breaks the 
bonds of nature; when she gives her husband children who are not his own, she is false 
both to him and them, her crime is not infidelity but treason.' See also Oki, /oc. cit., 
where Rousseau's concern with establishing paternity is emphasized at pp. 114-115, 
noting in particular his analogy between a wife's adultery and treason. 
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faith.5 The natural imbalance in their relationship is most conclusively overcome when his 
power over her makes it possible for him to trust her. The unstated given is, of course, the 
presumption that people, unrestrained by law, seek dominion over others. 
The significance of the relationship between men and women for political 
relationships is, within contemporary male-stream political theory, either ignored or denied. 
Political philosophy essays the legitimation of power relationships, defining their bounds and 
establishing just limits for the exercise of collective power. Despite this, the most fundamental 
human power relationships, those within human families, seemingly require no legitimation. 
While such relationships may be regulated by the state, the political structure of the 
relationships themselves is denied. The exercise of power by men over women and by both 
men and women over children is perceived by society and by law as natural6 when it occurs 
within a socially sanctioned setting. 
Early liberal attempts to account for family relationships oscillated between the 
contractarian and the biological. All sought to contrast political relationships and familial 
relationships, to maintain an absolute distinction between them.7 The contractarian view of 
marriage common to Locke and Hobbes must be distinguished from the 'naturist' account of 
Rousseau. As is clear in the passage from Leviathan cited above, Hobbes saw contract as 
essential to the existence of the family, and to the existence of fatherhood itself. Similarly, 
Locke states both that 'the first Society was between Man and Wife', and that 'Conjugal Society 
is made by a voluntary compact between a Man and Woman,' although he attributes the 
necessity for this 'voluntary compact', or contract, to the prolonged neoteny of the human 
species.8 For both, once the family was established the relationships within it disappeared 
from politics. The identity of the wife was submerged in that of the husband, political theory 
mirroring contemporaneous legal reality.9 
It is only within the last few years that genetic testing has been able to absolutely 
determine paternity. 
A natural relationship is one which requires no legitimation. 
Rawls clearly belongs to this tradition. See 'The Domain of the Political and 
Overlapping Consensus', /oc. cit., 242. 
Locke, /oc. cit., 362-363. Rawls also emphasizes the voluntary character of non-
political relationships among adults and contrasts these with the coercive and non-
voluntary character of political society. Rawls, 'The Domain of the Political and 
Overlapping Consensus', /oc. cit. 
Under the common law doctrine of coverture, the identity of the wife was submerged 
in that of her husband for the duration of the marriage. A married woman lacked 
contractual capacity, upon marriage her personalty vested absolutely in her husband 
who was also entitled to the control of her real property and to the rents and profits 
thereof. Her husband had exclusive guardianship rights over the children of the 
marriage and was entitled to appoint a guardian by will should he predecease her. 
See 32 Hen. 8, cap. 28 s. 1 of which recognized the husband's right to lease and receive 
the profits of land held in right of their wives, 34 & 35 Hen. 8, cap. 5 (Statute of Wills) 
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Rousseau was much more ambivalent. He attributed the origins of family life to the 
development of settled habitations which required defence. He states 
the first developments of the heart were the result of a new situation in which 
husbands and wives, fathers and children, were united in a common dwelling. 
The habit of living together gave rise to the sweetest feeling known to man: 
conjugal love and paternal love. Each family became a small society all the 
better united because mutual attachment and freedom were its onlyties. io 
The concluding sentence rules out any contractarian basis for the family. Rather, as human 
beings abandoned the isolated and nomadic existence of the proto-human phase and found it 
advantageous to engage in cooperative ventures increased proximity and permanent 
habitations led to the establishment of permanent relationships between men and women. 11 
Rousseau's conception of the family seems today wholly sentimentalized, based not upon 
contract but upon proximity and upon the passions it engendered. Horowitz suggests that in 
Rousseau's view, 
society is not, then, the creature of the family. If anything the reverse is true; the 
family is the creature of society. And the familg is conceived of as the creature 
of society in much more than a juridical sense." 
He appears to be correct. Rousseau suggests that as people formed communities, united not 
by law but by a common climate and lifestyle, the passions developed. He describes these 
early communities as assembling outside their huts and adds that 
singing and dancing the true offspring of love and leisure, became the 
amusement, or rather the occuRation, of men and women thus assembled 
together with nothing else to do. 1' 
What Rousseau is imagining is a community based, not upon law or concepts of morality or 
consent, but upon the natural passions of men and women living in a state of freedom. 14 Only 
which specified that a married woman lacked the capacity to devise land and could not 
bequeath chattels without her husband's authority. The statutory language equates 
married women to minors, idiots and the insane. See also Tinker v. Colwell 193 U.S. 
473, 48 L.Ed. 574 (1904). The court emphasized that the cause of action involved in 
'criminal conversation' was fundamentally proprietary, that such an assault was an 
injury to the property of the husband in his wife. 
10 	Rousseau, The Essential Rousseau, loc. cit., 176. 
11 	Ibid., 212. 
12 	A. Horowitz, Rousseau, Nature, and History, Toronto, Univ. of Toronto Press, 1987, 
78-79. 
13 	Rousseau, The Essential Rousseau, loc. cit., 178. 
14 	In some ways, Rousseau's account of the development of families prefigures some 
elements of Dworkin's account of associative obligations discussed later in this 
chapter. Points of similarity include the evolutionary nature of such relationships as 
social practices and the way in which the roles and obligations involved arose out of 
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with the advent of private property did a need for law and morality arise, and the destructive 
passions predominate. For this reason, Rousseau's account may be interpreted as supporting 
the view that the family reproduces the power relationships characteristic of the wider society. 
While Rousseau believed that the capability for love and jealousy arose 
simultaneously, and these passions, together with the advent of property created the necessity 
for both morality and law, only with the development of private property and a sophisticated 
form of the division of labour, did human passions become so destructive they must be kept in 
check by law. transition from an idyllic state where mutual attachment and freedom 
predominated to the civilized state in which the destructive passions predominate appears to 
have been a consequence of increasing social stratification. Just as the conditions within civil 
society necessitated the social contract, conditions within the family and the wider society 
necessitated the move from natural freedom and attachment to masculine authority. 16 
Despite the very different rationales family relationships remained outside the 
perceived scope of political theory. Even for Rousseau who recognized that the family was the 
creature of society, that these developments were necessarily interdependent, relationships 
within the family remained pre-political, outside the social contract and pre-existing it. Family 
relationships thus became somehow independent of history and culture. Only through 
surmounting such ties did political relationships become possible. 
Equally, despite the 'naturalness' of family relationships and the ordained 'female 
role' within the family, family relationships have generally been both malleable and permeable. 
Today the state regularly intervenes under 'appropriate' circumstances. Minson can argue 
with some justice that, from its beginnings the family 
has always been cellular and to that extent apparently quarantined off from the 
realms of public - economic and political - life. Yet, at the same time, this 
"nuclear" family has always been permeable by public institutions, hence open 
to either compulsory or advisory outside interventions. Whilst these 
interventions have no single origin or purpose, the primary occasions for 
interventions have been issues to do with the care and control of children. On 
the one han4 the family, always in various and often conflicting ways, acts as a 
relay for the realisation of public objectives, ranging from the control of disease 
to the control of dissidence. On the other, the failures of families constitute the 
conditions for posing this Aemzeability, i.e. for politically acceptable intervention 
into the familial domain." 
the practice rather than being pre-determined by contract or by moral authority 
imposed from without. 
15 	Rousseau, The Essential Rousseau, loc. cit., 182-188. 
16 	See the detailed analysis in Ch. 8. 
17 	J. Minson, Genealogies of Morals: Nietzsche, Foucault, Donzelot and the Eccentricity of 
Ethics, London, The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1985, 183. More generally see J. 
Donzelot, The Policing of Families, trans. by R. Hurley, New York, Pantheon Books, 
1979 and J. Eekelaar, 'Family Law and Social Control' in J. Eekelaar & J. Bell, Oxford 
Essays in Jurisprudence, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1987, 125. 
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THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE FAMILY 
The disappearance of the family from contemporary political theory raises several 
interesting questions, questions about the character and nature of these relationships, about 
their economic and social implications, and about the legitimacy of state involvement in the 
regulation and control of private relationships. Such questions must be approached from 
several different directions. It is essential to understand the nature and character of family and 
household relationships if they are to be dealt with in a meaningful and accurate way within 
political theory. Unfortunately, much of the information needed to do so exists, if at all, in 
distorted and fragmentary form. The voices within the family itself, most particularly the 
voices of women and children, command credence only to the extent that they conform to the 
expectations and ideologies of a cultural, legal, and political elite. To the extent that 
conformity is not realized, both their households and their voices are identified as symptomatic 
of social pathology. Such voices exist on the margins of society, not because they are few in 
number, but because they have been socially and politically defined as abnormal and 
unrepresentative. If the disappearance of the family from contemporary egalitarian theory 
seems bizarre, we need only to remember that in ancient Greece political theory concerned 
the relationships of a tiny minority of those within the polis. Women, children, metics and 
slaves were excluded. Their interests might be disregarded. The polls achieved its self-
proclaimed moral and spiritual perfection because its citizens were entitled 'to stand upon the 
bodies of its disenfranchised subjects.' 18 
Similarly, the liberal political theories of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries 
emphasized the self-perception and demands of a rising and increasingly Protestant male 
middle-class. Both their perceptions and their demands were deemed objective. Political 
society regulated the relationships of men and political theory concerned itself with the laws 
needed to control and regulate competition among men. Within the household competition 
was declared not to exist. Thus, competition among men signified competition among 
households. Each household was represented by its male head, and his public status 
determined the status of the family. 
Given the formally egalitarian impetus of much early liberal theorizing the denial that 
women's voices might be heard and counted in civil society seemingly compromises the 
principles espoused. Why, then, were women denied personhood? Two answers may be given. 
First, given early liberal premises concerning human nature, should women be recognized as 
persons, marriage and family life would become untenable and conflict of wills unavoidable. 
Ultimately, no true private sphere would exist, making a mockery of the freedom and 
autonomy affirmed. Second, reconciliation depended upon a further extraordinary 
18 	R.W. Krouse, 'Patriarchal Liberalism and Beyond' in Elshtain (Ed.), /oc. cit., 147. 
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assumption, one which reflected the extent of the revolution in ideas and attitudes then talcing 
place. Given the denial that inherited social status and family origins determined public status, 
given the presumption of political equality, only two forms of status were compatible with its 
presuppositions. The primary status, that of citizen, applied to men. This defmed man's 
relationship to the state and had little if anything to say about his concrete social position with 
respect to his fellow citizens. His perceived status depended upon his occupational role, his 
relationship to the means of production. Those assumptions identified the ideal family as that 
family in which the sole functions of the female reflected her as wife and mother. Man's 
position was determined by his success in the economic market. Woman's position was 
determined first by her socially and biologically ascribed status as daughter of a particular 
man, and second by her success in the marriage market and her acquired status as wife of a 
particular man and mother of his children. Relationships within the family had been banished 
from the theoretical landscape. 
Norton's analysis of the ways in which the market and the family relate to the 'late 
capitalist' state becomes revealing and significant in this context. Norton observes that 
it is with regard to their standing before the late capitalist state that the two 
arenas of private life can be most clearly distinguished.. . . As the corporate 
monopoly and state sectors of the private economy become more broadly 
integrated with state administration and finance, the family is left to flounder in 
the interstices of administrative supervision. No doubt the continued existence 
of many small, low-status families comes to be predicated on the supply of state 
welfare and subsidized social commodities. It is precisely this supply that is 
endangered in times of economic crisis: it is the private economy and its 
proposed reindustrialization that hogs the lion's share of the public interest. To 
the family, the state offers traditionalist rhetoric, minuscule tax adjustments, and 
draconian measures designed to restore the dependency of women and 
unemployed youth upon an institution that can no longer sustain them. From 
the 'heartless world" of civil society the family receives a familiar message. 
When push comes to shove it is the health of the private sector - the capitalist 
system of production, distribution, exchange, and capital accumulation - that 
must take priority over the intimate domain of private life, that is, families with 
their few remaining productive functions. Having long since transferred most of 
these to the state, economy, and other institutions of civil society, the family 
packs little clout with which to back up its demands. Cut off more than ever 
from the productive process, it can live free or die. I9 
I believe that Norton is correct. His perception of the vestigial nature of the family explains 
the virtual disappearance of sustained analysis of family structures and functions from 
contemporary liberal theory. Political theory focuses upon critical relationships, those of the 
individual to the state, the means of production to the state, and the individual to the means of 
production. When the family became marginal as a productive institution, it became almost 
irrelevant as a theoretical concern. It is significant that the transition from traditional fault 
based divorce regimes to contemporary no-fault regimes for the dissolution of marriage has 
19 	T.M. Norton, 'Contemporary Critical Theory and the Family' in Elshtain (Ed.), /c.c. 
cit., 254, 261. 
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been accompanied by a more significant transition. Whatever the injustices and inadequacies 
of traditional regimes, they were recognizable as regimes of 'black letter law'. Modern no-
fault regimes, by contrast, are discretionary, administrative in character, and generate pressure 
to ratify this development by replacing adversarial court based procedures with judicial 
ratification of the outcome of more or less informal forms of mediation and conciliation. 20 
Another way of putting the matter is to suggest that, for the family, the rule of law is being 
gradually replaced by administrative discretion. This may also indicate the extent of the chasm 
between the ideological valorization of the family and its actual importance or value. As Rose 
notes 
Economic thinkers have been telling us for at least two centuries that the more 
important a given kind of thing becomes for us, the more likely we are to have 
these hard-edged rules to manage it. 21 
Because family status was irrelevant to public status, because kinship had ceased to be 
a fundamental mode of political organization indeed, become almost irrelevant to it, it became 
tempting to ignore the family in theorizing. It seemed natural for individual to became 
synonymous with public person - with bourgeois citizen and market actor. The family 
remained useful as a scapegoat, of course, although it had been deprived of both political 
significance and economic role.22 Theoretically, it had become the raw material of minor 
sociological investigations rather than a constituent part of political theory. Given that its 
official roles had been limited to biological reproduction and the socialization of children, and 
given our cultural association of these functions with women, a reference to the family became 
a shorthand reference for the mother/child dyad, hardly a matter of theoretical significance. 
The relationship of the privatized nuclear family to the state and to production was mediated 
through the citizen, and just as the citizen of classic liberal theory had been the male head of 
the household, the citizen of contemporary theory might be viewed as the representative or 
20 	Eg. Family Law Council, Arbitration in Family Law, A.G.P.S., 1988; Weitzman, /oc. 
cit., 218-235; A. Gerard, 'Conciliation: Present and Future' & A. Bottomley, 
'Resolving Family Disputes: A Critical View' in M.DA. Freeman, State, Law, and the 
Family: Critical Perspectives, London, Tavistock Publications, 1984, 281 & 293 
respectively. 
21 	C.M. Rose, 'Crystals and Mud in Property Law', 40 Stanford L.R. 577 (1988). 
22 	Norton notes that, 'in the United States, scholars and the media are preoccupied with 
the matter of the family's decay. On the one hand, the image of "the family it: crisis" is 
backed up by mounting statistical evidence on divorce, marriage, the brutalization of 
women and children, psychopathology, and more. . . . On the other hand, the family lives 
on, if only because the society has found no functional equivalent for it.' Norton, /oc. 
cit., 265. Put another way, confronted by an exceptionally brutal gang rape by 
fourteen and fifteen year olds which apparently left the victim with irreparable brain 
damage, Mayor Koch of New York denounced the 'social breakdown' evidenced and 
said The family has to be accountable.' C. Bremmer, 'A warp on the wild side', The 
Australian, 27th April, 1989. What he meant, of course, is that the breakdown of the 
traditional nuclear family is primarily responsible for the upsurge in violence. 
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head of the family line. 23 If, in the terms of classic liberal theory, the family was pre-political, 
for contemporary theory it has become almost irrelevant. 
The definition of the family as private and outside the scope of political society 
engenders a number of serious conflicts in the context of contemporary liberal political theory. 
The most obvious concerns the theoretical legitimacy of the role of the state in regulating and 
defining the terms of family life. Within the frame of reference of classic social contract theory 
this posed no problem whatever. Because women ceded their identity to men upon marriage, 
because the family might be seen as pre-political, represented a limited state of nature, and the 
interests of the household were both represented and determined by its head, any form of 
regulation which was thought to accord with the interests of male citizens was legitimate. 
Within the state, men dealt with one another as equals, their relationships being regulated by 
the laws of the state. Within the family, all that remained were defined social roles. The 
position of women and children was determined by their relationship to men, and men's 
proprietary interests in their wives and children might be enforced by the state just as their 
rights to other forms of property might be enforced. Any form of regulation which protected 
men's proprietary rights in their wives and children and which minimized conflict and 
competition among men was appropriate. 
For classic social contract theorists, other than Rousseau, the relationship between 
husband and wife was contractual. This, however, was a unique contract, one in which the wife 
ceded her identity to her husband.24 Liberal theory abandoned the most obvious form of the 
dualism characterizing Greek thought, abandoned the claim that although the family was 
biologically primary, political life was ethically. superior. The state was necessary to generate 
and enforce the rules needed to mediate competition for economic resources and to facilitate 
the transmission of property. The state served the world of production and exchange from 
above, provided the certainty and authority necessary to resolve conflicts among formally equal 
individuals establishing in this way a basis for mutual trust. The family both ensured a steady 
supply of new workers and citizens and met the biological and social needs of the present 
workforce thus freeing the worker from domestic and reproductive tasks and socially locating 
the responsibility for meeting the needs of dependent individuals. This last function is, from 
the perspective of the state, critical, and the contraction of the group whose dependence is 
politically enforced from the Elizabethan Poor Laws to the present marks the contraction of 
the family and its increasing political insignificance. 25 
23 	Cf. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, loc. cit., 128-129. 
24 	In some ways, it bore a striking resemblance to a contract to enter slavery. 
25 	It is notable that the Poor Laws from 1601 onwards sought to locate responsibility for 
indigent family members upon both ascendents and descendants. For example, 43 
Eliz., Cap. 2, s. 7 provided that 'the father and grandfather, and the mother and 
grandmother, and the children of every poor, old, blind, lame and impotent person not 
able to work, being of a sufficient ability, shall, at their own charges, relieve and maintain 
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CONTEMPORARY LIBERAL THEORY AND THE FAMILY 
Earlier in this chapter two distinct, but nonetheless interconnected, points emerged. 
First, it became clear that the private family was perceived both as somehow outside the 
bounds of civil society and immune to legal intervention in the strict sense while nonetheless 
open to administrative and social intervention. Second, despite its official autonomy and 
independence, it became clear that the family served in the past and remains in the present a 
site of social control, a locus for intervention and restructuring. Now it is time to turn to 
contemporary theories and to begin to piece together their scattered references to family 
relations and family life and to deconstruct the ideological foundations upon which they are 
based. 
Contemporary liberal theories which analogize political and legal obligations to 
reciprocal obligations which are supposed to arise naturally among family members present 
more serious conceptual difficulties than did early social contract theories. The ground of 
obligation and the concrete nature of the reciprocities within family groups is often neither 
analyzed nor examined, simply assumed.  relationships offer an attractive theoretical 
model of mutual responsibility and equality to such theorists, among them individual thinkers 
as diverse as Rawls and Dworkin, but the social and economic inequalities within existing 
families and the history and structure of the power relationships within them are either 
papered over or ignored. The reluctance of such theorists to extend to the family the same 
unblinking gaze extended to instances of political and economic inequality, together with the 
quite fundamental liberal assumption that individuals make choices and decisions designed to 
further their interests as they perceive them, reflects the blindness of liberal discourse to 
questions of power. When power is addressed at all, it is approached obliquely. Dworkin, for 
example, suggests that power is not the issue. Rather, concern with the unequal distribution of 
power may be simply a forceful way of calling attention to other, independently unjust, features 
of our social, political and economic culture. He comments: 
Consider the common, and wholly justiflett complaint that women have too 
little power of all kinds in most societies. Someone who takes that view might 
think that social organization is defective unless the average woman has the 
same influence over affairs. .. as the average man does. But someone else who 
makes the same complaint might mean something very different: not that men 
and women should, as a matter of right, have the same influence on average, 
every such poor person in that manner and according to that rate, as by the justices of 
peace of that county . . . shall be assessed.' A provision in similar terms was in force in 
England until 1948. See Poor Law Act 1930, s. 14 which was abolished by the National 
Assistance Act 1948. Contemporary social welfare legislation in Australia has 
significantly restricted this responsibility, imposing direct obligations only upon those 
in marriage and marriage-like relationships and with regard to children under the age 
of 16. See Social Security Act 1947. 
Thus, in Rawls, A Theory of Justice, loc. cit., Rawls notes the connection between the 
difference principle and the ideal conception of the family. See p. 105. Likewise, in 
Dworkin, Law's Empire, loc. cit., Dworkin analogizes familial obligations and political 
obligations in developing his conception of associative community. See p. 195-216. 
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but that the smaller influence women now have is the result of a combination of 
economic injustice, stereotype, and other forms of oppression and prejudice, 
some o4which, perhaps, are so fundamental as to be carried in the community's 
culture.`' 
Dworkin is both right and wrong here. He is undoubtedly correct in arguing that the 
linkage between an unequal distribution of power and other, independently unjust, features of 
our culture is significant. He slides too easily over another, quite distinct, aspect of power. 
Power is a relational concept. It makes no sense to speak of power in the abstract, in vacuo. 
To the extent that questions of power feature in discourse, and, in particular questions of 
imbalances in power, we are not simply looking at a consequence of other, independently 
unjust social structures. We are looking at networks binding individuals to one another, at 
questions of dependence and independence, of domination and submission. We may be 
looking at networks with the capacity to create and sustain economic injustices, stereotypes, 
and other forms of prejudice. The reciprocity is critical.. Dworkin quite correctly recognizes 
that the relative powerlessness of certain groups and individuals may be a consequence of 
other deeply entrenched injustices. Likewise, the particular pattern of these injustices in any 
given society is likely to depend upon the existing power structure within that society and the 
ideologies prevailing within it. Classifying these as stereotypes is far too easy, first, because a 
stereotype is simply a generalization which is applied unthinkingly and without due attention to 
individual differences, and second, because stereotypes themselves become current and 
pervasive only when they meet the needs of specific individuals or groups who already occupy 
positions of relative power.  serve both to justify and to reinforce existing 
imbalances in power and to provide an image of social relations in which certain accepted • 
social roles become unquestionable. Indeed, a measure of their power is the simple fact that, 
the more successful the stereotype, the more pervasive its hold upon the imagination, the more 
limited our capacity to recognize it as such. Simply describing the female gender role as 
stereotypic is, therefore, inadequate and wanting in analysis. Rather, it is critical to examine 
the role itself, ascertain the purposes it serves, the values it reinforces. 
27 	Dworkin, 'Political Equality', /oc. cit., 14-17. The passage quoted in the text may be 
found at pp. 14-15. Cf. Walzer's efforts to address the same question, and, in 
particular, his thesis that the problem is not imbalances of power in any particular 
sphere of human activity, but the way in which imbalances in any area tend to spread 
and permeate other domains. See generally Walzer, Spheres of Justice, loc. cit. 
For a discussion of the role of stereotypes as a form of social control see J. Doane & 
D. Hodges, Nostalgia and Sexual Difference, New York, Methuen, 1987. A very good 
example of the ways in which a comparatively powerful group can utilize and 
manipulate stereotypic imagery to its advantage may be found in the efforts of upper 
class feminists in the United State during the period before women were granted the 
vote. Their most successful arguments centred around the need for the purity of 
womanhood to find a public voice. So doing, they contributed to the development of 
the ideology of motherhood and successfully imposed that ideology upon less 
advantaged women. See Dally, /oc. cit., 124-150. 
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The pervasive association of femininity with marriage and with motherhood, the 
image of the dependent wife and mother as one whose life is wholly devoted to meeting the 
needs of her husband and children, remains one significant aspect of our cultural conception of 
ideal womanhood. Women remain, to a far greater extent than men, identified with the family 
and with the home, their status defined by their roles as wives and mothers. These roles, in 
turn, possess little, if any, independent status or authority within the wider community. The 
identification of women with their familial and domestic roles, an identification which depends 
upon their relationship to a particular man, defines their status in terms of that relationship. 
Women's status and identity, as a consequence, remain dependent, not in any real sense 
determined by their own efforts and achievements but assigned them as a consequence of their 
marital status and determined by their husband's efforts and achievements. This very 
dependence, in turn, has traditionally ensured that public power and status was effectively 
reserved for men. 
During recent years a further trend has emerged. While the valorization of 
motherhood maintains its significance as conservative politics gains in ascendancy29, legal 
changes, particularly in family law, proclaim a quite different message, emphasizing that 
women are equal citizens and equally responsible for ensuring that they are able to provide for 
themselves and their children.  two ideologies are both current and, at least 
superficially, wholly irreconcilable. Two distinct and separate messages are being sent, the 
first of which demands that mothers devote all their time and attention to the needs and 
welfare of their children, and the second which suggests that, at least in the event of dissolution 
of marriage, motherhood is a non-event. To reconcile these ideologies depends upon 
recognition that the 'mother role' is attainable only within the framework of monogamous 
marriage for life, that it is inseparable from the separate spheres ideology, and that any woman 
who wishes to meet the demands of the 'mother role' bears responsibility for ensuring that, 
even given a legal regime which facilitates dissolution of marriage, and, not infrequently, even 
in the face of sustained brutality, she preserves the marital relationship. Should she choose to 
terminate the marital relationship, or should it be terminated by her spouse, she must be 
29 	Allen, /oc. cit., documents these shifts in the United Kingdom, in discussing the efforts 
by the 'Family Policy Group' to return responsibility for the elderly, the disabled, and 
children to 'the family'. He notes further that effectively this means returning the 
responsibility to women. See pp. 171-174. 
This is particularly true in those jurisdictions, such as California and Australia, which 
have embraced the no-fault, divorce at will, model in its entirety. For an account of 
the egalitarian emphasis in the present Australian law, and of its inegalitarian 
consequences, see P. McDonald et al, 'Directions for Law Reform and Social Policy', 
in McDonald (Ed.), /oc. cit., 308-323. Of particular note are the presumptions of 
equality, the gender neutral language, and the complete absence of any presumptions 
as to the appropriate custodial parent. For a detailed discussion of the presumptions 
underlying the California model see generally Weitzman, /oc. cit. Note especially the 
discussion in Ch. 11, Divorce and the Illusion of Equality, 357-401. 
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prepared to meet, or attempt to meet, the demands of the new egalitarian ideology. The only 
alternative is the marginal and wholly manipulable status of state client. 
The egalitarian ideology of the family is an exceedingly recent innovation. It 
proclaims men and women persons in the eyes of the state and the law. Based upon the model 
of consensual relationships among individuals who are social, political and economic equals, 
this model assumes that men and women participate equally in the life of the community, that 
their opportunities are equal within it, and that, should they choose to form a family unit, the 
responsibilities and benefits will be equally shared. This model is tacitly assumed by 
contemporary accounts of distributive justice. An egalitarian ideology of the family which 
originated, at least in part, as part of the reform of family law has become a mirror for ideal 
social practice. The affective family, based upon egalitarian and mutually supportive and 
emotionally satisfying relationships among political, economic and social equals, is 
extraordinarily popular as a propaganda device, and, contemporary evidence suggests, rare as a 
matter of social practice. Many commentators have noted the dichotomy between social 
practice and legal reality. Weitzman comments at some length concerning the egalitarian, 
gender neutral language of contemporary law, and contrasts this with the reality of social, 
economic and family structures.31 Similarly, Funder notes that Australian divorced couples 
emphasize marriages with clear role differentiation and women assuming responsibility for the 
majority of household tasks. She comments that 
Australian marriages of both generations represented in this study seem to have 
quite traditional division of roles. Thus the observed differences in earning 
capacity, which are linked sic; wives' taking major responsibility for children and 
home, are likely to remain?` 
While the present legal and theoretical 33 models tacitly assume an egalitarian model of family 
relationships, a majority of families are organized upon the basis that the husband makes a 
proportionally greater investment in his career and its advancement than he does in household 
tasks and in parenting, while the wife, whether or not she is in the paid labour force, makes a 
proportionally greater investment in household or family labour and in parenting. Allen 
speaking of intact families studied in the United Kingdom, makes similar observations. He 
notes the popularity of the theme of marriage as an egalitarian and symmetrical relationship, 
and comments that 
31 	Weitzman, ibid., See particularly pp. 15-51 and 323-412. 
32 	See K. Funder, 'His and Her Divorce' in McDonald, /oc. cit., 224-240. The quoted 
passage may be found at p. 240. 
33 	If this assumption did not underlie contemporary egalitarian theories such theories 
would have been compelled to examine the connection between gender roles and 
economic and social equality and to offer an account addressing this prevalent form of 
inequality. 
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such an ideology of marriage is a popular one, but there is very little evidence to 
suggest that it is in any real sense true. Despite the changes that are occurring . . 
marriage remains an essentiey unequal relationship, still structured around 
principles of male advantage. 
DWORKIN AND ASSOCIATIVE OBLIGATIONS 
The points made in the section above will, I believe, become clearer and more readily 
accessible when we look at the ways in which contemporary egalitarian theory has addressed 
the family. In particular, we need to examine and deconstruct their references to families and 
the obligations within family structures and attempt to understand the assumptions upon which 
they are based. In what seems a paradoxical and remarkable shift of emphasis, egalitarian 
economic and political reforms are asserted to represent a political rendition of the ideal 
model of family relationships, an ideal in which individuals do not seek to advance themselves 
unless they can do so in ways which advance the interests of those close to them. While the 
ideal is never given concrete form or shape, it represents a significant background norm, or 
assumption, of such theories. Both the ground of obligation within the family and the basis for 
mutual trust among its members are often elided in analysis, although Dworkin is to some 
extent an exception in this regard. The model of family relationships tacitly assumed often 
seems to be the mother-child relationship, a relationship predicated upon natural inequality. 35 
The protective and nurturing role of 'ideal motherhood', the mother's willingness to sacrifice 
her own interests to those of her children, undeniably represents a tempting model for an 
expanded bureaucratic social welfare state. Just as the mother, in ideal theory, guides and 
nurtures her children towards the mature state of adulthood, so the expanded social welfare 
state will empower its clients to attain mature equality. 
Dworkin adopts an apparently unique approach, using the 'associative obligations' 
which he suggests arise within families and other biological and social groups as the foundation 
for his claim that certain sorts of political communities generate similar associative obligations. 
He argues that these obligations arise through social practice provided four conditions are 
met: the members must regard the group's obligations as holding uniquely within the group, 
they must accept that these responsibilities bind member to member - that is, apply inter se - 
rather than to the group as a whole, they must perceive these responsibilities as linked to a 
concern for the well-being of each of the members, and, finally, the members must believe that 
the practices of the group show equal concern for all members. Such groups he characterizes 
as fraternal, and he notes with respect to them that groups which meet these standards qualify 
34 	Allen, /oc. cit., 21-23, 78-99. The passage quoted may be found at p. 79. 
35 	Dworkin, Law's Empire, loc. cit., 437, n. 20 discusses what he terms fraternal relations 
and refers explicitly to the parent-child and child-parent relationship as well as to the 
bond between siblings. He is particularly concerned with relationships in which 
mutual obligations are present but in which the element of choice is absent. 
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as 'true communities' rather than simply bare communities. For a fuller discussion of the 
distinction, see the balance of this chapter. I do not regard this as invalidating the more 
general description above, but simply expanding it. problem is not the use of the ideal 
family as a model, but the failure to submit our existing and historical practice of family to 
sustained critical examination and to incorporate that practice or those practices within the 
structure of the theory as a whole. If the ideal family offers a tempting foundation for 
egalitarian theorizing, the impact of existing 'non-ideal' families upon distributive justice ought 
to form an inherent part of the structure of accounts of distributive justice, not simply a 
footnote to them. We cannot assume an unexamined 'ideal' until and unless we make its roles 
and structures present to theory and their connection with equality unassailable. 
Dworkin's reliance upon the non-voluntary obligations characteristic of family and 
similar practices in his account of the genesis of political obligations provides a particularly 
clear example of the use of the family as ideal. He argues that certain social practices generate 
obligations which arise, neither because of consent nor as a consequence of accepting benefits 
and thus incurring an obligation to respond in kind, but as an natural consequence of the 
relationships which prevail within them. Where the collective practices of the group meet the 
criteria outlined above, it is proper to speak of the members as having obligations inter se and 
such groups may be described as 'true communities'. The obligations are an integral part of 
the relationships which constitute the group. Archetypical among such associations are 
families. Several features of this model are significant. First, the critical element in Dworkin's 
account is the concern of each member for the well-being of other members of the community. 
Second, he emphasizes that not only must the members show concern for the well being of 
other members, but they must believe that the practices of the group demonstrate equal 
concern for the welfare of each individual member. The emphasis upon equal concern marks 
a significant departure from his earlier connection between equal concern and equal respect37, 
at least in the context of obligations. His account links the concrete practices of social groups 
with the group's beliefs concerning whether these practices are predicated upon equality of 
concern. For obligations to arise, the members of the group must both have genuine concern 
for the well being of their fellow group members as individuals and believe that their social 
practices show equal concern. The language used suggests that it is the actual beliefs of the 
participants in the practice which are initially dispositive of the legitimacy or otherwise of the 
obligations perceived. Given that contemporary pluralist societies are comprised of numerous 
smaller associations, some voluntary, others wholly unchosen, and given that not all the voices 
within those groups are equally likely to be heard and listened to, are we entitled to critically 
appraise the beliefs of the participants and declare that some associations are incapable of 
generating obligations, or must we accept the sincere beliefs of the participants, or at least of 
36 	Ibid., 198-210. 
37 	Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, loc. cit., 180-183, 272-278. 
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those participants whose voices are heard? While Dworkin undoubtedly wishes to provide 
criteria by which the participants in any social practice may assess their own obligations, one by 
one, difficulties remain. These difficulties are inextricably linked to questions of power and the 
hegemony of prevailing stereotypes, particularly those which hold women responsible for 
sustaining relationships even while they simultaneously ensure that women lack the resources 
and the social power essential if they are to influence the structure of those relationships in any 
meaningful way. Likewise, when one considers social practices such as family, it becomes 
absolutely essential to recognize that children are unlikely to be able to accurately assess the 
validity of their obligations and to extricate themselves from relationships which are not 
sufficiently just to impose obligations. The consequences of Dworkin's model for relationships 
between unequal individuals remain wholly unexplored, and yet it is within the family that 
inequality prevails. Surely, most particularly where children are concerned, the onus cannot be 
on the individual to assess the capacity or otherwise of the relationship to generate obligations. 
Dworkin's failure to consider the position of children renders questionable some aspects of his 
account of associative obligations, perhaps suggests he may have considered insufficiently the 
position of the weak and disadvantaged more generally in developing his mode1. 38 
The language actually used by Dworkin suggests both that it is the beliefs of the 
participants in the practice which are critical in evaluating the legitimacy of the obligations 
asserted and that these beliefs are open to critical evaluation from outside the practice itself. 
Thus he notes that 'even genuine communities that meet the several conditions just described 
may be unjust or promote injustice 39 either with respect to the members of the group or with 
respect to nonmembers. Should this occur, and should the defective features be compatible 
with the practice as a whole, a further question arises. Are the injustices so fundamental that 
the unjust obligations created by the practice are cancelled, or do they continue to subsist 
despite the injustice wrought? The fact that unjust obligations may continue to subsist 
emphasizes the need for attention to human relationships in constructing an account of 
distributive justice. Most particularly with regard to family structures and relationships, I 
would suggest, foreshadowing arguments to be developed in the next chapter, that even 
fundamentally unjust family structures can and do give rise to certain obligations, both 
between spouses and between parents and children, and these cannot simply be disregarded. 
We must take care, in the family as elsewhere, to distinguish between just and unjust 
obligations, to ensure that political institutions take their justice into account, strive to protect 
those who are, for whatever reason, unable to adequately identify and further their own 
interests. Family structures, and the inequalities implicit in existing structures, can neither be 
38 	It must be noted in this regard that the individuals who figure in his accounts of civil 
disobedience more generally seem neither weak nor powerless, indeed, they are 
individuals who have the capacity and the will to challenge the decisions of the state. 
See Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, loc. cit., 206-222. 
39 	Dworkin, Law's Empire, loc. cit., 202. 
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deleted from the theoretical agenda nor dismissed as individual or social preferences. The 
structure of our private lives is inseparable from our public equality. 
The lack of structural analysis on Dworlcin's part suggests, however, that the only 
relationships with which the state is concerned are those reflecting the public status of 
individuals as citizens. The equality of citizens is contrasted with the social and economic 
inequalities which attend differential professional or occupational roles. Social and economic 
inequality within the family is ignored. Because, as modern egalitarians have argued in 
different ways, social and economic inequalities do not depend upon morally significant 
differences between individuals, it is unfair to demand equal compliance with the rules and 
requirements of civil society from those who have no hope of receiving equal benefits. Yet if, 
as they also suggest, individuals act rationally - that is strive to satisfy their desires as they 
perceive them to the greatest extent possible, given the competing desires and interests of 
others - their willingness to accede to just distributive arrangements must be explained. The 
need for a rational basis for sharing necessitates reliance upon an ideal model of reciprocal 
obligations thus making it possible to argue that all would find it in their interests to support a 
distributive scheme which ensures that the benefits of social cooperation are fairly distributed. 
The model chosen is the family. In the family, says Rawls, individuals do not desire to advance 
their own interests at the expense of others. Rather, they strive to gain only in ways which 
advance the interests of other family members.' ° Well, yes, in some families, but it remains to 
do all the hard work. Who is it who here speaks? Who defines and establishes these interests? 
Are there power relationships involved? When decisions must be made, whose voice 
predominates and in what decisions? To what extent are the relationships involved willed and 
created by the individuals concerned, and to what extent are they also, and perhaps more 
significantly, themselves the products of legal and social changes, perhaps of the cultural 
environment as a whole? Without a concrete account of the ideal family and without an 
analysis of the place of the family in the basic structure and of the concrete entitlements of 
family members, Rawls' model of the ideal family lacks justificatory capacity even as a model. 
Positing an ideal family while failing to make its structures and roles present, failing to 
subject the ideal itself to analysis, and crucially and centrally, failing to locate the family and 
individual family members within the structures and institutions, both legal and social, which 
predominate in the wider society, perpetuates facile acceptance of what is. This obscures the 
history, nature and characteristics of intra-familial relationships, and thus also obscures the 
ways in which family structures and roles mediate market participation and the ways in which 
market structures and demands mediate family structures. While this enables theorizing to 
concentrate upon the economic inequalities which arise through market competition, what is 
forgotten is that the cost is an inadequate and incomplete account of market structures, and a 
inadequate account of equality. When women are made the subject of discourse, and thus 
40 	Rawls, A Theory of Justice, loc. cit., 105. 
133 
particularized, we are compelled to acknowledge that their economic inequality cannot simply 
be perceived as arising through market competition. Rather, their ability to participate equally 
in market competition is mediated by and through their familial roles, both as subjectively 
perceived and as ideologically constructed and imported into market practices. The present 
economic inequality of women reflects the meaning attributed in economic discourse to 
productive labour, and the exclusion of work done in a family context from this frame of 
reference.41 
Discourse is both freed and expanded when woman becomes the subject of discourse, 
and a signal benefit of this expansion resides in its capacity to also make present the reciprocal 
connection between men's familial roles and market participation and demands. Surely an 
egalitarian discourse premised upon a more sophisticated and accurate model is preferable to 
one predicated upon an inadequate and simplistic model. It is not here argued that existing 
forms of discourse are, in any simplistic sense, patriarchal, nor is it suggested that the 
constricted forms of discourse currently prevailing have been consciously constructed. Rather, 
once the conception of the individual is deprived of concrete content, and, in particular, once 
his or her individuality is perceived without regard to those dependencies which reflect its 
embeddedness in familial, social and economic structures, not only is 'the family inevitably 
bracketed out of the civil conception of society', but also the structures and roles which pertain 
to civil society attain an unwarranted independence, and their perceived isolation from the 
world of private society makes coherent analysis unlikely. 42 
While modern egalitarians are undoubtedly committed to eradicating the last vestiges 
of ascribed status upon the basis of race, caste, ethnic origins and religious belief, to the degree 
that they ignore the economic and political relationships within family groups and, in 
particular, the historically determined liberal equation of legitimate status with occupational 
and professional status and its concomitant denial of public individual status to those 
individuals who are not members of the productive labour force, they render their own project 
untenable. The ideal family may well provide the theoretical model for the egalitarian social 
welfare state, but the possibility of power relationships within families and the unequal 
positions of adult family members have been rendered invisible by this same ideal and by the 
accompanying ideological definition of the family as private. The conception of the individual 
which prevails in contemporary egalitarian theory - despite the efforts of contemporary 
theorists to affirm it as a political conception merely - a conception devoid of specific and non-
specific dependencies, parallels the conception of economic man, and these together are/ought 
to be devoid of constraints other than those which emerge from the laws of the liberal state 
41 	On the construction of economic discourse, and on the way in which, internationally, 
the labour of women is comprehensively excluded from conventional economic 
indicators, see generally Waring, /oc. cit. 
42 	See Yeatman, /oc. cit., 155-163, especially 155-158. The passage quoted may be found 
at p. 157. 
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and the functions and/or malfunctions of the economic market. As liberal citizens and liberal 
market actors equality becomes attainable. 
Because, as abstract citizens, equality before the law is a precondition for the 
legitimacy of the rule of law, and because as economic actors whose morally irrelevant 
differences are mitigated by the social welfare state, each stands for one and no more than 
one, the postulated coexistence of political and economic equality and hierarchical structures 
must be explained. Dworkin seeks to reconcile fraternity and hierarchy, commenting that 
while fraternal associations must be conceptually egalitarian, 
they may be structured, even hierarchical, in the way a family is, but the 
structure and hierarchy must reflect the group's assumption that its roles and 
rules are equally in the interests of all, that no one's life is more important than 
anyone else's. Armies may be fraternal organizations if that condition is met. 
But caste systems that count some members as inherently less worthy than 
others are not fraternal and yield no communal responsibilities.' 
There is a muddle here about the voices within the army, just as there is a muddle about the 
voices within the family.' 4 The phrase 'the group's assumption' conceals everything we need 
to know about the ways in which that assumption came into being, the voice or voices which 
43 	See Dworkin, Law's Empire, loc. cit., 200. But here perhaps one must ask if we can 
imagine a caste system in which all the participants sincerely believed (or assumed) 
that the roles and rules prescribed thereby were equally in the interests of all, in which 
the group believed that its practices did, in fact, show equal concern. Walzer 
suggested we might, and was savagely criticized by Dworkin for doing so. See Walzer, 
/oc. cit., 26-28, 312-315, cf. Dworkin, 'What Justice Isn't' in A Matter of Principle, loc. 
cit., 217. What Walzer in fact asked us to do was to 'assume now that the Indian 
villagers really do accept the doctrines that support the caste system' [Emphasis mine.] in 
order that he might explore what might follow from that assumption. Given that 
assumption, while in Dworkin's terms a caste system would not be just, ie. its 
conception of equal concern might be defective in some way, it need not follow that a 
community organized upon that basis was not a genuine community, one with shared 
conception of equal concern, at least if Dworkin is prepared to extend the same logic 
to a caste system as he does to a patriarchal family. Cf. Law's Empire, loc. cit., 202- 
206. Why ought it make a difference that the shared assumptions in a caste system 
are in practice attended by differential entitlements while the shared assumptions in a 
patriarchal family superficially appear only to be attended by differential levels of 
protection, by paternalism which appears appropriate when applied to women and 
girls and inappropriate when applied to men and boys? The precise thesis for which I 
have argued is that the overall entitlements of women (and girls) remain less than 
equal precisely because of their familial roles and the economic inequalities attendant 
upon those roles. Would it make a difference if Dworkin had, instead, imagined a 
family in which boys and young men were subject to stringent parental constraint 
upon the basis that due to the predisposition of young men to violent behaviour 
special protection was required until they were sufficiently mature to control their 
violent impulses? While, so far as I know, no existing families are organized upon this 
basis, there is at least some empirical evidence to support the argument that men and 
boys are more likely to resort to violent behaviour and therefore such constraints, in 
our culture, might well appear wholly reasonable and grounded in empirical evidence. 
I think here of MacKinnon's comment that the different voice perceived by Gilligan is 
simply the voice of the oppressed, and her further comment that oppression has the 
capacity to silence the oppressed. Feminism Unmodified, loc. cit., 39. 
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established the roles and rules involved, the specific and historically constructed ideologies 
which played a part in their creation, and the voice or voices which make that assumption 
present to us. To assume, on an individual level, is to take as given, thus obviating the 
necessity for critical analysis. What does it, can it, then mean to be told that a group assumes, 
in particular that it assumes that its roles and rules are equally in the interests of all? What is 
involved in what Dworkin acknowledges to be a personification? 45 
The concept of the personification of a social group is a critical structural element in 
Dworkin's account of the nature of political obligations and his argument for law as integrity. 
For Dworkin, integrity is a shorthand reference to the complex idea of law as a coherent and 
consistent set of principles which functions as an integrated whole. This conception of the 
nature of law, he argues, demands personification in that it supposes that 
the community as a whole can be committed to principles of fairness or justice 
or procedural due process in some way analogous to theway particular people 
can be committed to convictions or ideals or projects.' 
He insists that the community is not an independent metaphysical entity, that insofar as it 
'exists' it exists as a function of the practices of thought and language characteristic of the 
group. He argues that personification expresses the responsibility of the group, our sense that 
the group itself must be taken seriously as a moral agent. This remains 
a personification and not a discovery, because we recognize that the community 
has no independent metaphysical existence, that it is itself a creature of the 
practices of thought and language in which it figures.'" 
The examples given involve corporate responsibility and the responsibilities of political 
officials. We think it proper to speak of corporate responsibility for torts or crimes, not as a 
shorthand way of summing up the responsibilities of individual employees, shareholders or 
managers, but as part of a form of reasoning which commences with considering the 
responsibility of the corporation as a whole and only subsequently considers the degree to 
which that responsibility devolves on individual actors. Personification provides us with a 
vantage point from which to consider the responsibility of group members. 
Similarly, Dworkin argues that our political convictions assume that the community 
has principles of its own to which it may be faithful or unfaithful. In a complex argument he 
suggests that when a community has betrayed its principles, as Germany did during the Nazi 
era, whilst contemporary Germans are not to blame for the Nazi era, they nonetheless may 
45 	Dworkin discusses the conception of personification upon which he relies in some 
detail in Dworkin, Law's Empire, loc. cit., 167-175. 
Ibid., 167. 
47 	Ibid., 171. 
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have special responsibilities today because the Nazis were also German. The concept of 
personification explains our intuitions in this regard. Similarly, we conventionally speak of the 
responsibilities of government towards its citizens, arguing that, as citizens, we have a right 
that the government protect us against assault or provide adequate medical care to all. 
Dworkin suggests that arguments concerning the existence of such responsibilities precede 
consideration of how they might be institutionally met. Our belief that the government 
personified has such obligations provides the foundation upon which beliefs concerning the 
particular duties of political officials depend. With respect to the latter, he comments that 
most of us 
think they have a special and complex responsibility of impartiality among the 
members of the community and of partiality toward them in dealings with 
strangers. That is quite different from the responsibility each of us accepts as an 
individual. We each claim a personal point of view, ambitions and attachments 
of our own we are at liberty to pursue, free from the claims of others to equal 
attention, concern and resources. We insist on an area of personal moral 
sovereignty within which each of us may prefer the interests of family and 
friends and devote himself to projects that are selfish, however grand. 48 
Personification explains the perception that, as members of particular communities or 
associations, individuals have obligations towards their fellow members which are inexplicable 
on an individual level. The concept of the community personified emphasizes the identity of 
the social group as moral actor. 
The concept of personification in Dworkin's theory is complex and significant. It 
grounds his account of associative obligations. As he recognizes, the associative obligations he 
postulates as the basis of political community depend upon 'a history of events and acts that 
attract obligations'49 rather than upon any discrete act of deliberate contractual commitment. 
Obligations are the outcome of a relationship, not a condition precedent. They are embedded 
in the concrete history of the group and defined through its practices. Their nature and extent 
may well be controversial, but, according to Dworkin, what is sought is that interpretation 
which makes a given practice the best it is capable of being. 5° Interpretation occurs on three 
distinctive levels, the preinterpretive level, where what is required is consensual identification 
of the particular practice, the interpretive level which consists of a general justification for 
pursuing the particular practice in question, and the postinterpretive level, in which the 
'interpreter adjusts his sense of what the practice "really" requires so as better to serve the 
justification he accepts at the interpretive stage.'51 
48 	Dworkin, Law's Empire, loc. cit., 174. 
49 	Ibid., 197. 
50 	Dworkin, Law's Empire, loc. cit., 45-86. 
51 	Ibid., 66. In Ch. 6 1 endeavour to apply this model to family practices. 
137 
Here, it is critical to draw together the threads of a lengthy and complex discussion 
and to relate them to the arguments presented earlier in this and the preceding chapters. The 
practices central to the arguments presented thus far are those of political community and 
family. We have begun to examine the interpretations given of these practices in both early 
and contemporary liberal theories, and have attempted to draw out the interdependence of 
political practices and familial practices. It has been argued that the structural roots of 
women's inequality may be found in our cultural practices of family and in the gender roles 
which have evolved coevally with those practices. It has been argued further that to the extent 
that theories of distributive justice limit their analysis to the inequalities which arise out of 
market competition and out of political practices, whilst disregarding family practices, women's 
inequality will continue to be absent from the theoretical agenda. Even though women remain 
the least advantaged segment of the population at every socio-economic level, even though 
gender inequality remains more or less constant across the barriers of class, race, and 
ethnicity, and arises out of our cultural traditions, the compartmentalization inherent in 
current accounts renders it invisible. It has been argued further that such theories are 
themselves profoundly gendered, that the conception of the person relied on mirrors the male 
gender role characteristic of our culture and that the structural assumptions governing this role 
as an ideal prefigure the arguments presented. It is against this background that Dworlcin's 
conception of associative obligations becomes profoundly significant and relevant and it is this 
background which necessitates its exploration in substantial depth in this and succeeding 
chapters. 
When Dworkin tells us that an essential determinant of the capacity of a social 
practice such as family or political community to generate obligations is the group's assumption 
that its roles and rules are equally in the interests of all those within the group, he is relying 
upon personification to make real the idea that a social practice is capable of generating 
assumptions which belong to the practice as a whole and not to any individual member as 
individual. There are so many questions one might wish to ask here. Do our practices of 
family qualify in the sense his account requires? Does it matter that, for example, many of the 
voices within the family have gone unheard, that others may have been profoundly distorted? 
Does it even matter that the group's assumption may ultimately be nothing more or less than 
the assumptions of those who have, traditionally52, been entitled to exercise power within the 
family and who believe their power in this regard to be both legitimate and genuinely to 
manifest equal concern for the interests of all family members? Doctrines such as inequality 
of bargaining power, unconscionability and unjust enrichment have come to matter profoundly 
in contract law, and these doctrines emphasize that even in a relationship where bargaining 
ostensibly occurs at arms length we cannot simply assume that authentic mutual consent exists. 
Are we somehow less entitled to question the assumptions underlying practices such as family? 
52 	I here refer, not only to our social practices of family, but also to our legal practices of 
family. 
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Surely authentic mutuality and equality are still more critical within foundational and pervasive 
social practices such as family. Where is the ideal account of family we require to make his 
model real to us?53 
According to Dworkin, such associations need not be egalitarian in any readily 
accessible sense to generate obligations. In theory at least, family practices such as those 
characteristic of the 'separate spheres' ideology characteristic of early social contract theory 
would qualify provided that the responsibilities involved were perceived as owed uniquely to 
family members, that they were owed inter se rather than to the family as a whole, that the 
specific responsibilities identified flowed from a genuine concern for the well-being of each 
individual member, and finally that the concern was extended equally to each individual, 
whatever his or her specific role within the within the family. The assumptions emerge from 
the complex interaction between the historical development of a particular practice and a critical 
interpretation of that practice. Dworkin emphasizes that to interpret the requirements of a 
particular practice, the interpreter 'must join the practice he proposes to understand. '54 It 
follows that in order to properly interpret our culture's practices of family or of political 
community, it is necessary to enter into the role or roles the practice makes available. This 
step is essential if we are to determine what the practice actually requires seen in the best light 
and ascertain the degree of fit required between the present features of the practice and the 
justification offered for the practice itself. Even this, Dworkin acknowledges, may ultimately 
be insufficient, for although we have thus established the integrity or otherwise of the practice, 
we have not answered the quite separate question of whether or not the practice is just. 55 
Dworkin acknowledges that even authentic fraternal associations may be unjust, that 
unjust dominion [may lie] at the heart of some culture's practices of family [and 
that] even the interpretive attitude [may not] justi reading some apparently 
unjust feature of an associative obligation out of it. 
53 	See Ch. 6 for an attempt to construct an ideal theory account of marriage and family 
using Dworkin's interpretive model and for arguments that many of the family 
practices of our culture are illegitimate on the best interpretation available of our 
practices of family. I argue further in that chapter that, given the relationship of the 
state and the family, the degree to which the family has served in the past and serves 
in the present as a agent of social control, the state has an obligation to intervene 
where practices are unjust. 
54 	Dworkin, Law's Empire, loc. cit., 64. 
55 	I should add that, unlike Dworkin, I am uncertain whether, in the case of family 
practices, a clear distinction can be drawn between the justice and the integrity of a 
social practice. In Ch. 6 I argue, in essence, that for the practices associated with 
family to retain sufficient integrity to ensure their capacity to impose obligations they 
must also be just. 
56 	See Dworkin, 'Is There Really No Right Answer in Hard Cases' in A Matter of 
Principle, loc. cit., 119, 139-141. 
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When we deal with complex and structured practices, the sorts of practices which are 
characteristic of associative communities of the type Dworkin describes, to become a 
participant necessarily means to participate in its structure, to enter into one of the roles it 
makes available, together with the emotional and structural associations defining that role. We 
are not dealing with an exercise of the kind Dworkin uses as a model of literary interpretation, 
one in which it is (barely) possible to consider the participants simply as abstract individuals, 
but with a complex and hierarchically structured practice organized around distinct social 
roles. If our critic fails to become a participant, as Dworkin puts it, he or she will be unable to 
provide an interpretation of the central conceptual features of the practice. If our critic 
becomes a participant, he or she can only do so through an interpretation of one of the roles 
associated with the practice, and within the assumptions governing the structure of that role. 
What our critic perceives upon resuming a position outside the practice itself, outside the 
associative community in which it features, cannot but be a function, at least in part, of the 
position adopted within the practice. It goes without saying, of course, that what our critic 
finds within the practice itself, and the particular form of participation available may be 
determined in part by who, in particular, he or she is. Within our culture (any culture?) to 
adopt the interpretive attitude towards practices as constitutive of our identity as those 
involved in family we must draw upon our own experiences of selfhood, of our identity as male 
or female, as (potential or actual) husbands or wives, mothers or fathers, daughters or sons, 
brothers or sisters. In seeking to imagine, to intuit enough of the significance of such practices 
to be a competent critic, we confront an immediate barrier. Do we, can we, understand 
enough of what it is to be other than we are to become competent interpreters?57 I do not 
believe, I should add, that Dworkin would necessarily disagree with this account of the 
difficulties involved. These difficulties become crucial at the point at which, in interpreting a 
57 	The fact, or mystery of femininity, has become a significant, almost mainstream, 
problematic in criticism. See, for example, S. Cavell, Themes out of School: Effects 
and Causes, San Francisco, North Point Press, 1984. He alludes the demand for 
explicitness inherent in the social contract, and comments that the 'consent to be 
governed must express the desire to be governe4 governed by consent, hence to 
participate in the city. To express desire inexplicitly is an act of seduction, hence one that 
exists only in a medium of prohibition and conspiracy. It may be that human sexual life 
will continue to require this medium and its stru: ■:les for the foreseeable future, say for as 
long as our politics does not create a more perfect public medium, unfailingly intelligible, 
reciprocal, and nourishing. Without this, we will continue to interpret privacy as 
inexplicitness, and on this ground the private will continue to look like the natural enemy 
of the political. . .' See pp. 94-95. Later he comments upon the fact that Bergman has 
been credited with being the first modern filmmaker to confront and question the 
feminine in himself and asks if certain scenes in a filmic deconstruction of a Bergman 
film constitute an admission that we [who?] 'do not know what a woman, in oneself or 
others, is.' See pp. 119-120. At p. 179, again in reference to Bergman, he identifies 
Persona as signifying 'a man's imagination of the imagination of women, or perhaps a 
man's compulsion to imagine the imagination of a woman.' Finally, and I believe 
significantly, Cavell identifies the quality or possibility of being photogenic with the 
possibility of femininity in oneself (pp. 180-181), that is, as I read the passage, with the 
willingness to become or the possibility of becoming an object to subjects other than 
oneself. More generally see Betterton, /oc. cit. for a series of essays upon images of 
femininity in the arts and media. 
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practice such as family, we attempt to ascertain whether or not the group actually assumes its 
roles and rules are equally in the interests of each individual member. If, as seems likely, none 
of us, male or female, have any experience of selfhood or individual identity which is not 
gendered, and, equally likely, are not fully conscious of the role played by gender in our 
interpretations, such difficulties become critical in the interpretation of any social practice 
whose internal structure relies upon gender as a major determinant. 58 
The demands of the critical role are heightened where the text to be interpreted 
touches that which is believed constitutive of our identity as individuals, not merely peripheral 
to it. When reflecting upon Dworkin's acknowledgement that some culture's (our culture's?) 
practices of family might be unjust, we must reflect as well upon his acknowledgment that it 
may be that the injustice is 'so severe and deep that these obligations are cancelled'. He suggests 
that practices involving racial unity and discrimination provide examples where this is likely to 
be the case. But, he adds, this will not always be the case, and where it is not, dilemmas arise 
because 'the unjust obligations the practice creates are not entirely erased'. He then turns to the 
example of a family in which daughters, but not sons, have an obligation to defer to their 
father's wishes in the choice of a spouse. While I see no reason why practices involving racial 
unity and discrimination ought to be perceived as more profoundly unjust than family practices 
which deny some individuals the autonomy to which other individuals equally placed in all 
respects but the brute fact of biological sex are entitled, it is worth looking at his example and 
attempting to understand why it was selected. Dworkin begins: 
Does a daughter have an obligation to defer to her father's wishes in cultures 
that give parents power to choose spouses for daughters but not for sons? We 
ask first whether the four conditions are met that transform the bare institution 
of family, in the form this has taken there, into a true community, and that 
raises a nest of interpretive questions in which our convictions about justice will 
figure. Does the culture genuinely accept that women are as important as men? 
Does it see the special parental power over daughters as genuinely in the 
daughter's interest? If not, if the discriminatory treatment of daughters is 
grounded in some more general assumption that they are less worthy than sons, 
the association is not genuine, and no distinctively associative responsibilities, 
of any character, arise from it. . . . 
But suppose the culture accepts the equality of sexes but in good faith thinks 
that equality of concern requires paternalistic protection for women in all 
aspects of family life, and that parental control over a daughter's marriage is 
consistent with the rest of the institution of family. 
Under such circumstances, he argues, the obligations of community continue to exist, although 
they may be overridden by appeal to some other more general ground of rights.59 
58 	Similar difficulties may arise in the context of race or ethnicity, although individual 
awareness of such differences almost certainly arises later than does awareness of • 
gender. 
59 	See Dworkin, Law's Empire, loc. cit., 204-205. 
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The distinction at work in this argument, that between the situation where the 
injustice is so great that the obligations which would otherwise follow are cancelled and that 
between the case where these obligations continue but may be overridden appears to be linked 
to another distinction made earlier. In acknowledging that even genuine communities may be 
unjust, Dworkin notes that communal obligations may be unjust in two very different ways. 
The injustice may be confined to the obligations pertaining within the group, as in the example 
above, or it may flow outwards to those who are not themselves members of the group. If the 
latter is the case, the unjust obligations will conflict with obligations arising out of membership 
in other, wider, communities. Racially exclusionary practices implicit in the practices of some 
communities may therefore conflict with obligations of neighbourhood or citizenship. 6° 
Similarly, family practices may be objectionable, not simply because of their paternalism, but 
because they require members to commit crimes to protect family honour or otherwise serve 
family interests. 
Again, many questions arise. Surely patriarchal practices of family, the kind of 
paternalism described, also flow outwards, affect the attitudes and behaviours of family 
members in the workplace, the community, in politics. 61 Why is it that Dworkin, in seeking to 
identify family practices sufficiently unjust to cancel obligations, finds it necessary to draw 
upon families whose members are compelled to commit crimes in the name of family honour? 
From what, precisely, has he averted his gaze? Can he possibly believe that, for example, a 
father who sincerely believes that equal concern requires paternalistic protection for girls and 
women in all areas of family life can or will confine those attitudes towards girls and women to 
the family setting? What of his relationship in the workplace with women as colleagues, 
possibly as superiors, more likely as subordinates? How could he reconcile a sincere belief 
that girls and women require paternalistic protection in all aspects of family life with, for 
example, the loyalty and respect due a superior in the workplace, with the mutuality and 
equality due a colleague, even with the encouragement and challenge essential if a subordinate 
is to attain her full potential? In simple terms, I believe, the short answer is that his own 
example is flawed, that there is no reason to assume that such attitudes such as those described 
will not corrupt and render fundamentally inegalitarian the participation of the individuals 
involved in other spheres. 62 
It seems likely that where the injustice is confined to a specific feature of the 
relationships within the practice, Dworkin would like to argue that the responsibilities which 
arise are genuine, although the offensive obligation may be overridden by some more general 
60 
61 
62 
Ibid., 202. 
See, for example, C. Cockburn, 'The Gendering of Jobs: Workplace Relations and the 
Reproduction of Sex Segregation' in S. Walby (Ed.), Gender Segregation at Work, 
Stony Stratford, Open Univ. Press, 1988, 29. 
For further arguments on this point, see Ch. 6 & 11. 
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principle. Where the injustice is global, where it not only affects the roles and relationships 
within the group, but subverts the capacity of its members to fulfil other obligations, the 
practice itself is unjustifiable and ought not be tolerated. The subjectively perceived 
obligations of its members are cancelled, and the practice itself must be changed or eradicated. 
If! am right in this, are we then to abolish the family, or at least those families whose practices 
remain similar to these, as Rawls fears? Are we to intervene directly, alter the offensive 
practices? I believe that we must, and that the extent to which such intervention is morally 
mandatory has not been fully recognized by Dworkin. Many practices similar to those Dworkin 
cites remain both conventional and accepted within a wide spectrum of contemporary families. 
What of families in which the family members sincerely believe that the husband is entitled to 
expect obedience from his wife as well as his children, where the hierarchy involved is clear 
and explicit, even if such practices are, at the same time, sincerely believed to be compatible 
with equality of concern? Dworkin offers little in the way of direct guidance here, seemingly 
assumes that family practices such as those described either will not interfere with the capacity 
of family members to fulfil other obligations or, perhaps, that the interpretive attitude will 
demonstrate that the practices concerned are inconsistent with the institution of family as a 
whole. The first assumption is, I think, simply wildly implausible, the second profoundly 
difficult to sustain given our legal and social history and traditions. They seem all too 
consistent with our actual practices of family as they have evolved over the last several hundred 
years, even while they may be wholly inconsistent with the 'best interpretation' we can provide 
of these practices.63 This possibility, of course, raises further questions, questions which 
involve the responsibility of a state dedicated to equal concern in addressing private practices 
which are inadmissible on egalitarian grounds and these will be addressed in subsequent 
chapters. 
The passages above are difficult for several reasons. First, remarkably for a modern 
theorist, Dworkin is suggesting that associative obligations, to the extent that they are called 
into being by a social practice sufficiently coherent to meet the requirements of what he terms 
'true community', operate in the same way in families, racial or ethnic communities, and 
modern nation states. Likewise he acknowledges that questions of justice can arise within 
families as within wider communities. It makes no sense to characterize a feature of particular 
family structures as unjust unless justice is as relevant within families as elsewhere. To that 
extent, he may be taken to acknowledge that the personal may be political. Equally, like 
Rawls, he wishes to insist that his account of equality is a political account, that our 
responsibilities as private individuals and as citizens are distinct. As he says subsequently, 
our familiar convictions, which require government to treat people as equals in 
the scheme of property it designs but do not require people to treat others as 
63 	For a sustained argument that they are, however, inconsistent with the best 
interpretation of family that can be provided, see Ch. 6. It should be noted that 
interpretation I offer involves condemning many deeply embedded cultural traditions 
as inegalitarian and inadmissible within an egalitarian state. 
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equals in using whatever the scheme assigns them, assume a division of public 
and private responsibility. They suppose we have a duty in politics that does not 
carry over as any general duty of private life. 64 
The question which remains both unasked and unanswered in Dworkin is simple and critical to 
egalitarian theory. Under what circumstances does 'private' injustice become relevant to 
'political' justice? Dworkin has drawn upon an analysis of 'private' obligations in constructing 
his account of the nature of political obligations, has argued that specifically political 
obligations arise in the same way as do obligations within families, among friends, within 
workplaces and so on. Both the argument, and the distinction between unjust obligations 
which may be overridden by appeal to a wider principle and unjust obligations which are 
simply cancelled, while developed in the private context, clearly are intended to provide the 
structural elements essential for a reasoned account of civil disobedience and for an argument 
suggesting that some states are sufficiently unjust for there to be no political obligations, 
although, of course, citizens may well continue to obey the law out of prudence.65 Where the 
claims of conscience demand disobedience to a particular law out of obedience to a higher 
principle, it is proper to speak of overriding. The citizen remains bound by the other 
obligations of citizenship, and has something to regret. He or she owes to the political 
community 
an accounting and perhaps an apology, and should in other ways strive to 
continue [his on her standinK as a member of the community [he or] she 
otherwise has a duty to honor. 0 
I would add that this obligation must not be interpreted as unilateral. Surely the demand for 
an accounting must be seen as bilateral. Where the injustice is global, as has been the case 
with respect to the black community of South Africa, Dworkin may believe that it is improper 
to speak of obligations subsisting at all. Given that black South Africans have been excluded in 
almost every relevant sense from participation in that community, I imagine Dworkin would 
want to say that South Africa is a bare community merely, that neither white nor black South 
Africans have any obligation to obey the law. They may be obliged to do so, but that is very 
different. 
This very willingness to seek the nature of political obligation and legitimacy in the 
context of social life generally, raises further questions concerning the legitimacy of political 
intervention in the private sphere. Just as Dworkin reasons from the bottom up in offering an 
interpretive account of political obligation we must begin to reason down, ask to what extent 
do the demands of equality as a principle of political organization mandate political 
64 	Dworkin, Law's Empire, loc. cit., 299. 
65 	Many wives, of course, continue to obey their husbands for precisely the same reason. 
66 	Dworkin, Law's Empire, loc. cit., 205. 
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intervention directed at mitigating or eradicating the inegalitarian practices which continue to 
prevail in the smaller associative communities which comprise the nation state. To the extent 
that issues of justice and injustice arise within families, irrespective of whether such injustice is, 
in his terms, sufficient to erode the ground of obligation altogether, under what circumstances 
is the state either entitled or obliged to intervene, if it is truly dedicated to equal concern? 67 
Intervention would appear to be mandated in the event of communities evincing racially or 
ethnically discriminatory practices, be these communities political communities within the state 
or smaller, more 'private' associations. Equally, perhaps, discrimination upon the basis of 
gender may become part of the public agenda with respect to professional associations or 
clubs. In both cases state intervention would arise from the demands of those excluded, those 
seeking to be accepted within the community. 
What of the family? Surely, in the example given, the point lies in the potential of the 
injustice to cripple the development of some members of the family, to narrow, perhaps to 
extinction, the sphere of autonomy to which a daughter might otherwise be entitled and to 
which she might otherwise subjectively perceive herself to be entitled. It does not go too far to 
suggest that, in unjust families, those most likely to be harmed by practices which fail to meet 
the demands of justice are those who are most vulnerable, the children (and often the women) 
who are wronged thereby, and, it must be recalled, they are also those least able to assert and 
defend their own rights. The real question is not whether obligations within unjust families 
continue to subsist, even in attenuated form. Whether or not, as a matter of theory, they 
continue to exist, as a matter of practice they are believed to do so, and, indeed, the same may 
be true in political communities such as South Africa or, for that matter, ancient Athens. 
Dworkin does offer one example of a family so seriously unjust as to generate no obligations, 
one in which the family compels its members to participate in criminal acts against outsiders. 68 
Yet this example advances us no further, does not even present a 'hard case'. The hard cases 
involve injustices already pervasive in Western society, spousal abuse, both physical and 
psychological, child sexual abuse, patriarchal families, instances where the injustice arises 
because of the type of community created among family members. If such families are bare 
communities, families by convention or by the rule book merely as Dworkin's account suggests, 
the statistics cited in the first chapter suggest that between one third and one half of American 
families certainly cannot be called true communities. Even within profoundly abusive families, 
family members often perceive themselves as obligated to one another as do wider social 
institutions, including governmental authorities.69 Rather, given the admission that issues of 
67 	For a sustained argument that the state ought itself be perceived as male and 
structured around principles of male advantage see CA. MacKinnon, Towards a 
Feminist Theory of the State, Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1989. 
68 	Ibid., 205. 
69 	Even in a profoundly abusive marriage, a mother may perceive herself as having an 
obligation to her children, for example. Indeed, her obligation to her children may 
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justice arise within families as elsewhere, to what extent, and for what reasons, ought the state 
and its authorities be prepared to turn a blind eye towards injustice where it exists? These 
questions are difficult in part because, with respect to the family, outsiders are unlikely to be 
involved until the family has been defined as marginal. Here, demands for inclusion, for 
membership, tend to be attenuated.7° Equally, of course, the mere fact that family members 
authentically believe in such practices, and indeed, the fact that they may well perceive such 
practices to be just as among themselves, does not alter the situation. In Dworkin's terms, just 
as he is disposed to argue that slavery might be unjust, irrespective of whether 
people think it unjust, or have conventions accordinvo which it is unjust, or 
anything of the sort, but just because slavery is unjust,' I 
one may argue that certain practices within families are, for the same reasons, unjust, that this 
represents a 'moral fact', one which exists irrespective of whether they are thought to be 
unjust. Family structures pose particular problems, not because the injustice within them is in 
any way remarkable or unique, but because our cultural practices identify them as private, and 
this privacy shields them against intervention so long 'as and to the degree that they outwardly 
conform to the ideal of the middle class, male-headed nuclear family. 
Yet even given Dworkin's remarkable willingness to acknowledge family relationships, 
at least briefly, and to suggest that the genesis of obligations within family relationships (and, 
indeed, within other micro-communities) is analogous to the genesis of political obligations, his 
treatment of the family is deficient. First, as noted earlier, it appears more a marriage of 
necessity than an indication of his willingness to come to grips with the interaction of family 
structures with other social, economic and political structures. Second, his acknowledgment 
that questions of justice may arise with respect to relationships within the family, and not 
simply in the context of its relationship with outsiders, ought to have led him to reconsider the 
nature and function of the prevailing public/private distinction. Third, by his apparent 
acceptance of the liberal political equivalent of the separate spheres ideology, the assumption 
that family roles are discrete, private, unique to the family and in normal circumstances 
irrelevant to the wider political and economic context, he blinds himself to the ways in which 
these mediate the participation of the individual in other realms. The very discreteness of the 
injustice in his example is illustrative. In such a culture, at least with respect to the 
contemporary versions which I have encountered, it is not merely that women are perceived to 
induce her to remain, both because she cannot survive on her own and because she 
may believe that her children need a father. Are we to say she has no obligation to 
her children? Her interpretation may be deficient, but I would suggest her obligation 
is real. Are we to redefine the relevant community, even if a profound and significant 
reason for her remaining within an abusive relationship is her obligation to her own 
children? 
70 	Where a daughter has broken free and married a man of her own choice he may 
demand the same acceptance from her family as she enjoys from his. 
71 	See Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, loc. cit., 138. 
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require special protection in all aspects of family life. The same assumptions which mandate 
special protection within the family also alter the character of the participation of all family 
members in education, in economic life, in the social life of the wider community. They affect 
freedom of movement, independence, the whole range of options available. They also, and 
inevitably, affect attitudes towards others, whether within the home or within civil society. A 
culture in which the sole restriction applied to the choice of marital partner would be a strange 
culture indeed. Social practices are rarely so discrete and compartmentalized. If obligations 
within the family differ in no material way from obligations within political society, if our lives 
are cut from whole cloth and not fragmented into discrete and compartmentalized roles, then 
family structures and relationships ought to be present in every aspect of his account of the 
demands of equality, whether in terms of resources, in terms of liberty, or in terms of politics. 
Admittedly, his way is much simpler, yields a more economical account, but its economy is 
purchased at the cost of inaccuracy. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE BASIS OF THE MARITAL RELATIONSHIP IN LIBERAL THEORY 
INTRODUCTION 
In the last chapter we began to examine the relationship between familial ideologies 
and the structure of liberal political theories. We noted that contemporary egalitarian theories 
have relied, at least to some extent, upon an ideal conception of the family in developing their 
arguments for, in the case of Rawls, distributive justice, and, in the case of Dworkin, the nature 
of political obligations. We noted as well that despite the shadow or trace of an account of 
family relations in their texts they endeavour to insist that their liberalisms remain political 
merely, are concerned with relationships among citizens and between citizens and the state. In 
this chapter we will begin to explore the treatment of marriage in liberal theories and make 
use of the theoretical resources provided by Rawls and Dworkin to attempt to construct an 
account of marriage which is consistent with their theoretical structures as a whole. 
Even if the ideology of the traditional family is taken as a starting point, its public face 
remains difficult to characterize. The conventional approach suggests that marriage is 
contractual. Blackstone explicitly treated the civil face of marriage as contractual.' Hobbes, 
Locke and Kant all emphasized the contractual nature of marriage. Rousseau adopted no 
concluded view on the matter, although in his paeans to the patriarchal household he came 
close to characterizing marriage as wholly affective.2 Even in early social contract theory, 
however, if marriage was contractual, it certainly was not an ordinary civil contract. As a 
contract it was almost unique, invariably one in which one party, the wife, ceded her liberty and 
her independent identity to the other, the husband. It does not go too far to suggest that, to 
the extent marriage was perceived as contractual by early liberals, it had from their perspective 
only one true parallel, the 'social contract' by which men became members of the state. 
Women, that is, became wives by ceding their natural liberty to their husbands just as men 
became citizens by ceding their natural liberty to the state. Women became thereby entitled 
(at least in theory) to the support and protection of their husbands, to that which pertained to 
their status as wives, just as men, through the social contract, became entitled to protection for 
their persons and property and to their public status as citizens. 
Against the background of early social contract theory, characterizing the marital 
relationship as contractual in the sense specified above made perfect sense. Given a 
theoretical construct in which men were described as exchanging their natural liberty for 
protection against their fellows and for secure ownership of all they might acquire, a parallel 
1 	See Kerr, Vol. 1, /oc. cit., 404. 
See Rousseau, 'Discourse on the Origin of Inequality', /oc. cit., 211. Cf. C. Pateman, 
'The Shame of the Marriage Contract' in J.H. Stiehm (Ed.), /oc. cit., 69-97. For a 
contractual view of marriage see Hamilton, /oc. cit., 35-37. 
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marital contract served a number of distinct and critical purposes. Just as the social contract 
provided a firm foundation for order and authority within the state, given the basic 
presumption of equality, of the absence of any natural title to rule, the marital contract 
provided a firm foundation for order and authority within the household, again in the absence 
of any natural title to rule.3 Because every marital contract was identical, each citizen having 
equal title to rule within the household, his marital rights were of the same structural character 
as his other proprietary rights and might, therefore, be enforced against other men in the same 
way. In this way, the marital contract provided a firm foundation for family privacy. His 
authority as husband together with the proprietary nature of the rights acquired through the 
marital contract ensured that family relationships remained, under normal circumstances, 
outside the intervention of the law, preserving to each citizen a sphere of individual liberty. 
The marital contract offered an easy and obvious explanation for the exclusion of 
women from the bonds of civil society, of fraternity. If the social contract made men citizens, 
marriage made women wives. Because men were citizens, because they must be subject to law 
and not to the vagaries of other men, and because they, as well, were parties to the marriage 
contract, it was logical, indeed essential, that the terms of marriage be established by the state, 
that they be identical for all citizens.4 The same belief in the arbitrary and conflicting wills of 
men which necessitated entry into the social contract also demanded that marriage be 
regulated, not by individually negotiated agreements between husband and wife or by family 
arrangements negotiated by parents but by clear public laws which established the limits of the 
husband's authority over his wife and children and ensured that his power would remain within 
bounds, thus legitimating both his authority as husband and father and its exercise. Taking 
early social contract theory on its own terms (as it must be taken if sense is to be made of it) 
this identified civil society as the domain of equals, of men whose status was that of citizen. All 
citizens were equal, both before the law and within their own households, shared a common 
status. The independence of citizens was affirmed and protected. The status of women and 
children was established by their relationship to citizens. They remained outside the formal 
equality of civil society, existed in what is best perceived as a limited state of nature under the 
protection of citizens who were themselves governed by the rule of law, and whose power over 
their wives and children was itself limited by law. Both women and children became thereby 
the property of male citizens, providing an almost unassailable foundation for family privacy. 
Today, of course, this account of family relationships has become profoundly difficult. 
Women have full status as citizens. From the perspective of the state, their other relationships 
ought to be irrelevant to the rule of law. They ought to be fully members of civil society in 
precisely the same way as men. This change has rendered problematical what under early 
3 	See Ch. 7 for a discussion of how, invariably, women ceded their natural freedom to 
men in the marital contract and why men found the social contract essential. 
4 	Cf. Locke, /oc. cit., 362-67 and Hobbes, /oc. cit., 253-55. 
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social contract theory seemed tight, logically structured, and inevitable. Given that women 
have become citizens, possess, at least in the formal sense, equality before the laws in the same 
way as men, it becomes much more difficult to simultaneously describe marriage in contractual 
terms and defend the right of the state to impose a universal marital regime upon all 
individuals. If marriage is contractual, logic suggests that individual men and women ought be 
perceived as entitled to regulate their relationships to suit themselves, to establish the terms of 
private marital contracts according to individual preferences and to insist that these be 
enforced by the state to the same extent as are other contracts, such as those for employment 
or for goods. An account of marriage as akin to a property or slave contract is no longer 
acceptable. This, of course, presents problems of its own, not only as regards the interests and 
well-being of children, although their position must be perceived as somewhat problematical, 
but also and more importantly because full recognition of individual marital contracts (and 
cohabitation contracts) might be thought to demand the extension of principles similar to 
those presently prevailing in contract law generally to family life. 
The extension to family life of doctrines presently prevailing in contract law, doctrines 
such as undue influence, unconscionability, unjust enrichment, inequality of bargaining power 
and so on is only mildly problematical. Indeed, given the administrative and discretionary 
nature of contemporary family law and the increasing assimilation of marriage-like 
relationships to legal marriage, this change might, substantively, make little difference, given 
that many doctrines similar to these already figure (albeit inconsistently) in disputes over 
marital property and custody. Far more problematical must be the logical next step, the public 
regulation of marriage and marriage contracts on a model analogous, perhaps, to the 
contemporary regulation of the workplace and workplace relationships. Given the insistence 
of contemporary egalitarians that family life represents the heart of the private sphere, that 
family relationships (and indeed sexual relationships generally) epitomize private freedom, 
symbolize the moral independence of the individual 5, full assimilation of marriage, not to the 
Rawls' insistence upon the fundamental neutrality of political liberalism and upon the 
sharp distinction between the virtues associated with the ideal of a good citizen and 
those appropriate to family life epitomizes this. See 'The Priority of the Right and 
Ideas of the Good', loc. cit., 262-63. Similarly, Dworkin has recently emphasized 
'freedom of choice in matters touching central or important aspects of an agent's 
personal life, like employment, family arrangements, sexual privacy, and medical 
treatment.' The Place of Liberty', loc. cit., 7. Freedom of choice in employment and 
in medical treatment are comparatively easy analyse, emphasizing the right to choose 
one's occupation or one's medical practitioner and, equally, the right to leave 
employment or to reject treatment. Freedom of choice in family arrangements is 
generally interpreted as encompassing the right to choose one's marital partner, to 
terminate an unsatisfactory marriage, to determine family size, and so on. Family 
arrangements are, however, far more problematical. Two equal adult individuals are 
involved, at a minimum. Where there are children, decisions must be made on their 
behalf, and given the lasting consequences of many of these decisions, determining a 
just basis for decision making seems critical. Further, family roles and arrangements 
have, historically, had profound distributive consequences. Many such practices have 
contributed to the profound economic disadvantages faced by women both in the past 
and at present. Because, each individual has, according to Dworkin, a right to be 
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social contract, but to ordinary contract and by logical extension to employment contracts must 
open the door to the eradication of any conception of family relationships as private. On such 
a model, given the demise of freedom of contract generally, and the insistence of 
contemporary theorists that public intervention is essential to protect the interests of the weak, 
marriage and family relationships would become public in the same way as the other 
relationships of civil society. This, of course, is the precise problem that classic social contract 
theory was structured to avert. On the contemporary egalitarian liberal model, there is no 
reason why relationships between men and women ought to be treated in any way differently 
from other exchange relationships between individuals, between individuals and corporations, 
and so on.6 
What is, of course, fascinating, is the fact that recent and superficially egalitarian legal 
reforms, such as those embodied in Australia in the Family Law Act 1975 have generally 
moved, not towards an enhanced regulatory regime, nor towards a regime of private contract, 
but towards a discretionary regime marked by the eradication of fault as relevant to dissolution 
of marriage and the legal characterization of the conventional incidents of the marital 
relationship as non-obligatory. Such regimes have, at least superficially, moved closer to the 
new egalitarian ideal of freedom of choice in private relationships and the eradication of 
contract and principles derived from contract. This uniquely contemporary ideal is one which, 
in essence, argues that private relationships ought, in large part, be delegalized, reflect simply 
the preferences of the individuals involved. Equally, of course, the distributive consequences 
of marriage and family life have been ignored by egalitarian theory. Neither Rawls nor 
Dworkin consider the distributive consequences of family relationships, instead distributive 
justice within the family collapses into freedom of choice in family arrangements. The family 
is viewed, not as an institution generating obligations which the state ought to acknowledge 
and enforce, but a choice made by an autonomous individual which remains open to revision 
and, indeed, abandonment. 
The difficulties noted in the last few paragraphs emphasize the need for a new and 
different foundation for legal regimes regulating marriage and family life. The demand for 
legitimation which was resolved under classic social contract theory by the exclusion of women 
from the social contract and the legitimation of masculine authority over women and children 
achieved through the marriage contract has reemerged. While the full assimilation of 
marriage to ordinary contract seems logical and superficially consistent with egalitarian ideals, 
it poses significant problems given the denial by contemporary egalitarians of any conception 
treated with equal concern by the government, and is entitled to an equal share of 
resources, the distributive consequences of 'family arrangements' cannot be ignored. 
As emphasized in earlier chapters, all the same problems can arise in marriages as 
regularly arise in other situations where power disparities exist. 
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of freedom of contract.7  If the state is, as contemporary egalitarians acknowledge, entitled to 
establish the wages and conditions appropriate for employees, legally mandate safe conditions 
of work, increasingly require that benefits such as sick leave, holiday leave, protection against 
unfair dismissal and so on be guaranteed to employees, upon what rational basis can marriage 
be distinguished, if, it must be emphasized, it is ultimately founded upon contract? Neither 
Rawls nor Dworkin consider specifically the nature of marriage nor the legal or moral 
foundation of the marital relationship. In order to infer its theoretical basis it is necessary to 
have recourse to their more general accounts of the nature Of obligations and to attempt to 
build from these an account of marriage (and marriage-like relationships) which accords with 
their views concerning the structure of obligations generally and with the egalitarian principles 
upon which their theories are predicated. I shall deal with their accounts in turn, beginning 
with that of Rawls. 
RAWLS AND OBLIGATIONS 
Rawls argues, as a general principle, that 'a person's obligations presuppose a moral 
conception of institutions and therefore that the content of just institutions must be defined before 
the requirements for individuals can be set out.' 8 Presuming that the institutions in question are 
just, Rawls argues that 
there are several characteristic features of obligations which distinguish them 
from other moral requirements. For one thing they arise as a result of our 
voluntary acts; these acts may be the giving of express or tacit undertakings, such 
as promises and agreements, but they need not be, as in the case of accepting 
benefits. Further, the content of obligations is always defined by an institution 
or practice the rules of which specify what it is that one is required to do. And 
finally, obligations are normally owed to definite individuals, namely those who 
are cooperating together to maintain the arrangement in question. 9 
Given the above passages, marriage, for Rawls, quite clearly represents an institution or 
practice which is governed by specific rules and which is capable, if just, of generating 
obligations. The importance of ascertaining the justice of marriage as a social practice or 
group of practices, becomes clear in the light of Rawls' subsequent insistence that 'the contract 
doctrine holds that no moral requirements follow from the existence of institutions alone' and that 
obligations within any institution arise only as a consequence of the ethical principles chosen in 
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, loc. cit., 277-78, Law's Empire, loc. cit., 374. An 
interesting question arises in this context. If the state is, as Dworkin emphasizes, 
entitled to regulate hours of work and conditions in contracts of employment, ought it 
not, if marriage is contractual, be entitled to, for example, regulate the hours of work 
and conditions allowed in marriage contracts? 
Rawls, A Theory of Justice, loc. cit., 110. 
Ibid., 113. 
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the original position. 10 In the present context, this poses an immediate and serious difficulty. 
Taken at face value, these remarks suggest that marriages and family relations more generally 
are capable of generating obligations only if their internal structure can be reconciled with the 
principles of justice chosen in the original position. As currently formulated, these principles 
specify that 
1. Each person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic 
rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with a similar scheme for all. 
2. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they must 
be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality 
of opportunity; and secon4 they must be to the greatest benefit of the least 
advantaged members of society." 
Applied to marriage, these principles suggest that first, no marriage is capable of 
generating obligations if its rules and practices deny to any adult individual equal access to the 
basic liberties, including freedom of association and the liberty and integrity of the person. 
This would, I believe, identify as non-obligatory all those family practices in which individual 
freedoms such as these are in any way compromised, for example by practices which, as in 
some cultures, deny to the wife or to girls and women more generally freedom of association 
while permitting this to the husband, or which maintain that she has a duty to submit to sexual 
relations. 12 Similarly, to satisfy the principle of equality of fair opportunity within the family 
would apparently require that marital relationships be structured in a way which ensured that 
husband and wife be, so far as their relationship with one another is concerned, equally 
positioned with respect to their capacity to compete for such positions, and to the extent that 
this equality does not obtain, that any inequality can be shown to be to the advantage of the 
less advantaged individual, viewed solely as a free and equal moral person. Other social roles 
characteristic of existing practices including the conventional assumptions concerning the 
proper roles of husband and wife must be evaluated by just standards. As Rawls emphasizes, 
'laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if 
they are unjust.'13 The point of having a theory of justice is to enable rational criticism of 
existing institutions and practices. Given that today men and women share or ought to share a 
common status as citizens, it is of the first and highest importance that relations between them 
be just. Within marriage, as within wider institutions and cooperative activities, individuals are 
10 	Ibid., 348. I do not know whether Rawls acknowledges marriage as to be an 
institution in this sense, however he explicitly identifies the monogamous family as one 
of the institutions comprising the basic structure. Ibid., 7. 
11 	Rawls, 'The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus', /oc. cit., 251. 
12 	Within the contemporary pluralist state, it must be noted, such practices remain 
commonplace, and indeed, in many American states the duty of the wife to submit to 
sexual relations continues to be enforced by law. 
13 	Rawls, A Theory of Justice, loc. cit., 3. 
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entitled to a fair share of the benefits of cooperation. If these conditions are not met, no 
obligations arise. 
The account I have given would be, of course, in no way necessarily problematical if it 
were clear that Rawls intended his principles to be applied in this way and if simply treating 
non-conforming relationships as non-obligatory was capable of providing a resolution which is 
just when husband and wife are considered simply as citizens.14 Equally clearly, the fact of 
contract, or tacit agreement or the acceptance of benefits is not the critical element, any more 
than it is within any other institution. While social life may be voluntary all the way down, 
what is critical is whether the structure of the practice, taken as a whole and including the roles 
which are perceived as central to its continued existence 15, can be reconciled with principles 
which would be chosen behind a veil of ignorance. To the extent that many family practices, as 
they currently exist, do not conform to the principles of justice, their persistence must confront 
wider institutions, and most particularly political institutions as conventionally defined, with a 
serious problem. Just as a just or nearly just society which is seeking to realize in its 
communal life the institutions and relationships appropriate to a well-ordered community 
cannot in the long term turn a blind eye to the existence of practices such as slavery or serfdom 
within its bounds, so, too, and for identical reasons, it must also, in the long term at least, be 
unable to tolerate family practices which deny to some family members the freedom and moral 
personality to which others are entitled, most particularly where children are involved. This is 
most pressing and most obvious where the practices in question deny family members the basic 
liberties, including freedom of association and the freedom of the person. 16 It is, I believe, 
14 	His insistence all post-Theory writings that the principles and the account of the 
person from which they are derived form a political conception rather than a wider 
moral conception and his emphasis upon building an overlapping consensus and 
removing from the political agenda those issues which remain profoundly and deeply 
divisive raises doubts in this regard. Rawls specifies the division he has in mind 
particularly clearly in 'Social Unity and Primary Goods', /oc. cit., 162 where he 
comments that the principles of justice 'apply to what I shall call the 'basic structure of 
society", that is, to the way in which the major social institutions fit into one system. 
These institutions assign fundamental rights and duties and, by working together they 
influence the division of advantages which arise through social cooperation.' While the 
monogamous family is clearly a major social institution, Rawls regards the 
relationships between different families and between families and other institutions as 
governed by the principles of justice but does not make his position fully clear in 
terms of the relationships inside the institutions which form the basic structure. 
15 	In discussing the sorts of claims which are relevant in questions of justice, Rawls 
emphasizes that admissible claims are restricted to claims to the primary goods and 
that these, in turn, depend upon the conception of citizens as free and equal moral 
persons. He emphasizes further that 'the notion of a need is always relative to some 
conception of persons, and of their role and status'. Thus, the public conception of the 
needs of citizens differs from any conception of the needs of individuals occupying 
other roles, such as, for example those of husbands and wives. Ibid., 172. 
16 	About such agreements Rawls comments that 'any agreement by citizens which waives 
or violates a basic liberty, however rational and voluntary this agreement may be, is void 
154 
also true where the practices are such as to nourish and sustain inequality in access to the 
benefits of social cooperation as specified by the thin theory of the good. As Rawls 
emphasizes it is irrelevant that the practice in question may provided greater advantages for 
the society as a whole. Society as a whole is not entitled to require sacrifices from some in 
order that others, or indeed, the community as a whole may benefit. The bare fact of tacit or 
actual consent must be recognized as insufficient. The question is not whether consent is 
rational for that individual as he or she is socially located, but whether a free and equal moral 
person reasoning under the constraints imposed by the original position would have so 
consented. 
IS THE FAMILY CHARACTERIZED BY THE 'CIRCUMSTANCES OF JUSTICE'? 
Despite the clarity and unequivocal nature of these arguments, it is not entirely clear 
that Rawls believes that the principles of justice as stated are applicable to family life or that 
their extension to the family is as natural and obvious as it would appear upon the basis of his 
account of the nature of obligations. While Rawls identifies the monogamous family as part of 
the basic structure and presumes that children develop their sense of justice within just 
families, he does not, at any time, specifically consider the characteristics which a family, or a 
marriage, must have to be considered just. Rather, he comes close to an internally 
contradictory position by emphasizing that the conception of justice offered is a concept 
appropriate to political institutions and that its appropriateness in other spheres, including the 
associational and the familial, ought not be assumed. I want to emphasize the difficulty of the 
distinction involved. Rawls apparently wishes to simultaneously maintain that the 
monogamous family is one of the institutions (his term, not mine) comprising the basic 
structure of society and at the same time suggest that it need not necessarily be held to 
standards he elsewhere characterizes as inviolable. That, in the context of the remark quoted 
above, suggests that before we begin to explore the nature of marriage and the nature, genesis 
and scope of marital obligations, we need a conception of a just marriage, or a just family, and 
ought not necessarily assume that the principles applicable to the political are equally 
applicable to family relations. Just as Rawls' ideal theory account of the state and of just 
institutions provides a vantage point from which to evaluate existing institutions and to work 
towards change, an ideal theory account of a just marriage and just family arrangements is 
essential if we are to evaluate existing family institutions and to work towards change. 
Rawls, however, states simply that from the perspective of the basic structure one 
ought to assume that all positions other than that of citizen and that given by the individual's 
place in the distribution of income and wealth are voluntarily assumed, leaving open the 
possibility that the justice or injustice of these voluntarily assumed positions may be irrelevant 
when one is considering the justice of the basic structure, at least so far as their distributive 
ab initio; that is, it has no legal force and does not affect any citizen's basic liberties.' 
Rawls, The Basic Liberties and their Priority', /oc. cit., 81. 
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consequences are concerned. 17  Given the structure of his theory as a whole, however, it 
remains unclear as to why the fact that positions such as those of husband and wife are 
voluntarily assumed ought to be taken as in any sense determinative. Surely, whether or not 
such roles are voluntarily assumed, the sole question, given the pervasive nature of such 
relationships and their profound impact upon individual lives and opportunities, ought to be 
whether the structure of institutions such as family can be reconciled with the two principles of 
justice, not merely the basic liberties. One cannot, I would suggest, found just 'public' 
institutions upon a foundation of unjust 'private' institutions. 
Rawls offers no guidance in this regard, indeed appears not to have directed his mind 
to the place of families and the law governing families within his structure more generally. In 
his discussion of moral development and his reference to roles within the family such as those 
of a good husband or a good wife, a good son or a good daughter, he apparently assumes more 
or less conventional relationships marked by reliance upon traditional gender roles. 18 If he 
did not, there would be no reason to distinguish between the virtues appropriate to a husband 
and wife, nor would there be any reason to distinguish between those of a son and daughter. 
While he acknowledges that in a broader inquiry the family might be questioned 19, he at no 
time considers whether the account of marriage and family relationships suggested by his 
general theory of obligations is compatible with the institution of family as we know it, or 
whether that theory is adequate or relevant to describe such an institution. The general 
structure of his account of obligations, however, leaves him no option other than a 
fundamentally contractual2° account, albeit one which declares certain agreements void ab 
initio. I have, therefore, no choice but to proceed upon the basis that any acceptable account 
within the framework of Rawls' theory taken as a whole must be capable of being reconciled 
both with his account of the structure of obligations generally and with his account of citizens 
as free and equal moral persons 21 . 
For marriage to be a just institution the relationships within it must be structured in a 
way which acknowledges and respects the moral personality of the individuals involved, and 
that demands that they be regarded simply as free and equal moral persons, or citizens. (This 
does not, I should note, rule out love, nor does it rule out mutual obligations which extend well 
beyond those required by justice. Rather, it merely reminds us of what ought to be obvious, 
17 	Rawls, A Theory of Justice, loc. cit., 96. 
18 	Ibid., 468. 
19 	Ibid., 463. 
20 	Rawls' general account of obligations relies upon an expanded meaning of contract, 
emphasizing voluntary agreements or the receipt of benefits. In many ways it is 
somewhat similar to Rousseau's account of the social contract. See Chs. 8 & 9. 
21 	See Ch. 3. 
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that absent a foundation in justice, love may become indistinguishable from oppression. The 
cage may be gilded, but it remains a cage for all that.) Rawls' method suggests that the only 
way of working out the structure of marriage as a just institution, and, therefore, the only way 
of ascertaining the characteristics of a just family would be for reasoning to take place behind a 
veil of ignorance, at least if, as I shall argue they do, the circumstances of justice obtain within 
families. Otherwise, on his own account, we are likely to fashion an account which advances 
our own interests. We must ask, therefore, what principles would be chosen by individuals 
wholly unaware of their status in society, their natural characteristics, their biological sex and 
the gender roles and institutions characteristic of our culture. 
The first step in such an inquiry is to examine the degree to which the circumstances 
of justice obtain within families. Rawls identifies the circumstances of justice as those 
conditions which obtain among individuals who are 'roughly similar in physical and mental 
powers,. . . vulnerable to attack . . . [and] confronted by circumstances of moderate scarcity. ,22 
These factors he identifies as the circumstances which make cooperation among individuals 
inhabiting a common territory both possible and necessary, but also problematical. Thus, the 
circumstances of justice 'obtain whenever mutually disinterested persons put forward conflicting 
claims to the division of social advantages under conditions of moderate scarcity.' 23 
Do the circumstances of justice in this sense arise within families? It cannot, I think, 
be denied that they obtain within marriages. As every classic social contract theorist 
recognized, adult men and women are roughly equal in physical and mental powers, 
sufficiently so that both are ultimately vulnerable to attack. Likewise, the circumstances of 
moderate scarcity obtain within families just as they do as within the wider community. 
Resources entering most households are both finite and limited, and family members advance 
competing claims upon those resources which are available. Indeed, the fact that the 
circumstances of justice necessarily obtained within families if all family members were 
recognized as equally parties to the social contract was precisely the reason that classic 
theorists foreclosed the issue by commencing with a marital contract in which the wife yielded 
up her liberty and her separate identity to the husband, an option not open to Rawls. 
Likewise, classic theorists such as Hobbes and Locke extended the contractual account to 
emphasize that ultimately similar conflicts must arise between fathers and children, and that 
the child's obedience followed from the desire to secure a share in the father's estate. 
Effectively, in a tacit compact, the child offered obedience in exchange for present protection 
and support and for the possibility of future gain. Within contemporary households both 
resources and leisure are, under normal circumstances, finite and limited, and men and women 
22 	Rawls, A Theory of Justice, loc. cit., 126-126. 
23 	Ibid., 128. 
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advance competing claims to a fair share of social goods including these. 24 The position of 
children appears problematical, given their natural inequality, however this condition is 
temporary and Rawls in fact allows for their position in his account of reasoning in the original 
position. fact that access to wider opportunities is, at least in part, determined by the 
resources and leisure time available within the family, reinforces my claim that the 
circumstances of justice obtain within families just as they do within the wider community. 
(Simply assuming an ideal family in which individuals do not wish to gain unless others do as 
well assumes away the problem, rather than resolving it. It is necessary both to have an 
account of an ideal family and to figure out how to get there from where we are.) Resources 
entering the family are routinely allocated among family members, including children, and 
within a substantial number of families this allocation is made upon the basis of conventional 
roles, rather than upon the basis of the entitlement, as individuals, of all family members to a 
fair share of primary goods. Thus, to give a simple example, where resources are limited, 
many families continue to believe that it is more important to devote resources to the 
education of boys rather than girls, given the end in view, that of ensuring that they are 
appropriately prepared for their future role as breadwinners. 
The emphasis upon mutual disinterest seems intuitively less acceptable in the context 
of marriage and family life. Our ordinary common sense perceptions suggest that family 
members do, normally, take an interest in one another's interests, indeed such ideas form the 
core of our cultural beliefs concerning marriage and family life. Frequently, the belief that 
family life is/ought to be predicated upon love and intimacy is thought to proscribe reasoning 
upon the basis of mutual disinterest. Upon closer examination, however, given Rawls' 
discussion of the role of mutual disinterest in reasoning, I would argue that it may be, in fact, 
no less appropriate as a basis for determining background standards for just family 
relationships. It in no way seems counter-intuitive to describe a marriage as 'a cooperative 
venture for mutual advantage [and as] typically marked by a conflict as well as an identity of 
interests [nor is it counter-intuitive to describe husband and wife as having] their own plans of 
life [and] different ends and purposes', indeed that is precisely the problem and the reason 
justice is necessary within families.26 While, undeniably, ideally husband and wife have many 
ends in common, and act to further these cooperative goals, they also remain distinct 
individuals and it is unrealistic to assume complete commonality of interests. If all interests 
were common to all family members, if no divergence existed, if no disputes arose as to how 
best to pursue even shared interests, one would, I think, either have assumed away human 
nature or instituted an oppressive regime intended to eradicate the individuality of one 
24 	The prevalence of marital disputes over either money or, more recently, over the 
distribution of household tasks emphasizes this. 
Ibid., 248-49. 
Ibid., 126-27. 
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individual. Hobbes, Locke and later Bentham all recognized that the circumstances of justice 
were potentially relevant to family relationships, and, as we shall see subsequently, Rousseau 
devoted much of his theoretical project to an attempt to devise an educational project which 
would ensure that such conflicts could not arise.27 The terms of the marriage contract in 
classic theory were structured to avert the logical consequences of this recognition. 
Thus, I see no difficulty in accepting that, given that the circumstances of justice arise 
between husband and wife in substantially the same way as they do elsewhere, reasoning 
regarding a just basis for marriage ought to proceed upon the same basis as does reasoning 
about justice more generally. If one accepts Rawls' general method, and the arguments he 
offers for utilizing the 'thickest possible veil of ignorance', there is no reason why it is 
inappropriate as a basis for determining an account of justice in family relationships. Not only 
is family life characteristically marked by conflict as well as unanimity of interests, but also 
even social emotions such as love can lead to favouritism and inequality, and this is as true 
within the family as in the wider community. For this reason, it follows that the principles of 
justice apply within families as elsewhere, given that the circumstances of justice are present 
and because of their presence the same constraints on reasoning ought to apply. It also follows 
on Rawls' account that no obligations arise among family members unless the institution or 
practice of family itself can be seen as just (or nearly so), that is, unless the practice of family 
seeks to structure relationships in a way which enhances the ability of family members to 
secure a fair share of the benefits of cooperation and to maximize their access to the basic 
social goods as defined. (I should note that I am not entirely happy with this description of the 
problem, however within Rawls' framework I see no other option. It seems to me that, in fact, 
the problem is that in unjust families some individuals are failing to live up to their obligations 
as established by ideal theory, not that they do not have them.28) 
Just as Rawls emphasizes that society ought to be regarded as a cooperative venture 
for mutual advantage, certainly marriage must be so regarded.29 While entry into marriage, 
unlike entry into political society, may be seen as properly voluntary 30, given that family life in 
the broader sense is no more voluntary than is membership in political society, this limited 
distinction does not rule out the use of Rawls' method. We can no more escape family 
27 
28 
29 
See Ch. 8. 
See the discussion of the identical problem in Dworkin's account of associative 
obligations later in this chapter. The fundamental difficulty is that the weak, 
particularly those who are children, are unlikely to be able to extricate themselves 
from unjust relationships, and that simply suggesting that such relationships generate 
no obligations does little to assist them. 
The sociological evidence canvassed earlier emphasizes both the extent to which such 
conflicts do arise and the potential for injustice within families. 
There are, of course, exceptions and arranged marriages do in fact continue to prevail 
among some cultural groups. 
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membership and its consequences than we can escape some form of political institutions. 
Neither does the fact that children are ordinarily unable to advance claims and assert their 
interests. Indeed, their vulnerability in this regard emphasizes and intensifies the need to 
ensure that the circumstances of family life are, in fact, just. The critical factors to be 
considered with regard to children are their temporary inability to determine their own 
rational interests and act to advance them and the necessity to ensure that those who must act 
upon their behalf respect their potential to become free and equal moral persons. Since 
parents ought not presume that they are uniquely placed to know what the settled preferences 
of their children will be when they reach maturity, it would appear that they have no recourse 
but to decide upon the basis that their children will, as adults, prefer a greater rather than 
lesser share of basic social goods. Rawls acknowledges this and comments, in addressing the 
basis upon in which paternalistic decisions ought to be made on behalf of those, such as 
children, who cannot rationally advance their interests, that such decisions 'are to guided by the 
individual's own settled preferences and interests insofar as they are not irrational, or failing a 
knowledge of these, by the theory of primary goods. 31 In the case of young children, of course, 
since they have not yet developed settled preferences and interests, the primary goods offer the 
only legitimate basis for decision making. Rawls emphasizes that paternalistic intervention 
must be guided by the principles of justice. Given this, I conclude that justice is the first virtue 
of family relationships as it is of all other social institutions. While it is not the only virtue 
which may be relevant, its presence is critical. 
LOOKING AT THE ORIGINAL POSITION 
Once we recognize that the circumstances of justice obtain within families as 
elsewhere, it must be acknowledged that Rawls' account of the original position is, in certain 
respects seriously deficient. Earlier, I noted the fact that nothing in Rawls' account of the 
original position took into account the need to ensure that the concrete responsibilities (or 
obligations) involved in securing the welfare of future generations are fairly shared and that he 
persistently suggests that a fair share of the primary goods may not be relevant outside the 
political as he (rather narrowly) defines it. Based upon his own analysis, doing so is 
fundamental to an account of justice more generally, given that the circumstances of justice 
obtain within families as elsewhere and given the pervasive nature of family as a social 
institution. Because the social problem which necessitates justice is the fact that people often 
pursue their own interests at the expense of those of others, and that, as a consequence, the 
benefits and burdens of cooperation are unfairly distributed, it is striking that those in the 
original position fail to recognize that the concrete responsibilities involved in securing the 
welfare of subsequent generations are among the burdens of social cooperation, necessary 
background conditions to any form of human social life. After all, those in the original 
position recognize the principle of paternalism in order to protect themselves against the 
31 	Rawls, A Theory of Justice, loc. cit, 249. 
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possibility that they will be unable to secure their own interests, ie. that they may discover 
themselves to be children. Given that the division of labour between men and women in this 
regard represents the most fundamental and enduring example of the social division of labour 
generally, it would seem absolutely critical to ensure that it does not affect more general social 
outcomes. We must consider further whether Rawls' theory as it stands offers the critical 
resources necessary to address questions such as these. 
In existing, unjust societies, as argued earlier, it is quite clear that women's access to 
the basic social goods is largely determined by their family circumstances and roles. Some 
family practices continue to deny women access to some of the basic liberties, including 
freedom of association and the liberty and integrity of the person as defined by the rule of law. 
Many more effectively deny to women the free choice of occupation against a background of 
diverse opportunities, if only because conventional family practices assign to women primary 
responsibility for social reproduction and for the care and nurturing of children, and this, in 
itself, is sufficient to significantly limit their access. Similar arguments have already been put 
with respect to the other categories of basic social goods identified by Rawls. Clearly, families 
which restrict access to the basic liberties cannot be tolerated. Other disadvantages are 
allowable only to the extent allowing them can be shown to be to the advantage of women, as a 
group. All inequalities must satisfy the two conditions specified by the difference principle. 
First, it must be shown that the lesser freedom women enjoy in terms of choice of occupation 
against a background of diverse opportunities and in terms of their access to the powers and 
prerogatives of offices and positions of responsibility is to their benefit, just as it must be 
shown that their diminished share of income and wealth is to their benefit. Second, it must be 
shown that these inequalities are 'attached to offices and positions upon to all under conditions 
of fair equality of opportunity:32 
The problem with existing, unjust, family arrangements is that not only are the roles 
within the family not open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity (parenting, for 
example, remaining significantly gendered), but also, the conventionally accepted structure of 
family roles renders public fair equality of opportunity formal rather than substantive. Persons 
may be entitled to fair equality of opportunity, even biologically female persons, but many 
opportunities within wider institutions are structured in a way which rules out the possibility 
that persons may also be wives and mothers. (Many families, of course, are likewise structured 
in a way which explicitly denies that wives and mothers can also be persons.) I am 
unconvinced by Rawls' suggestion that individual institutions within a social structure may be 
unjust while the social structure as a whole is, in fact, just. 33 While this may just possibly be 
32 
33 
Ibid., 83. 
Ibid., 57. Rawls notes that 'an institution may be unjust although the social system as a 
whole is not [and that it may be that] one apparent injustice compensates for another 
[making] the whole less unjust than it would be if it contained but one of the unjust 
parts.' 
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the case with peripheral institutions, where one is dealing with an institution as pervasive as 
family it is more likely that injustices within the family will in fact be reinforced by 
complementary unjust practices in other institutions, as is in fact the case in contemporary 
society. A specific institutional form of injustice will become socially normative, and in order 
to address it within one institution, it becomes essential to address it in all others where it is to 
be found. We need therefore evaluate Rawls' theory further and ask whether it provides the 
resources to address existing forms of injustice within families while maintaining its 
commitment to tolerance and to realizing a stable overlapping consensus. 
RAVVLS AND EDUCATION - RIGOROUSLY APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF 
PATERNALISM  
The difficulty noted in the last paragraph, that, at least where fundamental institutions 
are involved, injustice is seldom if ever discrete and confined to a particular institution poses a 
particular problem in the context of Rawls' unfortunately truncated remarks upon the role of 
the state in imposing educational requirements. Given the arguments put in A Theory of 
Justice, and in particular Rawls' emphasis upon the fact that, where individuals have not yet 
developed settled preferences we must decide for them upon the basis that they would prefer a 
greater rather than lesser share of the primary goods, his remarks upon the limited role of the 
state in respect of the education of children must be taken as either incompletely thought out 
or ultimately inconsistent with his theory more generally. Rawls emphasizes that those 
religious sects, for example, who seek to remain apart from the influences of contemporary 
culture, are entitled to do so and that the state's interference in the education of their children 
ought to be limited to ensuring that they are aware of their political rights and prepared to be 
fully cooperating and self-supporting members of society. 'The state's concern with their 
34 education lies [Rawls states] in their role as future citizens. , 
Yet, given that in many families, such as the patriarchal family described by Dworkin, 
opportunities and options are differentiated by gender, given that family decisions are 
frequently made upon the basis of the ideal-typical gender roles prescribed by the practice 
rather than upon any conception of the potential of children to become free and equal moral 
persons, and given that Rawls himself acknowledges that paternalistic decisions ought to be 
made upon the basis of a presumption that the individual will, upon attaining full capacity, 
prefer a greater share to a lesser share of the primary goods, his emphasis upon limited 
intervention becomes problematical. Surely the principles of justice demand a far more active 
role for the state. Teachers and education authorities are normally thought to stand in loco 
parentis in respect of the children in their care. It would appear, therefore, that, as a minimum 
requirement, education ought to proceed upon the basis that when the children come to 
maturity a greater share of primary goods will be preferred to a lesser. It follows that 
educational decisions ought be made upon the basis of whether or not a given course of study 
34 	Rawls, 'The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good', /oc. cit., 267-268. 
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is likely to further this end. Rawls himself makes it clear that where individuals have not yet 
developed settled preferences (and this is the case with children well into adolescence) all 
decisions ought to be made to maximize access to the primary goods. Likewise, to the extent 
that, within many families, decision making proceeds, not upon the basis Rawls identifies as 
appropriate, but upon the basis of traditional gender roles and the conduct appropriate to 
these roles, it would appear that to the extent the paternalism necessary in respect of children 
is exercised in a way which cannot be reconciled with the principles of justice, not only are such 
families devoid of obligations but also active intervention by the state upon behalf of the 
children and their long range interests may be mandatory. (Does this require 'the oppressive 
use of state power' as Rawls suggest must result if a society is ordered by any comprehensive 
doctrine, religious or secular? 35) While Rawls recognizes in a footnote that the rights of 
parents are constrained by that necessary to ensure the adequate development of their 
children's moral powers36 it seems clear that he has not considered the full implications of 
what this may require or the level of intervention required. 
The critical issue in all circumstances in which paternalistic intervention is appropriate 
is that we are dealing with individuals who do not, for some reason, have the present capacity 
to develop and pursue rational interests and life plans, and, as a necessary consequence, others 
must act on their behalf. Where those who ordinarily might be thought to be best placed to do 
so fail to exercise their powers justly, their failure, it would seem to me, demands intervention 
by the state, given the natural and temporary incapacity of children. While, with respect to 
adults, it may be thought sufficient to simply acknowledge that unjust arrangements generate 
no obligations and that seriously unjust arrangements (those which deny some individuals 
access to the basic liberties) are void ab initio leaving the individuals involved to fend for 
themselves, this 'hands off' approach cannot be considered appropriate where the interests of 
children are involved. A practical complication arises in this context. Within the sorts of 
pluralist states to which Rawls envisions his theory applying, there are also a plurality of family 
practices, some of which may be just or nearly so and others which are profoundly unjust, a 
social fact which emphasizes the need for a clear, public standard, one which could, viewed 
from the appropriate perspective, be accepted by all. I have argued above that Rawls' account 
of the principles of justice has the capacity to provide such a standard, despite his reluctance to 
so apply it. It also, and this cannot be too strongly emphasized, must necessarily collapse the 
boundary between private lives and public persons he wishes to secure. If, as I have shown, the 
circumstances of justice apply within families as elsewhere, it would appear that state 
intervention on behalf of children is mandatory, not optional, in all circumstances where it 
might appear those responsible for securing their interests as defined fail to fulfil their 
responsibilities in this regard. 
35 	Rawls, 'The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus', /oc. cit., 249. 
36 	Rawls, 'Justice as Fairness', /oc. cit., 245, n. 27. 
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In discussing marriage and family life, and, in particular the principles which ought to 
govern family life if Rawls' method and theory are to be taken seriously, it has been necessary 
to draw upon widely scattered remarks, some of which might well appear to many to be 
inapplicable to family life as it is normally understood. In arguing that the circumstances of 
justice typically arise within families as elsewhere, and that no rational distinction can be made 
upon that basis, and in arguing further that, given this fact, and given that, as classic social 
contract theorists recognized, such relationships are typically marked by a divergence as well as 
an identity of interests, we emphasized the need for a just foundation for family life. Given 
that paternalistic decision making is inevitable where children are involved, we, in fact, 
identified a profound and significant reason for suggesting that families ought to be held to 
higher standards in respect of justice than are less intimate institutions. Given its conventional 
role in the rearing of children, and given the unavoidability of paternalistic decision making, it 
might be thought that most particularly within the family partial compliance is unacceptable, 
that a 'nearly just' family is a contradiction in terms. Yet Rawls' account also and profoundly 
depends upon the notion that a coherent distinction can be drawn between the public identity 
of the individual as citizen and his or her nonpublic identity. He emphasizes that 
citizens in their personal affairs, in the internal life of associations to which they 
belong may regard their final ends and attachments in a way very differently 
from the way the political conception involves. Citizens may have . . . 
affections, devotions, and loyalties that they believe they would not, and indeed 
could and should not, stand apart from and objectively evaluate from the point 
of view of their purely rational good?' 
Inevitably, among these affections, devotions, and loyalties are those to family members, just as 
among the conceptions of the good and moral doctrines which individuals may affirm as part 
of their nonpublic identity are doctrines and conceptions which not only structure family life, 
but impact profoundly upon decisions and choices with respect to children. Here, a distinction 
made earlier is again relevant. I argued that Rawls failed to consider with sufficient clarity one 
critical possibility. While an overlapping consensus may indeed be possible to the extent that 
individuals, families and religious or ethnic associations will, in fact, come to endorse Rawls' 
conception of justice with its emphasis upon society as a fair scheme of cooperation, this 
becomes more tenuous and difficult if we insist that the internal life of these families and 
associations ought be subjected to the same standards. Rawls emphasizes in recent writings 
that the political virtues38 are intended to characterize the ideal of a good citizen and that they 
must be distinguished from 'those appropriate to roles in family life and to the relations between 
individuals. 39 While Rawls acknowledges that the political virtues might also be valued for 
37 	Ibid., 241. 
38 	Rawls, 'The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good', /oc. cit., 263 identifies these as 
civility and tolerance, reasonableness and a sense of fairness. 
39 	Ibid., 263. 
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other reasons within particular comprehensive schemes, 	earlier noted that the 'moral 
sentiments that support adherence [to the principles of justice] are those that it is rational for the 
members of a well-ordered society to want in their associates Al he never attempts to locate such 
principles and the moral sentiments which support them in the context of their necessary role 
in nonpolitical associations. 
I have argued throughout that, by his failure in this regard, Rawls has averted his gaze 
from the precise elements which make a stable overlapping consensus profoundly unlikely 
once we recognize that the circumstances of justice obtain within families as elsewhere. In this 
chapter, I have, I believe, established that not only ought the relationship between husband and 
wife be governed by the principles of justice, that between parents and children must be. We 
need, that is, not only a theory of just relationships between the institutions of which the basic 
structure is comprised, but a public theory of just institutions, one known and acknowledged by 
all. Again, I must emphasize that the requirements of justice ought to be seen as the minimum 
requirements for social cooperation. Nothing in this requirement rules out the possibility that 
more demanding standards may be deemed essential to practices such as family. Such may 
well be appropriate. However, from a public perspective, viewing the justice of individual 
families from the perspective of citizens conceived simply as free and equal moral persons, it is 
clear that, in societies such as our own, it is critical that minimum standards be publicly 
established and upheld by wider institutions. 
RAWLS AND THE JUST FAMILY 
Now I should like to return to the relationship between husband and wife and apply 
Rawls' theory and his principles to that specific relationship. Earlier we examined the primary 
goods as identified by Rawls, and the degree to which, historically and in contemporary 
societies, women have been profoundly disadvantaged in access to these goods, and indeed, 
noted the fact that among many segments of society, access to many of these goods continues 
to be perceived as inappropriate for women. We also noted the degree to which women's 
inequality is inseparable from their familial roles and the characteristic virtues associated with 
roles such as those of wife and mother. Likewise, we came to recognize that women and 
children, uniquely, are far more likely to become the victims of violence within the family than 
within the wider community and that the true extent of such violence is unknown. We have, 
that is, moved from the problems associated with developing an ideal theory account, and into 
the realm of partial compliance, again assuming the existence of a background ideal theory 
standard. 
Given that existing institutions are unjust, and given that, under existing conditions the 
benefits of cooperation are not fairly shared at present nor are they likely to be in the 
40 	Ibid., 264, n. 21. 
41 	Rawls, A Theory of Justice, loc. cit., 437. 
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foreseeable future, it is time to turn to the real, real world. Now we must attempt to ascertain 
whether the principles of justice as derived and stated by Rawls offer the conceptual tools 
needed for an account of family law and a legal basis for family relationships and for the 
resolution of disputes which arise because existing institutions are not uniformly just and 
compensatory measures are essential. Let us consider first the clearest situation, that which 
arises where a particular family is seriously unjust, where, let us say, the basic liberties are 
arbitrarily denied to one family member by another. (In many abusive families, not only is the 
victim frequently deprived of the liberty and integrity of the person, freedom of association is 
also often denied as is, in practice, the right to hold personal property.) If we have a 
background conception of family as an institution structured by the principles of justice, do we 
have the conceptual tools which are needed to resolve the situation? (If we have no such 
background conception, it may make no sense to speak of family relationships as just or unjust. 
Classic social contract theory did, in fact, provide a background conception. While this 
background conception denied that women (and children) were members of civil society, it 
provided the foundation for a clear public regime. It is one which has been overtaken by 
events.) First, where profound injustice is involved, from a legal perspective, all rights and 
obligations which either or both of the parties may perceive as binding among themselves are 
void. Whatever promises or agreements may have been involved have no legal existence and 
are wholly irrelevant to a just resolution. Second, where the degree of injustice has been such 
as to compromise the capability of one of the adult individuals involved to rationally identify 
and pursue his or her own interests, the principle of paternalism discussed earlier applies. It 
follows, I believe, that the state has an obligation to intervene directly under such 
circumstances. Two distinct possibilities exist. The state may either proceed upon the basis 
that it ought to attempt to restore the victim to the position which that individual would have 
occupied had the relationship never existed, or it may attempt to place the victim in the 
position which that individual would have occupied had the relationship been justly structured. 
Simply proclaiming the relationship null and void is not a resolution which meets the demands 
of justice, given that it does not provide any form of redress but involves the pretence that the 
injustice might be seen as localized and devoid of wider consequences. 
Where children are involved the situation becomes significantly more complicated. It 
does not seem to me that it makes much sense to suggest that no obligations are involved, even 
if that might be said to be the case in respect of those which the adults perceive as binding 
among themselves. Rather, the problem is that the public obligations which form the basis of 
just family relationships have not been honoured, and as a consequence, the state has an 
obligation to intervene. (Since I am attempting to determine the extent to which Rawls' 
principles as applied to the family provide a basis for dealing with the sorts of problems 
commonplace in existing pluralist societies, I ignore for the moment the fact that our society 
has no theory of the just family capable of providing background standards, although that 
undoubtedly provides one reason for the difficulties in expounding adequate principles for 
family law. Rather, our society operates upon the basis of a rag-tag collection of family 
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ideologies and practices whose justice has never been considered, in part because the family is 
conventionally believed to be outside the realm where justice is relevant.) The state can 
neither proceed upon the basis of restoring the children to the position they would have 
occupied had the relationship not existed nor can it readily place the children in the position 
they might have occupied had the relationship been just. The first approach is negated by the 
likelihood the children themselves might well not have come into being. The second demands 
the reconstruction of family relationships upon a just basis, and such reconstruction is well 
beyond the scope of our present level of understanding of human psychology and relationships. 
The best that can be hoped for, therefore, assuming that the adult victim has the capacity to 
act justly in respect of the children42, is to place the wronged parent together with the children 
in a position which, as nearly as may be possible, approximates that which they would have 
enjoyed in a just family. (Quite clearly, that involves securing to the parent and the children a 
fully adequate share of the basic social goods, and that may well involve provision not only of 
means of subsistence which are fully adequate, but also of provision of the background 
opportunities essential for full participation in the public culture.) If this cannot be done, no 
alternative exists but to attempt to place the children in a situation where their interests and 
needs as identified by the principle of paternalism will be fully served. 
In more ordinary situations, where, perhaps, the family in question is not justly 
structured, but the injustice is not so severe as to render the marriage void ab initio, the 
situation becomes more complex. (I assume, for the purposes of argument only, that this 
represents the normal situation in cases of family breakdown.) First, if we presume that the 
obligations involved in marriage arise in the way in which other obligations arise within Rawls' 
general theory, and I can find no basis for assuming otherwise in the context of Rawls' theory 
taken as a whole, it will be insufficient to simply attempt to place family members in a position 
which approximates that which they would have occupied had the relationship been just. The 
promises and undertakings involved in the relationship itself must be considered irrespective of 
whether these have been formalized into a contractual document. Unlike the grossly unjust 
situation discussed above, such cannot simply be deemed void. Where such promises and 
undertakings are consistent with what justice requires, even if they go well beyond its 
requirements, they ought to be taken into account in determining the relationship of the 
parties. Where, however, they are inconsistent with the requirements of justice, they can be 
given no weight. This would, I believe, include enforcing the terms of individual marital 
contracts and tacit agreements, excluding only those terms which cannot be reconciled with the 
principles of justice as stated. Only where such terms could not be severed would it be 
42 	In this context acting justly requires the capacity to have full regard to the moral 
personality of the children, and, Rawls' theory specifies that to the extent they have 
developed settled preferences which are themselves rational these be satisfied, and, 
failing this, that those acting on their behalf make decisions upon the basis that when 
they attain full rationality they will prefer a greater rather than a lesser share of the 
primary goods. 
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appropriate to disregard the desires of the parties concerned altogether. Quite obviously, and 
appropriately, this leaves open the possibility of a inquiry into fault to the extent that such 
promises and undertakings are voluntarily undertaken by the parties themselves. Equally 
obviously, given that we are here dealing with free and equal moral persons, fault cannot be 
conventionally established upon the basis of, for example, traditional gender roles. Rather a 
full legal determination based upon the understandings and undertakings of the parties 
themselves becomes essential. The involvement of equitable principles cannot be foreclosed, 
perhaps including something akin to the requirement that the parties come before the court 
with clean hands. 
Determining the best possible outcome with respect to the children becomes more 
complex. Here it is likely that neither parent has forfeited altogether his or her 'parental 
rights'43, and both may be reasonably capable of acting justly with respect to their children!" 
For this reason, it is likely that conflicts will arise concerning the interests of the children and 
the steps which ought to be undertaken to further those interests. To the extent that the 
children themselves have settled preferences which are rational, these clearly must be taken 
into account. Where this is not the case, it would appear that the decision ought to be made 
on the assumption that the children, when they attain full rationality, will prefer a greater to a 
lesser share of primary goods. I fmd this less than fully satisfactory, since, ceteris paribus, it 
suggests that one of the determinative factors may well be the material advantages of the 
respective households. However, the willingness of each of the parents to act so as to further 
the children's interests in this regard is equally relevant. In this context it becomes critical that 
the resolution as regards the parties themselves is just or nearly so since the material 
conditions obtaining in the household of which the children are a part are likely, in the long 
term, to have a significant bearing on their access to the primary goods. 45 If, on family 
dissolution, a strictly equal division of resources is chosen (even assuming agreement could be 
reached upon those goods which are to count as resources for this purpose) this will yield a 
just result only to the extent the previous relationship of the adults has satisfied the constraints 
of the difference principle. (Provision for the welfare of the children must be considered 
separately, and such provision must be made in accord with the principle of paternalism and in 
recognition that the background obligations of each parent to provide for their children's 
43 	I use this term only because Rawls speaks of the rights of parents. 
44 	Here I need only assume that both parents desire to ensure that all their children have 
the widest possible range of options (consistent with justice) open to them as adults 
and that, as specified in the construction of the original position, they have a concern 
for the well-being of their immediate descendants. As Rawls notes it is possible to 
work out the demands of intergenerational justice by assuming 'a generation cares for 
its immediate descendants, as fathers say care for their sons.' A Mealy of Justice, loc. 
cit., 288. 
45 	Rawls recognizes this source of inequality although he does not address it in this 
context. Cf. Ibid., 301. 
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material well-being are equal.') Where, during the marriage, the adult individuals have 
chosen to allocate responsibilities among themselves in a way which has significantly limited 
the access of one of them to the primary goods to a degree incompatible with the constraints 
of the difference principle, an equal division of the available resources will be inadequate. 
Rather, given that the demands of justice have not been complied with during the relationship 
itself, it will be necessary to divide resources (and quite possibly make provision for ongoing 
support) with a view towards putting the parties, so far as possible, in the position they would 
have occupied had the relationship been conducted justly. Where this is not possible, given the 
resources reasonably available to the parties themselves, I would argue that, to the extent that 
political institutions have been implicated by their failure to restructure wider institutions to 
ensure that they more nearly conform to the requirements of justice, they are obliged to secure 
to the less advantaged individual that share of basic social goods which would have been 
enjoyed (given the general level of wealth of the society and the level of development of its 
institutions) had family institutions been just. If none of this is entirely satisfactory, strictly 
speaking, much of its inadequacy stems from the injustice of many basic institutions themselves 
and our cultural failure to address the fundamental issue of the just family. 
None of what has been written above represents, in the strict sense, Rawls' theory as 
he has developed and presented it. Indeed, Rawls' work, taken as a whole, endeavours to 
place the family beyond the reach of justice, to emphasize that justice applies to the basic 
structure merely, to the public rights and obligations defining the relationships between' the 
basic institutions. All I have attempted to do is argue first, that the circumstances of justice 
apply within families, that given the circumstances of justice and the constraints upon 
reasoning Rawls argues are essential to ensure that individuals will not structure institutions to 
their own advantage, no reason is apparent why different principles ought to be appropriate to 
family life. If the problem is fundamentally the same, and the method is appropriate generally, 
the same principles will emerge. The rest belongs to partial compliance, the attempted 
application of just background principles to an unjust world. 
DWORKIN AND ASSOCIATIVE OBLIGATIONS 
Dworkin's account of obligations attempts to disassociate liberalism from the 
contractual paradigm characteristic both of early social contract theory and of the work of 
recent theorists such as Rawls. Dworkin argues that philosophers have erred in seeking to 
derive an account of political legitimacy from conceptions such as justice. ° As he puts it, 
justice is too universalistic in its aims and ambitions to account for the specificity of 
obligations, their attachment to particular local communities. It cannot, according to Dworkin, 
explain why a citizen of Britain has an obligation to British institutions which is different in 
46 	See Ch. 11 for a discussion of this point. 
47 	Dworkin, Law's Empire, loc. cit., 193. 
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character from any duty to support just institutions more generally. Likewise, according to 
Dworkin, the argument from fair play48 allows too much. It both seemingly presupposes that 
obligations can be incurred merely by the receipt of benefits, whether sought or not, and, 
according to Dworkin, leaves the term benefits fatally ambiguous. ° 
I shall not address Dworkin's rejection of the arguments offered by Rawls in any 
detail50, rather my present concern is with the structure of Dworkin's account of associative 
obligations and with whether it has the capacity to provide an acceptable account of marital 
obligations and an acceptable background standard for family law and the resolution of 
matrimonial disputes generally. Dworkin's account emphasizes, not voluntariness, or consent 
or the making of promises, but social practices taken as practices. He wishes to derive an 
account of obligations generally from 
the special responsibilities social practice attaches to membership in some 
biological or social group, like the responsibilities of family or friends or 
neighbors. Most people think that they have associative obligations just by 
belonging to groups defined by social practice, which is not necessarily a matter 
of choice or consent, but that they can lose these obligations if other members of 
the group do not extend them the benefits of belonging to the group. 51 
Dworkin comments further that 
the history of social practice defines the communal groups to which we belong 
and the obligations that attach to these. It defines what a family or a 
neighborhood or a professional colleague is, 91,4d what one member of these 
groups or holder of these titles owes to another."' 
48 	Dworkin provides a schematic outline of what he terms the argument from fair play, 
in Law's Empire, loc. cit., 193-195. As he acknowledges it is a sketch of Rawls' 
account of obligations as discussed earlier in this chapter. 
49 	Dworkin, Law's Empire, loc. cit., 193-195. 
50 	I should note that I do not believe that the criticism levelled by Dworkin is fair to 
Rawls' argument. First, Rawls insists that obligations arise only among individuals 
who are engaged in a common cooperative venture or social practice, deflecting the 
first criticism, and second, Rawls argues explicitly that no obligations arise where the 
institution or association cannot be seen to be just or nearly so, that is where its rules 
and practices cannot be reconciled with those which would have been chosen by 
individuals in the original position. Nozick's philosopher in a sound truck is simply, at 
least in legal terms, off on a 'frolic of his own'. He is attempting to impose a common 
cooperative venture upon the basis of mere proximity, and nothing could be further 
from the actual meaning of Rawls' account. Cf. the account given earlier in this 
chapter of the structure of Rawls' account of obligations. 
51 	Dworkin, Law's Empire, loc. cit., 196. 
52 	Ibid. 
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At first glance, Dworkin's account appears profoundly conservative, reactionary even, 
with its emphasis upon the history of social practices.53 Even a cursory glance at the history of 
our social and legal practices of family suggests that the family has been in the recent past and 
remains in the present a profoundly inegalitarian institution, one predicated upon relationships 
of domination and subordination rather than independence and equality. Dworkin, however, 
seeks to deflect the force of this criticism by his emphasis upon the interpretive attitude. Thus, 
he suggests the 'raw data' of our actual practices of family, past and present, are not conclusive 
of an argument about the obligations of family.54 Rather, the interpretive attitude requires 
that we assume that the practice of family 
serves some interest or purpose or enforces some principle. .. that can be stated 
independently of just describing the rules that make up the practice. 55 
At this juncture, it is critical to acknowledge that, at least as applied to social practices such as 
marriage and family, profound similarities obtain between Dworldn's account and the 
interpretation I have offered of Rawls' account of obligations generally in this context. Rawls, 
like Dworkin, grounds his account in social practices or institutions, indeed emphasizes the 
need to examine the rules of the practice in question. The fundamental distinction between 
Dworkin's account and that of Rawls lies in Dworkin's conception of the interpretive attitude 
and of its role in legitimating and justifying the practice itself. Whereas Rawls argues that no 
social practice or institution is capable of generating obligations unless it is reasonably just, 
indeed, argues that 
unjust social arrangements are themselves a kind of extortion, even violence, 
and consent to them does not bind56 
Dworkin asks that we embark upon a theoretical evaluation of the practice itself in order to 
determine what integrity requires, applied to that specific practice. We must attempt to 
ascertain the interests served by the practice, impose meaning upon the rules involved in it, 
and, on the basis of the interpretive attitude, seek to restructure it in terms of that meaning. 
We must, in other words, generate an ideal account of the practice. 
53 	This concern is reinforced by the fact that Dworkin explicitly acknowledges that what 
he terms associative or communal obligations are more conventionally known as 
obligations of role. Ibid., 195-6. Particularly with respect to women this seems less 
than a promising beginning given the degree throughout our history to which women 
have been so thoroughly identified with and constrained by their concrete social roles 
especially those of wife and mother as to have been denied individuality and the 
potential to occupy other roles. 
54 
55 
56 
Ibid., 197. 
Ibid., 47. Certainly the classic social contract theorists, and most particularly 
Rousseau, would agree with him in this. Indeed, Rousseau in particular offered a 
profound and detailed account of the purpose or value of family. See Ch. 8 & 9. 
Rawls, A Theory of Justice, loc. cit., 343. 
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GENERATING AN IDEAL THEORY ACCOUNT OF MARRIAGE AND FAMILY 
At what Dworkin terms the `preinterpretive stage'57 what is sought is broad 
communal consensus concerning the parameters of the practice, indeed he suggests an 
interpretive community requires consensus at this at this level if constructive interpretation is 
to be possible. (One wishes here to inquire how one defines the relevant community, a 
threshold question, but one which is critical. Surely the problem in contemporary pluralist 
states is that there are many interpretive communities, particularly with regard to practices as 
central as that of family.58) Given the fact of pluralism our question must be this. Does broad 
consensus exist within political communities such as the United States and Australia 
concerning the parameters of the institution of marriage? Marriage is conventionally 
identified as the voluntary union of one man and one woman for life for the purpose of 
procreation and the rearing of children. It requires both a public ceremony in which vows are 
exchanged between the parties and subsequent sexual relations, to consummate the marriage. 
(There are, of course, dissenting voices, ranging from those who argue that marriage simply 
institutionalizes sexual access to women and their oppression 59, to those who argue that the 
concept ought to be extended to permanent homosexual relationships or who argue that 
procreation is/ought to be irrelevant, however I suspect that the conventional account would 
be accepted even by dissenting groups as accurate enough.) More importantly, our legal, 
social and cultural traditions defme marital relationships in particular and family relationships 
more generally as profoundly and utterly private. Such relationships represent at their 
foundation a realm in which law intervenes at its peril. Here, to a far greater extent than 
elsewhere, freedom of choice prevails, even though the emphasis upon freedom of choice 
coexists with an equally fundamental belief that in marriage one individual, the wife, exchanges 
her independence or autonomous existence for the support and protection of the other 
individual, the husband. Finally, and equally significantly, such practices are seen as fluid and 
emotional, both structured and unstructured. Rules, as such, are perceived as inappropriate, 
incompatible with the intimate nature of the practice as such, although authority, most 
particularly the authority of the husband and father is perceived by many as critical and central 
to the coherence and stability of the practice. 
Dworlcin's second stage is substantially more complex. At the second stage, it 
becomes necessary to produce an argument or arguments justifying the main elements of the 
practice as identified at the preinterpretive stage. The account given at the preinterpretive 
57 	Dworkin, Law's Empire, loc. cit., 65-73. In what follows, I shall attempt to follow the 
method suggested by Dworkin in these passages, become what he terms a philosopher 
of marriage and family. 
58 	Cf. R.L. West, 'Adjudication is not Interpretation: Some Reservations about the Law- 
as-Literature Movement', 54 Tenn. L.R. 203 (1987). 
59 	C. Pateman, The Sexual Contract, Stanford, Stanford Univ. Press, 1990. A. Dworkin, 
Intercourse, London, Martin Secker & Warburg, 1987. 
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stage included only those elements about which broad general consensus might reasonably be 
thought to exist. At the interpretive stage, particularly within pluralistic communities such as 
our own, we must confront the fact that we may, in fact, not be dealing with a discrete practice, 
but with a group of practices which, while they share common elements, differ profoundly in 
the social meaning ascribed to those elements. Among many communities, for example, 
marriage is seen as a relationship in which one individual, the woman, promises to obey the 
other individual, in exchange for his support and protection for her and for any children she 
may bear him. Families of this sort are characterized by their affirmation of conventional 
gender roles and by emphasis upon the woman's responsibility for child rearing and domestic 
labour. At the other extreme, marriage may be identified simply as a companionate affective 
relationship between adult individuals. For such couples the relationship of the adults is 
substantially more significant than the conventional emphasis upon procreation and child-
rearing, indeed, the procreative role of the family may be irrelevant. In some cases such 
relationships are fundamentally egalitarian in character, in others less so. Between these 
extremes lie a variety of mixed practices. Still other groups or individuals argue for the 
extension of practices like marriage and family to incorporate more or less informal 
relationships, to communal 'families' or to stable homosexual and lesbian relationships, 
particularly where the children of either partner live in the home. Polygamous marriages, 
while legally proscribed in countries such as Australia and the United States do persist among 
some groups and are recognizable as family practices, and arranged marriages remain 
relatively common among some subcultures. Finally, the single-parent family is, as a matter of 
social fact, now commonplace. Indeed, given the range of practices to which, even within 
contemporary societies, it is intuitively appropriate to apply the term family, it often appears 
that the only truly universal features characteristic of the range of practices identified by the 
terms marriage and family may be summed up by the terms private and intimate, or emotional. 
Even identifying one or more paradigm cases of marriage and family is profoundly 
difficult. The account of marriage and family relationships provided by early social contract 
theory is surely one paradigm, and one which was enforced by law until relatively recently. 
Another paradigm is that of the traditional family, with its male breadwinner, its female 
homemaker and the more or less obligatory two or three children and the family pet. These 
two paradigms may, of course, substantially overlap. We may, perhaps, perceive an emerging 
paradigm in the dual career family with its superficially egalitarian ideology of marriage and 
family life and its theoretical emphasis upon the sharing of responsibilities in all spheres. Still 
another paradigm (although not one we would wish to recognize as acceptable) may be found 
in the violent or abusive family.60 Finally, of course, a significant contemporary paradigm 
(although one culturally defined as 'abnormal') is the single parent family. 
60 	Research in Australia has suggested that among many families violence is regarded as 
the norm rather than as exceptional. See National Committee on Violence, /oc. cit., 
33-34. 
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Because of the wide variety of concrete practices concealed within terms like marriage 
and family, constructive interpretation becomes profoundly difficult, in part because no settled 
paradigm prevails and no one practice of family predominates. I am not in the position of 
Dworkin's philosopher of courtesy, who is able to begin with discrete acts which are taken as 
paradigms of courtesy. I have, however, no alternative but to begin, using the elements which 
appear to typify the preinterpretive stage as a guide. Marriage, on the conventional account, 
represents the voluntary union of one man and one woman for life. In what may be found the 
value or purpose of that union? Upon what basis may our practices of family be justified? At 
the preinterpretive stage, the purposes given were procreation and child-rearing. Further, 
marriage itself is marked by the voluntary exchange of promises or vows, by the necessity for 
sexual relations, and by some degree of economic interdependence. These demands can, quite 
clearly, be met by a great variety of concrete practices, ranging from the wholly traditional to 
the egalitarian to the profoundly abusive. Common sense, therefore, suggests that the 
justification accepted at the preinterpretive stage is insufficient to confer meaning or value. 
The two features noted as universal, the emphasis upon privacy and intimacy may, however, be 
more helpful. They epitomize our profound cultural belief that a sphere of individual freedom 
is essential to a meaningful and truly human life, a sphere where choices and decisions can 
made wholly upon the basis of the individual's beliefs concerning a life that he or she perceives 
as personally meaningful. I note here a number of difficulties with our emphasis upon privacy 
and intimacy. First, human relationships are involved and the choices and decisions involved 
inevitably concern the sort of relationship one individual desires to have with another or with 
several others and how that individual desires those others to respond. Second, where children 
are involved the concrete choices and decisions of the adult individual or individuals may well 
be wholly or partially determinative of the future lives and options of those children. Because, 
ideally, having children represents both a wholly private and personal decision and one which 
contributes immeasurably to the value of the individual life, it seems likely that the procreative 
role of the family is intertwined with our cultural paradigms of privacy and intimacy, that it 
represents a significant part of the social meaning or value of such practices. 
If our conclusions at the interpretive stage seem, perhaps, less substantive than might 
be ideal, we do, nonetheless, seem to have extracted a core of meaning or value characteristic 
of a wide range of cultural practices which may be subsumed under the rubric of marriage and 
family. The characteristics of privacy, intimacy, interdependence and procreativity are so 
intimately intertwined with our traditions that it is difficult to imagine using the terms family 
and marriage absent these values. According to Dworkin, at 'the postinterpretive or reforming 
stage' we adjust our sense of 'what the practice really requires so as better to serve the justification 
[we accepted] at the interpretive stage.'61 At the interpretive stage, we tentatively accepted as 
justifications for practices such as marriage and family, the need for a private sphere of 
intimacy and emotion, a realm in which individuals could in fact strive to create value and 
61 	Dworkin, Law's Empire, loc. cit., 66. 
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realize a form of life they found personally meaningful. We accepted as well that for many 
individuals a critical source of value and meaning might be found in the choice to have children 
and rear a family. Accepting these tentatively as justificatory, we must, according to Dworkin, 
now strive to determine what the practice 'really requires' if these values are to be realized. 
Here, it is necessary both to examine concrete practices and traditions and attempt to ascertain 
whether, on some plausible interpretation, they do in fact serve these values, and to suggest the 
form and shape the practice 'really requires' if it is to be perceived as valuable. The central 
element in our justification was the need for a sphere of life in which individual choice could 
be seen as determinative, in which people could in fact realize a life they found good for 
themselves. At the interpretive stage we noted two problems with this justification: that 
individual choices and decisions invariably implicated others and, given the fluidity and 
intimacy of family relationships, inevitably involved beliefs or preferences concerning how 
others ought to behave, and that, where children were involved, the beliefs and attitudes of 
adult family members was likely to be wholly or partially determinative of the options open to 
the children in later life. 
Can we imagine a way in which our cultural practices of family might be restructured 
so that they may both serve the justification accepted at the interpretive stage and 
simultaneously avoid the problems associated with it, including its capacity to conceal and 
institutionalize oppression? What elements appear, intuitively, to be critical in such a 
restructuring? Here, it becomes critical to draw upon other concepts widespread in our 
cultural vocabulary. Dworkin identifies a number of the central features necessary for 
legitimacy in his discussion of associative obligations, elements such as reciprocity and the 
sense that obligations are uniquely owed to group members as individuals, that they are 
personal in some sense, and reflect genuine and equal concern for the welfare of group 
members, taken one by one.62 Even these, I would argue are not enough, prove inadequate to 
legitimate, at least in practices such as family. Too much is left unsaid. Perhaps more critical, 
if one is to attempt a coherent justification for practices such as family, is the need for an 
authentic conception of equal respect as a foundation for family relationships. Not only must 
each family member act in a way which manifests equal concern for the well-being of other 
family members, as individuals, each family member must act in a way which manifests equal 
respect for the actual or potential capacity of each family member to form and act upon a 
meaningful conception of how his or her life should be lived.63 . 
62 
63 
Ibid., 199-201. 
At one time, it should be noted, Dworkin's conception of equality was summed up by 
the phrase 'equal concern and respect' and he identified concern with our human 
capacity for suffering and frustration and respect with our capacity to form and act 
upon intelligent conceptions of how our lives should be lived. See Taking Rights 
Seriously, loc. cit., 272 and, more generally, 272-78. In recent writings all references to 
equal respect have been dropped. 
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Given the intimate and fluid nature of family life, its foundation in emotion and 
procreativity, I would argue, equal respect is absolutely critical, even if it may, intuitively, not 
be thought applicable to some aspects of family relationships. Our justification for family life 
emphasized the need for a sphere of privacy, for a realm in which individuals were able to 
realize a form of life they found meaningful, as well as the presence of emotional bonds 
between those individuals. We noted the danger, the fact that, most particularly in intimate 
relationships, the preferences of one individual inevitably implicated the roles and 
responsibilities of others. Concern, even equal concern, for the well-being of another, may 
well be exercised in a way which fails utterly to respect the capacity of that individual to form 
and act upon a meaningful conception of how his or her life should be lived. It is, I believe, 
inevitable that, however deep and intimate the bonds between individuals, they nonetheless 
remain distinct individuals with interests and ends of their own which warrant respect. No one 
individual is ever entitled simply to assume his or her ends and purposes are of greater 
importance than those of another, or that he or she is uniquely placed to determine the 
interests of another. I think here, for example, of those two career families in which one 
individual assumes that his or her career is of greater long-range significance and that, as a 
consequence, where the demands of family life conflict with the demands of employment, such 
sacrifices as must be made fall to the other. concern, even equal concern, may be 
wholly sincere in such relationships, what is lacking is respect for the ends and purposes of 
another. Ultimately, therefore, absent respect, concern must inevitably fail to become equal 
concern, however sincere the beliefs of group members. For clarity, however, particularly 
where, as discussed in Chapter 5, so much turns upon what the group 'assumes', it is essential 
that concern and respect remain conceptually distinct. The concepts involved are already 
open-ended and inherently contested. Confusion between them would make the interpretive 
project untenable. 
The need for a conception of equal respect, I shall argue, is particularly critical where 
the interests of children are involved. While this may appear counter-intuitive, when one 
considers what is at stake it is, in fact, entirely reasonable. Because children are by definition 
not yet fully developed individuals, may lack rational ends and purposes of their own, an 
adequate conception of equal concern superficially appears far more important where their 
interests are involved. Common sense suggests that it is concern for their welfare in both the 
long and short terms which ought to guide parental actions, suggesting that equal concern is 
paramount. This is, in fact, simply wrong. This can be illustrated in what may appear a 
dramatic way by the example of a child who is to some extent, physically or mentally 
handicapped. Concern, in such cases, pulls toward protection from risks, towards an attempt 
In purely monetary terms, of course, it may well be that the most economically 
rational decision for the family as a whole is to proceed upon this basis, however 
Dworkin's model emphasizes that even equal concern must be fully individualized. 
Concern for the welfare of the group as a whole does not legitimate, it must be 
personal, for individuals as such. Law's Empire, loc. cit. 199. 
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to ensure that child is exposed to no greater risks than a normal sibling. Yet more and more 
we are coming to recognize that too often concern imperceptibly slides into over-
protectiveness, that it frequently cripples rather than enhances potential. To some extent risk 
taking appears to be critical to normal development, has the capacity, within reasonable 
bounds, to expand potential. Something of the same sort is at work in Dworkin's example of a 
family whose traditions prescribe that girls require greater protection in all aspects of family 
life than do boys. The impulse towards protection, towards excessive paternalism, while 
understandable, and while it may be a plausible interpretation of equal concern, fails in both 
cases. What is not recognized is the need for equal respect, for a principle guiding 
paternalistic conduct which takes into account the fact that children are in the process of 
becoming mature individuals with an intelligent conception of how their lives should be lived 
and that equal concern which is not counter-balanced by a meaningful conception of equal 
respect is likely to render this project at best, more difficult and tenuous, at worst, self-
defeating. 
I conclude, therefore, that at the post-interpretive level, any intelligible justification 
for our practices of family must incorporate a developed conception of equal respect. I am 
inclined, also, to suggest that Dworlcin's general account of associative obligations must be 
perceived as incomplete without a meaningful conception of equal respect. It is not enough, I 
would argue, for the group to assume, however sincerely, that its roles and rules are equally in 
the interests of all, that they manifest equal concern. Far more important is a requirement 
that, at the very least, the group assume that its roles and rules manifest equal respect for the 
capacity of individuals to form and act upon an intelligent conception of how their lives should be 
led.65 
Indeed, I would argue further with respect to family at least, that the demand for 
equal respect is implicit in the justifications for the practice we accepted at the interpretive 
stage. As will be recalled, at the interpretive stage we acknowledged the critical importance, in 
our cultural traditions, of a developed idea of family privacy and we connected the emphasis 
upon privacy with our belief in the importance for each individual of a sphere of life in which 
that person could create meaning or value, realize a life he or she believed worthwhile. 
Privacy, however, is not valuable in and of itself, to the extent that it represents an independent 
purpose or value, it does so because of what it makes possible for people. 66 It provides one of 
the essential preconditions if individuals are, in fact, to form and act upon intelligent 
65 	Certainly a right to equal respect was implicit in arguments Dworkin earlier made for 
a right to moral independence, and to my knowledge he has not modified or 
abandoned those arguments. See 'Do We Have a Right to Pornography' in A Matter 
of Principle, loc. cit., 335, 353. 
Cf. Dworkin's comment that 'liberty seems valuable to us only because of the 
consequences we think it does have for people: we think lives led under liberty are better 
lives just for that reason'. 'The Place of Liberty', /oc. cit., 2. 
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conceptions of how their lives ought to be led, and it is worth preserving only to the extent that 
it serves this underlying purpose. Quite obviously, this is particularly crucial with respect to 
children, but it necessarily applies to adult relationships as well. To the extent that an 
intelligible and fully adequate conception of equal respect is excluded, the justificatory 
potential of the conception of privacy collapses. Indeed, to the extent that privacy is allowed to 
conceal dominion and the crippling of individual potential, it is devoid of value. 
Similarly, we recognized that among the core values of practices such as family was 
their role in securing and enhancing a sphere of intimacy and affect, of, in short, love. Yet love 
has destructive potential as well as life-affirming potential. Without mutual respect, without 
full recognition that the loved one has the capacity to form and act upon an intelligent 
conception of how his or her life ought to be led, without recognition that his or her humanity 
is ultimately rejected if this potential is thwarted or rejected, love becomes destructive. Again, 
nowhere is this more critical than with respect to children. 67 
Any acceptable postinterpretive account of marriage and family relationships must, 
therefore, be founded upon mutual respect, and upon an adequate conception of the 
importance of equal respect in family life. Earlier, we sketched many practices which might 
plausibly be considered family practices in our culture. Now, we must consider whether, or 
indeed if, those paradigms can be reconciled with the justifications we accepted at the 
interpretive stage, and with our heightened perception of their purpose or value as developed 
at the postinterpretive stage. 
Some of the paradigms we suggested remained current in our culture clearly cannot 
be reconciled with any acceptable justification. Neither the account of family derived from 
early social contract theory nor that manifest in the violent or abusive family can be reconciled 
with any meaningful conception of equal respect. This is in fact an interesting distinction. The 
account of family derived from early social contract theory, may, in fact, be thought to manifest 
a conception of equal concern, at least if family groups organized upon this basis sincerely 
assume that the roles and rules involved are equally in the interests of all family members, 
taken one by one. It is respect for the ends of the other which is wholly absent.68 The violent 
or abusive family is quite simply hopeless, absent both concern and respect, equal or 
otherwise. It, may not, however, be absent love, albeit in a deformed or distorted form. 
Traditional families come in many different forms, as do dual career families and single parent 
families. Where distinct and different roles are freely and consciously chosen, where 
67 	Cf. Rawls' emphasis upon the role of love in moral development and especially upon 
the development of self-respect and self-esteem. Noteworthy in Rawls' account is the 
recognition that love ought to be guided by the demands of justice, by the recognition 
that the child will become a free and equal moral person. A Theory of Justice, loc. cit., 
462-67. 
68 	Cf. the discussion of early social contract theory and particularly that account 
developed by Rousseau in Ch. 7 & 8. 
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individuals deal with one another as individuals, realize mutual and equal respect, not as 
occupants of the ideal/typical roles more or less characteristic of the practice, but as unique 
and irreplaceable individuals attempting to realize in practice a valuable life for themselves, 
they can clearly be reconciled with the justification developed at the postinterpretive level. 
Here, of course, we recognize as well the potential for radical transformation of the practice 
itself, the acknowledgment that the roles depend not upon biologically assigned characteristics 
but upon the belief of the individual that they embody a meaningful life, an intelligent 
conception of how his or her life ought to be lived. That, at a minimum, demands that they be 
thought about, subjected to rational and critical evaluation, not simply accepted as natural and 
inevitable, and equally, where children are concerned, demands that such roles be recognized 
and presented as one possibility among many. Where it cannot be said that roles are freely 
and consciously chosen, where, perhaps, individuals are perceived substantially in terms of 
their correspondence with the ideal/typical roles characteristic of the practice, where the 
content of the roles themselves enhance the capacity to develop and pursue an intelligent 
conception of a valuable life in some individuals while wholly or partially foreclosing it in 
others, the position is otherwise. Frequently, as well, where this is the case ideal/typical roles 
are presented to children, not as one choice among many potential choices, but as natural or 
inevitable, or worse, imposed upon them. I think here of Dworkin's patriarchal family. While 
it may, as he suggests, be compatible with a sincere, if defective, conception of equal concern, 
it cannot be reconciled with any viable conception of equal respect, no matter what the group 
may or may not assume and how sincere their beliefs. A meaningful conception of equal 
respect in this context must involve respect for the individual as one who is equally capable of 
forming and acting upon an intelligent conception of how her life ought to be lived. Where 
paternalism is predicated upon biological sex, as in Dworldn's example, it implicitly denies 
equality of respect. 
What I have attempted to do thus far is apply the method of constructive 
interpretation as developed by Dworkin to a concrete social practice or group of practices, that 
of family. Doing so, I have identified the values or purposes served by the practice, and 
attempted to develop a critical justification for the practice itself. Significantly, I believe, I 
have shown that the integrity of the practice depends, not only upon those elements which 
Dworkin argued were essential to generate what he terms 'fraternal' obligations, but upon a 
developed conception of equal respect. 69 Without a developed conception of equal respect, 
family privacy cannot be justified, most particularly with regard to its procreative role. The 
value of privacy, to the extent it has value, lies in the space it affords the individual to develop 
and act on a meaningful conception of an appropriate life for himself or herself. 
69 	It may be significant here that in his discussion of associative obligations as they 
pertain to family practices, his concrete examples deal with obligations of children to 
parents and those between brothers. Those of parents to children and those between 
spouses do not figure in the discussion. 
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THE UNJUST FAMILY 
Does the demand for equal respect apply more widely as Dworkin once thought it 
did? I believe so, however it is sufficient for present purposes that I have established its pivotal 
importance in any plausible justification for family practices. What follows from this for any 
account of family law capable of meeting the demands of integrity? An immediate barrier 
arises because the arguments presented suggest that many concrete family practices which are 
believed utterly fundamental and beyond question among some cultural groups within the 
wider community are inherently incapable of giving rise to any obligations whatever. I am not 
happy with this analysis, not, it must be stressed, because I believe such practices are either 
legitimate or justifiable, but because it seems to me that this analysis fails to capture the 
problem with sufficient precision. The problem, particularly with abusive families or, for that 
matter, patriarchal families such as that in Dworlcin's example, is that one or more of the 
individuals within the family have simply got it wrong. There are obligations, most particularly 
where children are concerned, and surely between spouses, but those obligations have not 
been honoured. Social practices do not go away simply because they are deemed non-
obligatory, rather the community must sort out the mess created by them, and deeming them 
fundamentally non-obligatory does not seem a promising start. Dworkin's account may, of 
course, offer a thoroughgoing justification for legally declaring such relationships at an end, it 
does not help us determine an appropriate course of action, given that the relationship is at an 
end and the needs of the individuals must be considered. 7° Consider the situation which 
might arise where, let us say, a wife and children escape from a violent husband, or somewhat 
less dramatically, a rigidly authoritarian husband who believes himself justified in demanding 
utter compliance from his wife and children. Are we to say, as would seem probable on the 
basis of Dworlcin's account of associative obligations, that such families are devoid of 
obligations? That analysis would also suggest that the husband has no responsibility to provide 
for the support of his former wife and children, that they must, henceforth, fend for themselves 
or be supported by the state. It may also suggest that they can be left to extricate themselves 
from the situation, a position which is untenable where children are involved, since they simply 
cannot do so•71 Both propositions are, it seems to me, strongly counter-intuitive, and would 
be extremely difficult to reconcile with the common sense perceptions of the community at 
70 	I raise here, but do not address in detail, the possibility that Dworkin may have 
pressed too hard upon the notion of associative communities. It may be, in fact, that 
despite the initial persuasiveness of Dworkin's analogical reasoning, the differences 
between different types of 'associative communities' are as striking and critical as their 
similarities. 
71 	I think here of the comment by Chief Justice Rehnquist in DeShaney v. Winnebago 
Soc. Serv. 489 U.S. 103 L.Ed. 2d. 249, 262 that 'while the State may have been aware of 
the dangers that Joshua faced in the free wor14 it played no part in their creation, nor did 
it do anything to render him any more vulnerable to them.' Joshua was, after all, only 
four years old, and to characterize the world of a four year old left in the custody of a 
parent known to be violent and abusive as free beggars the imagination. 
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large.72 If, in such a situation, there are no obligations, law would appear to provide very few 
answers. While each adult could demand that property which was properly his or hers be 
restored to him or her, and claim damages for tortious wrongs, any legal obligations for 
ongoing support, for example, Would necessarily be imposed from without. They would have 
no foundation in the practice itself, must be independently legitimated, perhaps upon the basis 
of detailed statutory provision for family relationships and for the obligations appropriate to 
such relationships. A proposition such as this seems, however, to conflict profoundly both with 
the pluralistic nature of contemporary communities and with the best justifications we can give 
for practices of family. If a significant part of our justification for family practices in fact 
follow from privacy a detailed, state prescribed regime, such as that suggested above seems 
incompatible unless the obligations enforced are in some sense generated from within the practice 
itself. This may, in fact, represent an extremely important distinction between communities 
such as families and communities such as the contemporary nation state. 
Dworkin therefore cannot, I believe, argue simply that even those practices which are 
devoid of integrity are incapable of generating obligations. Rather, a very much more complex 
argument is required. We have the required standard for the integrity of the practice in the 
justification derived at the postinterpretive stage in our constructive interpretation of the 
practice of family.73 We might term this an ideal theory of family, an outline of the conditions 
which families must meet if the internal roles and rules the members believe to obtain are in 
fact capable of imposing genuine obligations. When we examine particular practices which 
might reasonably be thought to represent family practices, using the criteria explored and 
developed at the preinterpretive and interpretive stages, and fmd that these practices cannot be 
reconciled with the justification developed at the postinterpretive stage, the problem is not that 
no obligations exist. Rather, the problem is, as a common sense approach suggests, very much 
more complex. While, undeniably, the particular roles and rules we have found to be 
profoundly defective do, indeed, have no binding force, are void ab initio, it does not, however, 
follow, that, as an example of family, the relationship between the individuals concerned is 
devoid of obligations. Rather, given the fact that the relationship between the individuals is 
72 	These are of course the same common sense perceptions relied upon by Dworkin in 
commenting that 'most people think that they have associative obligations just by 
belonging to groups defined by social practice, but that they can lose these obligations if 
other members do not extend to them the benefits of belonging to the group.' Law's 
Empire, loc. cit., 196. 
73 	I believe that the postinterpretive justification developed necessarily goes to the 
integrity of the practice, not simply to its justice. My reason is simple. Within liberal 
culture, beliefs concerning family privacy and the rationale behind these beliefs are 
inseparable from an intricate network of cultural beliefs concerning the individual, the 
autonomy of the individual, and in particular, the capacity of the individual to create 
value. They are not compartmentalized and discrete, cannot be confined to the 
institution of family as such. Rather, they are precisely those values that liberalism 
honours most fundamentally and generally, those that, above all else, it seeks to 
guarantee and protect. 
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recognizably a family relationship, albeit distorted and destructive, what follows is that wider 
institutions, particularly legal and political institutions, are themselves obliged to seek to 
restore the victims to positions approximating those they would have occupied had the 
particular instance of family generated internally valid obligations. This public obligation 
arises by virtue of the fact that our public culture accepts and recognizes practices of family, 
indeed, given the degree to which our public culture relies upon such practices in socially 
assigning burdens and benefits, it cannot simply disregard corruptions or distortions of those 
practices. It may declare certain obligations between particular individuals at an end, but what 
remains are the background obligations central to the practice in its ideal form. Here, it is 
critical to note that this distinction makes sense of our desire in such circumstances to 
distinguish between those individuals who have, in fact, sought to honour at least some of the 
obligations inherent in the practice of family, and those who have failed utterly in this regard. 
It enables us to speak in the language of victims and oppressor, a vocabulary otherwise 
unavailable to us. I do not know what language is available if the practice, as such, is simply 
incapable of generating any obligations. Even in Dworlcin's 'Mafia example'74 there are 
almost certainly some obligations inter se which are reasonably just and which ought to be 
enforced, some of those between husband and wife or between parents and young children. 
Where, perhaps, the particular family can be reconciled with an adequate conception 
of the practice taken as a whole, where it does meet the test of integrity, even if it is defective 
in certain respects, it will be insufficient to proceed simply upon the basis of our abstract ideal 
account of family. Rather, it will be necessary, should disputes arise, to examine the roles and 
rules as they are present, to examine the obligations upon the basis of which family members 
have apparently conducted their relationship. (Again, because of the centrality of such 
practices, the state cannot simply wash its hands of the matter.) To the extent that these 
concrete roles and rules and the obligations which flow from them are consistent with our 
abstract ideal account, disputes among family members ought to be resolved upon this basis. 
Where they are not, the defective obligations must be ignored, and it will be necessary to 
proceed upon the basis of those which would have been present on the basis of our abstract 
account. In practice, therefore, the approach required is profoundly similar to that we used in 
extending Rawls' principles of justice to the family, and, as with Rawls, we recognized both the 
impossibility of avoiding the concept of fault and the necessity to ensure that our inquiry into 
fault is particularized, makes use of the concepts implicit within the particular family, or, to the 
extent those are defective, makes use of those which follow from our abstract ideal theory 
account. This similarity, may, of course, be coincidental, or it may, as I believe to be more 
likely, signal a profound similarity between the deep structures of their theories and suggest 
that Rawls' account of the obligations generated by the principle of fair play and Dworkin's 
account of associative obligations are substantively far more similar than appears upon the 
surface. To the extent that these approaches apparently differ, the difference may be 
74 	Dworkin, Law's Empire, loc. cit., 205. 
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accounted for by the apparent absence, in Dworkin's work as a whole, of any discrete and 
developed theory of paternalism, although I believe such a theory to be implicit in the 
justification we accepted at the postinterpretive stage, and by the fact that we have not yet 
directly considered the issue of distributive justice within the family in dealing with Dworlcin's 
theory of associative obligations. 
RECONCILING EQUALITY OF RESOURCES AND ASSOCIATIVE OBLIGATIONS 
At this juncture, it becomes imperative to consider the congruence between Dworlcin's 
theory of associative obligations (as applied in the context of the practice of family) and his 
background theory of equality of resources as explored in Chapter 3. As we saw, Dworkin 
argues that a government dedicated to equal concern has an obligation in the scheme of 
property it designs to secure to each citizen an equal share of resources to invest or consume 
as he or she wishes. Likewise, as I have argued earlier, to disregard the role of the family as a 
distributive mechanism and its impact upon distributive justice more generally is, in the real, 
real world to construct an account of justice which remains profoundly gendered and irrelevant 
to women. In Chapter 3, I argued that a serious problem with Dworlcin's account of equality 
of resources lay in the fact that as currently set out it apparently disregarded the impact of 
women's culturally assigned responsibility for domestic labour and parenting upon their share 
of resources, given that equality of resources 'assumes that people's wealth should differ as they 
make different choices about investment and consumption' and indeed more generally 
concerning the particular balance of work, leisure and consumption they find appropriate. 75 
In that context, I emphasized an element which has traditionally played and continues to play a 
significant role in our cultural practices of family, the idea that a woman who devotes her life 
to domestic labour and parenting is not entitled to any share of resources beyond those which 
her spouse elects to make available. While she is entitled to support and to protection for 
herself and their children, our practices of family uniformly deny that she is, in any sense, 
entitled to a wage. Rather, on current assumptions concerning the meaning of terms such as 
work, leisure and consumption, a traditional homemaker would apparently devote the whole of 
her time to leisure and consumption. 
In the real, real world, most particularly should her spouse die or her marriage 
collapse, Dworkin's account of equality of resources at least superficially suggests that despite 
her actual economic disadvantage, she nonetheless remains equal as equality is understood by 
equality of resources. Now it is time for a much closer look, for a sustained effort, given our 
abstract account of the associative obligations implicit in our cultural practices of family, to 
integrate equality of resources into that account to the extent that this can be done. It is, I 
believe, important to address immediately a threshold question. On the basis of equality of 
resources as Dworkin has presented it, it might seem that the obvious approach would be for a 
woman contemplating entry into a long term relationship to negotiate directly with her 
75 	Ibid., 297. More generally see the arguments and citations provided in Chapter 2. 
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intended partner in respect of compensation for child-bearing, domestic labour and 
parenting.76 Given that, absent her willing cooperation, or the cooperation of another suitable 
partner, her intended partner will be unable to form a family would appear that the 
provision of such services might be said to form part of the ongoing market Dworkin envisions 
after an equal initial division of resources. All such arguments, however, face a number of 
immediate barriers. Dworkin emphasizes that the reciprocity involved in associative 
relationships is profoundly abstract, that any endeavour to concretize the sort of reciprocity 
required, as the argument above would demand, 
would make [marriage] possible only between people who shared a detailed 
conception of [marriage or family life] and would become automatically more 
contractual and deliberative than it is, more a matter of people checking in 
advance to see whether their conceptions matched well enough to allow them to 
be [married].78 [Dworkin comments further that] friends or family or 
neighbours need not agee in detail about the responsibilities attached to these 
forms of organization. 
If, therefore, we simply suggested that equality of resources required that the parties define 
their concrete financial relationships in advance, that they make financial provision for child-
bearing, for domestic labour and for parenting, we would be going a substantial way towards 
making our cultural practices of family more contractual and less associative than Dworkin 
suggests they are, superimposing the concrete and detailed obligations of contract upon the 
diffuse and open ended reciprocities Dworkin argues are characteristic of associative 
obligations. Might we, indeed, have marched up the hill of constructive interpretation only to 
find it to be indistinguishable in certain respects from contractual interpretation? 80 If the 
foundation of marriage ought to be, in fact, contract, if equality of resources is to obtain, if 
family life is to be perceived as originating from contract, in one significant area at least, 
Dworkin's account of associative obligations appears to be at least in part superfluous. 81 It 
76 	We are, of course, moving here towards a contractual account of marriage with all the 
problems that entails. 
77 	I leave aside the possibility of a surrogacy arrangement, adoption, and/or the 
combination of one or more of these with the presence in the home of an employed 
housekeeper. Such permutations are well beyond the scope of this thesis. 
78 	Dworkin, Law's Empire, loc. cit., 198. 
79 	Ibid., 199. 
80 	Given contemporary trends in contract law, and, in particular, the current 
predominance of equitable considerations almost to the exclusion of many traditional 
contract principles perhaps courts are currently moving towards an interpretation of 
contract which renders it almost indistinguishable from Dworkin's account of 
associative obligations. 
81 	Ultimately, it seems to me, this alteration might well cost Dworkin either his account 
of associative relationships or his account of equality of resources simply because a 
theory incorporating two fundamentally incompatible elements lacks sufficient 
coherence to be viable. 
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becomes, therefore, essential to explore whether and if Dworlcin's background theory of 
equality of resources can be incorporated into our postinterpretive account of the justification 
we derived for family practices upon another basis. 
Dworkin argues that equality of resources is the best interpretation of the background 
obligation of governments to treat those they govern with equal concern in the scheme of 
property rights it designs. He argues as well that concern, most particularly equal concern, is 
critical for the existence of associative obligations. Equal concern, therefore, seems a logical 
candidate for the necessary bridge between these elements of Dworlcin's theory taken as a 
whole. Our aim is a coherent account reconciling superficially inconsistent elements. 
Dworkin's account of equality of resources is, as we saw earlier, designed to provide, 
on the ideal theory level, a account of what equality of resources might look like, and thus, in 
turn, provide a standard against which real world distributions might be compared. In looking 
at equality of resources we recognized that, at the ideal theory level, all human relationships 
were represented as exchange relationships, relationships predicated upon contract and 
conducted between independent and rational individuals dedicated to maximizing their own 
interests as they perceived them. Contra Dworkin I argued that equality of resources 
apparently offered few if any answers for those individuals, particularly women, whose 
economic inequality flows, not from lack of natural endowments, but from the impact of their 
culturally assigned responsibility for domestic labour and parenting upon their capacity to 
compete in the marketplace. To a substantial extent, women's inequality follows from their 
own perception of their obligations to their children and spouses and from the 
institutionalization of expectations concerning their private roles. It follows, that is, largely 
from moral constraints which inhibit competitive capacity. Now we must try to establish the 
precise status of these moral constraints or associative obligations within the framework of 
equality of resources. Dworkin's account of associative obligations is, as we saw in Chapter 5, 
designed to establish the circumstances under which citizens have a genuine moral obligation 
to obey the law. We must now attempt to understand the role 'moral obligations' such as 
those involved in political community play in equality of resources. Might it be legitimate to 
argue that equality of resources must take into account the effect of these moral obligations 
upon access to resources? Dworkin argues that while legal constraints are part of the 
circumstances of the individual and relevant to equality as understood within equality of 
resources given that they restrict the possibilities which would otherwise be open to that 
individual, felt moral constraints belong to personality and are for that reason irrelevant. What 
does he mean by this? In addressing the distinction, he notes that a 'complication' arises 
because of the fact that many people believe that they have a moral obligation to obey the law. 
This complication is resolved by arguing that, for the purposes of equality of resources, legal 
constraints 'are to be viewed as Holmes' bad man" would view them - as threats putting up the 
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cost of the actions they forbid.'82  Given that Dworlcin's account of associative obligations is 
designed to show the circumstances under which political community has the capacity to 
generate just such obligations, and given his explicit statement that for the purposes of equality 
of resources even our obligations to obey the law are to be viewed as threats putting up the 
cost of the actions they forbid, I can see no compelling justification for assuming that they 
ought to be taken into account in determining equality of resources within a family context. 
We explored as well obvious avenues for extending equality of resources, including such ideas 
as wages for household labour and parenting. Now we see that these easy and obvious avenues 
are hard to reconcile with Dworkin's account of associative obligations, that they either 
superimpose concrete contractual obligations upon marriage and family life or leave equality 
within families unaddressed. We must, therefore, explore alternative approaches. 
It is appropriate to begin by asking how a government dedicated to realizing equality 
of resources in the scheme of property it designs would address these facts in the real, real 
world. As Dworkin comments, 
government must constantly survey and alter its rules of property, radically if 
necessary, to bring them closer to the ideal of treating people as equals under the 
best conception.' 
It may follow that the issue of distributive justice for women, given our cultural traditions and 
the prevalence of conventional gender roles which profoundly disadvantage women in 
economic competition (irrespective of their talent, their motivation, and their overall 
preferences) is a matter which must be addressed as part of the overall scheme of property 
designed by government.  issue is substantially complicated by two further 
considerations, that legislative decisions about property must respect certain fundamental 
individual rights, and, more importantly, that the legislature in making such decisions may 
pursue the collective general interest, that the legislative details are a matter of wise social 
policy rather than principle. So long as the scheme of property designed does not mask 
illegitimate discrimination which violates individual rights or operate so arbitrarily as to 
suggest it could serve no legitimate and coherent conception of the public interest, the 
requirement that government must treat its citizens as equals ought to be seen 
Dworkin, The Place of Liberty', /oc. cit., 18-19, esp. n. 21, p. 19. This suggests that, 
for example, a wife's perception of the obligations she owes to her husband and 
children is simply a felt moral constraint irrelevant to equality as it is understood 
under equality of resources. This, however, seemingly renders associative obligations 
irrelevant as well, and indeed, the passage cited in the text supports this view. 
Dworkin, Law's Empire, loc. cit. 310. 
In Ch. 11 I argue that many, perhaps most, of these cultural factors are a consequence 
of inegalitarian attitudes which are deeply intrenched in our cultural traditions, and 
that they render the concrete preferences actually expressed 'inauthentic' and 
therefore illegitimate within the framework of equality of resources. 
82 
83 
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as commending a general collective goal that respects equality of concern 
overall and statistically, rather than as supposing that each individual statute or 
regulation judged on its own, must award each citizen something he is entitled 
to have. 8S 
Even a constructive interpretation of the social purposes rights in private property 
might be thought to serve may not offer much in the way of concrete guidance. Dworkin 
clearly accepts as fundamental the idea that individuals have a right to use or exchange the 
property assigned to them under any plausible scheme of property rights free from any general 
responsibility to show equal regard for the interests of others. 86 Perhaps all that can be said is 
that, given our legal and social history and our political traditions, the link between individuals 
and that which they are able to acquire through their own energies and efforts is almost 
unchallengeable. The problem faced by a substantial majority of women, however, is that the 
family responsibilities conventionally assigned to them and honoured by them make it 
extraordinarily difficult for them to acquire property through their own energies and efforts. 87 
If these are, indeed, simply felt moral constraints, and therefore features of personality which 
are, as such, irrelevant to equality of resources, perhaps women would be well advised to 
abandon them! 
Perhaps our detour into these more general concerns was itself a mistake. While, on 
the one hand, distributive justice for women represents an aspect of distributive justice more 
generally, as does distributive justice for other currently disadvantaged segments of the 
population, it also seems to be an issue which cannot be addressed without attention to the 
family and family roles. Perhaps our question ought to be this: Given that any acceptable 
justification for the practice of family must, on Dworkin's arguments, incorporate a meaningful 
conception not simply of concern for each family member, taken as an individual, but of equal 
concern, can we argue that, at least within the family, any acceptable interpretation of equal 
concern will require an internal allocation which might be thought to reflect a plausible 
conception of equality of resources? If so, this may provide a more promising approach. 
Dworkin emphasizes the reciprocities characteristic of associative obligations, and emphasizes 
that these reciprocities demand that if one family member makes sacrifices for another that 
other has an obligation to reciprocate by making sacrifices in turn. These obligations are 
owed, not to the group as a whole, but to individual family members, one by one. 88 A more 
85 	Ibid., 310-11. 
86 	Ibid., 298-99. 
87 	This does not, of course, mean that legislation proscribing discrimination in 
employment, in access to financial services and so on is in any way problematical. 
Given that a government dedicated to equality of concern must ensure that arbitrary 
discrimination is proscribed, such legislation would be clearly required by principle. 
88 	Ibid., 198-199. 
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promising account, therefore, might flow from the concept of a moral ledger introduced and 
discussed in Chapter 3. Dworkin notes that where individuals have an ongoing relationship, 
the particular example he gives is that of long time neighbours, and a conflict of interests 
arises, each individual decision ought to be regarded as part of a continuing series of linked 
decisions. Thus, 
if I forgo an opportunity in one case, because the relative loss to you will be 
greater, this should be entered to my credit in a moral ledger against the next 
decision I (or you) have to make. 89 
The concept of a moral ledger, of chained or linked decisions, appears promising applied to 
family relationships, even though Dworkin would appear to restrict its use to circumstances 
where 'the activities we independently plan, each in the enjoyment of general rights secured by 
property assignments, conflict.' 9° Can an argument such as this be extended to the case where 
the conflict is not directly between the activities we independently plan, but arises out of the 
difficulty of reconciling those activities with other, hopefully shared, obligations? Dworkin 
argues that where such conflicts arise, 
we must act as if the concrete rights we cannot both exercise had not yet been 
distributed between us, and we must distribute these ourselves as best we can, in 
the way equality of resources commends. [Dworkin argues further that] we 
must calculate who would lose less in these circumstances by comparing 
financial costs, not because money is more important than anything else but 
because it is the most abstract and therefore the best standard to use in deciding 
which of us will lose more in resources by each of the decisions we might 
make. 9I 
Where direct financial cost are not at stake, the potential damage is to be measured in the way 
the market simulation test suggests, 'by asking whether you would pay more for me to stop 
playing than . . . I would pay for the opportunity to play. ,92 Where, of course, a realistic 
opportunity for negotiation is, in fact, present, as with neighbours or between husband and 
wife, people who do 'have a continuing and self-conscious relationship, ,93 decisions cannot be 
treated in isolation and calculations of comparative cost are likely to become extraordinarily 
complex. 
Can we incorporate something similar to Dworkin's idea of a moral ledger into our 
abstract account of the practice of family? Intuitively, the idea seems appealing and 
persuasive. Surely marriage is the paradigm case of a continuing and self-conscious 
89 	Ibid., 306. 
90 	Ibid., 302. 
91 	Ibid., 303. 
92 	Ibid., 303-4. 
93 	Ibid., 306. 
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relationship, one in which decisions ought to be made which strike a reasonable balance 
between interests and preserve equality of resources overall. Again, certain threshold 
questions arise. First, is what is at stake a conflict over the uses to which private property 
ought to be put? Dworkin, in 'Equality of Resources' was at some pains to deny that 
individuals have, in any meaningful sense 'property' in their own labour, in the context of 
discussion of whether rights over labour might be thought to be among the goods auctioned.94 
Physical capabilities are not up for grabs in that way. More recently he has suggested that the 
reason that rights over labour ought to be excluded from the original auction is simply because 
the right of individuals to use their physical capabilities, including their labour, as they saw fit 
formed part of the liberty/constraint system set in place before the auction began. 95 To allow 
otherwise would be to legitimate a form of slavery. Somehow, in the family context, we must 
characterize more or less precisely what is involved, in order to determine whether or not the 
idea of a moral ledger is appropriate. If felt moral constraints are, as I have argued above, to 
be seen as features of personality and irrelevant to equality as it is understood in equality of 
resources, what is the point of a moral ledger anyway? It would appear to be nugatory. Does 
the fact that, in Dworkin's example, the conflict arose because each individual had independent 
and independently recognized property rights which, were it not for the fact of conflicting uses, 
would never have come into question between them legitimate its use? If that is the case, the 
fundamental right of each individual to make use of his or her labour to gain further resources 
ought also be sufficient to legitimate its use. If the allocation of responsibilities within a family 
effectively destroys the competitive capacity of one individual within the marketplace, does this 
not represent a conflict of interests in the same sense, given the individual's right to make use 
of her labour as she sees fit? Does the presence of these background rights signal a shift in the 
meaning of the term moral, changing what would otherwise depend upon special features of 
personality which are irrelevant to equality to a matter of principle fundamental to equality? 
Questions such as those in the last paragraph are far from easy to answers. 
Nonetheless, it is important to try to make sense of and reconcile these ideas. Perhaps we can 
say that within any marriage, adult individuals ought to make decisions about work, leisure and 
consumption against what might be termed the baseline constraint of the obligations inherent 
in the idea of family as an associative community. 96 (Are these obligations somehow 
localized, specific to the practice of family, and therefore irrelevant to our equality as citizens? 
Such an assumption would certainly serve to reconcile the apparent conflict, but at the cost of 
94 	Dworkin, 'Equality of Resources' /oc. cit., 304.12, and esp. 311-12. 
95 	Dworkin, 'The Place of Liberty', /oc. cit., 23-24. 
96 	In characterizing associative obligations as a baseline constraint I am trying to 
recapture a sense of their binding force, situate them sufficiently outside the individual 
to avoid an immediate collapse into 'felt moral constraints'. If this strategy works, 
they become part of the individual's circumstances and therefore relevant to equality 
rather than part of his or her personality and therefore irrelevant. 
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denying that wives qua wives are citizens.) These decisions have a significant bearing both 
upon their individual ongoing access to resources and upon the leisure time available to each 
of them, taken as individuals. In many families obligations to children play a definitive role in 
choices of this kind. Our initial difficulty arose because Dworkin emphasized that moral 
constraints (as opposed to legal constraints) belong to an individual's personality along with 
convictions, ambitions, tastes and preferences, rather than to his or her circumstances, 
circumstances including the resources, talents and capacities commanded. 97 This suggests a 
real difficulty in extending the concept of a moral ledger and, indeed, the concept of equality of 
resources to our account of family, despite the fact that it initially appeared persuasive. 
Equality of resources, after all, is, as we saw earlier, designed to be ambition sensitive, to allow 
the actual wealth of individuals to reflect their choices in the balance of work, leisure and 
consumption available, while remaining endowment insensitive so that equality is not affected 
by differences in ability among people with similar ambitions.98 
Now it is time to turn to a concrete example. Bob and Carol are both lawyers and 
have been married and engaged in legal practice for about seven years. While Carol has 
generally assumed the bulk of the responsibility for the household, since their incomes have 
permitted some household help, this was not unduly burdensome. After seven years of 
marriage they jointly decide to begin a family. After Deily is born Carol remains at home for 
six months and then returns to work. Now she finds that, despite adequate child care 
arrangements and some household help, she is unable to simultaneously meet her professional 
obligations and assume the bulk of responsibility for the household and caring for Delly. 
While Bob enjoys playing with Delly in the evenings and on weekends, he is unwilling to either 
sacrifice more of his leisure time to share the domestic responsibilities equally or to cut back 
on time devoted to legal work. As a consequence, and at Bob's suggestion, Carol ultimately 
leaves full time professional work and seeks a part time position, foregoing both the resources 
involved and her chance for a partnership. 
What resources does Dworkin make available to characterize their resultant 'bank 
account' inequality? The abstract account of the associative obligations of family we developed 
earlier surely acknowledges that both Bob and Carol have obligations not only to each other 
but to any children they may have. These obligations are reciprocal, if diffuse. They arose out 
of the relationship between Bob and Carol, and subsequently out of the relationship of each of 
them to Deily. Earlier, I suggested that applied to family relationships, both equal concern 
and equal respect were implicit in the best justification we could provide for the institution of 
family. If, Bob, for example, has an obligation to treat both Carol and Delly, not only with 
equal concern, but with equal respect, it would follow that Carol, for example, has a right to be 
treated with equal concern and respect. (A question relevant here concerns the extent to 
97 	Dworkin, 'The Place of Liberty', /oc. cit., 18-19. 
98 	Dworkin, 'Equality of Resources', /oc. cit., 311. 
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which this 'moral right' in the family context ought to be viewed as a political right. To 
characterize as a right that which is incapable of enforcement is an empty idea.) These 
obligations, or felt moral constraints, however, belong to the personality of each, and 
seemingly, therefore, are irrelevant within the framework of equality of resources. 99 Bob 
might, for example, argue that his moral obligations, to the extent that they were relevant, to 
both to Carol and to Delly were fulfilled by his continuing commitment to work and to 
providing resources to meet the needs of his family. He is, he might argue, already making 
substantial sacrifices both in terms of the lessened resources available for his personal 
consumption and his lessened leisure. While Carol as well has made sacrifices, albeit of a 
different order, the reciprocity of their relationship is maintained. He might argue further that 
any inequality in terms of bank account wealth which attended Carol's decision did not 
diminish her equality as equality is interpreted by equality of resources. Her bank account 
wealth was diminished wholly as a consequence of certain features of her personality which 
affected the balance she preferred between work, leisure and consumption. No legal 
constraints put up the cost of the choices she made. So long as provision was made for the 
proper care and supervision of Deily (a legal constraint affecting both them equally in the 
formal sense) her liberty in that regard was identical to his. Why should he alter his lifestyle 
and diminish his access to resources, simply because she preferred a different balance of work, 
leisure and consumption? His concern, after all, led him to suggest that she cut back on work, 
both in her own interests, and also in the interests of Delly. He respected her decision to do 
so, even if it effectively diminished the resources available to him for his own purposes. 
If the account and arguments put above are accurate, we do not seem to have made a 
particularly promising beginning. (In point of fact, I would suggest that we have arrived 
abruptly at the position prevailing in 1990.) Have we developed an abstract account of the 
conditions essential to legitimate our cultural practices of family only to find that equality of 
resources is meaningless within it? What might Carol argue? She might, of course, begin by 
arguing that even if his suggestion that she cut back on work so that she could meet her family 
obligations did show concern for her well-being as an individual, and, indeed, concern for 
DeIly's well-being, it had in fact failed to show her equal respect, given that they had jointly 
agreed to have a family and given that she had as much invested in her legal career as he had 
in his and many of their overall ambitions were similar. She might further argue that the mere 
fact that he did not feel obligated to restrict his workload or sacrifice some of his leisure in 
order to have the time available to share in domestic responsibilities and in parenting, did not 
alter the fact that he had an obligation to do so within the community they shared. However, 
Dworkin comments that 'a person's liberty - the range of actions open to him free from 
any legal constraint - belongs to his circumstances rather than to his person or 
personality. . . . Felt moral constraints, on the contrary, belong to personality. A 
complication therefore wises in virtue of the familiar moral conviction many people 
have, that they ought to obey the legal constraints. I avoid this complication by assuming 
that legal constraints are to be viewed as Holmes' 'bad man" would view them - as 
threats putting up the cost of the actions they forbid."The Place of Liberty', /oc. cit., 19. 
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rather than relying upon this obligation in any direct sense, or even relying directly upon the 
notion of a moral ledger, she might then adopt a very different tack. She might instead rely 
upon the language of true opportunity costs and remind him that 
equality of resources aims that each person have an equal share of resources 
measured by the cost of the choices he malcutAreflecting his own plans and 
preferences, to the plans and projects of others.' 
In other words, in the community they share most intimately, that of the family, he ought to 
test those things he needs to pursue his own projects and goals (including leisure and freedom 
from domestic responsibilities) against the costs his choices impose upon the plans and 
projects of others. To the extent that the cost of his choices to her (and to Delly) has not been 
brought fully into account, she has, she might argue, amassed a substantial credit in their 
moral ledger and this ought to count in her favour in future decisions. She might argue, that is, 
that he has not paid the full price of the life he has chosen to lead, is getting it 'on the cheap'. 
While their community is, in a sense, too small for anything like a market to operate in the 
literal sense, surely even here there is room for the adoption of market simulating rules for 
decision making. At the very least should their marriage fail, for example, by analogy to 
Dworkin's account of the role of a 'moral ledger' in resolving nuisance disputes between 
neighbours, surely this credit ought to be brought to account in the financial settlement 
between them. 
This, in many ways, seems a more promising avenue. Just as Dworkin has argued that 
the resources available to any individual within the wider political community, ought, in 
principle, depend upon the true opportunity costs of those resources to others, we have 
suggested that within the micro-community of family, the same principle ought to apply and 
for the same reasons. We have said that just as government ought to treat its citizens with 
equal concern so too a family ought to treat its individual members with equal concern and 
respect. Are we as happy talking about the family personified as the community personified? 
Do we take the family seriously as a moral agent? In discussing political community Dworkin 
emphasizes the profound distinction between the responsibilities of officials acting as such, and 
the area of personal moral sovereignty to which each individual, acting solely as an individual, 
is entitled. What of the family? What 'official' exists with special obligations in this regard, 
who, within the family is allowed no latitude, is expected to act with absolute impartiality? 101 
Everyone? Perhaps, or, at the very least, every adult individual. (Do we need to resurrect the 
idea of the father as sovereign characteristic of early social contract theory?) Have we 
mounted an argument for equality of resources within the family only to find that it is totally 
100 
101 
Ibid., 27. 
Cf. Dworkin, Law's Empire, 172-175. Dworkin argues that we allow officials acting in 
their official capacity no area of personal moral sovereignty, and that the individual's 
normal latitude for self preference is called corruption when it occurs in an official 
capacity. 
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irrelevant, that any attempt to realize it eradicates absolutely that area of personal moral 
sovereignty free from the claims of others Dworkin argues is fundamental to our beliefs? The 
problem is this. If any feature of the family and family life is truly paradigmatic within our 
culture, it is our allegiance to the idea of the family as private and autonomous. Nothing, 
within our culture seems more unalterably private and bound up with our personal freedom 
and moral sovereignty than our family relationships, and it is at least some of these traditions 
upon which we have drawn in constructing our ideal account of family. A political official, a 
union official, an office holder in a club or association has a private life to which he or she can 
retreat, escape official responsibilities, at least for a time. Even Hercules is not a judge all the 
way down. If we insist that those within the family (at least adult family members) are bound 
by similar 'official obligations' to one another we seemingly leave no exit. If we do not, we 
change nothing at all. If we are to accept the notion of the family as generating associative 
obligations, we must, I believe also accept its consequences. Just as Dworkin has argued that 
the obligations of officials in political communities are derivative from the obligations owed by 
citizens to one another, that officials are the agents of the community in discharging that 
responsibility, so to we must accept that, at the very least, adult family members have similar 
obligations, that no latitude for self-preference remains, irrespective of whether this 
requirement radically diminishes our area of personal moral sovereignty. 102  What follows 
from this when we come to consider the responsibilities of political officials towards family 
members? It must, I believe, follow that, in resolving matrimonial disputes political authorities 
have an obligation to place family members in the positions which they would have occupied 
had their own responsibilities to one another been fully met in this regard. Further we must 
conclude is that political officials, owing as they do a duty of equal concern to all the members 
of the community, have an obligation to act at the behest of those who claim that their rights 
have been denied and to intervene where it appears that the rights of those who cannot 
advance claims on their own behalf are prejudiced. Perhaps, and this will be argued later, such 
officials may also be thought to have an obligation to implement conditions which foster and 
encourage equality within the family, ensure, so far as possible that adult family members are 
equally placed to honour their obligations in this regard. 
It is time to return to the main thread of the argument we have been developing, one 
concerning the characteristics which a family must possess if it is to constitute a true 
community. Once we have incorporated both the background conception of equality of 
resources and the notion of a moral ledger into our ideal theory account of family as a social 
practice, we must confront a further threshold question, one encountered in a slightly different 
form earlier. Have we, in relying upon the language of opportunity costs and appropriating the 
concept of a moral ledger, begun a slow and almost imperceptible slide from a fluid and open 
ended discussion of associative obligations into a concrete and specific marriage contract? Is 
the slide into contract characteristic of any attempt to give concrete form and shape to the 
102 	Ibid. 
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ideal of an egalitarian social practice, at least within this form of discourse? Here we fmd 
ourselves calculating costs and benefits, insisting that Bob evaluate the social setting he desires 
in order to pursue his chosen way of life in terms of the costs it specifically imposes upon Carol 
and Delly, and perhaps that Carol as well bears some responsibility, that she ought not simply 
defer when their interests conflict, that she is both entitled and obliged to advance claims to 
further her own interests. In relying upon the concept of a moral ledger, we are relying upon 
the background idea of negotiation between individuals with a continuing and self-conscious 
relationship, individuals who, at the point at which conflict arises, have approximately equal 
resources.1°3 In seeking to argue that concepts such as true opportunity costs and a moral 
ledger are relevant to a discrete and local social practice such as family, have I sought to make 
the obligations implicit in marriage seem 'more contractual and deliberative' and less an 'open 
question'? 104 Yes, undeniably. In any wholly open ended and fluid position, that individual 
less willing to claim and defend rights is likely to lose ground. (We ought not forget that very 
often that particular reluctance is itself predicated upon those felt moral constraints which 
earlier were characterized as special features of personality. I am tempted to say, despite its 
impropriety in a thesis, that that is precisely how, historically, women have been 'screwed'.) 
On the other hand, perhaps such negotiations between spouses ought to be described not as 
seeking 'just to keep explicit agreements hammered out at arm's length but to approach each issue 
. . . in a manner reflecting special concem.' 105 If adult family members in fact occupy a position 
analogous to that of political officials, if they are morally obliged to approach the issues which 
arise in their common life in a manner which leaves no latitude for self-preference, they are 
simply honouring such obligations, attempting to work out the problems which inevitably arise 
in a manner reflecting equal concern and respect. If the arguments put thus far have been at 
all persuasive, we have come a very long way with our account of family as a social practice. 
Our journey has supplied at least the rudiments of a further postinterpretive requirement for 
our account of family and the associative obligations inherent in our practices of family. 
Now it is time to return to that account, and ascertain both the degree to which our 
actual practices of family can be reconciled with the theoretical account we have been 
developing and also consider the implications of our full account for family law. I have argued, 
or attempted to argue that any plausible egalitarian account of family as a social practice, 
within Dworkin's framework, must, as part of the more general requirement of equal concern 
and respect, acknowledge equality of resources, at least with respect to adult individuals. That 
is, the true opportunity cost of the resources and the social requirements some family 
103 	I, in fact, chose the example given to suggest that any initial inequality between Bob 
and Carol was a consequence of decisions concerning work, leisure and consumption. 
Were they not relatively equal at the outset (which is of course likely in communities 
such as our own) matters would have been complicated still further. 
104 	Dworkin, Law's Empire, loc. cit., 198. 
105 	Ibid., 200. 
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members have available to pursue their own ends and ambitions must be tested by asking how 
important they are to others. While it is somewhat more difficult to extend this argument to 
children, I believe that any plausible interpretation with respect to children must argue that 
their parents stand in the place of political officials with respect to decisions concerning their 
welfare, that they must show impartiality among them, treat them as equals in the allocation of 
opportunities and resources within the family. 106 This might mean, for example, that a family 
would not be entitled to devote more resources to the education of sons than of daughters 
simply because of beliefs concerning appropriate education and future roles, because any such 
decision would fail to treat them with equal respect. Differences might of course be justified 
on other grounds, for example, a handicapped child might require more resources than a 
normal sibling if he or she were to be treated so far as possible as an equal. It might also 
mean that where, as in Dworlcin's patriarchal family, the parents sincerely believed that the 
conduct of daughters must be more strictly constrained than that of sons, their daughters 
would, at the very minimum, be entitled to, for example, enhanced educational provision 
designed to encourage enough intellectual independence to compensate for physical 
constraints. 107 To the account already offered of the potential consequences of rigorously 
applying Dworldn's account of associative obligations to the family, and making that account 
the basis of our political and legal practice with respect to the family we now add, upon a 
relatively secure foundation, the idea that equality of resources is as relevant within the family 
as it is within the wider political community. What might this mean in practice? 
In the most obvious case, that of dissolution of marriage, a number of reasonably 
clear principles emerge. All property decisions, and I include the questions of spousal support 
and child support in that general category, must be made upon the basis established in equality 
of resources, that is, taking the history of the marriage as a whole, we must seek to allocate 
resources between the parties as they would have been allocated had the parties made their 
decisions in respect of the plans and projects they pursued and the social requirements they 
believed essential to pursue their way of life upon the basis of the true costs imposed by these 
decisions upon others. With respect to children, the matter is, I might add, far simpler. The 
appropriate criteria is to place them as nearly as is possible in the economic position they 
would have been in had the family endured - including where appropriate provision for support 
through further education or university. Again, the issue of custody ought to turn upon the 
question of which parent would be more likely to honour fundamental associative obligations 
with respect to the children. In the hypothetical noted earlier, clearly Carol would be entitled 
to be placed in the position she would have occupied had the obligations of family life been 
shared as equality demands. 
106 	This requirement is similar to, but perhaps more open ended and less restrictive than 
that required by Rawls' principle of paternalism. 
107 	That requirement would, in practice, effectively nullify the restrictions imposed. 
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Yet, in other circumstances, it is not altogether clear that a straightforward accounting 
on the basis of true opportunity costs will yield an egalitarian outcome. Consider, for example, 
a wholly traditional couple, let us call them Emile and Sophie 108, who seek to divorce after 
twenty years of marriage and four children, three of whom are still in school. While Sophie, 
who came from a patriarchal family very like that described by Dworkin, worked briefly before 
her marriage as a typist, she has not at any time since worked outside the home nor has she 
wished to. Emile, on the other hand, began as a carpenter and now owns and manages a small 
construction firm. After many disputes over the education of their three youngest children, 
Sophie wishing her children to have the opportunities which she never had and go on to 
university, Emile begins an affair with his secretary and subsequently leaves home by mutual 
agreement. A case such as this presents a wholly different set of problems. First, Sophie has 
never desired to be anything other than a wife and mother. While it may be that what might 
be characterized as her general lack of ambition or wider horizons were a consequence of her 
own upbringing, she and Emile have, throughout their married lives, conducted their 
relationship upon the basis that she would assume full responsibility for domestic labour and 
parenting and he would fulfil the role of breadwinner. If one assumes that, when they were 
married, they were relatively equal, it may be thought that her lack of resources twenty years 
on is wholly a consequence of her preferences in respect of work, leisure and consumption. 
Similarly, the fact that Emile has, through his own energies and efforts, been able to attain a 
reasonable degree of bank account wealth, might also be thought to be a consequence of his 
preferences. After all, as Dworkin notes, he is entitled to choose a life 'in which sacnfices are 
constantly made and discipline steadily imposed for the sake of financial success and the further 
resources it brings.'109 Here, moreover, it would appear that Sophie endorsed his decision 
fully, that their common life style was freely assented to by both and formed the basis of their 
relationship for as long as it subsisted. 
Given this set of circumstances, the language of true opportunity costs seems less 
helpful. While, on one level, Emile seems not to have paid the 'true cost' of the life he chose 
to lead, on another it might also seem that Sophie ought in fact be required to pay the 'true 
cost' of the life she has chosen to lead, given that 'equality of resources offers no. . . reason for 
correcting for the contingencies that determine how expensive or frustrating someone's preferences 
turn out to be. '11°  If she has gambled and lost, the outcome is surely a matter of option luck, a 
'deliberate and calculated gamble' lll which she might have foreseen and protected herself 
against, for example by maintaining and developing those talents which might have enabled her 
to secure additional resources. We cannot, for example, suggest that with regard to her choice 
108 	See Ch. 8. 
109 	Dworkin, 'Equality of Resources', toc. cit., 313. 
110 	Ibid., 288. 
111 	Ibid., 293. 
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to remain a homemaker, Emile has failed to demonstrate equal respect. He has, in fact 
respected her ends as she defined them. Can we say that he has nonetheless failed to show her 
equal concern? Strictly in terms of equality of resources, I think not. He has, for twenty years, 
provided for her and for their children to the best of his capacity and their understandings 
were fully mutual and shared in this respect. He has, in this respect, made sacrifices to ensure 
her well being and that of their children, just as she has made sacrifices by limiting household 
expenditure or consumption to ensure that the resources needed if long term goals were to be 
attained remained available. If their sacrifices were different, they were fully reciprocal. Does 
this rule out calculations based upon opportunity costs? The problem is this. Dworkin's 
account of a moral ledger is designed to measure the relative importance of conflicting 
activities to the individuals concerned through a market simulation test. Here our problem is 
slightly different. Throughout their marriage no conflict was perceived. Both Emile and 
Sophie pursued the activities they preferred. Given that conflict has now arisen, not over the 
lifestyles they each chose, nor over the impact of those choices upon individual access to 
resources or the opportunity costs of those choices, but over matters seemingly unrelated to 
any imbalances in a moral ledger, is it proper and legitimate to argue that any appropriate 
resolution of their affairs must look at the actual opportunity costs their mutually chosen 
lifestyle imposed irrespective of their actual preferences? 
In this context, the contractual backdrop we rejected as inconsistent with Dworkin's 
conception of associative obligations might have proved useful. Had Sophie, for example, had 
the foresight to bargain for a fair market price for her services as wife and mother, she might 
have protected herself against just such an eventuality, ensured herself against the risks 
inherent in the life she chose. Dworlcin's account, however, ruled out such an argument. 
Hence, we have no choice but to return to our more general conception of associative 
obligations and attempt to ascertain if it provides assistance. Surely, we might argue, the 
requirement of equal concern goes also to the question of other aspects of their relationship. 
Even leaving aside the question of sexual fidelity and the role of mutual fidelity in their 
relationship, surely, given the agreed basis for their relationship, equal respect might be 
thought to demand that he take into account in what might be termed her reliance interest, the 
idea that he was not entitled to rewrite the conditions of their relationship halfway through, 
given that their mutually agreed course of conduct suggests it must have been deemed 
permanent. Does pursuing this argument suggest as well that in circumstances such as these 
dissolution ought to be prohibited? Dworkin does, after all, emphasize that if the appropriate 
conditions are met 'people have the obligations of a tnie community whether or not they want 
them.,112 Or perhaps, does it suggest that, given that continuing the relationship between 
them has become untenable, and he must assume some responsibility for that circumstance, 
she is entitled upon the basis of our more general argument to be restored to the overall 
112 	Ibid., 201. 
197 
position she would have occupied had the obligations between them been honoured, that the 
agreed financial basis of their relationship ought to be maintained? 
The children present a further problem, and one which demands that we again draw 
upon the resources developed in our ideal theory justification for the institution of family. 
What are Emile's obligations in respect of their children? Quite obviously, on the basis of the 
arguments deployed in the last paragraph, his financial obligations continue. Two questions 
which are immediately relevant are the question of custody, given that the children can no 
longer live with both parents, and the question of the duration of the support obligation. Does 
Dworkin's account offer the conceptual resources needed to resolve this further issue? On the 
account I have developed thus far, the question of custody ought to turn solely upon the basis 
of the entitlement of the children to equal concern and respect. That is, that parent ought to 
be primarily responsible for their welfare who will most nearly treat them with equal concern 
and respect. Given that family relationships have been marked by conflict over educational 
provision for them, and given that equal respect demands that they be given that education 
which will most nearly enable them to develop their capabilities and realize and pursue ends of 
their own, it would appear that Sophie ought to retain custody. For the same reasons, it would 
appear that Emile ought to be required to make fmancial provision for the children and for 
their education until they have completed their schooling, through university should they so 
desire. Emile's attitude cannot be fully reconciled with equal respect, while Sophie's offers the 
promise of reconciliation. 
Yet it may also be that this seems too easy, that Emile's voice has not been heard. 
Surely Emile might argue that the resolution suggested above utterly defeats the fundamental 
premise upon which equality of resources is grounded, that `i f people . . . choose different lives it 
is unfair to redistribute halfway through those lives' 113 and that this applies within the family as 
elsewhere. After all, he might argue, surely he cannot be held wholly responsible for the fact 
that he and Sophie chose different lives, and that effectively the reason she lacks resources now 
is because she consumed much expensive leisure earlier. He might argue further that the kind 
of redistribution suggested denies him any choices whatever. His freedom has been wholly 
eradicated. If he is expected to provide the resources to maintain her at the level which would 
have obtained had their marriage continued, not only are we ignoring the fact that they chose 
different lives, with different inherent risks and rewards, we are making that determination in a 
way which disrespects his right to equal concern. We are disadvantaging him solely upon the 
basis that we disapprove of his personal moral standards, of his decision to leave a relationship 
which was no longer meaningful and enter one which offered the promise of being so. Not 
only is this nothing more or less than prejudice masquerading as justice, what we have 
suggested is a fair or egalitarian resolution would, if implemented, effectively enslave him for 
the rest of his life. Because he will, merely to survive, be required to work for the rest of his 
113 	Dworkin, 'Equality of Resources', /oc. cit., 310. 
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life for little or no reward, he is enslaved in precisely the same sense Dworkin argues that 
excessively high rates of income protection insurance would enslave. 'He must now work at 
close to his top earning capacity . . . to break even. He will be a slave to his maximum earning 
power.'114 These are, undeniably, powerful arguments, and they lead us inevitably to further 
questions, questions which are even more fundamental than those posed earlier. 
In fact, we are drawn back to what I earlier termed a baseline constraint, the idea that 
family members ought to make their decisions against the background constraints provided by 
the associative obligations inherent in our ideal theory account of family. Ought the state 
enforce that baseline constraint, is it in the position of the auctioneer in Dworkin alludes to in 
'The Place of Liberty' who is obliged to put certain baseline constraints in place prior to the 
auction to ensure that the results of the auction were not distorted by such factors as prejudice 
or constraints which could only be justified on the grounds of personal morality? Dworkin 
alludes to the possibility of the betrayal of such obligations only once, referring to one who has 
grown weary of or is embarrassed by the obligations of friendship, and notes simply that at that 
point it is impossible to reject those obligations without betrayal. 115  Undeniably that is true, 
but most normal individuals have, at some time in their lives, been betrayed by those they 
deemed friends, and no one, I think, would suggest that political intervention was appropriate. 
Partners, of course, simply dissolve their partnership, and their affairs are settled according to 
the terms of the partnership deed or in terms of the parole agreement upon the basis of which 
they have conducted their relationship. Because partnership seems to me to be grounded in 
contract, whatever the other obligations involved, a more or less objective basis exists for 
decision making, and very often, in real terms, they can be restored to an approximate position 
of equality.116 Marriage and family relationships are more problematical. They are 
fundamentally private, in a way partnership is not, and at the same time more significant than 
even the most intimate friendship. In a sense, the state is caught firmly between Scylla and 
Charybdis, damned if it does intervene and damned if it doesn't. Intervene it must, but upon 
what basis? Ought it, as I suggested earlier, intervene upon the basis of the obligations which 
were recognized by the parties themselves unless those could not be reconciled with our ideal 
theory account of family in which case the latter should prevail? Here, clearly, Emile 
undertook to support Sophie for her life, and she undertook to accept full responsibility for 
maintaining a home for him and for their children. What course of action is appropriate 
where, for example, the marriage is at an end because one individual betrayed an obligation 
Ibid., 320. 
Dworkin, Law's Empire, loc. cit., 198. 
I should add that I question the coherence of applying the term 'associative 
obligations' to obligations generated by practices as wholly distinct, both in formation 
and character, as families, friendships, partnerships, companies, and political 
communities, not to mention the other potential candidates, ranging from 
neighbourhoods to local communities. 
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the other believed fundamental? Does it matter, for example, that Emile no longer perceives 
his relationship with Sophie as imposing any authentic obligations? The problem is this. If the 
state enforces the obligations upon which their relationship appears to have been based, 
supplemented so far as is necessary by our background justification for the practice of family, it 
will effectively enslave Emile in the special sense discussed above. If it does not, it has utterly 
failed to show Sophie equal concern. (In a situation where neither wishes to continue the 
relationship, it surely cannot insist that the relationship between them continue.) The last 
twenty years in practical terms sound in profound economic consequences, in actual 
opportunity costs, and it is impossible to restore her to the position she occupied prior to her 
marriage, in part because, in terms of the options realistically open to her, she is no longer the 
same person. 117 
Both the potential permutations of relationships which are recognizably family 
relationships and the difficulties in a fully coherent resolution are almost limitless in 
contemporary society. If, as Dworkin's account of associative obligations seems to compel, we 
are to recognize and enforce the actual obligations involved, it becomes necessary at some 
point to spell them out, make them concrete, even contractual. Yet this conflicts with 
Dworlcin's emphasis upon fluid and open-ended reciprocities, upon disagreement within the 
family as to the actual obligations entailed. When we attempt to incorporate equality of 
resources, as is essential if women are to be shown equal concern, we are confronted by 
further problems. To function adequately in this context, equality of resources seemingly 
pushes us almost inexorably towards a contractual analysis, at least with respect to the 
economic obligations of family, and would undoubtedly function most effectively if these 
obligations were spelled out in advance. (As we saw in our account of the two-career family, it 
might also be essential to spell out precisely the way in which the responsibilities of family life 
were to be shared.) Doing this, however, sits uneasily with Dworlcin's overall account of 
associative obligations, indeed, is wholly denied by some aspects of it. Further, and perhaps 
most seriously, as the account of Emile and Sophie emphasized, in the real world we are 
regularly confronted by conflicts which cannot be resolved in a manner consistent with 
integrity, let alone justice. The case of Emile and Sophie suggests that political officials might 
be unable to resolve such disputes in a way which manifested equal concern for the parties 
involved, and this, of course, raises further and profoundly significant questions concerning the 
responsibilities of government. 
117 	Dworkin does note that 'we may . . . have special reasons for forbidding certain forms of 
gambles [for example] paternalistic reasons for limiting how much any individual may 
risk.' Equality of Resources', /oc. cit., 295. Perhaps, in this context, given the agreed 
basis upon which they conducted their relationship, they ought to have been required 
to take out 'marriage insurance' at the outset, to ensure that funds would be available, 
if circumstances changed, to provide full compensation. Given current divorce rates, 
such would likely be prohibitively expensive. Or, perhaps, given that Sophie has, in 
effect, rejected her former life, might it be that she is entitled to a fresh stock of 
resources'? Ibid., 334. 
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In this chapter I have argued that no coherent justification exists for our cultural 
failure to apply egalitarian principles to family life. When we looked at Rawls' theory we 
recognized that the circumstances of justice did, in fact, apply within families as in political 
communities more generally. Similarly, when we examined Dworldn's account of associative 
obligations and sought, using his method, to construct an ideal theory account of marriage and 
family in order to provide a foundation for family law and the resolution of disputes which 
arise within families, we recognized the absolute necessity of incorporating Dworkin's 
background theory of political equality, equality of resources. We recognized as well that, in 
the real world, even these radical extensions could not, in all cases, provide a resolution which 
met the demands of justice, leaving open the possibility that a government truly dedicated to 
justice might find it necessary to go further. Our account thus far calls into serious question 
the insistence of both Rawls and Dworkin that their accounts represent 'a principle of political 
organization that is required by justice, not a way of life for individuals'. 118  If no rational reason 
exists to exempt family life from the demands of justice, it follows that no rational basis exists 
for the insistence of theorists such as Rawls and Dworkin that their theories are 'political 
merely and their account of the individual a political account. It follows as well that the 
distinction between private lives and public persons may be impossible to sustain. Given this, 
we now turn to examine the accounts of classic social contract theorists in some detail, and 
particularly to examine the way in which their exclusion of women (and children) from the 
social contract enabled them to sustain the public/private distinction, secure a realm of private 
freedom, and, most importantly, advance an account of the individual which implicitly denied 
moral standing to ordinary human relationships. 
118 	Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, loc. cit., 203. 
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CHAPTER 7 
SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY AND THE FAMILY 
In the last chapter we examined the resources contemporary egalitarian theories make 
available to characterize the marital relationship. So doing, we recognized that, for both Rawls 
and Dworkin, our attempt to construct an ideal egalitarian account of marriage, and ultimately 
family relationships, moved us inexorably towards an account of marriage and family life in 
which individual obligations were given concrete form and shape and towards state 
enforcement of the terms of those relationships where they were sufficiently just to impose 
moral obligations. We have moved some distance towards an account which suggests that no 
justification exists for treating the family as somehow outside the requirements of civil society, 
indeed, the fact that no adequate resolution existed for certain common problems suggested 
that the state might have an obligation to develop programs designed to encourage equality in 
family relationships. Having argued that family relationships are not, in fact, fundamentally 
different in character from political relationships, that the same standards ought to apply, we 
have begun to move towards an account suggesting that political officials have an obligation to 
ensure that justice obtains within family relationships in the same way and to the same extent 
as elsewhere in civil society. This, of course, was the precise problem that the structure of 
classic social contract theory was designed to avert. In this and succeeding chapters, we will 
return to early social contract theory and examine its treatment of marriage and family life and 
attempt to understand the perceptions and ideals which acted to compel the accounts given 
and fmally the degree to which these same perceptions and ideals remain relevant to 
contemporary theories. 
The earliest liberal theories circumvented any need to consider the political 
implications of the relationship between men and women and that between parents and 
children by proclaiming that, from a public perspective, the interests of all family members 
were vested in the male head of the household and only he possessed legal status as a public 
person. Such theories appear to have simply accepted and justified the existing legal position. 
The father's authority within the household was beyond question, and the manner of its 
exercise, except in cases of pathological violence, immune to interference from the agencies of 
the state. It was without doubt the most significant and most sweeping of the private liberties 
secured by the rule of law. Not only was a man's home his castle, within it he was legally 
entitled to rule as monarch. 
Equally the apparent failure of classic liberal theorists to question traditional ways of 
ordering family relationships must be compared with their ruthless and radical questioning of 
prevailing assumptions concerning the nature and origins of political society and the source of 
the legitimacy of state coercion. Their assault upon the legitimacy of patriarchal political 
authority must be contrasted with their thoroughgoing, even enthusiastic, affirmation of men's 
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authority over their wives. Why did theorists such as Hobbes and Locke in particular', 
assume, given a state of nature in which men and women were approximately equal, that only 
men would become parties to the social contract and that women would uniformly 'consent' to 
male dominion? What sort of consent was involved and how was this consent obtained? Why, 
indeed, would women consent to what, at least for Hobbes, amounted to wholly arbitrary rule? 
To understand what is involved, two very different stories must be explored and reconciled, 
one suggesting the a-rationality of passion and affect and the danger posed by passion to the 
dispassionate and rational civic fraternity, and the other suggesting conquest by force which 
was subsequently 'legitimated' by consent and enforced by the rule of law. 
HOBBES AND THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT 
Hobbes, characteristically, delineates the story of force most clearly, although, as we 
shall see subsequently, even in his account ambiguities remain. In the state of nature, it 
mattered not at all how dominion was acquired, whether by consent or by force. 2 In either 
case the critical factor was contract. If dominion was by consent, that consent was binding, and 
in the state of nature it was obligatory even if it originated from fear. 3 If dominion was by 
force, at the point at which a captive was granted bodily liberty he or she might be taken to 
have agreed to accept the master's rule and not do violence unto it. If men succeeded in 
obtaining absolute dominion over women prior to the foundation of civil society, their 
authority continued undiminished unless or until it was curtailed by law. As Hobbes notes 
For the Father, and Master being before the Institution of Common-wealth, 
absolute Soveraigns in their own Families, they lost afterward no more of their 
Authority, than the Law of the Commonwealth taketh from them. 4 
Now what Hobbes means is that certain status relationships, those between husbands and 
wives, between fathers and children, survive the social contract, indeed can be enforced by law 
if necessary. Such relationships, when entered by contract, establish voluntary as opposed to 
hereditary bonds of domination and subordination. The social contract, a public contract 
between equals, was between sovereign and independent individuals, representatives of the 
families over which they had previously obtained dominion. The institution of commonwealth 
need not touch the internal ordering of these relationships, save only in that all within the 
household, including its head, must obey the laws which govern all subjects. (Here also we see 
the absolute necessity for an initial contract, as that between husband and wife and between 
1 	Rousseau's account is very different and the arguments put by him supply a detailed 
rationale for the exclusion of women from civil society and an implicit account of the 
reasons women would find it rational to submit to male authority. See Ch. 8. 
2 	Hobbes, /oc. cit., 255-56. 
Ibid., 198. 
4 	Ibid., 285. 
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parents and children. Had wives, for example, not once been 'individuals' who by their consent 
enabled their husbands to represent them they must, on this account, have remained outside 
the rule of law, remained a force capable of undermining the social contract.) Their status, 
their voluntary subjection, both eradicated their natural equality and ensured that, despite 
standing outside the social contract, they were nonetheless subject to the laws of the state. The 
source or basis of male dominion over either individual women or women in general was 
irrelevant. Howsoever acquired, whether by consent, tacit or actual, or by force and, 
thereafter, promised obedience in exchange for limited freedom, it preceded the formation of 
commonwealths. A man's wife and children were among those possessions the social contract 
was intended to secure. Citizens must be compelled to act justly, so that no man is deprived of 
what is his own, his life and limbs, his property in his wife and children, and his other goods, 
for it is these that the commonwealth is instituted to protect. 5 
LOCKE AND THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT 
Locke tells a very different story, one which, on its face, emphasizes emotional and 
biological ties. According to Locke, the 'natural' bonds of necessity, convenience and 
inclination led men and women to form private societies. The first society was that formed by 
compact between man and wife, its purpose or aim being the continuation of the species. 
Unlike Hobbes, Locke (perhaps carelessly) attributes the subjection of the wife to the 'natural 
fact' that the man is the abler and stronger. 6 This 'natural fact', of course, was wholly 
inadequate to explain the subordination of women, and Locke must have recognized its logical 
inadequacy. If natural differences in ability and strength are sufficient to legitimate 
subordination, it follows logically that stronger and abler men ought to be entitled to rule over 
their weaker fellows, rendering the 'social contract' irrelevant, indeed both unnecessary and 
impossible. For this reason it is significant that Locke was at great pains to distinguish the 
dominion involved in household relations, a dominion which was inherently limited to the 
purposes for which it was required and which granted no legislative power from the dominion 
involved in political society which was marked by legislative power extending to power over life 
and death. Locke emphasizes that the authority of the husband is merely conjugal, being 
the Power that every Husband hath to order the things of private Concernment 
in his Family, as Proprietor of the Goods and Land there, and to have his Will 
take place before that of his wife in all things of their common Concernment; 
but not a Political Power of Life and Death over her, much less over any body 
else. 7 
Ibid., 382-83. As Hobbes notes 'of things held in propriety, those that are dearest to a 
man are his own life & limbs; and in the next degree, . . . those that concern conjugall 
affection; and after them riches and means of living.' 
Locke, /oe. cit., 362-365. 
Ibid., 210. Even while Locke denies the equation of political authority and conjugal 
authority, the parallels between the two are striking. Even as the authority of the 
husband is limited to matters of common concern, the authority of the state is limited 
(It should be noted that the 'fact' that every husband has this power does not tell us how he 
obtained it or why, even should he be deemed the abler and stronger, this legitimated anything 
whatever. It does not even tell us how it came to be that the husband was proprietor of their 
common goods and land, rendering the wife's labour irrelevant.) What Locke does appear to 
be attempting to do in these passages is to distinguish between natural authority and natural 
obligations, which, because of their purported foundation in nature, require no legitimation, 
and political authority which must be legitimated. Effectively, perhaps, the 'natural authority' 
of the husband over his wife and of both parents over their children 8 was to be found in the 
idea that nature willed the continuation of the species and male authority was for some reason 
believed to be essential to this end. The clear distinction of families and 'the Security of the 
Marriage Bed' were axiomatic and foundational and both depended upon masculine authority 
within the household.9 Perhaps, reading between the lines, it may be suggested that his 
inconsistent and uncritical acceptance of the dominion of the husband as abler and stronger 
had more to do with the nature of sexuality and the passions and the threat both posed to 
reason and order than with any actual or perceived difference in capabilities. 
For both Hobbes and Locke the affirmation of masculine authority within marriage 
served a further critical purpose. It ensured that the family spoke with a single unified voice, 
that conflict within the family might be resolved without recourse to law. (It does not, of 
course, explain the fact that the husband seemingly became judge, jury, and executive authority 
in his own cause, although it may have been thought that the absence of rules within the family 
averted this.) Likewise, because both women and children were outside of the bonds of civil 
society, all relationships which involved inequality and dependence could also be excluded 
from civil society, the domain of equals. Thus relationships among men might be said to 
epitomize independence and equality, qualities which fitted men to create and to participate in 
civil society, while those between men and their wives and children epitomized dependence 
and inequality. Because women were destined to become wives and mothers they could 
neither create nor participate in the relations of civil society. While, since marriage was 
contractual, men and women must have been equal in the state of nature, men entered civil 
society and became citizens while women (inevitably?) became wives. Even if men and women 
to the public good. Ibid., 403. Perhaps the real distinction is that the husband lacks 
legislative capacity while the state necessarily possesses legislative power. This 
strongly suggests that an important distinction between the family and political society 
is the effective absence of rules (or laws) within the family. What prevented the 
authority of the husband from being arbitrary with respect to his decision making on 
matters of common concern, and who might be entitled to establish what those 
matters were is not clear. Perhaps its potentially arbitrary character was simply 
irrelevant. 
8(?)(?)(?)(?)(?)(?)(?)(?)(?)(?)(?)(?)(?)(?)(?)(?)(?)(?)(?)9 Ibid., 220. Among many social 
Ibid., 220. Among many social groups, of course, this is still believed to be the case. 
Cf. Dworkin's account of associative obligations, and, in particular the justifications at 
the interpretive and post-interpretive level discussed in Ch. 6. 
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(It should be noted that the 'fact' that every husband has this power does not tell us how he 
obtained it or why, even should he be deemed the abler and stronger, this legitimated anything 
whatever. It does not even tell us how it came to be that the husband was proprietor of their 
common goods and land, rendering the wife's labour irrelevant.) What Locke does appear to 
be attempting to do in these passages is to distinguish between natural authority and natural 
obligations, which, because of their purported foundation in nature, require no legitimation, 
and political authority which must be legitimated. Effectively, perhaps, the 'natural authority' 
of the husband over his wife and of both parents over their children 8 was to be found in the 
idea that nature willed the continuation of the species and male authority was for some reason 
believed to be essential to this end. The clear distinction of families and 'the Security of the 
Marriage Bed' were axiomatic and foundational and both depended upon masculine authority 
within the household.9 Perhaps, reading between the lines, it may be suggested that his 
inconsistent and uncritical acceptance of the dominion of the husband as abler and stronger 
had more to do with the nature of sexuality and the passions and the threat both posed to 
reason and order than with any actual or perceived difference in capabilities. 
For both Hobbes and Locke the affirmation of masculine authority within marriage 
served a further critical purpose. It ensured that the family spoke with a single unified voice, 
that conflict within the family might be resolved without recourse to law. (It does not, of 
course, explain the fact that the husband seemingly became judge, jury, and executive authority 
in his own cause, although it may have been thought that the absence of rules within the family 
averted this.) Likewise, because both women and children were outside of the bonds of civil 
society, all relationships which involved inequality and dependence could also be excluded 
from civil society, the domain of equals. Thus relationships among men might be said to 
epitomize independence and equality, qualities which fitted men to create and to participate in 
civil society, while those between men and their wives and children epitomized dependence 
and inequality. Because women were destined to become wives and mothers they could 
neither create nor participate in the relations of civil society. While, since marriage was 
contractual, men and women must have been equal in the state of nature, men entered civil 
society and became citizens while women (inevitably?) became wives. Even if men and women 
to the public good. Ibid., 403. Perhaps the real distinction is that the husband lacks 
legislative capacity while the state necessarily possesses legislative power. This 
strongly suggests that an important distinction between the family and political society 
is the effective absence of rules (or laws) within the family. What prevented the 
authority of the husband from being arbitrary with respect to his decision making on 
matters of common concern, and who might be entitled to establish what those 
matters were is not clear. Perhaps its potentially arbitrary character was simply 
irrelevant. 
8(?)(?)(?)(?)(?)(?)(?)(?)(?)(?)(?)(?)(?)(?)(?)(?)(?)(?)(?) 9  Ibid., 220. Among many social 
9 	Ibid., 220. Among many social groups, of course, this is still believed to be the case. 
Cf. Dworkin's account of associative obligations, and, in particular the justifications at 
the interpretive and post-interpretive level discussed in Ch. 6. 
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(as abstract individuals in the state of nature) were approximately equal, men and wives were 
not. Women contracted to become wives, and doing so forswore equality, and as wives, agreed 
to remain outside the relations of civil society. Whether they had any actual, as opposed to 
formal, choice was irrelevant, as both Locke l° and Hobbesil made clear. 
THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND MALE BONDING 
The social contract was envisioned as an agreement between those who were capable 
of acting as public persons, might be said to possess full legal capacity. The absence of women 
from the formation of civil society on the formal level, however, must not be taken to signify 
either universalization or inattention on the part of early theorists. Rather, there was no 
reason for women to be present on the formal level precisely because of their symbolic role, 
their location within the family as wives. When we look at these early theories, then, we must 
ask again whether this simply represented unquestioning acceptance of the status quo, of the 
legal status of married women as femme covert, or whether something very different and far 
more significant is operating beneath the surface of the written text. (The intersection of force 
and passion, the oscillation between these images may be significant.) The social contract 
symbolizes an agreement, not between individuals, but between families, each represented by 
its head, a point which is explicitly made by Hobbes. If, on the formal level, women were 
wholly absent, on the symbolic level that was because, prior to the advent of the social 
contract, they had ceded their independent identity and equality to their husbands. 
Cooperative relationships within families presented no problem because women had ceded 
their natural liberty to their husbands who were, by contract, entitled to maintain their 
authority by any means appropriate to that purpose.  relationships between 
men, indeed between families, on the other hand, presented serious problems given the belief 
among such early theorists that without law and without the coercive authority of the state to 
enforce it, men could not be relied upon to keep their promises. In political terms, the social 
10 	Locke, /oc. cit., 325. In discussing slavery, Locke notes that while no man can contract 
to become a slave, because true slavery gives the master power over life and death, a 
man may nonetheless enter a contract for lifelong servitude, reserving only to himself 
his power over his own life. The parallel between this sort of 'slave' contract and the 
marriage contract is inescapable given that Locke clearly differentiates the power of 
the husband over his wife from political power by virtue of the fact that it does not 
extend to life and death. See pp. 365-66. How consent was obtained, whether to 
marriage or to servitude for life was irrelevant. 
11 	Hobbes, /oc. cit., 255-256. 
12 	Likewise, masculine or paternal authority might be thought to ensure obedience. 
Such liberty as women enjoyed within marriage depended upon their obedience and 
compliance, and should they violate the terms of the agreement, their liberty might be 
removed. Cf. Hobbes' discussion of slavery and the obedience due a master by a 
slave. Implicit in this is the master's right to retaliate should the slave disobey. Ibid., 
198-200. Fear again would suffice to compel her to keep her bargain, at least up to a 
point. Again, contemporary accounts of violent relationships support this. In many 
cases, such relationships endure' for years, despite escalating violence. Fear, a 
perverse form of love, and profound dependence are enough. 
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contract was an attempt to explain how separate and independent families, each represented 
by its head and jealous to guard its interests against other families and to preserve its property 
might find it in their interests unite and form a state. 13 Entry into the social contract and 
submission to the rule of law formed the substratum of a theoretical account of male 
bonding14, of the conditions necessary to ensure that men would find it to their advantage as 
heads of households to engage in cooperative activities and to submit, together with others like 
themselves, to the rule of law. 
Yet, despite the ample justifications for the account given above in the structure of the 
texts of theorists such as Hobbes and Locke, a very different account is also available. Family 
relationships and political relationships were seen in very different terms. 15 Family 
relationships lay beneath or beyond explanation, had seemingly always existed almost 
unchanged. The emotional bonds between husband and wife, between mother and child, 
required neither explanation nor justification, although, crucially, the bond between father and 
child was also accounted for very differently, as sustained by the desire of the child to secure 
his inheritance. 16 The symbolic proclamation of equality and fraternity emphasized the 
rejection of feudal hierarchies and assigned status and affirmed the independence and equality 
of adult males, their capacity to act as representatives. All relationships depended upon 
contracts between equals. Early social contract theories developed their accounts of civil 
society against the background of an imagined state of nature. In the state of nature, all 
individuals, male and female, were approximately equal. This approximate equality is critical 
to the structure of such accounts. It applied whether the state of nature was the brutal 'state of 
war' of Hobbes, the comparatively peaceful but competitive and acquisitive world of Locke, or 
the idyllic and pre-human natural freedom of Rousseau. If bonds among individuals in the 
state of nature existed at all, these were somehow less moral bonds than natural relationships, 
13 	For a parallel account, see Oki, Women in Western Political Thought, loc. cit., 197- 
201 Rousseau made the connection between the role as head of the family and the 
role of citizen explicit. See Rousseau, Emile, loc. cit., 160. 
14 	The critical problem was to offer an account of how independent individuals, with no 
natural foundation for cooperative relationships, might find it reasonable to agree. 
While sexual attraction and procreation provided a 'natural' basis for relationships 
between men and women, no comparable foundation existed for relationships 
between men. Given the total absence of any biological (or moral) foundation for 
male bonding, a political foundation must be established. 
Cf. Locke's distinction between political authority and paternal or spousal authority. 
A Queen might exercise political authority over her husband as over any other subject, 
but he might, apparently, exercise conjugal authority over her in all those matters 
which concerned their relationship as husband and wife unless this had been excluded 
by contract. Locke, loc. cit., 209-210. 
16 	Locke explicitly notes that a significant element in the power and authority of the 
father is his right to bestow his estate upon that child who pleases him best. Locke, 
/oc. cit., 357. See also, Rousseau, The Essential Rousseau, loc. cit., 190 where he 
describes the father's property as the tie which keeps his children 'under his 
dominion'. 
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the sexual relationship between man and woman, the nurturing and protective bonds between 
mother and child, and these were given a 'natural' or quasi-'natural' foundation. 17 The 
philosophical problem was to offer an account of civil society which showed how men might 
realize peaceful and productive relationships among themselves, given the absence of any 
binding ties such as affection or sexual need. While sexuality bound man to woman and 
woman to man, at least for brief periods, while maternal instinct bound mother to child, no 
natural bonds of any kind existed among men. Under feudal hierarchies, hereditary bonds of 
obligation and status had ordered society in complex hierarchical structures, had ordered 
social relationships among men. These political and socially constructed relationships were 
being swept aside, were the object of attack by social contract theorists who argued no natural, 
hereditary right to political dominion existed. 18 For this reason, a political account was 
required, one which explained how, in the absence of emotional bonds and divinely constituted 
authority, peaceful and productive political relationships might be created among men who 
perceived themselves as equals. 
Family relationships, relationships among men and women, and, apparently, 
relationships among women themselves, posed no comparable problem. The bonds between 
mother and child were mediated on the one hand by the dependence and helplessness of the 
child and on the other by the natural obligation of the mother to protect the child until it had 
attained the competence to do so for itself. Similarly, where the father had or was granted 
authority over the child, the relationship remained natural, did not at the outset require legal 
ratification and enforcement. Although early social contract theorists with the somewhat 
ambiguous exception of Rousseau accounted for marriage in contractual terms, contract seems 
an afterthought which gave public ratification to a natural, pre-civil relationship, and enabled 
the state, where necessary, to back a natural relationship with the authority of law. Locke, 
unlike Hobbes, argued explicitly that the authority of parent over child, of husband over wife 
was different in character from political authority. Only political authority entitled its holder 
to enact laws which might be enforced by the power of the state. 19 It follows that the clearest 
distinction between the family and the state lay in the fact that within the family there was 
authority but no law, whereas within the state authority and the submission of all to the rule of 
law were in separable. In simplest form then, peaceful and productive relationships among 
17 	The use of the terms 'nature' and 'natural' is, of course, profoundly ambiguous. Given 
the schematic account of motivation adopted in varying degrees by all social contract 
theorists, such terms appear to be redundant and devoid of legitimating capacity. All 
perhaps that can be said with any degree of certainty is that a natural relationship is 
one in which concepts of law (and indeed morality) have no role to play. A 
relationship which is natural is one which does not require the intervention of law to 
survive. 
18 	Locke developed the distinction between paternal authority and political authority 
most fully. Locke, /oc. cit., 169-303. 
19 	Ibid., 308. 
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men depended upon law, relationships between parents and children, between husbands and 
wives, and between women themselves seemingly did not, at least at the outset. The exercise 
of state power, through law, demands legitimation; familial authority does not. 20 The power 
of law over the family and family members serves to establish these relationships publicly, to 
ensure that men's property (acquired by contract) in their wives and children will be 
recognized and respected by other men. 
Why was this thought to be the case? What differentiates the relationship between 
husbands and wives, between parents and children from relationships among men? The 
account developed thus far from textual references21 comes close to analogizing the marriage 
contract to a 'slave' contract, grounding family relationships ultimately in something akin to 
conquest (or rape), giving credence to the accounts of contemporary radical feminists.22 Yet 
other aspects of Locke and Rousseau23 present a less violent face. Locke emphasizes 'mutual 
Support, and Assistance, and a Communion of Interest. . . as necessary . .. to unite their Care 
and Affection. ,24 Certainly a passage such as this with its emphasis upon mutuality, intimacy 
and affection seems difficult to reconcile with the contractarian backdrop and its potential for 
a consent extracted by force or fear. This, in itself, suggests that on a phenomenological level, 
the contractarian account of marriage, while needed for theoretical coherence or integrity, was 
at odds with another, very different account. If, for example, as the passage quoted above 
suggests, the critical characteristics of the marital relationship were mutual support and 
intimacy, it may have been those precise elements which were unique to family relationships 
and which finally and irrevocably set them apart from relationships among men. Mutual 
support and intimacy seem unlikely to emerge from a contractual relationship which might, in 
the final analysis, have been compelled by the fear of one individual and the threat of force on 
the part of the other. On this reading, the contractual interpretation of marriage and family 
relationships could be said to be superimposed upon the intimate for a very particular reason, 
that of ensuring that such relationships were acknowledged and honoured by other men. 25 
Contract representing reason, rules, and the possibility of invoking impartial authority must be 
superimposed upon intimacy and affect, if intimacy and affect are to be secure from 
depredation. Reason must attain ascendancy over passion. (This as well provides a clear 
20 	While both marriage and the relationship of fathers with their children were ratified 
by contract, the means by which consent was obtained does not appear to be relevant 
to the legitimacy of masculine authority. 
21 	The legitimacy of naked force is clearest in Hobbes, however it is open on Locke's 
account as well. See n. 2-8, 12, 14 above and the associated text. 
22 	Eg. A. Dworkin, /oc. cit. 
23 	See Ch. 9. 
24 	Locke, loc. cit., 362. 
25 	Cf. Hobbes, /oc. cit., 383. 
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argument for masculine authority within the home and within the state. If women were 
believed to act, not on the basis of rational self-interest, but from emotion, masculine authority 
was essential if the interests of the family were to be protected. Emotion, intimacy, even love 
are irrational, do not depend upon a rational assessment of self-interest. They are uncertain, 
subjective, and arbitrary.) 
Lyman, working within the modern context, has argued that the need to account for 
male bonding through contract, and, therefore, to account for the emergence of civil society as 
a contractually established bond among men is best understood through examining the role of 
rules in relationships among men. He argues that relationships among men are 
characteristically mediated by rules rather than being emotionally warm and intimate, citing 
the bonds created through sporting activities and games which involve competition mediated 
by the rules needed to ensure that aggression remains goal directed rather than destructive. 
Rules, and ultimately law, replace intimacy and emotion as a basis for harmonious cooperation 
and interaction. Lyman comments: 
Rule-governed aggression is a conduct that is very usefill to organizations, in 
that it mobilizes aggressive energies but binds them to order by rules. The male 
sense of order is procedural rather than substantive because the male bond is 
formal (rule governed), rather than personal (based upon intimacy and 
commitment). Male groups in this sense are shame cultures, not guilt cultures, 
because the male bond is a group identity that subordinates the individual to the 
rules, and because social control is imposed through collective judgments about 
self-control, such as "strength" and "cool". The sense of order within such male 
groups is based upon the belief that all members are equally dependent upon 
the rules and that no personal dependence is created within the group. This is 
not true of the family or of relations with women, both of which are intimate, 
and from theguys' point of view, are "out of control" because they are governed 
by emotion. 
The parallel with social contract theory is unmistakable. The emphasis upon shared 
dependence upon rules, and the rejection of all forms of personal dependence represents the 
classic problematic of social contract theory. In the state of nature, lawlessness and/or passion 
prevail. Survival either depends upon strength and perpetual watchfulness or entails reliance 
upon the good will of others. In either case, it is uncertain. If survival depends upon strength, 
one can survive only as long as one's strength and watchfulness last, and even then one must 
sleep. If survival depends upon the good will of others, this is also uncertain. On the one 
hand, if survival depends upon securing and maintaining the good will of those who are 
stronger, no inherent limits exist. One will do whatever one must to maintain it, and, 
See P. Lyman, 'The Fraternal Bond as a Joking Relationship: A Case Study of the 
Role of Sexist Jokes in Male Group Bonding' in M.S. Kimmel (Ed.), Changing Men: 
New Directions in Research on Men and Masculinity, Newbury Park, Sage Publications, 
1987, 149-163. The passage quoted above may be found at p. 161. Cf. Locke's 
emphasis upon the real and ultimate distinction between familial authority and 
political authority. Family authority confers no legislative power, the essence of 
political authority is legislative power. Locke, /oc. cit., 364-367. One might say that 
what distinguishes the public and the private is the presence or absence of rules. 
210 
inevitably, this constitutes a relationship of profound dependence. 27 On the other hand, good 
will itself is transitory. That which pleases today is likely to be out of favour tomorrow. In 
either case the individual is dependent upon the essentially arbitrary will of his fellows. If, as 
early social contract theorists believed, men naturally pursued their own interests and sought 
to set themselves above their fellows, dependence upon others was profoundly risky. Only if 
all depended equally upon rules, upon impartial authority, would it be possible to engage in the 
sorts of exchange transactions which furthered the interests of all. This demanded that the 
political bond of civil society, the public bond, be constructed in opposition to the emotional, 
and therefore, unruled or arbitrary, substratum of family life. 
Here then was a double edged sword. The family itself must be brought under civil 
control. The state, or sovereign represented the only legitimate authority, and no lesser form 
of regulation might usurp its authority. Despite this, because family relationships depended 
upon emotional bonds and were open ended, bearing little resemblance to the bounded and 
discrete transactions typical of private law, law must be kept out of the family. Simultaneous 
realization of these goals depended upon the exclusion of women from civil society and upon 
recognition that the husband was entitled to exercise dominion over the family itself. The 
family as a conceptual entity, as the property of male citizens, might be subjected to rules, thus 
minimizing the threat to masculine solidarity posed by intimate relationships. Because family 
relationships generated emotional bonds, epitomized intimacy and individual commitment, 
rather than impersonal and formal rule governed relationships, women were perceived 
ambivalently as both remaining in the state of nature as individuals and becoming subject to 
the laws of civil society, not as individuals, but through their status as members of families, as 
wives, daughters or sisters. Either way, women might be excluded from the formal and rule-
governed relationships of civil society and their inherent demand for equality. 
Lyman's account is provocative against the background of the social and economic 
changes leading to the development of early social contract theory and suggests an alternative 
way of viewing its form and shape. The feudal order had broken down and the social 
obligations governing relationships among men ceased to exist. Traditional ways of 
maintaining social order were under threat. Against the background of the increasing 
predominance of waged labour and the polarization of society between rich and poor, the 
authority of the state seemed both devoid of justification and urgently needed. Men were 
perceived as rootless and detached from any natural order in a way which had not before been 
the case. Two interrelated problems had to be solved. First, why would men submit to rules, 
given that traditional hierarchies and networks of obligation had become irrelevant and there 
was nothing to replace them? Second, and even more fundamentally, how could such 
submission be conclusively demonstrated to be equally in the interests of all? The answer was 
simple. Men submitted to the rule of law, to the social contract, because only in this way could 
27 	This, of course, also represents the precise problematic of the violent marriage. 
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they achieve stable relationships among themselves, and secure order without reconstituting 
the abandoned status relationships of superior and subordinate, relationships which involved 
personal dependence and inequality. Rule-governed relationships generated wholly by 
exchange, exchanging something less valued for something more valued, offered the promise 
of stability and order. Men submitted to rules because it was in their interests to do so. If men 
were to realize peaceful relationships among themselves, the bonds between them must be 
socially created and authoritatively enforced. No natural bonds of affection or of compelling 
need such as that produced by the natural inequality of the child were available as substitutes 
both because such relationships seemed arbitrary and irrational and because they inevitably 
involved personal dependence. The conditions of economic life militated against enduring 
cooperative relationships among men. Men competed to secure the resources necessary for 
survival, and in a world in which perhaps as much as half the population lived at or below the 
subsistence level, it seemed clear that men such as these had little reason to honour 
agreements unless it could be shown to be in their interests to do so. The already desperate 
have few reasons to honour agreements, and the strong even fewer, at least when dealing with 
those weaker than themselves. Against the background of a social system in which status was 
individual, available to be won and easily lost, traditional relationships such as kin and 
community provided no defense against chaos. 28 For theorists such as Hobbes, the state of 
nature represented a society in which natural order had been destroyed, in which the old ties 
binding man to man had been dissolved and nothing existed to replace them. Only law, 
authoritatively enacted and universally and impartially enforced, had the capacity to restore 
order, harness aggression and self-interest and render them productive. 
In the Hobbesian account, because men were incapable of self-control, they could 
escape the brutality of the state of nature only through their voluntary submission by contract 
to the Sovereign, Leviathan. Their submission to the rule of law, a submission born of fear, 
enabled them to escape the uncertainty and brutality which was their natural condition. While 
Hobbes emphasized the fundamental equality of men and women in the state of nature, 
women were not to be found among the parties to the social contract, ostensibly because men 
created commonwealths, not women.29 More subtly and significantly the state of nature might 
quite reasonably be seen as inherently feminine in the sense that it represented a world 
without formally structured relationships between equals mediated by rules. Men perceived 
their own relationships with women, and, most particularly, women's relationships to children 
as unstructured, fluid, intimate, emotional. Relationships within the family fit this model. 
28 	For a discussion of the demographic and economic background of social contract 
theory, see I. Shapiro, The Evolution of Rights in Liberal Theory, Cambridge, 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1986, 24-29. 
29 	On the brutality of the state of nature, see Hobbes, /oc. cit., 188, on the need for 
absolute authority to enforce agreements among men see p. 196, on the role of law in 
securing and sustaining paternal authority and on the natural equality of women see 
pp. 253-255. 
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Women were perceived as mothers, as wives, as sisters or daughters, but not as competitors, 
not as involved in the struggle for survival in the same way as men. Family relationships, 
unlike other traditional relationships of mutual dependence, had not been swept aside by social 
and economic change, appeared timeless, and in that respect, natural and a-political. In this 
respect, women seemed much more closely allied to nature than were men. The primary 
relationships in which they were involved, given the increasing destruction of their economic 
role, remained outside the struggle for survival.30 Familial roles represented the core of 
women's lives, and these roles and the relationships surrounding them, depended upon 
emotional bonding and intimacy, not rules. 
It is revealing that Darwin, little more than a century later, might, in the course of a 
cost-benefit assessment of the advantages of marriage, cite as a significant benefit the presence 
in the home of 'an object to be beloved and played with - better than a dog anyhow' and contrast 
this with 'spending one's whole life, like a neuter bee, working working and nothing after all'. 31 
In this passage two significant elements are present: the image of an unstructured, fluid, 
emotional, but none the less proprietary relationship such as one might have with a superior 
domestic pet, and the inescapable balancing of interests. Women's roles and relationships 
were perceived as unchanging, rather like the lives of the small dogs common in paintings of 
the period. In men's lives, on the other hand, a sharp distinction might be made between the 
fluidity and formlessness of family relationships, and the struggle to compete and to survive 
characteristic of civil society, a contrast clear in the passage above. For them, the distinction 
was all important. The enforcement of contractual arrangements, the protection of 
proprietary rights, protection against arbitrary violence were essential. Without these 
protections, neither the marketplace nor the home would be secure. 
Another factor might be thought to be significant as well, one likewise highlighted by 
Darwin's musings. The marriage relationship was also perceived as analogous to a proprietary 
relationship, an image highlighted by the use of the word object, one in which the husband saw 
himself as obtaining a species of property in his wife's body and securing thereby the legitimacy 
of his heirs.32 All proprietary relationships required protection by law, a point emphasized by 
every contract theorist. Hobbes' characterization is unusually sharp and pointed: 'no 
Propriety, no Dominion, no mine and thine distinct; but only that to be every mans that he can 
get; and for so long as he can keep it.'33 The emotional bond was different. The desire to 
30 	I note here the class distinction, the gulf between the social habits and attitudes of the 
elite and those of the working classes among whom women continued to work as they 
always had. 
31 	The Darwin Papers, Cambridge Univ. Library, cited in Macfarlane, Marriage and Love 
in England, loc. cit., 3-4. 
32 	Macfarlane, /oc. cit., 242-243. 
33 	Hobbes, /oc. cit., 188. 
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provide for the secure transmission of property to legitimate heirs represented an important 
theme in early social contract theory. Hobbes, like Rousseau, recognized fatherhood as a 
socially constructed relationship as opposed to one which was self-evident and immediate like 
motherhood. Precisely because fatherhood is not self-evident, but depends upon the wife's 
willingness to permit sexual access only within marriage, this presented a further problem. 
Relationships outside of civil society were perceived as arbitrary and unruled, governed by 
emotion, fraught with danger for that reason. Outside of civil society no reasons existed for 
men to keep their promises, honour their obligations if they perceived doing so to no longer be 
in their interests. Quite clearly, given that men and women were equal in the state of nature, 
and therefore shared a common motivation and psychology, the same applied to women. No 
reason is immediately apparent why this logic ought not to have applied to the promises 
inherent in marriage, including the vow of sexual fidelity. Why, then, might it remain 
permanently in a woman's interests to be faithful? Why, indeed, would she ever consent to her 
own subjugation in the first place? The first question might be easily answered. Dependence 
upon a husband for protection and support became the answer. If she could not survive 
without protection and support for herself and her children, if her relationship with her 
children could be severed should she depart from her husband, her dependence would 
guarantee her fidelity. (Such reasoning, paradoxically, depends upon the belief that women 
would not willingly abandon their children, that for them, at least, natural enduring bonds were 
possible.) The second, obviously, is more difficult and complex, and, indeed two very different 
answers were explored above. The first, and most textually obvious answer, lies simply in force 
and fear, in the threat of rape and the promise of protection in return for compliance. The 
contractarian accounts given by both Locke and Hobbes emphasize the binding force of 
obligations acquired by at least some contracts, even in the state of nature, and irrespective of 
the circumstances under which consent was obtained. Only life itself might be said to be 
sacrosanct. Secure possession of women and families as property provided a motivating force 
for the social contract. Only through the social contract could men secure their property in 
their wives and children against other men. The second, suggested by textual evidence in the 
work of Locke and Rousseau, lies in the intimacy and fluidity of family relationships. 
Relationships between men and women in particular were lawless, essentially unruled, 
irrational, governed by emotion not reason. The sexual or marital contract was superimposed 
upon the emotional substratum, served not to alter the character of the relationship as such, 
but to guarantee that it would be respected by other men because it had been entered by 
contract and could be enforced by law. 
Despite the inherent ambiguity, family relationships were thought of both as outside 
of civil society in the sense of pre-existing it and being independent of it and as fundamental to 
the structure of civil society and to its purposes, in particular, the lawful transmission of 
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property to legitimate heirs.34 While dependence might bind woman to man in the short term, 
more was needed, given that women were equal to men in every respect, and in particular, 
unless compelled by law, no more likely to honour their promises. In what way, then, might 
fatherhood be securely established? The answer was the dominion of the husband over his 
wife (howsoever attained), usually put in terms of his entitlement to rule. Civil society was 
essential, to enforce the authority of the husband and father within the household should this 
be necessary and to punish those who violated the husband's proprietary right in his wife. Civil 
society guaranteed men legally enforceable dominion over women and children. Once family 
relationships were regulated through agreement among men, the power of the state could be 
used to protect the rights and obligations granted thereby just as it could be used to enforce 
the reciprocal rights and obligations of the marketplace. The rules of civil society limited the 
parameters of conflict among men, whether over women and children or over other forms of 
property. Within the limits established by rules, men were free to compete among themselves, 
mobilize aggression for productive ends. Men emerged as citizens, equal and independent 
members of civil society, while women remained wives, necessarily dependent and no longer 
equal. 
Even in the gentler imagery of Locke, despite the approximate equality of men and 
women in the state of nature, participation in civil society was reserved for men. For Locke, 
the social contract had as its primary role the securing of proprietary rights and the facilitation 
of the transmission of property from father to son. Locke explicitly attributed the obedience of 
children to their fathers to a tacit compact. Only through continued obedience could children 
secure their patrimony. The father would naturally transmit the bulk of his property to that 
child who pleased him best. The natural compact between fathers and children, one born of 
self-interest and one which tended towards monarchical rule, must be replaced by a social 
contract among men. This secured male independence from the tyranny of patriarchal rule, 
and replaced it with the formal fraternal equality of men in civil society. 35 This line of 
reasoning is particularly interesting because Locke simultaneously argued that children owed 
equal obedience to both their father and their mother, both parents being equally responsible 
for their existence and well being, an argument integral to his attack upon Filmer and his 
denial of the legitimacy of patriarchal political rule. then, did he find it critical to 
reinforce the bond between father and son with a tacit compact, a compact which might be 
The latter point was put particularly clearly by Rousseau in one of the notes to 'The 
Social Contract'. See Rousseau, The Essential Rousseau, loc. cit., 123. 
On the function of civil society, see Locke, /oc. cit., 395-396. On the tacit compact or 
contract between fathers and children and particularly on the way in which the 
possibility of receiving an inheritance induced children to obey their fathers see pp. 
356-361. 
Ibid., 345-36L It is noteworthy that, at least in the family context, Locke thought 
obedience could be equally owed to both parents, unlike the ruthlessly consistent 
Hobbes. 
34 
35 
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thought, in light of his previous argument, to be redundant, particularly since the mother child 
relationship required no such reinforcement? The contractual rider is most coherently 
accounted for by the fact that the mother-child relationship is self-evident, unimpeachable, 
while the father-child relationship is socially constructed, relatively easily impeached, and 
dependent either upon custom or upon law. While men achieved independence and secure 
ownership of all they possessed as members of civil society, women, not being members but 
subjects, remained outside. Given these assumptions, children could not be bound to their 
mothers by a desire to secure future benefits. Women's natural freedom had been ceded to 
their husbands in exchange for continued support and protection. While Locke acknowledged 
that the husband's authority over his wife had limits, extended only to matters of common 
concern, and that in some societies she might have the right to separate from him, so long as 
the relationship subsisted the family spoke with a single voice, that of the husband. Because 
marriage and paternity vested the interests of the wife and children in the male head of the 
household, women and children possessed no publicly acknowledged interests which might 
conflict with those pursued by the head of the household. In the private marital contract, a 
contract ultimately ratified by the state, the woman exchanged her independent identity and 
her right to make certain decisions regarding the disposition of her person and property for 
her husband's protection and support. Once this had been done, she was hidden from public 
view, legally identified as a femme covert. She ceased to exist as an individual, as an 
independent right and duty bearing unit visible to civil society. 37 The status of wife was 
incompatible with individuality. 
Why was this perceived as necessarily so? After all, within the state of nature, woman, 
for both Hobbes and Locke, must have been at least potentially equal. Were she not, she 
could not contract. The critical transition was from individual to wife. As individual, woman 
was at least approximately equal - as wife subject to the will of her husband. Seemingly, this 
very natural equality necessitated both the treatment of family relationships as a-political or 
pre-political, and, with the implementation of the order of civil society, dictated her 
dependence and subordination. It is in their accounts of relationships between men and 
women that we find the clearest distinction between Hobbes and Locke. While Hobbes 
acknowledged the presence of love among the passions, and like Rousseau, linked it 
immediately with jealousy, did not mention love or even affection in his account of family 
relationships. Rather men's wives and children were mentioned in the same breath as their 
persons and chattels and were identified as a primary source of conflict among men, men 
seeking to make themselves masters of other men's goods. 
Why women did not seek to make themselves masters of other women and men and 
of their property is not immediately apparent given Hobbes' schematic account of human 
37 	Ibid., 364-365. 
38 	Hobbes, /oc. cit., 124. 
216 
nature. If his logic is applied ruthlessly and universally, it follows that not only is woman 
approximately equal in strength and prudence, but in self-interest. Like her mate, she would 
honour agreements only so long as it remained in her interests to do so; like his, her will was 
fundamentally arbitrary. She was, in fact, as was her mate, a reasonably unpleasant predatory 
animal, governed by self-interest, acquisitive and competitive, and unlikely to honour any sort 
of agreement should it conflict with present interests. As Hobbes emphasized, in the state of 
nature there could be no valid covenant based upon mutual trust.39 It followed that, without 
authority backed by law, any domestic liaison between these two was unlikely to be either 
peaceful or idyllic. There could have been no family life, no marriage contract in the state of 
nature except a contract entered out of fear, one where a weaker party submits out of fear to a 
stronger.40 Yet, Hobbes also acknowledged the natural inclination of the sexes to one another 
and of parents to their children, suggested an alternative foundation for such relationships in 
the passions.41 Equally clearly, however, no secure relationship in the state of nature might be 
founded upon the passions alone, nor could mere promises or covenants to perform in the 
future be binding. 
How might this (rather perverse) contractarian dilemma be resolved? On the one 
hand, Hobbes alludes to natural lust or inclination as the source of family ties in the state of 
nature.42 On the other, given that lust is readily superseded by other inclinations, it is 
inherently insecure. How then may the unity arising out of the passions be sustained if the 
only valid contracts in the state of nature were those in which performance was immediately 
complete or those entered out of fear? The answer, ultimately, was that the bond between 
husband and wife could not be sustained in the absence of civil society. Relationships between 
men and women predicated upon natural inclination or mutual lust (love?) required civil 
society to endure. Only relationships based wholly upon fear or conquest might be valid 
outside it, and even these would endure only so long as the inequality attained thereby might 
be enforced.43 It is significant that Hobbes regarded such contracts, even in the state of 
nature, as valid and binding. Thus, if we imagine a contract between man and wife such that 
(out of fear) she yielded up all her natural right saving only that which she could not yield, her 
right to preserve her own life, the bare existence of this covenant was sufficient to disen title the 
wife from entry into civil society. 44 
39 	Ibid., 196. 
40 	Ibid., 198. 
41 	Ibid., 253. 
42 	Ibid., 187 where Hobbes explicitly suggests that the concord within small families 
depends upon 'natural! lust'. 
43 	I note, but do not develop, the possibility of an equation of sex and violence. 
Hobbes, /oc. cit., 229. Hobbes notes that those who covenant must be understood to 
have no prior obligations repugnant to the civil contract. If, prior to the social 
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The perverse alternation between natural inclination or passion and contractually 
orchestrated subjugation makes perfect sense on Hobbes' account of human nature. 45 Indeed, 
it may have appeared to Hobbes that natural inclination, in the state of nature, required 
subjection to ensure that it was not too readily dissipated. The possibility of law within the 
family conflicted profoundly with the perceived nature of family life, its emotional, 
unstructured, fluid character. Likewise, the natural bonds between mother and child seemed 
peculiarly unsuited to legal rules, dictated as such bonds were believed to be by instinct. The 
central problem was the relationship between husband and wife. If natural equality were to be 
translated into civil equality, if relationships of dependence within the household were to be 
eradicated by substituting equal dependence upon rules the household would necessarily be 
assimilated to the other institutions of civil society, become as competitive, as acquisitive, as 
potentially fractious as were they. Private contract would prevail between husband and wife 
who would bargain as equals. Conflict within the family might well be thought to be more 
total and less resolvable, in that a political or democratic solution was out of the question, 
leaving only the marketplace. The only alternatives to the civil eradication of her existence 
were two very different visions - either two animals locked in combat, or two rational market 
actors dealing at arm's length. 
For Locke, reconciliation of two apparently disparate accounts, that generated by 
contract and that which apparently followed from his account of the family, may be attained by 
tracing a number of critical assumptions. For Locke, man's natural liberty and his political 
liberty were identical in structure. Liberty consisted solely in not being subject to the arbitrary 
will of any other, save only by his own consent, and even by consent he was incapable of giving 
another power which extended to his life itself. 46 For Locke, also, even in the state of nature, 
consent was, in fact, morally binding or obligatory. What was lacking in the state of nature was 
public settled law clear even to the most self-interested, an impartial judge, and the power to 
ensure that decisions were carried out. Precisely the same conditions existed within the 
contract, women ceded their natural right to their husbands, saving only their right to 
preserve their own lives, they lacked competence to enter the civil bond. Equally to 
the point, of course, is the converse. Should women enter the social contract on the 
same terms as men, men and women could not, subsequently, become husband and 
wife. Having yielded up their natural right to the sovereign, while women could 
contract to provide sexual services, or child-bearing services or housekeeping services, 
these were ordinary exchange contracts like others in civil society, not contracts 
conferring sovereignty upon the husband. With no legitimate (ie. contractual) 
authority within the household itself and no possibility of establishing any, law must 
govern within the family in the same way and to the extent as within the marketplace. 
45 	Cf. Rousseau's belief that, should women attempt to sustain equality with men, the 
inevitable outcome was their subjection to men. The only alternative to willing and 
voluntary submission was subjugation by force. It follows, therefore, that women 
submit to men because it is to their advantage - given the alternative, absolute 
subjugation by force (rape?). Rousseau, Emile, loc. cit., 134. Rousseau's educational 
project is specifically designed to eliminate this oscillation between contract and 
violence. See Ch. 8. 
46 	Hobbes, /c.c. cit., 324-26. 
218 
household in the absence of clear and authoritative rules regarding matters of common 
concern. The wills of both men and women were arbitrary and self-interested, and because of 
the emotional substratum of family life, disputes between them concerning matters of mutual 
concern might be thought to be less capable of rational solution than disputes among men. 
• Thus, paradoxically, because family relationships were emotional and fluid, order within the 
family depended upon the contractual vesting of authority in matters of common concern upon 
one adult member, whom Locke identified as the husband. What is very much less clear on 
Locke's account than on that of Hobbes is why this familial vesting of authority in the husband 
denied to the wife the capacity to participate in civil society as an equal. For Locke only wives 
(women?) and slaves lacked utterly civil capacity. Locke explicitly attributes the slave's lack of 
capacity to his lack of property, extending even to property in his own life and person. 47 What, 
exactly, is it that women yield up to their husbands in the marriage contract? Unlike slaves, 
wives retained power over their own lives, and might by contract or custom possess the liberty 
to separate from their husbands. 48 What feature of the husband's authority over matters of 
common concern eradicated civil capacity? One can only suggest that wives having yielded up 
their 'executive authority' (will?) to their husbands in matters of common concern 
simultaneously authorized their husbands to represent them, and they for that reason lacked 
the capacity, as with Hobbes, to participate in the formation of civil society. 
ROUSSEAU AND THE ORIGIN OF FAMILIES 
In the contractarian vision of Rousseau, the ideal was to realize that liberty consistent 
with a like liberty for all. Independence, both moral and economic, was essential. Liberty was 
to be secured through the formal and explicit downgrading and public denial of recognition 
and legitimacy to all interests which were incompatible with the demands of autonomy as a 
theoretical idea1.49 Young children were naturally dependent and in need of adult support 
and protection. Their lack of public status was easy to justify, since, by definition, they were 
47 	Locke, /oc. cit., 366. 
48 	Is this, perhaps, another inconsistency, albeit minor? If women ceded up their 
property in their own persons, even extending to life and death, as in the classic slave 
contract, would this ultimately have obliterated the distinction Locke sought to draw 
between conjugal authority and political authority, deprived him of the substance of 
his argument against Filmer? Whereas Filmer had derived the authority of the state 
directly from patriarchal authority, seeking to legitimate thereby monarchic rule, 
Locke argued that authority within the family and authority within the state were 
fundamentally distinct. While the state possessed legislative capacity and had the 
power of life and death over those subject to it, the father lacked both legislative 
authority and power over life and death. 
49 	On Rousseau's fear that partial societies within the state would subvert the expression 
of the general will, see Rousseau, The Essential Rousseau, loc. cit., 27 where he notes 
that 'when there are factions, lesser associations detrimental to the greater one, the will of 
each of them becomes general in relation to its members and particular in relation to the 
state.' As Rousseau himself recognized, this demand ultimately reflected his desire 
that each citizen maintain an absolutely independent cast of mind and judgment. 
219 
not equals. Justifying the subordination of women would appear more difficult and 
ambiguous, since Rousseau quite unambiguously emphasized the equality of women and men 
in the 'state of nature'.5° It is worth exploring how this was done and the steps by which 
women came to be excluded from the social contract. 
The transition from nature to society was mediated by a critical development, private 
property. Rousseau's account of the origins of property is striking. In his historical 
anthropology, as proto-humans gradually became more social and more industrious, they 
began to use tools and constructed huts. Out of these developments, he argued, came the 
period of a first revolutionary change that established and distinguished 
families, and introduceA a kind of property, in itself the source of much 
quarrelling and fighting. " 1 
Of what kind of property is Rousseau speaking, wattle and daub huts, or a development 
equally critical to his philosophical anthropology, the origin of families, or both? For 
Rousseau the development of proprietary relationships and family relationships seem 
conceptually interwoven, at least in their consequences for human beings. By the next 
paragraph both the pre-social equality between men and women and the proto-families which 
followed have been replaced by the patriarchal family. Rousseau tells us that the 
women grew more sedentary and became accustomed to keeping the hut and 
the children while the men went off in search of food for all. 2 
Charvet comments that this 
primitive social condition [which] Rousseau sees . . . as sort of golden age plays 
an important role in his thought about social man.. .. Something of the same 
idea, that is of economically self-sufficient families enjoying an independent, i.e. 
non-essential intercourse with each other recurs from time to time in his various 
writings as an ideal human existence. It is an existence which is clearly both 
human and social, and yet at the same time lacks most of the comtpting and 
competitive pressures of society associated with the activity of our amour-propre 
and the dependence of men on each other. 53 
What is significant is the degree to which this supposedly idyllic vision contains all the 
ingredients which foreshadow its destruction. First, while men and families remain 
independent and self-sufficient women have become dependent upon male provision, a 
profound contrast to Rousseau's earlier description of a life style in which men and women 
came together only for sexual encounters and in which women provided for themselves and 
50 	Rousseau, The Essential Rousseau, loc. cit., 157-158. 
51 	Ibid., 176. 
52 	Ibid., 176-177. 
53 	Charvet, /oc. cit., 22 
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their children unaided. Dependence, specifically the dependence of women upon men, is 
already present in this golden age, as are specialization and a primitive division of labour. 54 
Surely, the golden age is long past, given that Rousseau argued that 
as soon as one man realized that it was useful to have enough provisions for 
two, equality disappeare4 property came into being work became necessary, 
and vast forests were changed into smiling fiel . . in which slavery and 
poverty soon germinated and grew with the crops. 
Likewise, whilst Rousseau asserts that the establishment of families brings profound benefits 
in the form of conjugal love and paternal affection, this seems contradictory in light of his 
earlier assertion that 'only in society has love, like all the other passions, acquired the impetuous 
ardor that so often makes it harmful to men, '56 serious strife over sexual partners being unlikely 
prior to the advent of relatively complex forms of social life.57 In society, however, 
the jealousy of lovers and the vengeance of husbands daily cause duels, 
murders, and even worse; . . . the duty of eternal fidelity only gives rise to 
adultery; and. . . the very laws of continence and honor necessarily increase 
debauchery and multiply the number of abortions. 58 
His own logic, therefore, traces the origins of inequality to the establishment of families. It 
suggests further that the development of private property and of family life are conceptually 
intertwined, and that, whatever the benefits derived from these linked developments, the costs 
outweigh them. 
Despite this, as will be seen in the next chapter, both his educational project and his 
social contract theory are dedicated to the reestablishment, not of the state of nature, but of 
this 'golden age', peopled he suggests by 'true children of love and leisure'. 59 Here, men have 
become fully human, both human emotions and human capacities fully in play. Despite the 
appearance of jealousy and discord along with love and other gentle sentiments, this era 
54 	On the evils of dependence and their relationship to the social division of labour, see 
Rousseau, The Essential Rousseau, loc. cit., 179-183. Cf. Charvet, /oc. cit., 22-23. 
55 	Rousseau, The Essential Rousseau, loc. cit., 180. 
56 	Ibid., 168, 176-177. 
57 	Rousseau explicitly notes that in relatively simple societies, such as that of the 
`Caribeans' the sexual passions do not lead to jealousy and quarrelling. Something 
similar is undoubtedly at work in his description of the men and women of his early 
idealized families singing and dancing together, 'me children of love and leisure'. 
Ibid., 168, 178. Only as social relations become more intense, competitive and 
enduring, only when men are compelled to cooperate in order to survive do the 
destructive passions predominate, necessitating law and justice. Ibid., 169, cf. 180. 
58 	Ibid., 169. 
59 	Ibid., 178. 
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midway between the indolence of the original state and the irrepressible activity 
of our egotism, must have been mankind's happiest and most stable epoch. 6° 
The benefits were noted earlier, the advent of conjugal and paternal love. With the advent of 
family life, men become fathers, a crucial development. Rousseau comments in passing upon 
the concern of paternal authority with the welfare of the child, and the inexorable progress of 
the relationship between father and child (son?) towards equality. He notes further that 
rather than saying that civil society derives from paternal authority, we ought to 
say that the latter draws its greatest strength from the former. No man was ever 
recognized as the father of several children until children began remaining with 
their fathers.ul 
What Rousseau appears to be trying to suggest is that the development of the passions is 
essential, even if this first development carries within itself the seeds of all man's destructive 
tendencies. The social question then, is how these benefits may best be realized while 
minimizing the costs. Rousseau desires to preserve the love and concern manifest by father 
for child, in order that they may be implanted in the wider society, and to safeguard against the 
jealousy and lust for power over others which have accompanied their development. 
Dependence and an almost contemporary division of labour appear unexceptional within 
families. Rousseau introduces them without comment and in the course of a single line. Why 
do these same phenomena become pernicious when they permeate relationships among men 
and why must they be reinforced and safeguarded in the relationships between men and 
women? Why is it that men and women can engage in cooperative relationships without 
socially destructive effects, while cooperative relationships among men inevitably lead to the 
need for laws and for the rules of justice?62 If we can answer these questions, we shall be 
much closer to understanding the way in which these ideals demanded the excision of women 
from the body politic. 
FROM NATURAL EOUALITY TO CIVIL SUBORDINATION 
Early social contract theory is marked by two features. In the state of nature, equality 
was both natural and universal with respect to adult individuals. In civil society, this natural 
equality has been replaced by full formal equality among men, and by the inequality of women 
and their excision from the body politic. Logically, if early liberals had remained faithful to 
their purportedly individualistic premises, and to their insistence that men and women were 
equal in the stateof nature, women should have been equal parties to the social contract and 
their rights protected by it. Equally uniformly, they were not, but submerged in family 
relationships. The choice may have been between civil inequality and the exclusion of law 
60 	Ibid., 179. 
61 	Ibid., 190. 
62 	Ibid., 181. Cf. n. 26 and the associated text. 
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from family relationships, or fully civil equality and the implementation of a full legal regime 
within the family. No alternative existed, given prevalent assumptions about human nature. If 
women were to be equals in civil society they must be perceived as remaining similar to men. 
Given prevailing assumptions concerning human nature, taking such a step would have ratified 
their natural equality and specifically affirmed women as independent, competitive, acquisitive 
beings who would naturally strive to realize their interests in competition with men. Equally 
rational and equally independent, women would not willingly submit to any restriction to which 
men did not submit. Like men, they would recognize no interpersonal obligations other than 
those created by contract, would be bound only by their own consent. The natural inequality 
of children would render them pawns at the mercy of their parents' interests. If competition 
was to prevail within family groups as without, the image of domestic bliss must be replaced 
with that of potential strife. As with market relationships, should disputes arise, these must be 
resolved by law. If no natural internal authority existed within the family, if family 
relationships were simply consensual relationships between two independent legal persons, 
establishing the concrete terms and incidents of marriage would be a matter for private law, 
freedom of contract prevailing. While, as with private commercial contracts, wills or trusts, the 
state would have power to establish what must be done for marriage to have legal force, it 
could not impose a common contract upon all those who desired to marry, any more that it 
could establish the particular terms and conditions of every commercial contract, will or trust. 
Early liberal thinkers instead affirmed the independence of men, and the dependence 
of women. If only men were independent, they could agree to regulate family relationships 
amongst themselves, protect their interest in the integrity and security of their households 
from the potentially unrestrained passions of other men. Because married women had no 
independent public existence, were effectively chattels, the state might intervene to protect the 
family against outsiders, but its power did not extend inside the household itself. Private 
freedoms remained secure. The control of husband and father over wife and children 
maintained his independence and authority. The force of sexual desire threatened cooperative 
relationships among men unless, like conflict over other species of property, it was governed by 
the rule of law. The problem was simple. Access to women must be regulated by rules to 
prevent conflict and establish paternity, however the necessary regulation threatened to 
destroy altogether the existence of a realm of private freedom unless the authority of the state 
ended outside the household itself. If women were equally public persons and entitled to 
demand that their agreements with their husbands be enforced according to their terms, no 
such limits existed. 
The tension between the need for control and the demand for liberty was resolved by 
denying women independent legal personality. Control over women became a prerequisite to 
masculine cooperation. Control over sexuality and sexual relationships could be reconciled 
with individual liberty if men have essentially absolute authority over women, if women are 
compelled to rely upon them for support and protection. Masculine authority over women in 
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turn, secured paternity and made possible the transmission of property from generation to 
generation. If women were acknowledged to have equal rights and liberties in civil society, 
male authority over them must be seen as unjust. Despite their natural liberty and equality in 
the state of nature, these must be realized through voluntary submission to the rule of the 
husband. In the private marital contract (a contract between equals) the wife ceded her 
natural liberty to her husband in exchange for his support and protection. The civilly instituted 
marital contract parallelled the social contract, except, of course, in Rousseau, who remained 
ambivalent.63 If every woman was subject to the rule of either her husband or her father, and 
every man subject to the laws of the state, the rule of law would replace the uncertainty and 
chaos of the state of nature. 
The liberal vision of the just commonwealth depended both upon the idea that, by 
contract, equals agreed to relinquish their natural liberty to the state, empowering it to resolve 
conflicts among them, and upon the necessity for a single standard from which could be 
derived the specific rules needed in civil society. Despite the explicit denials of early liberal 
thinkers, the authority of the state was (and is) very like the authority of the father in 
patriarchal pre-liberal society. Just as the stability and justice of civil society depended upon a 
single legitimate source of authority with the capacity to resolve conflicts among its members 
in a way which was fair to all, conflicts within the private society of the household could only be 
avoided or resolved if a single standard or authority existed there as well. This authority was 
the father, and his power was preserved and entrenched by denying that women were parties 
to the social contract and entitled to rank as public persons within civil society. This both 
secured the position of husband and father within the family, and established a zone of private 
freedom within which the authority of the state could not run. Even this ordered vision, one 
based upon the need for a single authoritative standard to order the competition of arbitrary 
wills, however, fails to answer one last question. Given that the husband possessed essentially 
absolute power within the household, and given that unconstrained by law, his will was 
63 	Rousseau oscillated between a sentimentalized vision of the family and a vision of 
marriage as a civil contract. In 'Discourse on the Origins of Inequality Among Men' 
he described the family as a 'small society, all the better united because mutual 
attachment and freedom were its only ties.' Ibid., 177. Here, there is no suggestion of 
promises, of mutual obligations, of a contractual relationship between man and 
woman. Rather, the image is wholly sentimentalized, focuses upon the development 
of conjugal and paternal love. (Maternal love, presumably, took care of itself.) By the 
time he wrote 'The Social Contract', however, while acknowledging that the family is 
the only natural society, the imagery has wholly altered. Having described the family 
as the only natural society, he goes on to state that 'the family is the first model of 
political societies: The father corresponds to the ruler, the children to the people; and all, 
having been born free and equal, give up their freedom only for their own advantage.' 
Several elements are, however, notable. First, woman has become invisible. Second, 
the image of bargain or contract has been extended to the children. The tacit claim is 
that (male) children obey the commands of the father in order to secure a share in 
their patrimony. Finally, in his accompanying notes, he defends the civil nature of 
marriage, asserting that 'marriage . . . being a civil contract, has civil effects without 
which society cannot even exist.' Ibid., 9 & 123. 
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necessarily arbitrary, why was the family not perceived as a miniature state of nature in which 
life remained nasty, brutish and short, and not the idyll of affect and contentment suggested by 
Locke and Rousseau at least? How did the fraternal bond of the social contract eradicate 
this? Why were men believed more likely to exhibit restraint within the family, that domain 
where affect reigned supreme and reason played a subordinate role, than in their relationship 
with their fellow men? Why was emotion less dangerous here? Rousseau came closest to 
answering this question, and, as we shall see in the next chapter, his answers are profoundly 
revealing. 
Contemporary statistics on domestic violence suggest that in altogether too many 
households the family remains a limited state of nature in which life remains nasty, 
brutish and short. Where retaliation eventually occurs, of course, it is often fatal. 
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CHAPTER 8 
FORCING MEN TO BE FREE - THE EDUCATION OF CITIZENS 
INTRODUCTION 
In the last chapter, having come to the realization that any attempt to develop an 
egalitarian account of marriage within the theoretical structures offered by Rawls and Dworkin 
drew us towards an account of marriage and family life in which obligations were spelled out 
and made fully concrete and particular, and in which those obligations were a legitimate 
matter of public concern, we returned to early social contract theory and explored the 
treatment of marriage and family relationships contained therein. As we explored the 
accounts offered by Hobbes and Locke in particular, we recognized that two very different 
interpretations were available of the marriage contract in early social contract theory, one 
emphasizing subjugation compelled by force and the other emphasizing the irrationality of the 
passions and the threat posed by love and intimacy to relationships among men. While these 
accounts did offer an alternative designed to avert the possibility that family relationships 
would simply be assimilated to ordinary exchange relationships in civil society, or, alternatively, 
subject to a detailed legislative regime to ensure equality prevailed, neither is compatible with 
the egalitarian suppositions of contemporary theorists. Now it is time to turn to another, very 
different account, one which endeavours to escape the alternatives posed by Hobbes and 
Locke and which seems, at least on its surface, more compatible with some of the structural 
assumptions of contemporary theorists. 
Unlike Hobbes and Locke, Rousseau confronted many of the implications of the 
liberal account of human nature directly, and, in particular, attempted to come to terms with 
the full implications of many of its more central assumptions: the spectre of competing and 
arbitrary interests and wills, the dichotomy between reason and passion, the full implications of 
an account of human beings which insisted that obligations originated in the will of the 
individual. For Rousseau, the central question was how individuals could live together in 
community and yet, at least subjectively, remain free. If his solutions remain fundamentally 
unsatisfying, and curiously anti-liberal in their implications, his questions remain both accurate 
and profound. Indeed, I believe it is fair to suggest that Rousseau set the agenda for 
contemporary egalitarian theory, and that the problems he posed and the questions he sought 
to answer have yet to be resolved satisfactorily. As we explore Rousseau's account of human 
nature, his account of the just society, and his account of marriage and family life, two factors 
must be kept in mind. Rousseau sought to avert both the potential for subjugation by force 
always present in Hobbes and that of a state ultimately governed by shifting alliances of 
arbitrary interests and wills underlying Locke. Second, he sought an account of marriage and 
family life which simultaneously ensured that it would remain private, beyond the reach of law, 
and which did not simply collapse into subjugation by, force. Because Rousseau confronted 
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questions such as these directly, and because many of his ideas fmd direct parallels in the 
arguments put today by Rawls and Dworkin, it is important that we explore his account in 
some depth and begin to trace the connections which may be drawn. 
Rousseau came closest to expressing the theoretical imperative underlying the 
exclusion of women and displayed the most sophisticated understanding of why it was 
essential. In his ideal vision of a community of equal citizens, equality and submission to the 
general will could only be achieved by downgrading and defeating all those conflicting aims 
and interests which might interfere with its realization. Citizens, he realized, at least citizens of 
the liberal republic, must be made. No one was born a citizen, indeed, men must be forced to 
be free.1 While Rousseau is easy to dismiss as the liberal patriarch par excellence, this 
dismissal is facile and suggests a failure to come to terms with the problematic nature of 
certain liberal ideals. Uniquely among early social contract theorists, Rousseau fully 
understood the ideological imperative implicit in liberal ideals. 
Liberalism could not remain merely a weak set of universal norms which seried the 
minimal function of securing the individual against force, coercion and fraud. Weak norms 
such as these were lacking in two quite different respects. First, they lacked the moral stature 
needed if independent individuals were to realize themselves as a community of equal citizens. 
If men obeyed the law solely out of fear and out of the need for protection against their 
fellows, they would be no more than slaves. Rather than obeying a law they gave to 
themselves, which Rousseau defined as freedom, they would be subjects. Second, and far 
more importantly, such norms were incapable of resolving the problem of independence. If 
liberalism demanded no more than universal norms of liberty and formal equality, true 
independence could not be realized. Men would remain dependent upon the good will and 
opinion of others and this was sufficient to compromise their independence. For Rousseau, 
the virtuous man, and, a fortiori, the virtuous citizen was ultimately answerable only to his own 
conscience or moral sentiment. He who depended upon the good will of others in order to 
survive was nothing more than a slave. He would act, not from conscience or duty or moral 
sentiment, but out of his subjective need to maintain the good opinion of others. The 
1 	For Rousseau, the central dilemma posed by human society was reconciling the innate 
and inviolable independence and freedom of the natural human individual with the 
restrictions of civil society. According to Rousseau, 'since no man has natural 
authority over any other, and since force creates no right, we can only conclude that 
agreements are the basis of all legitimate authority among men.' [Emphasis mine.] See 
Rousseau, The Essential Rousseau, loc. cit., 12. On the nature of the citizen's 
obligation to the 'sovereign', and upon the supreme danger to the body political posed 
by the conflict between the partial private interests of the individual and the general 
will he asserts, 'in order, therefore, that the social pact shall not be an empty fonnality, it 
tacitly includes one stipulation without which all the others would be ineffectual: that 
anyone who refuses to obey the general will shall be compelled to do so by the whole 
body. This means nothing else than that he shall be forced to be free, for such is the 
condition which gives each citizen to his country and thus secures him against all 
personal dependence.' See pp. 19 -20. 
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imperative of independence, of the autonomous individual, demanded a positive and 
substantive commitment to equality and to the eradication of all competing ideologies. As a 
participant in the general will, man's highest duties and most profound responsibilities must be 
to the government and well-being of the state. 2 If the virtuous individual was he who 
depended solely upon his own capabilities to survive, who heeded his inner voice or 
conscience, and pursued thereby his true interests, the general will of a community of such 
individuals would represent equally for each a law he gave himself. Each individual would be 
truly autonomous. In obeying the laws of the state as expressed through the general will, he 
would necessarily act to further his true interests and be answerable to nothing but his own 
conscience.3 
Rousseau's concern with the moral imperative behind independence and his belief 
that only fully autonomous individuals were fitted to be the citizens required by the ideal 
republic induced him to deal at length with the care and education of children. First and 
foremost, the goal of education was to ensure the development of men who realized their 
natural independence and autonomy!' If man as individual and man as citizen were to be 
reconciled without corrupting man's nature, man must first realize his natural goodness fully. 
Only such men would have the independence of mind and spirit to ensure that the state 
remained just and did not destroy the liberty of its citizens. Only they could participate 
authentically in the general will. Thus, in Emile, he argued that boys were to be educated to 
freedom, that the moral habit of independence of spirit and judgment could only be achieved 
2 	If man were to gain moral freedom from his role as citizen, specifically freedom from 
his appetites and from the danger that they would lead him into dependence upon 
other, and gain the moral stature which attends obedience to duty, the republic itself 
must be constituted so as to make this possible. Thus, Rousseau emphasizes the 
necessity of 'a high degree of equality in rank and wealth, without which equality in 
rights and authority could not last long. And finally, little or no luxury, for luxury is 
either the effect of wealth or makes wealth necessary; it corrupts both the rich and the 
poor: the former by possessiveness, the latter by covetousness; it sells the country to 
indolence and vanity; it deprives the state of all its citizens by enslaving some to others, 
and all to public opinion.' Ibid., 57. Equality was not merely, in his vision, a formal 
ideal, it was a substantive moral imperative. 
Rousseau envisioned law (as established by the general will) as an internal moral 
constraint on individual conduct. In the society foreshadowed by the social contract 
the restrictions imposed by law would be identical to the restrictions imposed by the 
conscience of the individual. Unlike Hobbes, for example, he did not view law as 
simply putting up the costs of the actions it forbade. 
Early in Emile, while discussing the obligation of the father to educate his children 
(read sons), Rousseau asserts: 'A father has only done a third of his duty when he 
begets children and makes provision for them. To his species, he owes men; to society, 
he owes social beings; to the state he owes citizens.' Rousseau, Enzi/c, /oc. cit., 18. 
Rousseau believed that only men who had been educated to realize their natural 
independence could truly be worthy citizens, precisely because, as he said, 'liberty is 
not to be found in any form of government. It is in the heart of the free ',Ian.' Ibid., p. 
165. Such a man might truly realize the benefits of the civil state and would willingly 
dedicate his life to it. 
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through careful and consistent guidance and training so that the child came to do what was 
right as if he had discovered it for himself. At every stage the illusion must be fostered that it 
is the child, and not the tutor, who is in control. Like the citizen, the child must be forced to 
be free. Rousseau's romantic model for the education of the wealthy and orphaned Emile 
parallels the rationalist ideal of attaining true freedom through obedience to self-given laws. 
Just as Emile was to become both free and independent through carefully concealed guidance 
designed to ensure that he would, as if of his own will, follow the correct path, citizens, through 
their voluntary submission to the general will, would realize true independence. 5 
Rousseau's account of the education of Emile bears a striking resemblance to the 
conception of the individual which dominates the contractarian state of nature. Ideally, he 
encounters the natural world alone and nature is his only teacher.6 Through his developing 
rational powers, he unlocks the secrets of nature, conquers the natural world and achieves 
control over it. For Rousseau, `the true freeman wants only what he can get, and does only what 
pleases him.'7 Throughout these passages, the emphasis remains upon what the individual can 
obtain unaided, solely through the use of his own powers. He must be thwarted only by 
natural obstacles. Rousseau believes that 
there are two kinds of dependence: dependence on things, which is natural, and 
dependence on men, which is social. Dependence on things being non-moral is 
not prejudicial to freedom and engenders no vices: dependence on men being 
capricious engenders them al1.8 
For Rousseau, 'obedience to self-given law [was] freedom. ° Like the individuals in the 
state of nature, Emile has no binding affective ties, no experience of the mutual pleasures and 
enduring bonds of family life. He has neither natural relationships nor natural obligations. 
5 	Rousseau believed that true education took place only when the child was required to 
learn nothing, and therefore learned only what he 'felt to be of actual and present 
advantage'. Ibid., 51. 
6 	Cf. Rousseau, The Essential Rousseau, loc. cit., 162, where he comments 'it is 
impossible to imagine why, in that primitive state, one man should need another any 
more than a monkey or wolf needs another of its kind; or, assuming such a need, what 
might induce the other man to satisfy it; or, if he was willing to do so, how the two of 
them could agree on the conditions.' 
7 	Rousseau, Emile, loc. cit. 35. 
8 	Ibid. It is critical to note that Rousseau believed that, in society, dependence upon 
others could only be subverted through dependence upon the law of the state, upon 
the realized general will, because this represented the jurisgenerative capacity of the 
individual. Cf. Rousseau, The Essential Rousseau, loc. cit., 17-18, where Rousseau 
speaks of the social contract as one in which each man surrenders himself with all his 
rights to the whole community, p. 20 where this total surrender is stated to secure him 
against 'all personal dependence.' 
9 	Ibid., 21. 
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Binding emotional ties and dependence upon the actions and the opinions of others corrupted 
the drive to freedom and made authentic independence of mind, spirit and body unattainable. 
Those guided by the opinions of others were not free and for that reason were not fitted to act 
as citizens, participate in the general will. They abrogated their own rationality. Children 
must be educated by nature, allowed to discover the principles of proper conduct and 
understanding uninfluenced by the corrupt world around them. In particular, young boys must 
be shielded from the temptation to their own sexuality posed by women until they have 
attained mature and rational judgment. 10 Just as the laws of nature guided the human 
children of Rousseau's imagined pre-social world, they must guide the education of the young 
Emile. In this way male children were to become both natural men and, ultimately, virtuous 
citizens. 
The education of young girls was very differently conceived. No hint of natural 
freedom, of independence remained. If the virtuous man depended solely upon things and 
never upon the opinions of others, the virtuous woman must be wholly ruled by the opinions of 
others. Girls were destined to become the mothers of future citizens, and their education must 
be shaped to ensure their fitness for this role. Here too, nature must guide education, but for 
girls the only natural facts of importance related to their reproductive role and what Rousseau 
believed to be an innate tendency towards self-adornment and the development of domestic 
slcills.11  Thus, despite the absolute equality and independence of both sexes in the pre-social 
state, Rousseau's concern is to prepare girls to become the virtuous wives and mothers 
required by patriarchal society. 12 Unlike Emile, Sophie was not an orphan but blessed with 
10 	Significantly, given the symbolic connection between woman and nature, the 
occupation chosen to divert Emile from premature pre-occupation with sexuality is 
hunting. Rousseau justifies selection of what he characterizes as a 'cruel passion' by 
asserting that 'it is enough for me that it serves to hold back a more dangerous passion 
and allows him to listen to me calmly when I speak about it.' Rousseau, Emile, loc. cit.. 
119-120. 
11 
12 
Ibid., 137-141. 
Here it is important to contrast the description of pre-social woman in the 'Discourse' 
with the description of social woman in 'Emile'. In describing the transition from 
natural, proto-human freedom to primitive patriarchy, Rousseau notes 'this was the 
time when the first differences appeared in the two sexes' way of living which had 
previously been the same.' See Rousseau, The Essential Rousseau, loc. cit. 176. This 
passage ought to be contrasted with the following passages from Emile. After noting 
that 'in everything that does not relate to sex the woman is as the man: they are alike in 
organs, needs and capabilities', Rousseau continues 'it is the part of the one to be active 
and strong and of the other to be passive and weak. Accept this principle and it follows 
in the second place that woman is intended to please man. . . . This is not the law of 
love, I admit. But it is the law of nature. . .' Rousseau, Emile loc. cit., 131. These 
passages raise a very simple question. What is it about civil society that has the 
capacity to alter the nature of woman, and, further to the point, why is this change 
desirable? The answer follows directly. As Rousseau notes, 'by giving woman the 
capacity to stimulate desires greater than can be satisfied nature has made man 
dependent on woman's good will and constrained him to seek to please her as a 
condition of her submission.' Ibid., 132. Rousseau's statement of the problem is clear. 
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parents and siblings she must learn to serve. Submission and self-sacrifice cannot be learned 
in isolation. Girls were to be trained and educated, not to independence, but to the 
recognition that their lives and their happiness depended upon their capacity to please a man 
and secure his continued support and care for themselves and their children. For them, 
nothing should be of greater importance than the good opinion of others. 
Rousseau did not go beyond this and assert that women were incapable of 
independence and citizenship. For women, independence and citizenship were inappropriate, 
not impossible. 13 If such attainments were beyond women, it would not have been nearly so 
important to ensure that all traces of independence were eradicated. Rather, he claimed that 
these ideals were inappropriate applied to women and that their realization would destroy the 
private world of the household and the family and inevitably lead to the corruption of both 
men and women. Rousseau argued that the education of girls ought to reflect their future 
roles as wives and mothers, offering as proof his belief that 
on the good constitution of the mothers depends that of the children and the 
early education of men is in their hands. On women too depend the morals, the 
passions, the tastes, the pleasures, aye and the happiness of men. For this 
reason their education must be wholly directed to their relations with men. To 
give them pleasure, to be useful to them, to win their love and esteem, to train 
them in their childhood, to care for them when they grow up, to give them 
counsel and consolation, to make life sweet and agreeable for them: these are 
the tasks of women in all times for which they should be trained from 
childhood. 14 
For Rousseau, this constellation of attitudes and attributes was far more critical than for other 
social contract theorists because he believed that the just state depended upon far more than 
contract, it depended upon the devotion of the citizen to the state, and this devotion originated 
in the experience of love and loyalty within the home. 15 
ROUSSEAU AND THE NATURE OF LOVE 
In an imagined pre-social world, male and female are equal. With the beginning of 
society, and that dependence which attended the need for a particular other, male and 
female were no longer equal. Because women aroused male sexual desires and need 
not satisfy them, p. 132, because fatherhood was seen as the connection between the 
individual and the wider community and it depended both upon female morality and 
upon the mother's proper performance of the maternal role, p. 16, a natural 
imbalance developed. The balance could only be restored by ensuring that women 
devoted their lives to pleasing men, thus, I would suggest, restoring for Rousseau the 
initial position of equality. Ibid., 134-135. Cf. Rousseau, The Social Contract, loc. cit., 
250. 
13 	Cf. Rousseau, Emile, loc. cit, 134 where Rousseau acknowledges that women have the 
capacity to be educated in the same way as men. 
14 	Ibid., 135. Rousseau anticipated both the separate spheres ideology and the 
conception of motherhood as a vocation discussed in Ch. 5. Here, as elsewhere, his 
prescience is remarkable. 
15 	Rousseau, Emile, loc. cit., 133. 
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Uniquely among early social contract theorists, Rousseau sought and account both of 
the state and of family life which recognized the importance of the passions, and recognized 
equally that to be fully human was also to be fully social, a member of a community. His 
attempt to reconcile the potential for conflict created by our (arbitrary) passions and the 
relationship of our social emotions to the possibility for moral conduct led him to deal at 
length with family life and with love in Emile. It is significant that, in his educational programs 
for boys and girls, Rousseau is recreating and synthesizing two very different periods in his 
historical anthropology. The model for the education of boys reflects the natural freedom of 
the proto-human state, when man's needs were limited to food, a female, and rest. 16 Yet 
Rousseau idealizes, not this period, but that which replaced it, the golden age in which the first 
patriarchal families emerged, and in which both man's intellect and his passions were first 
stirred.17 For Rousseau the problem was both to educate a natural man who might grow up 
free of the vices to which social men were prey, yet to do this in such a way that the intellectual 
powers and moral sentiments essential to social man might flourish, uncorrupted by the vices 
which he had previously argued inevitably attended them. 18 In light of his desire to preserve 
both the absolute independence characteristic of the pre-social state, and to attain the 
intellectual and moral benefits which could only arise in the social state, an avenue had to be 
found through which the harmful and corrupting elements in the passions might be 
transformed and given a positive role. This was the family, a purified and idealized family in 
which no possible occasion arose to stir destructive passions such as jealousy. 19 His intent is 
made clear when, in Emile, he stimulates his pupil's imagination with the image of an 'ideal 
woman', Sophie. About this Rousseau comments, 
people are more in love with the image they make for themselves than with its 
object. To see what we love exactly as it is, would make an end of love on the 
earth. 20 
16 	Rousseau, The Essential Rousseau, loc. cit., 154. Cf. pp. 155-172. 
17 	Ibid., 176-180. Here, it should be noted that I follow Charvet, /oc. cit. and Horowitz 
/oc. cit. in treating 'The Discourse upon the Origins of Inequality Among Men', 'The 
Social Contract' and Emile as both emblematic of Rousseau's fully mature thought 
and as inextricably linked. Essentially the 'Discourse' poses the problem to which 
Emile and the 'Social Contract' are, together, meant to provide the solution. 
18 	Ibid., 178-184. Cf. Ch. 7. 
19 	Cf. the discussion in Ch. 7. 
20 	Rousseau, Emile, loc. cit., 121. Cf. Charvet, /oc. cit., 111-117, esp. his comment at p. 
114 that 'love, for Rousseau, is not a relation in which both lovers are present to each 
other in respect of their real qualities, but in respect of ideal qualities which they do not 
possess, but which it is necessary for each to attribute to the other for then: to be capable 
of love at all.' 
232 
Charvet put the matter particularly clearly in his comments upon the nature of love in 
Rousseau's writings. He observes that, given Rousseau's ideal of detachment, 
the point is, however, that one possesses them and is not possessed . . . The 
enjoyment consists in having things and persons dependent on one and subject 
to one's control without oneself being dependent on them in return. ... There is 
no commitment of oneself to what one makes one's own, no external 
dependence and so no danger to oneself . . But this form of possession . . is 
none the less another fonn of personal imperialism. For it involves the attempt 
to appropriate the world and other without offering anything in return. In 
respect of human relationships it requires the dependence of the other, the 
commitment of the other to oneself but not one's own to the other. For in so 
far as both attempt to play the same game, there will be nothing for either to 
enjoy, the mere facade of a human relationship, in which each keeps himself 
securely apart. And a world of such men would be a barely human world, the 
mere empty shell of such a world, in which each, in trying to guard the treasured 
possession of his independent and purely s,elf-determined identity, is left 
guarding an empty chamber and a vacuous self 41 
Understanding the problematic of love in Rousseau, and its intimate relationship to the 
demand for independence, sheds substantial light upon precisely how and why, when Rousseau 
came to deal with the education of girls, no shadow remained of his early account of proto-
social freedom and absolute equality. As discussed earlier, in Rousseau's historical 
anthropology, both men and women were initially fully equal, capable of surviving on their own 
in an isolated and semi-nomadic existence. It has, in fact, been suggested that, if anything, 
women were more than merely equal in that they were easily able to provide for both 
themselves and their young unaided. 22 By Emile, the 'natural' woman is already a social 
being, a member of a family, trained from infancy to perceive herself solely in relation to 
others. The educational project for girls is designed to reproduce, not the proto-human 
natural woman, as capable of fending for herself as her mate, but the wives and mothers of 
patriarchal society, of Rousseau's golden age. This second stage has come to represent the 
'natural woman' and, indeed, Rousseau proceeds to argue that it is the law of nature that 
'woman is made to please and to be dominated', apparently because she is the passive partner 
in sexual relations.23 Still more tellingly, in following up his claim that women are made for 
obedience, he argues further that 
being destined to obey a being so imperfect as man (often with many vices and 
always with many shortcomings), she must learn to submit uncomplainingly to 
unjust treatment and marital wrongs. 24 
21 	Ibid., 117. 
22 	Oki, Women in Western Political Thought, loc. cit., 111. 
23 	Rousseau, Emile, loc. cit., 13L 
24 	Ibid., 140. 
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No two accounts could be more different. The education of boys was to enable them 
to realize their natural freedom, and, eventually, to enable them to be brought to full human 
maturity through the acquisition of the gentle passions, love and paternal affection. The 
education of girls was intended to instil docility, submission, and essentially unquestioning 
obedience and self-sacrifice. Men were destined through the realization of their natural 
freedom and the awakening of the moral passions to become both truly independent men and 
members of the state, women must aspire neither to independence nor to citizenship, but must 
perceive their entire existence relative to men. Again, it is necessary to ask why. Broome25 
suggests that Rousseau was simply reproducing male views as prevalent then as now that 
women ought to be assigned a domestic role, but neither this, nor his subsequent suggestion 
that woman's natural dependence (arising from her childbearing role) directs her self-interest 
towards always seeing herself as relative to man and seeking to please him to account 
for the fact that for Emile the rule of opinion is the enemy of morality, whilst for Sophie an 
almost unquestioning acceptance of authority and reliance upon the opinions of others is the 
only morality thinkable. To find answers, we must look rather further. 
In many ways, the education prescribed for Sophie serves dual purposes. Sophie who 
has been nurtured on illusion like Emile27 provides a mirror in which Emile may see himself 
larger and more perfect than life. Given Rousseau's description of her as having 'taste without 
study, talents without art, judgment without knowledge [and] a mind which is still vacant but has 
been trained to learn'28, it is difficult to imagine what else she might be. What she lacks, 
indeed, what her whole education has been devoted to ensuring that she might not develop, is 
the sort of independence Emile's entire education has been dedicated to fostering. If Emile is 
to represent the universal in mankind, the man who must remain inwardly apart from all 
particular attachments and passions29 since it these which engender dependence and all the 
vices to which social man is prey, Sophie represents the particular. She must evaluate her own 
conduct, not inwardly, but in terms of the responses of others, of the effect it produces. Thus, 
having argued that 'woman is made to please and to be dominated', the moral precept 
25 	J.H. Broome, Rousseau: A Study of His Thought, London, Edward Arnold 
(Publishers) Ltd. 1963, 98-99. 
26 	Ibid. 
27 	Cf. Rousseau, Emile, loc. cit., 152 where Rousseau specifies that Sophie has already 
fallen in love with a character in a romantic novel before she meets Emile. 
28 
29 
Ibid., 153. 
Cf. ibid., 160-161, where Emile is told that he must 'learn to lose whatever can be taken 
from you, and to rise above the chances in life. Then you will be happy in spite of 
fortune and wise in spite of passion. In the good things which are most fragile you will 
find a pleasure that nothing can disturb. They will not possess you but you will possess 
them; and you will find that in this passing world man only enjoys what he is ready to 
give up.' 
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immediately follows that 'she ought make herself agreeable to man and avoid provocation.' 30 
Her existence is to be entirely relative, relative first to the needs of her husband and lover, in 
that it is necessary for him to possess her but not be possessed by her, 31 and later to the needs 
of her children. Of the mother-child relationship, Rousseau observes 'no mother, no child32 
and shortly thereafter, 'the best nurse would be the mother if she were prepared to take her 
instructions from the tutor.'33 [Emphasis mine.] In any case, only one person ought to be in 
charge of the child throughout his education, and ideally that person is the father. 34 If the 
father is the tutor, and the mother, if the child is male, confined to the nurturing role in 
compliance with the precepts laid down by the father, the goal may be best attained. Hence, 
Sophie is to be taught to be industrious, instantly compliant to authority, used, as Rousseau 
says, 'to be stopped in the middle of [her] play and put to other tasks without protest. . . 35 
Indeed, until the age of reason, perhaps twelve or thirteen, 'good or bad for young women is 
36 only what those around them so regard. , At this point, external authority must be reconciled 
with conscience or moral sentiment, and this, Rousseau assures us, requires reason, but reason 
of a very limited kind. The sole precept required is simple: 
The obedience and loyalty she owes to her husband and the tender care she 
owes to her children are such obvious and natural consequences of her position 
that she cannot without bad faith refuse to listen to the inner sentiment which is 
her guide, nor fail to recognize her duty in her natural inclination. 37 
Presumably, then it is sufficient that woman be loyal and obedient, and willing to devote 
herself utterly to husband and children. The capacity for detachment and yielding to necessity 
essential to ensure the natural man would not become prey to the opinions of others and the 
desire to secure both things and others utterly, to bind them to oneself, has been replaced by 
the arational devotion of a faithful pet.38 
30 	Ibid., 131. 
31 	Cf. n. 27, and see also Charvet, /oc. cit., 111-117. 
32 	Rousseau, Emile, loc. cit., 17. 
33 	Ibid., 20. 
34 	Ibid., 18-19. 
35 	Ibid., 140. 
36 	Ibid., 146-147. 
37 	Ibid., 149. 
38 	Cf. the cost-benefit analysis of marriage of Darwin cited in Ch. 7. Rousseau himself 
apparently felt that the most essential attribute of the wife was willing submission to 
injustices and marital wrongs, again the essential characteristics of a devoted pet. 
Rousseau, Emile, ibid., 140. 
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When one recognizes that, for Rousseau, dependence upon the opinions of others is 
the ultimate vice, the source of all the evils to which social man is prey, it would appear that 
woman is to be trained for vice and immorality in order that man be the embodiment of virtue. 
Put another way, his virtue, in the social state, is profoundly dependent upon her vice. If this 
simplistic account were, in fact, accurate, its force would wholly undermine his theoretical 
structure since it would suggest that, not only is his ideal of independence incapable of 
realization, but also any attempt to realize it will bring a new and uniquely pernicious 
dependence in its wake, suggesting that human virtue ultimately depends upon evil and lack of 
virtue in others. This, however, does Rousseau a profound injustice. While he is often 
apparently inconsistent and occasionally even contradictory, here I am suggesting an 
inconsistency which goes to the core of his theoretical structure and which vitiates the ideals 
upon which it is based. For this reason, it is essential to attempt to understand how it can be 
that what, for Emile, is the ultimate vice, becomes, for Sophie, the highest form of virtue. 
Clearly, Rousseau believes that ideals of detachment and yielding to necessity cannot 
be reconciled either with the duties of marriage or with the care and nurture required by 
children and the inherent inequality of the mother-child relationship. Here, it is necessary to 
be cautious, if only because common sense suggests that paramount among those things which 
must, ultimately, be yielded up, are one's own children, as Rousseau himself emphasizes with 
respect to the paternal role. 39 A simplistic account will not suffice. Emile's willingness to 
yield to necessity, is parallelled in Sophie by her own carefully inculcated willingness to yield 
unquestioningly to authority, to put aside what she is doing without question and take up that 
which is required of her, so that yielding to his will becomes necessity. Rousseau is suggesting 
that a woman who sought to realize independence and freedom in her own life, who would not 
willingly submit to the will of any other and cared nothing for the opinion of those around her 
unless it mirrored her own40, would both be reluctant to sacrifice her own freedom to the 
needs of her children41 , and could not provide her husband with security in his reproductive 
role, thus enabling him to be secure in the experience of fatherhood. 42 Rousseau emphasizes 
that the wife 'forms a bond between father and child she alone can win the father's love for his 
39 	Rousseau, The Essential Rousseau, loc. cit., 9, where Rousseau emphasizes that the 
natural bonds uniting fathers and children last only so long as the children remain 
incapable of independence. 
40 	Cf. Charvet, /oc. cit., 111-113. 
41 	Cf. Rousseau's observation in Emile, loc. cit., 138, that women's way of life does not 
permit them to devote themselves to their talents at the expense of their duties. 
Contrast this with his earlier description of Emile at twelve or thirteen: 'Habit, routine 
and custom mean nothing to him. . . . He never follows a fired rule and never accepts 
authority or example. He only does or says what seems good to himself' Ibid., 67. 
42 	Ibid., 16. 
236 
children and convince him that they are indeed his own. 43, According to Rousseau, only a 
dependent and submissive wife would be able to convince her husband that the children of her 
body were the children of his body as well. Her role was to induce her husband to love his 
children and, Rousseau argued , this could only come about through his knowledge of her total 
submission and dependence upon him. 44 Love of children was not natural or instinctive, but 
acquired, a distinctively moral sentiment.45 While women ideally learned to love their 
children through the biological processes of gestation and subsequent care and feeding', men, 
lacking this concrete and immediate connection to the child, must achieve and sustain the 
paternal role. Rousseau intuitively grasped the dialectic implicit in reproductive relationships 
and sought synthesis through the submission of the wife to the mind and the will of her 
husband. Thus, for him, only the absolute submission of the wife to the will of her husband, 
only her overriding concern with how her conduct appeared to others, made the illusion of love 
possible. 
Rousseau's recognition of the conffict between independence and freedom and the 
demands of family life is extremely significant. Within the family, men, women and children, 
one would think, are bound together by ties of sentiment and by reciprocal needs and desires. 
As Rousseau recognizes, given the ideal of independence he has developed, 
every attachment is a token of insufficiency. Were it not that every one of us 
had need of other people, we would scarcely think of associating with them."3 
Thus, the conflict between Rousseau's ideal of the virtuous and independent natural man, and 
the mutual dependencies and reciprocal needs embodied in family life must be resolved. 
43 	Rousseau, Emile, (Foxley edition), /oc. cit., 324. 
44 	In 'Discourse on Political Economy' Rousseau summarized the reasons that the 
husband's rule within the family must be absolute. First, 'in every difference of opinion 
there must be a single voice to decide', second, even if one assumed substantial equality 
between man and woman, woman was, from time to time 'disabled' by her 
reproductive functions and this was sufficient to favour the man, third, and crucially, 
'the husband ought to be able to superintend his wife's conduct, because it is of 
importance for him to be assured that the children whom he is obliged to acknowledge 
and maintain, belong to no-one but himself' and finally, because children ought to be 
obedient to their father who has provided for them and provide for him, in turn, in his 
old age. See Rousseau, The Social Contract, loc. cit., 250. 
45 	Cf. Rousseau, The Essential Rousseau, loc. cit., 176, where Rousseau attributes 
conjugal and paternal love to the development of (patriarchal) families. 
46 	Rousseau, Emile, loc. cit., 16-17. 
47 	Ibid., 102. What he does not go on to state, is that which follows inexorably from the 
discovery of this insufficiency, given the ideal of independence. When attachments 
develop, when this insufficiency is recognized, independence is at once compromised. 
The opinion and esteem of the needed other become important, and the previously 
autonomous individual is compromised. This is particularly critical if the attachment 
deepens into love. Only if the 'love' is simply for an ideal, if no real encounter 
between authentic individuals exists, can independence be sustained. 
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Unlike most more recent representatives of male-stream thought, his arguments reflect a clear 
understanding that the ideal of the absolute independence of spirit and judgment he believed 
to be central both to individual virtue and to just public decisions and true public morality were 
impossible to reconcile with the conditions he himself believed to be necessary for the 
maintenance of family life and the nurturing of children. For the ideal woman to devote her 
existence entirely to the welfare of her children and to being for her husband only and never 
for herself is essential to the survival of family life as Rousseau envisions it, and further, and 
even more centrally, essential to the development of the conventional bonds upon which the just 
community is founded. She is both to forego the existential project of self-creation, and 
undertake, at least with respect to her husband, a project which comes perilously close to self-
immolation, total and willing submission to injustices and wrongs at his hands.' 8 
Rousseau's account of the education of the natural man and the 'natural' woman is 
designed to ensure that there is only one adult person within the family and that person is the 
husband. He exists for her as that being upon which her entire existence depends, she exists 
for him as ideal to be possessed, but in no way can she be said to exist as an individual in her 
own right. As Charvet suggests, in considering the degree to which Emile is capable of 
encountering and acknowledging the judgments of others, 
in so far as others may be important for him, it will be as backing for himself as 
extensions of his own judgement, and not as separate persons. Others will be 
important only as they reflect and support his own self-conception, so that they 
can be admitted only by being incorporated into his own identity for himself." 
If, in fact, the 'natural' woman must be no more than a mirror for her man, a reflection larger 
than life of his own self-conception, it becomes possible to reconcile the apparently conflicting 
descriptions of family life given in 'The Discourse on Inequality' and 'The Social Contract'. 
Whereas, in 'The Discourse' the family was a 'small society all the better united because mutual 
attachment and freedom were its only ties', by 'The Social Contract' the father has become the 
ruler, the children the people, and the mother has disappeared altogether. 5° Despite 
Rousseau's assertion in a much earlier work, 'The Discourse on Political Economy' 51, that 
democratic decision making within the family was out of the question because majority rule 
was impossible, here he has accounted for the absence of democracy within in the family in a 
much simpler way, effectively by the absence of the plurality of independent individuals 
necessary to constitute a democratic society. Within the family, the kingdom of the private 
48 	Cf. Oki, Women in Western Political Thought, loc. cit., 167-172, especially her 
references to the fates of Emile and Sophie in Rousseau's unfinished sequel, Les 
Solitaires. 
49 	Charvet, /oc. cit., 113. 
50 	Rousseau, The Essential Rousseau, loc. cit., 177, 9. 
51 	Rousseau, The Social Contract, loc. cit., 250-251. 
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household, only one autonomous individual exists, and he is destined to maintain dispassionate 
and rational authority over the household he rules, to rule it as he himself ought to be ruled by 
the general will. 
As Charvet suggests, with reference to Rousseau's essential project, that of reconciling 
natural and social man without reproducing the evils he himself perceived to attend the social 
state, recognition of particularity must be eradicated. 
He must always be able to treat the other as a mere duplication of himself, so 
that in acting for the other, he is not acting for a different individual with 
different ends, whom he wishes to please, but only for the (tract replica of 
himself and his own ends." 
Rousseau's account of the courtship of Emile and Sophie suggests that this is precisely the 
project he has undertaken. After describing the utter vacuity of Sophie's mind at the 
conclusion of her education, Rousseau comments: 
Happy is the man destined to instruct her. She will be her husband's disciple, 
not his teacher. Far from wanting to impose her tastes on him, she will share 
his. 
Subsequently, Rousseau describes Emile as attempting to teach Sophie everything he knows, 
commenting 'he assumes that he has only to talk and immediately she will listen. '53 Sophie is to 
become a replica of Emile, and most particularly, of his system of ends. Should she become a 
person in her own right, a person with ends and projects of her own, recognition of her 
essential individuality and particularity would, given Rousseau's ideal of independence, either 
compel Emile to abrogate his own independence in seeking to please her and thus becoming 
dependent upon her, lead to brutality on his part in enforcing his will, or, alternatively, compel 
him to withdraw altogether. 54 In demanding that her husband recognize her as an individual 
like himself, as one who possessed an independent system of ends, in seeking like him to avoid 
true commitment, to avoid becoming for the other and dependent upon him, no relationship 
between them could or would exist. Reconciliation of natural man and social man depends 
upon his self-creation, on the one hand, and her self-immolation on the other, for only in this 
way might natural man attain the benefits of the social state without falling prey to the evils 
which attend the full recognition of particularity. Hence it is, for Rousseau, that a woman's 
52 	Charvet, /oc. cit., 145. 
53 	Rousseau, Emile, loc. cit., 153, 156. 
54 	In fact, Rousseau himself foreshadowed this latter possibility in the uncompleted 
fragments of Les Solitaires. Sophie, having become depressed over the death of her 
daughter, is taken by Emile to Paris. After Emile breaks his marriage vows, Sophie, 
rejected, herself commits adultery. Emile, unable to bear the thought of Sophie's 
sharing her affection between his son and the child of another man, abandons both 
wife and child. See the discussion of these fragments in Oki, Women in Western 
Political Thought, loc. cit., 168-172. 
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honour depends not upon virtue and good conduct but upon reputation. While 'public opinion 
is the tomb of a man's virtue,. . [it is] the throne of a woman's. ,55 Only to the extent that she 
becomes that which it is desired that she be, can she sustain her honour, and he his 
independence. 
INDEPENDENCE AND THE NEED FOR THE OTHER 
If Rousseau can be defended against the conventional charge of misogyny, remarks 
such as these must be demonstrated to follow from the ideal of independence itself. As 
Rousseau recognizes, while the need of others follows from our nature as social animals and 
from our inability in the social state to meet all our needs without recourse to the society of 
others, once we have need of others we risk becoming dependent upon their good opinion. 
This, he believes leads men to subordinate their own judgment to public opinion, a 
subordination which enslaves them and destroys virtue. A truly virtuous man is one who 
desires only that which he can attain unaided and is answerable only to his own conscience. 
This poses a profound problem in the context of human sexuality. Once men and women 
formed enduring bonds of love and companionship, their absolute independence was 
seemingly inevitably compromised by their need for one another, as concrete and particular 
individuals. Rousseau sought to reconcile the socially constructed reality of family life with the 
ideals of independence and equality he believed to hold the key to human virtue and to 
ensuring that no man would be subject to domination by another. The conditions by which 
men became enslaved were clear. As he said, 
the bonds of servitude are formed only by men's mutual dependence and the 
reciprocal needs that unite them, it is impossible for one man to enslave another 
without first having made himself necessary to him. 56 
If, as he also recognized, within the socially constructed reality of the family, mutual 
dependence and reciprocal needs appear inevitable, man's independence appeared 
55 	The passage from which this extract comes is worth reproducing in full because it 
contains a number of remarkable admissions. 'Men and women are made for each 
other but they differ in the measure of their dependence on each other. We could get on 
better without women than women could get on without us. To play their part in life they 
must have our willing help, and for that they must earn our esteem. By the very law of 
nature women are at the mercy of men's judgments both for themselves and for their 
children. It is not enough that they be estimable: they must be esteemed. It is not 
enough that they should be beautiful: they must be pleasing. It is not enough that they 
should be wise: their wisdom must be recognized. Their honour does not rest on their 
conduct but on their reputation.' Rousseau, Emile, loc. cit., 134-135. The first point to 
be made is that Rousseau clearly recognized that the dependence was mutual. The 
fact that men were less dependent, in his view, than women does not alter the fact of 
their dependence, their need for the good opinion of women. Thus, Rousseau must 
deal with the natural consequence of attachments, mutual dependence, in a way which 
does not compromise the autonomy of the man or abandon the ideal of autonomy 
altogether. 
56 	Rousseau, The Essential Rousseau, loc. cit., 171. 
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compromised at the outset. Husband and wife cannot but be necessary to each other, for were 
they not, no enduring relationship could exist. Given that the alternative, following Plato, 
seemingly demanded the abolition of the private family, which was for Rousseau the wellspring 
of virtue57, a way must be found of reconciling family life and independence, and reconciling 
thereby, and still more importantly, natural man and social man. 
The ideal of liberty could be realized only through walling off those aspects of human 
relationships and human life by which it seemed threatened. Family life, seemingly the most 
particular of existences, with its apparent mutuality and the mutual acknowledgment or 
recognition one might have hoped would be recognized as implicit in human sexuality and 
reproductive relations, becomes instead an abstract relationship between the autonomous and 
independent subject and one whose existence and worth are defined by her capacity to reflect 
for his gaze his virtues and his ends. He remains for himself alone, and she, to the extent that 
she exists at all, for him only. It is for this reason that nowhere in Emile is there any 
suggestion that Emile concerns himself with his physical appearance whereas Sophie's 
education commences by harnessing her 'natural' instinct for self-adornment. 58 Perhaps it 
does not go too far to suggest that if Emile is educated to become essentially pure mind, 
Sophie remains body to his mind in the sense of remaining an object almost devoid of will. 59 
Charvet has suggested, in the course of a sustained and detailed analysis that the mind-body 
distinction developed in 'The Creed of a Savoyard Priese60, reflects the division in social man 
'between his moral will and his "natural desire" to be related to others as a particular. ' On this 
interpretation, the privatized family may be seen as an attempted resolution of the mind-body 
problem. By effectively denying Sophie mind, except in so far as her 'mind' mirrors Emile's 
own, and by displacing the conflict between the moral imperative to be and remain for himself 
57 	For Rousseau's views upon the role of the family in making virtue, and indeed, 
citizenship, possible, see The Essential Rousseau, loc. cit., 176-177; Emile, loc. cit., 16- 
19, 160-161, and particularly where, at p. 132-133, he emphasizes that the bonds of 
convention always develop from the natural bonds of friendship and family life - 'that 
it is the good son, the good husband, the good father, that makes the good citizen.' 
58 
59 
60 
61 
Mid., 137-138. 
See the discussion in Ch. 4 of the way the 'private' or privatized family itself assumes 
the guise of an object, of the 'property' of a public person. 
Rousseau, The Essential Rousseau, loc. cit., 231 ff. 
Charvet, /oc. cit., 108. Cf. the discussion in 'The Creed' at pp. 240-259, and especially 
at 258-259 where Rousseau comments in respect of the correct principles of conduct, 
'What I feel to be right is right, what I feel to be wrong is wrong. . . . Our first concern is 
for ourselves, yet how often the inner voice tells us that in seeking our own good at the 
expense of others we are doing wrong! We believe that we are following the impulsion of 
nature when we are actually resisting her; listening to what she says to our senses, we 
despise what she says to our hearts; the active being obeys, the passive being commands. 
Conscience is the voice of the soul, the passions are the voice of the body. . . . Reason 
deceives us all too often, . .. but conscience never deceives us.' The Essential Rousseau, 
loc. cit. 
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alone and the social drive for particularity onto a relationship in which he is mind and Sophie 
represents body, Rousseau hopes to offer an avenue through which natural man and social 
man can be reconciled and reunited. On such an analysis, privatisation cannot represent an 
accidental by-product of liberal thought, or the result of simple misogyny, but stands instead as 
the essential foundation for the construction of a virtuous life and a just public world. If the 
republic depended for its realization upon the independence of mind and spirit of its citizens, 
upon their, willingness to subordinate all private inclinations and interests to the general will, 
and upon the mutual recognition as abstract individuals made possible by this fraternal 
submission, the family depended for its continued existence upon women trained from infancy 
to subordinate both their inclinations and their intellects and spirits to the needs of their 
husbands and children. Like citizens, wives and mothers were made, not born. 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FAMILY AND THE STATE 
Earlier in this chapter, we explored Rousseau's conception of family life, and, in 
particular, his attempt to reconcile his clear understanding of the fundamental importance of 
our social emotions, such as love, with his ideal of the independent individual who remained 
answerable only to his own conscience. It is important to recognize that Rousseau believed 
that people were capable of moral conduct, that properly educated, they would desire to heed 
the demands of conscience. In his political theory, Rousseau sought to offer an account of the 
just commonwealth founded upon this moral capacity. The parallels between his account of 
the ideal family and that of the just state are striking. 
Just as only a single standard or criterion for decision making, conformity to the 
general will, could provide the secure foundation necessary for the just commonwealth, only a 
single ultimate authority could secure the home. The virtuous family formed the only secure 
foundation for the virtuous state. Equality in civil society could only be guaranteed by the 
equal submission of all to the general will. As Rousseau noted, in civil society dependence 
upon men could only be averted through law - and he spoke of the need 'to put the law in place 
of the individual, and to arm the general will with a real power that made it superior to every 
individual will.'62 If the same standard were applied to family relationships - if law were to 
prevail within the family as it must within civil society, the family would cease to exist. 
Relationships between spouses, between parents and children, would have to be governed by 
law in the same way and to the same extent as relationships within civil society, that is by laws 
designed to ensure that all traces of personal dependence would be eradicated. It is well to 
recall that Rousseau, alone among early liberal theorists, recognized that only true substantive 
equality had the capacity to ensure that men might remain independent. Citizens must be 
secured against becoming poor, true necessities must never be taxed, for these are essential to 
62 	Rousseau, Emile, loc. cit., 35. 
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survival, but the taxes imposed upon those who have amassed superfluous goods may extend to 
all which they possess above the bare necessities of life.63 In Rousseau's radical conception of 
equality, even the magistrates and others in positions of authority were to be respected for 
their wisdom and their virtue and their avoidance of the prerogatives of office. 
Should Rousseau's radical conception of equality be applied within the family as 
within civil society, a conception, it must be remembered, which was designed to ensure that 
relationships of dependence could not arise, no enduring relationships between the sexes 
would exist. All relationships more enduring than casual matings engendered simply by sexual 
need are by their nature particular, reflect the need of the individual for a specific other. As 
Rousseau acknowledged in the 'Discourse on the Origin of Inequality', once men and women 
had become social, they learned to make comparisons between people, developed the need of 
a specific partner, and both love and jealousy inevitably followed.64 What is critical here is not 
only the need of a specific partner, but its particularity, its specificity. Men and women desire 
to appear to one another as unique and particular individuals, not as ideals, nor as abstract and 
universal individuals. The need is of and for a specific other, not an idealized reflection of self. 
In such relationships each individual seeks recognition from the other for what he or she is, a 
unique individual who desires to be valued for his or her very particularity. Mutual 
dependence is inevitable, and it is this which, in the very beginnings of the social state, 
contributes to the full development of all the human passions, both for good and for ill. 65 
How then, to reconcile natural man and social man? 
As we saw earlier in this chapter, Rousseau's project is both complex and 
sophisticated. Woman is to remain social woman, indeed, she must become so fully social 
woman that she exists solely in relation to others, through their eyes as it were. If her need of 
others is fully social, it is yet devoid of the pernicious comparisons and the rampant egoism of 
social man. She lacks both self-love in the non-egoistic or natural sense, and self-love in the 
egoistic or social sense.66 In a sense, woman must become fundamentally devoid of self, 
simply one element in an aggregate, a larger whole, deriving her identity and her existence 
from it.67  If women were to be educated to absolute personal and economic self-sufficiency as 
63 	Rousseau, The Social Contract, loc. cit., 279-282 and again p. 285-286. 
64 	Rousseau, The Essential Rousseau, loc. cit., 178. 
65 	Cf. A. Slcillen, 'Rousseau and the Fall of Social Man' in 60 Philosophy 121 (1985). 
Skillen quite correctly notes the centrality of love in Rousseau's thought and its 
problematical nature. 
66 	The distinction here is the well known distinction between amour soi and amour 
propre. 
67 	It is perhaps worth noting that Rousseau's ideal citizen is also but an element in a 
larger whole. As he says 'The citizen is but the numerator of a fraction, whose value 
depends on its denominator; his value depends upon the whole, that is, on the 
community.' Rousseau, Emile, (Foxley translation), /oc. cit., 7. 
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men must be, come to exist for themselves alone, dependent upon things but never upon 
others, they would be unwilling/unable to relinquish this self-sufficiency and become solely for 
their husbands.68 Man, on the other hand, must attempt to reconcile the natural and the 
social, must remain for himself alone, and yet become simultaneously the head of a family and 
a citizen, an equal member of a wider collective. Within the family, the conflict was resolved 
by the self-immolation of the wife, the absorption of her identity in that of her spouse. 
How, then, is the conflict between natural man and social man to be resolved within 
the state? In the 'Discourse upon the Origins of Inequality' man's development as a social 
being was accompanied by increasing inequality, increasing competitiveness, increasing strife. 
As Rousseau notes, 
finally, consuming ambition . . . aroused in all men a vile inclination to harm 
one another . . . there was competition and rivalry on the one han4 opposition 
of interests on the other, and always the hidden desire to profit at the expense of 
others. 69 
Social man driven by private property and the need for the labours of others inevitably became 
embroiled in a war of all against all strongly reminiscent of Hobbes. 70 A social contract 
followed, also reminiscent of that in Leviathan, and about this Rousseau comments: 
Such was, or probably was, the origin of society and laws, which gave new fetters 
to the weak and new strength to the rich, permanently destroyed natural 
freedom, established the law of property and inequality forever, turned adroit 
usurpation into an irrevocable right, and for the advantage of a fcv ambitious 
men, subjected all others to unending work servitude, and poverty.' 
While this was probably a reasonably accurate description of the France of his day, this was 
not the social contract Rousseau sought to define as the foundation of the just state. The 
social contract of the 'Discourse' originated out of civil inequality and entrenched it through 
law. Because it reflected only the particular interests of particular individuals, it must be 
illegitimate. In no sense might the parties to it be said to be equals. No true community of 
purpose existed between them. By contrast, in the social contract Rousseau envisioned, one 
whose terms demanded 'the complete surrender of each associate, with all his rights, to the whole 
community'72 in exchange for civil freedom and ownership (as opposed to bare possession) of 
property, the one feature which assured absolute civil reciprocity was the equality of the 
68 	To some extent, of course, events have proved Rousseau right. As the education of 
women more closely resembles that of men, women are seeking to maintain economic 
independence. 
69 	Rousseau, The Essential Rousseau, loc. cit., 183. 
70 	Ibid., 184. 
71 	Ibid., 186. 
72 	Ibid., 17. 
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surrender. Nothing might be withheld, and since each inevitably gained the same rights over 
others as he granted over himself, no man would have anything to gain from inequality. In 
their total dependence upon the general will, which epitomized the abstract interests of each 
individual, each would be secured against all possible dependence upon particular others. 
Charvet describes the formulation of the general will thus: 
Each begins by expressing his private interest, which is his selfish desire for an 
arrangement. . . designed to give him as an individual an advantage over all 
others. By cancelling out the selfish element in the arrangements each proposes, 
we are 1 with an arrangement which gives no one the preference but treats all 
equally. 
Yet, if we take our particular interests to be, not simply selfish or egoistical interests, but 
interests which are uniquely our own, reflect our individuality and full particularity, it is 
difficult to see how the general will can be anything but an abstraction devoid of truly 
substantive content. Charvet suggests that 
this serves as a solution by ensuring that individuals can be related to each other 
in a community without becoming dependent on each other as particular 
individuals with particular systems of ends. Each is dependent on the other 
fundamentally only in respect of his abstract individual interest which is 
identical for each, so that he is related to another as a mere duplication of 
himself and his own interest. 74 
As citizens, equality merges into identity, and each, to the extent that he is dependent 
upon the general will remains dependent upon himself merely. 75 As particular individuals, no 
continuing relationship between these citizens appears possible, equality merging 
imperceptibly into a kind of sovereign isolation. As individuals, each pursues his own interests, 
endeavours to further his own ends, and is entitled to do so as long as he pursues them as does 
natural man, solely by reference to his own needs and without regard to the interests of others. 
73 	Charvet, /oc. cit., 128. More generally see pp. 126-138. 
74 	Ibid., 138. This interpretation of the origin and role of the general will bears a strong 
resemblance to Rawls' original position, indeed the belief that rational shared 
interests can be identified suggests many shared assumptions. Dworkin's curious and 
provocative conception of the `group's assumption' that its roles and rules are equally 
in the interests of all likewise displays substantial affinity with Rousseau's notion of 
the general will, although his account of equality of resources seems more closely 
allied to the utilitarian tradition. See the discussion of Dworlcin's theory of associative 
obligations in Ch. 5 & 6, and his account of equality of resources in Ch. 3, 6, 10, & 11. 
75 	Again, the parallel between Rousseau's conception of the formation of the general 
will and the 'original position' of Rawls is striking, particularly in the utter absence of 
a plurality of individuals at the level of ideal theory. The conflict between universal 
and particular is resolved by eliminating particularity. 
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, Social man has been purged of the vices inherent in the social state by his surrender to 
the general will and his alienation of all that he has to the community. Natural man remains at 
liberty to pursue his own interests to the extent that his particular interests do not interfere 
with the interests of others. The outcome would appear to be a condition of alienation, of an 
absence of sociability in order that dependence upon particular others be averted, another form 
of the paradox mentioned earlier, that of the divided self. Yet Rousseau also places 
extraordinary demands upon citizens, ideally demands, not representation but full 
participation, love of country and of his duty. He insists that 
once public service ceases to be the main concern of the citizens and they prefer 
to serve with their purses rather than their persons, the state is already close to 
ruin.76 [Subsequently he comments that] it is the cares of commerce and 
industry, avid pursuit of gain, softness, and love of comfort that change personal 
service into money. . . . In a truly free state, the citizens do everything with their 
own hands and nothing with money. Far from paying for exemption from their 
duties, they would pay to fulfil them in person. . . . In a well governed republic, 
everyone hurries to assemblies; under a bad government, no one likes to take a 
step to go to them,,,. i . . because everyone is completely absorbed in his own 
domestic concerns.' 
The virtuous citizen must love his country and give it his total devotion. 78 Rousseau believed 
that conventional sentiments such as those engendered by the social contract could not be 
cultivated had a basis not been established in natural sentiments. Loyalty had its origin and 
basis in the experience of love.79 Rousseau could not accept a Hobbesian outcome, a 
Sovereign outside the community of citizens and authorized by them to maintain order and 
security. Since such a contract inevitably deprived men of their independence and enslaved 
them, their consents could not bind. For Rousseau, the Sovereign was no more and no less 
than the community of citizens as a whole80, indeed Rousseau describes the relationship 
between the individual and the state as one in which each citizen 'is under a double obligation: 
76 	Rousseau, The Essential Rousseau, loc. cit., 78. 
77 	Ibid. 
78 	Rousseau, Social Contract, loc. cit., 264. 
79 	Thus, in Emile, Rousseau observed that 'the bonds of convention always develop from 
some natural attachment: that the love one has for his neighbours is the basis of his 
devotion to the state; that the heart is linked with the great fatherland through the little 
fatherland of the home. . 2 Emile, loc. cit., 133. What he did not acknowledge, 
although it follows, is that the basis of the love he extolled as the wellspring of civic 
virtue incorporates respect for the opinions of the loved one, and thus, inevitably, 
reciprocal dependence. Only if the 'love' involved is self-love (amour soi) can this be 
avoided, and this is, of course, what the education of Emile and Sophie is designed to 
foster. Rousseau's ideal community is, perhaps, a community of rational egoists. 
80 	I note here the similarity to Dworkin's curious and provocative conception of the 
'community personified', the idea that a community can be faithful to its own 
principles which it can itself honour or dishonour, and that these principles must be 
distinguished from the conventional or popular morality of its members. Dworkin, 
Law's Empire, loc. cit., 168. 
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toward other individuals, as a member of the sovereign, and towards the sovereign as a member 
of the state. '81 The loyalty of which he speaks emanates from within rather than being 
imposed from without; he seeks to create ,a community of equal citizens, not private 
individuals. If a contract is to bind separate individuals who recognize no social ties force is 
essential and enslavement inevitable. In the social contract as Rousseau perceived it 
individuals remained free precisely because they obeyed only themselves as members of the 
sovereign. It was this aspect of the social contract which required that men perceive the social 
contract• as subjectively obligatory, as morally binding, and it was this which demanded a 
foundation in natural sentiments. What Rousseau is in fact suggesting is that if we do not first 
experience obligations and moral sentiments within the family we will lack the capacity to 
understand our relations within political community in moral terms. The alternative to moral 
community is slavery.82 
Even given Rousseau's thesis concerning the profound inter-relationship between the 
development of the social sentiments and the governance of the just republic, it is not 
immediately apparent how this devotion is to be realized. Charvet suggests that, for Rousseau, 
the illusion of love which we saw prevailed in the relationship between his ideal man and 
woman serves as the model for the relationship between the citizen and the state. He 
comments: 
The value of this love for the lover is the same as the value for the individual of 
his love of the moral good. The lover feels himself to be significantly related to 
another person without attending to that person's particularity, as the individual 
in his love of the moral good feels himself related to others but not as 
particulars. His self-exaltation in his love does not simply dispense him from 
paying but requires him not to pay, attention to the particularity of his beloved, 
just as the individual's love of the moral .good involved the denial of the 
relevance for him of the particularity of others. °3 
Even Rousseau acknowledged that the social sentiments he was desirous of cultivating 
normally brought dependence in their wake. Indeed, rather belatedly, Rousseau acknowledges 
the possibility of an attachment between tutor and pupil/father and child. After Emile reaches 
the age of sixteen or seventeen, and his sexual stirrings awake his sentiments, Rousseau 
81 	Rousseau, The Essential Rousseau, loc. cit., 18. Again, I note the parallel to 
Dworkin's theory of associative obligations, particularly his view that such obligations 
are uniquely owed to group members, that they are personal, and that they exist only 
where the group's practices show equal concern for all its members. Dworkin, Law's 
Empire, loc. cit., 199-201. Despite Rousseau's contractarian backdrop, his notion of 
the act of association as involving a reciprocal commitment and being essentially 
involuntary emphasizes the similarity, as does his view that the association at once 
ceases to bind should the mutuality vanish. 
82 	Cf. Rousseau's nebulous conception of a 'civil religion' grounded in sociability and 
demanding devotion to law and justice and duty. The Essential Rousseau, loc. cit., 113. 
83 	Charvet, /oc. cit., 114-115. 
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acknowledges that Emile may become attached to his tutor, and that this may create 
dependence. Yet he describes the ensuing attachment in a way which emphasizes the extent to 
which it is devoid of recognition, a perversion of the social. Initially, it 
will be [to] only those with whom he associates, people who think and feel like 
himself and have similar pains and pleasures, those in short whose obvious 
identity of nature with him increases his self-love. [Only later will he] succeed 
in comprehending his individual notions under the abstract idea of humanity 
and comkining his personal affections with those that identify him with 
mankind.°'4 
In these passages it is critical to note that Emile's attachment is not for the other, but 
ultimately only for the self, and it is this love of self (amour soi) which leads to his 
identification with mankind. Others come to exist for him and to be meaningful to him only to 
the extent that he perceives himself and his ends as mirrored by them. The problem of 
sociability has not been resolved by Rousseau's attempted synthesis. If sociability without 
dependence is possible only with those who mirror the self, whose systems of ends are as one's 
own, it lacks the capacity to provide a solution to the paradox of sociability as perceived by 
Rousseau, the situation which arose when man found it needful 'to show himself as different 
from what he actually was'85 in order to win the esteem and the assistance of others possessed 
of interests and ends of their own. 
Rousseau's attempted resolution depends upon two critical assumptions. The first is 
that our true or authentic will is always for our own good, and it is that will to the good which 
finds ultimate expression in the general will. The second is that, given that our true or 
authentic will is always for our own good, and given that the good is necessarily the same for 
every individual (ie. our subjectively experienced freedom or power of self command), the 
good for every individual is identical. 86 As Rousseau observes 'we always will our own good, 
but we do not always see what it is. The people is never corrupted but it is often misled, and only 
then does it seem to will what is bad. '87  Rousseau envisions a community devoid of 
particularity, of individuality, but one in which each individual subjectively experiences himself 
as free and independent and wholly particular. The individual thus becomes merely an 
element in a larger aggregate, one whose individual will is identical to the general will. Only in 
84 	Rousseau, Emile, loc. cit., 105. In many ways this is strikingly similar to the account of 
moral development relied upon by Rawls and discussed in Ch. 4. 
85 	Rousseau, The Essential Rousseau, loc. cit., 183. 
86 	Cf. the much more recent account of Rawls. Rawls' conception of basic social goods 
as the basis for reasoning in the original position and his distinction between our 
rational decision to maximize access to these goods and our particular final ends is 
very close to the distinction Rousseau attempts to draw between our private wills as 
particular individuals and the general will. 
87 	Rousseau, The Essential Rousseau, loc. cit., 26-27, cf. 19. 
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this way can the individual attain moral freedom, for impulsion by appetite alone is slavery, and 
obedience to self-imposed law is freedom.'88 
Within a family constituted as Rousseau envisions, this conflict does not arise. To the 
extent that Rousseau's ideal woman has become devoid of self, mirror for her husband's 
system of ends, Rousseau has provided a model for the devotion of the citizen to the state. In 
his ideal woman as in the citizen, devotion to duty must be absolute. Should, however, woman 
be educated as was man, educated to the full recognition and awareness of her own 
particularity and independence, develop fully her natural love of self, and with it her own 
system of ends, any relationship between man and woman would inevitably compromise the 
independence of both. Rousseau argued that if women were educated as were men, the 
greater the success of this project, the greater the ultimate subjugation of those so educated. 89 
Why ought this be so? The answer is simple. To the extent that women came to be educated 
in the same way as men, and, in particular, educated to utter independence of mind and spirit, 
not even the illusion or shadow of a particular relationship between men and women would 
exist which did not reflect the corruption of the social state. To attain her favours, he would 
either be constrained to endeavour to persuade her to take an interest in him, to attempt to 
make himself appear in her eyes above all others, or, alternatively, must attempt to compel her 
compliance, bend her will to his. Either her tastes, her pleasures, will be imposed upon hirn 90 , 
or his upon her. Rousseau seems wholly to have lacked the conception of the possibility of a 
fully social and particular relationship in which different interests and ends represent a source 
of enrichment and mutual enhancement, rather than a source of strife and ultimate 
dependence upon the will of another, and this, in turn, reflects the particular interpretation 
Ibid., 21. Cf. Rousseau's account of the virtuous man: 'He who can conquer his 
affections; for then he follows his reason, his conscience; he does his duty; he is his own 
master and nothing can turn him from the right way. So far you have had only the 
semblance of liberty, the precarious liberty of the slave who has not received his orders. 
Now is the time for real freedom; learn to be your own master; control your heart, my 
Emile, and you will be virtuous. . . . Would you live in wisdom and happiness, fix your 
heart on the beauty that is eternal; let your desires be limited by your position, let your 
duties take precedence of your wishes; extend the law of necessity into the region of 
morals; learn to lose what may be taken from you; learn to forsake all things at the 
command of virtue, to set yourself above the chances of life, to detach your heart before 
it is torn in pieces. . . . Then you will be happy in spite of fortune, and good in spite of 
your passions. You will find a pleasure that cannot be destroyed, even in the possession 
of the most fragile things; you will possess them, they will not possess you, and you will 
realise that the man who loses everything only enjoys what he knows how to resign.' 
Emile, (Fmdey translation), /oc. cit., 406-11. 
Rousseau, Emile, loc. cit., 134. 
88 
- 89 
90 	Cf., ibid., 153. 
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given the ideals of independence and autonomy.91 Dependence upon things, recall, 
engendered no vices, dependence upon people engendered them all. 
The danger, the problematic of dependence arose precisely because of man's 
capriciousness and his desire to set himself above his fellows, and it was for this reason that 
Emile was to experience only the opposition of things, and never of the human will. 92 Once 
the opposition was perceived as coming from another like himself, he would see his satisfaction 
as dependent upon that other. His well being must not be defined in terms of his relationship 
to others, but independently of all such relationships.93 If the relationship between man and 
woman is to be one between two such individuals, each must be fatally compromised, 
incapable of being either for himself or herself, or for another, for being for another amounted 
to enslavement. Only to the extent that the relationship between them was constructed in 
terms which ensured that this conflict could not arise, could family relationships exist. Were 
the relationship between man and woman to become identical to that between citizens, its 
particularity would vanish, and with it the basis for the development of the capacity for love in 
future generations. The dependence inherent in particular, loving relationships, the need for a 
specific other, was both essential and unacceptable. The privatized family was the resolution. 
Rousseau saw in the absolute intellectual, moral, social and economic dependence of 
the wife a resolution of the paradox of sociability. Because he believed that `the morals, the 
passions, the tastes, aye and the happiness of men'94 depended upon women, women must be 
made wholly dependent upon men both for their survival and for their self-perception. 
91 	Contemporary egalitarians, of course, perceive this problem in very different terms. 
Rawls, for example, wholly displaces our particularity into the micro-communities of 
which the well ordered community is comprised. Within our private communities we 
pursue our final ends. Only in our deliberations concerning the form and shape of the 
just community are we mutually disinterested individuals reasoning upon the basis of 
our desire for shared and rationally identified 'social goods'. The principles chosen 
constrain the goals which may be pursued in private community, thus guarding against 
the danger that we will be compelled to abrogate our final ends because of the 
attitudes of others. Similarly, Dworkin distinguishes between choice-insensitive 
decisions, those which ideally ought to be decided upon the basis of shared rational 
principles (right answers) and choice-sensitive decisions, those which ideally ought to 
be determined upon the basis of community preferences. His preferred account of 
equality, equality of resources, defines equality as that set of outcomes which would 
follow if equal individuals who differed only in their preferences allocated resources 
equally among themselves, an egalitarian distribution being that distribution in which 
the individual's preferences were most fully satisfied, given the preferences of others. 
For both, rationally identified principles protect the individual against the danger that 
his own particularity will subject him to majoritarian prejudice and that he will be 
compelled to sacrifice his own beliefs and principles if he is to live in community with 
others. 
92 	Rousseau, Emile, loc. cit., 39. 
93 	Charvet, /oc. cit., 63. 
94 	Rousseau, Emile, loc. cit., 135. 
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Dependence must replace equality. To the extent that she came to mirror his interests, his 
needs, his desires, he might please her simply by being for himself, having no need to create an 
appearance apart from reality. Her will could not conflict with his own, both because she had 
never been allowed to become for herself, and because she was destined to become in all 
matters her husband's disciple, and never his teacher. Mutual trust as it might come to exist 
between equals was impossible, because trust made one vulnerable to betrayal. Within the just 
state, the equality of submission to the general will ensured that no individual could gain 
ascendancy over the other, eradicated the possibility of conflicting wills. 95 Likewise, as 
Rousseau noted, the relationships of the members of the state amongst themselves ought be as 
limited as possible. He comments 
the second relation is that of the members among themselves, or with the entire 
body politic. This relation should be as small as possible in the first case and 
as great as possible in the second, so that each citizen will be completely 
independent of all the others and extremely dependent on the state. This is 
always done lz the same means, since only the power of the state makes its 
members free. 7u 
Clearly, this is utterly untenable with respect to the family, since it would cease to 
exist. If the law of the state were to run within the family as within the wider community, a law 
whose aim was to eradicate relationships of personal dependence and to substitute for them 
dependence on the state, and was empowered to regulate every aspect of human life, family 
relationships would be perceived as a threat to the existence and justice of the state, and must 
be eradicated. Yet this was far from Rousseau's intent, indeed, he criticized the Platonic 
solution precisely because it destroyed the family and substituted loyalty to the state. 97 The 
only tenable alternative involved radical privatisation of the family, a privatisation so all 
encompassing that its success depended upon the total eradication of individuality and will in 
the wife. Only such families had the capacity to rear the naturally virtuous citizens needed if a 
just civil society were to be within reach. 
RECIPROCITY AND THE NEED FOR AUTHORITY 
Underlying the arguments canvassed in the last section is the shadow of another, very 
different, argument. Social contract theory is based upon the reciprocity of equals, each ceding 
to an equal degree his natural freedom to the state, and each receiving in turn its guarantee 
that his civil rights and liberties and his property would be protected by its laws and decrees. 
To some extent, the reciprocity between citizens depends upon each individual's possessing the 
capacity to recognize himself in the position of the other, to perceive that the position taken 
95 	See Rousseau, The Essential Rousseau, loc. cit., 27. Clearly, this is behind Rousseau's 
intense fear of partial associations. 
96 	Ibid., 47. 
97 	Rousseau, Emile, loc. cit., 132-133. 
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must be as fair from the standpoint of the other as from his own. He must both perceive the 
other in himself and himself in the other. Reciprocity depends upon relationships of equality. 
Far more clearly than other early liberals, Rousseau recognized the role of economic, social 
and political equality in maintaining reciprocal relationships within civil society. Male and 
female educated as Rousseau's ideal demanded are incapable of reciprocity. Their 
relationship was to be that of complements, not equals. Thus, it is necessary to ask why 
Rousseau, having acknowledged that male and female were sufficiently similar in innate 
attributes to be capable of reciprocity, sought to ensure that this would not be realized. 
In the ideal of rational independence shared by Rousseau and Kant, virtue and 
morality depended upon the capacity to detach oneself from all particular interests and 
attachments. It implied a willingness, at every moment, to transcend human feelings, whether 
of animal passion or of tender love and compassion, and adopt an objective and rational 
attitude of mind.98 Yet this atmosphere, one of detachment and objective evaluation and of 
purely rational commitment, is ultimately dehumanizing, destructive of the naturally virtuous 
man Rousseau idealized, and, for this reason, incapable of providing a secure foundation for 
the virtuous state. It lacked the possibility of love. For Rousseau, it was not enough that men 
did what was right, they must want to do so naturally. Both mind and heart must act together. 
Rousseau's conception of brotherhood, of the fraternal bond, depends upon the existence of 
rational and dispassionate authority, upon that equality and commonality of submission to 
impersonal authority which guarantees that reciprocity will be maintained and which secures 
legally guaranteed rights and liberties. Only submission to the general will makes the virtues 
of citizens possible. Authority alone has the capacity to create an environment in which virtues 
such as sympathy, loyalty and, indeed, love can safely be given expression. Without the security 
born of the rule of law, he who ventures the expression of sympathy, compassion or loyalty, 
risks being taken advantage of, compelled to submit. 
If authority is essential within the state, it is even more critical within the family. 
Recall the purpose for which the absolute authority of the general will was essential within the 
state, to ensure that each citizen remain, so far as possible, wholly independent of particular 
others and wholly dependent upon the state. In an intimate, ongoing relationship the condition 
precedent for this independence does not exist, it being the Limitation of particular 
relationships among individuals in order that they should relate to one another solely as 
citizens, as free and equal members of the state. It follows that the existence of families ought 
necessarily compromise the independence of citizens and destroy the foundation of the just 
state. Rousseau could not, without destroying the logic of his own argument, accept this. The 
family, in particular the social sentiments of conjugal and paternal love, were to provide the 
basis for the love and loyalty owed to the state. 
98 	Cf. Rousseau's account of the reasons that Emile, having fallen in love with Sophie (or 
more precisely the illusion which he has created of Sophie), must leave his promised 
bride. Rousseau, Emile (Foxley translation), /oc. cit., 406-12. 
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Rousseau must therefore reconcile the existence of an intimate, ongoing, and 
apparently wholly particular relationship with independence. Within the state, men were to 
experience one another exclusively as citizens, as members of the state. Their dependence 
upon law supplanted all particular dependencies. Within the family, as we have seen, this 
resolution was not possible. However, if the particular individualities of the adult individuals 
were to be supplanted by their social identities, their roles as husband and wife, and if no 
opposition of wills existed, if man and wife were one and he was that one, reconciliation 
seemed possible. His independence would remain uncompromised, enabling him to 
participate as citizen in the expression of the general will. The absolute authority of husband 
and father within the family, an authority vested in the roles it was essential that he fill, was to 
be, in its own way, as impersonal as the rule of the state. In obeying Emile, Sophie would obey 
herself precisely because she had no will, no interests, no basis for judgment apart from his. If 
authority within the household is secure, if the wife submits unquestioningly to the rule of her 
husband and devotes her life to her domestic duties, an illusion of love and warmth will 
become possible, and this is crucial. It is not the mind of the child which is of importance, but 
his natural instincts and feelings. These must be guided towards what is right, not by reason 
and argument, but by experience. The constant attention and supervision required if children 
are to be shielded from the follies and corruptions of society and allowed to learn naturally 
demands selfless devotion and patience. Guided always by the wisdom of her husband the 
virtuous wife provides the required atmosphere of industry, security and warmth. 
Having denatured his ideal man and citizen and ensured that he would always have 
the capacity to step back from particular commitments and attachments, and, centrally, having 
proclaimed this capacity the very characteristic upon which the commonwealth depends if men 
are not to be enslaved, a haven in which man's natural feelings and passions may be safely 
expressed becomes essential. Only in this way might man avoid being enslaved by them and, 
therefore, by those who provided him with satisfaction for his need of them. Sophie, educated 
to ensure that she would be incapable of rational detachment, and trained from infancy to 
utter self-abnegation, the denial of self for the pleasures and the needs of others, provides that 
haven. Where Emile is rational, she is impulsive and affectionate. Where Emile is trained to 
reject the vagaries of fashion and the dictates of others, she devotes her life and her 
capabilities to being, for Emile, the concrete embodiment of his every desire. If man must, in 
order to be a citizen, subordinate passion to duty and conscience, woman must embody desire, 
but this must be confined to the household in order that her husband may be certain that her 
desire is for him alone. Only in this way may man be saved from the threat to his 
independence posed by his own sexuality. household becomes a miniature 
99 	Ibid., 117-120. 
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commonwealth, one in which reason, embodied by the husband, rules desire and impulse, 
embodied by his wife. 100 
While it is both easy and conventional to dismiss these aspects of Rousseau's thought 
as inconsistencies reflective of his misogyny, this does him a profound injustice. His account 
remains a sophisticated attempt to reconcile the conflict at the heart of rationalist thought. 
The effort to establish reason and morality as autonomous, as linked to freedom and to the 
universal in human nature not only denied the moral character of all affective ties, 101 
including those between parents and children, it denied that men and women are necessarily 
fully embodied beings, beings whose capacity for reason cannot be separated from their 
physical and biological nature. Family ties are heteronomous, depend both upon the bonds of 
blood and affection and, far more importantly, upon the socially constructed relationships of 
care and nurture. Like other social behaviour, caring behaviour is learned. In an ideal world, 
family relationships and ties would reflect the sort of mutual interdependence without which 
true independence never becomes possible. Such relationships threaten the vision of political 
society as a society of equals whose deepest and most profound loyalty is to a common ideal, 
precisely because family relationships offer an alternative vision of the meanings of freedom 
and independence and suggest competing ideals. They imply the existence of many different 
kinds• of loyalties and of obligations which do not depend upon law for their force. If these 
other relationships and obligations are truly given force, the danger of conflict is ever present. 
Loyalty to other individuals, a loyalty acknowledged to have moral force, not simply emotional 
force, introduces the potential for a conflict of interests which, given Rousseau's ideal of 
independence, could only lead to continual strife and not that submission to the general will 
which ensured the just hegemony of civil society. The family must become merely another of 
the partial societies destined to defeat the generality of the general will. The ideal citizen must 
be ready to subordinate all, including his obligations to his wife and children and his life itself 
if need arise, to his duty to civil society. 
While this model seems strange today, it was and is a theoretically workable model in 
many respects. So long as the Sophies of the world submit utterly to the men who rule them, 
and so long as the inherently unequal marital relationship is reinforced initially by the charm 
100 	Cf. Charvet, /oc. cit., 106-111. Effectively, the intense conflict Rousseau perceives 
between reason and man's will to the good and his passions is displaced onto the 
relationship between man and woman. So long as reason remains in complete 
control, and passion exists to serve reason utterly, the conflict can be surmounted. 
101 	Ultimately, at least one contemporary egalitarian confronts the same conflict. 
Dworkin, 'The Place of Liberty', /oc. cit., 18-19, esp. n. 21. Dworkin explicitly 
characterizes moral constraints upon conduct as special features of personality and 
thus is able to deem them irrelevant to equality as he understands it, rather than 
locating such constraints in our circumstances. If the (subjective?) force of our moral 
obligations is ultimately no more than a special feature of the personality of some 
individuals, we can, should we realize the necessary detachment, abandon them. Cf. 
Chs. 5 & 6 and the discussion therein. 
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which draws Emile's desires to her and later by the paternal role, Emile's needs will bind him 
to Sophie as surely as her carefully inculcated submission, self-denial and dependence will bind 
her to him. Because, both as husband and as father, he acts solely in pursuit of his own 
interests, his independence will remain tmcompromised. Only one inconsistency remains to 
suggest a flaw in this grand vision. In a society in which there are both masters and slaves, 
even if the slave is represented as a dutiful and obedient wife, independence surely remains 
illusory. Should Emile ever perceive himself as Sophie's master, his mastery over her is 
sufficient to enslave him simply because she has become necessary to him and it follows that 
he is dependent upon her. 
Rousseau recognized this problem, and, indeed, addressed it in quite another context. 
As he observed 'this or that man may regard himself as the master of others, but he is more of a 
slave than they. ,102  How then may a man perceive himself as his wife's rightful lord and 
master, and yet preserve his independence? It would appear that the patriarchal role itself is 
sufficient to enslave him, that the social problem has not been resolved. We explored one 
resolution of this problem earlier in this chapter. To the extent that the wife possesses neither 
will nor needs of her own, lives solely for him, the question of patriarchal rule does not arise. 
Identity and mutuality have been attained. He need not perceive himself as her master 
precisely because there will be no shadow of conflict. To the extent that this is not attained, 
that the educational project is thwarted 103, Rousseau suggested that the alternative must be 
subjugation for the woman, and, by necessary implication, dependence for the man. 104 Such 
people, by their very unfreedom, seem unfitted for life under just laws, were more likely to 
contribute to the corruption of the state than its proper governance. 105 
Yet Rousseau also emphasized that he sought, in the social contract, to offer an 
account of a legitimate civil order, 'taking men as they are and laws as they might be'. 106 Given 
102 	Rousseau, The Essential Rousseau, loc. cit., 8. 
103 	That Rousseau recognizes this possibility is made clear by the fact that women are to 
be taught to submit uncomplainingly to wrongs and injustices at the hands of their 
husbands. Ibid., 140. 
104 	Ibid., 134. Effectively the only alternatives appear to be the eradication of the 
particularity of the wife and her subjugation by force. See Ch. 7 for an exploration of 
the connection between the marriage contract and slavery or voluntary servitude for 
life in the theories of Hobbes and Locke. Rousseau appears driven by precisely the 
same perception of the alternatives, however, given his (entirely correct) recognition 
that slavery corrupts master and slave alike, he sought a different resolution. 
Marriage as a slave contract was unacceptable to Rousseau precisely because of this 
recognition. Given the spectre of the conflict of wills, the educational project of Emile 
provided the only answer. 
105 	Rousseau, The Essential Rousseau, loc. cit., 38-40. 
106 	Ibid., 8. 
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that he recognized the flaws in existing institutions1°7 and given that the entire argument in 
Emile is intended to suggest the kind of education which would enable men to transcend the 
institutions surrounding them and recover their natural goodness, this passage is in the first 
instance somewhat mysterious. The answer may be that while Rousseau recognized that the 
actual particular individuals of his time were in fact enslaved by the institutions of civil society 
as they had come to exist, he also believed that through their participation in the community 
foreshadowed by the social contract, they yet might escape their chains. The relations which 
obtained within civil society, the untrammelled pursuit of self interest, the constant 
enhancement of needs, the dependence of the wealthy upon the labour of the poor, and of the 
poor upon whatever they might realize from their labour, nonetheless contain within them the 
potential reciprocity of equals. Horowitz suggests that the 
historical predicament that makes the social contract both possible and 
necessary is the existence of civil society. The existence of absolutely 
independent individuals, for whom the only grounds of obligation lie in their 
private wills, makes the contract necessary, because such individuals have an 
absolute need for protection from their equals.. . . Yet the contract is possible 
because these same individuals recognize their antagonists as their equals - 
none claims any a priori right to rule, but only to fight. Under these conditions 
social existence must assume the form of a contract. It must be a contract since 
an act of exchange is the only relation among absolutely independent 
individuals that is legitimate.' 
If the relationship of husband and wife stands, as has been argued, altogether outside 
of civil society, is necessary to its continuation but no part of it, then the mutual dependencies 
and needs which arise within that context become almost irrelevant. The state exists to redress 
the ills to which civil society is heir, to ensure that the formal equality generated by relations of 
exchange is replaced by the substantive equality of citizens. The family stands outside both 
state and civil society. To the extent that the civil order is founded upon the willing alienation 
by each of all that he is and all that he possesses, and to the extent that the laws of the state 
ensure that dependencies do not arise among men, and men devote themselves to their civil 
duties, the relationship between the citizen and his privatized family will become marginal, 
unimportant to his happiness. 109 
For Rousseau, participation in the civil state was essential to man's realization of his 
humanity, substituting justice for instinct, duty for impulse, and law for passion. Under the 
107 	Eg. his attack upon the evils of the society of his time and the corruption of its people 
in 'Discourse on the Arts and Sciences'. Ibid., 206 ff. 
108 	Horowitz, /oc. cit., 183. More generally, see pp. 168-193. 
109 	Rousseau, The Essential Rousseau, loc. cit., 78-79. Effectively, what I am suggesting 
here is that Rousseau foreshadowed the 'separate spheres' ideology, envisioned a 
family setting in which man's duties as provider and citizen effectively occupied him to 
the exclusion of all else, while his wife devoted herself entirely to home and children. 
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social contract law might be substituted for strength, securing to each that which was his own 
and ensuring that productive relations among men might continue. It is for this reason that the 
apparent conflict between the existence of private particular relationships involving the loss of 
natural freedom and legal relationships intended to secure it is resolved once we realize that 
only men participate in civil society, enter reciprocal relationships of exchange secured by law. 
Within these reciprocal relationships, dependencies are intolerable, for they corrupt the 
generality of the laws and turn it to the service of partial interests. Outside of such 
relationships, while dependencies may be inevitable, they have no such ill effects. So long as 
relationships between men and women do not become a part of the network of bourgeois 
exchange relationships typifying civil society, so long as their 'life-worlds' remain apart, the 
mutual dependencies within them remain comparatively unimportant. It is only to the extent 
that women strive to realize reciprocal relationships with men that mutual dependencies 
threaten the social order and law must, at that point, regulate the household as it does civil 
society. This recognition in turn enables us to reconcile the suggestions in both the 'Discourse 
on the Origin of Inequality' and Emile that, ideally, the relationships between men and women 
reflect their natural freedom.11° This natural freedom is sustainable so long as the 
relationships involved remain those between complements, a marginal note to man's true role 
in life. To the extent that relationships between men and women become relationships between 
equals predicated upon exchange, they are subject to the formal resolution of the social 
contract, 111 a resolution implying the relegation of family relationships to the particular, self-
interested relationships of civil society which, ideally will come to play only a minor role in the 
happiness of the individual. For Rousseau, ultimately, the relationship between husband and 
wife becomes marginal, essential to the creation of citizens, but unimportant to men as 
citizens. Because women remain in the state of nature and play no part in the exchange 
relationships of civil society, a man may be the master of his wife, in the sense that he 
embodies her interests and her needs, just as he may be the master of his domestic animals, 
but this will not enslave him because he need do nothing to sustain that relationship which 
does not emerge naturally from his amour soi. 112 
110 	In the 'Discourse', Rousseau identifies mutual attachment and freedom as the only 
ties binding man and woman. See ibid., 176. A passage with much the same general 
import appears in Emile, loc. cit., 166 where Rousseau emphasizes that 'neither 
belongs to the other except by his or her own good will. Both must remain masters of 
their persons and their caresses.' 
111 	As we saw in Ch. 6, when we attempted to develop an account of marriage and family 
life consistent with the basic premises of the theories of Rawls and Dworkin, we found 
it necessary to treat marriage as an exchange relationship among equals and, 
therefore, a relationship subject to the same formal constraints as the other exchange 
relationships of civil society. 
112 	Rousseau, The Essential Rousseau, loc. cit., 8. 
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CHAPTER 9 
LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY AND THE FAMILY 
INTRODUCTION 
In the last two chapters we explored in some depth the interpretations of marriage 
and family life made available by early social contract theory. Despite the inegalitarian 
assumptions of these accounts, an attempt to explore them became critical given our 
recognition that any attempt to apply the egalitarian accounts of Rawls and Dworkin to family 
life led us inexorably into an account of marriage as akin to an ordinary civil exchange 
relationship among citizens, the precise consequence, it must be recalled, classical theories 
were structured to avert. Having examined the structure and assumptions of classic social 
contract theory, it is now time to explore the connections between classic theory and 
contemporary accounts. Our analysis of Rousseau is critical to this attempt because of the 
shadow his account of family life and of the idea of political community as a community of 
equal citizens has cast over the contemporary imagination. 
ROUSSEAU AS PROPHET 
Whatever Rousseau's inconsistencies his ideas continue to dominate our 
understandings and many of our social institutions. Until quite recently, Rousseau's image of 
the family persisted as an ideal representation of domestic bliss, and it is to Rousseau that we 
owe much of the contemporary reification of childhood. In many ways, his vision continues to 
exert substantial force over our understandings of family life. It came closest to realization, at 
least for the upper middle class, during the Victorian era and the early years of the Twentieth 
Century.' It is, however, impossible to reconcile with the quasi-egalitarian model of domestic 
relations now enshrined in law, that of the affective family. 
Society has changed a great deal since Rousseau wrote. Today, the transmission of 
both wealth and power have been institutionalized. The new wealth, and the only true wealth 
attainable today, lies in the personal capacity to accumulate goods and entitlements through 
individual effort and accomplishment within the marketplace. The bundle of rights and future 
entitlements attached to employment has rightly been termed the new property. 2 Not only is 
Cf. the material in Ch. 5. 
The term, the new property was coined by Reich in 1963. See C. Reich', 'The New 
Property', 73 Yale U. (1963) 733. Weitzman, /oc. cit., 110-142. Dr. Weitzman uses 
the phrase 'career assets' to explicitly refer to such benefits as 'pension /and retirement 
benefits, a license to practice a profession or trade, medical and hospital insurance, the 
goodwill of a business, and entitlements to company goods and service See p. 110. In 
addition, the 'new property' comprises the education and training necessary to pursue 
many occupations and professions, security of tenure in employment and welfare 
rights, and, to an increasing extent, represents the single mOst significant asset 
available to most individuals. 
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the new property quintessentially individualistic in character, it is wholly personal, 
insusceptible of transmission to heirs and assigns. For this reason, the traditional liberal 
concern with securing the property of the individual and ensuring his freedom to transmit it to 
his heirs is gradually being rendered obsolete by social and economic change, even as the 
liberal emphasis upon the individual as the locus of entitlements is gradually being realized. 
Rousseau foreshadowed aspects of this as well. As we saw in the last chapter, the educational 
project of Emile was intended to create a man who would have the capabilities, wherever he 
found himself, to provide for his needs unaided. For Emile, the only 'property' of significance 
was that within himself, that to be found in his own developed capabilities or talents. 3 
Rousseau remains the most compelling of the early social contract theorists, and the 
one who most clearly established the parameters of the problem of human sociability. While 
all early liberal theorists were concerned with a political solution for the dangers which arose 
from competing interests, be the resolution seen in terms of Hobbesian absolutism, Lockean 
democracy, or Kantian rationalism, Rousseau identified this problem as one concerned, not 
only with market exchanges, but also with the necessary pre-conditions for creating a republican 
civic life. In this important respect he stands apart from other early social contract theorists. 
He both sought to devise a social contract theory which was a fundamentally political rather 
than an instrumental response to the problem of order, and, in his emphasis upon shared and 
rationally identifiable human interests foreshadowed the work of contemporary theorists such 
as Rawls. He remains attractive to those who envision a politics within which communal 
destinies are charted and pursued for that reason.4 The central problematic dominating both 
the political thought of Rousseau and his social and moral thought is simple. Given that 
individuals have different interests and different ends, given that they hold apparently different 
values and pursue different goals, how can we, as a political community, identify and pursue 
our common ends without subjecting some individuals to the dominion of others? It must be 
emphasized that contemporary theorists continue to confront all of the same issues which 
Rousseau attempted to address, whether the method employed is the clearly political (as 
opposed to natural) rights theory of Dworkin 5, the social union of social unions of Rawls, the 
nihilistic abandonment of the political of Nozick, or, in a more optimistic vein, the untidy and 
conflictual pluralism of Walzer. Rousseau shares with Dworkin and Rawls the belief in a 
Rousseau, Emile (Foxley translation), /oc. cit., 435-6. 
Recently Dworkin has alluded to the connection between his own conception of the 
community personified and Rousseau's conception of the general will although he also 
emphasizes the 'confusion' into which Rousseau fell in ignoring the importance of the 
individual. See R. Dworkin, 'Equality, Democracy, and Constitution: We the People 
in Court' (1990) 28 Alberta L.R. 324, 330. 
Here, as well, Rousseau has cast a long shadow. His philosophical anthropology is 
constructed in a way which rules out any conception of 'natural rights'. There is no 
'natural man' outside of culture and history capable of having rights. Cf. Horowitz, 
/oc. cit. 36-49. 
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political resolution, the identification of criteria for judgment which will potentially attain the 
acknowledgment of all. In some ways, Rousseau's attempt to reconcile our social and 
conflictual nature with the possibility of a just and authentic political order remains both more 
sophisticated and more complex than its modern cousins. Rousseau recognized that the 
problem of sociability, the danger of dependence and of the subordination of the self to the 
goals and ends of others, permeated every aspect of social relations. In that respect, in his 
intuitive (and wholly correct) recognition that the boundary between the merely social and the 
truly political was fundamentally uncertain, and in his insistence upon taking man as he was, 
Rousseau's attempt, for all its flaws, is far bolder that the self-consciously political efforts of 
contemporary theorists.6 
Whatever the inconsistencies in Rousseau's mature thought, his thought is meant to 
be taken as a whole, as a response to the problem of sociability as he perceived it, and it 
warrants respect for that reason. In his eyes, the social problem had its origins in the fact that, 
at the very outset of social life, individuals not only formed particular relationships with others, 
but also became subject to domination by those others. This arose, and here Rousseau was far 
more perceptive than his contemporaries, not merely from competition over scarce resources, 
but from our social emotions, the desire to win the esteem and the approbation of others. In 
this he was profoundly correct. Our greatest capacity for doing violence to our own natures 
and our own personalities - our real and potential uniqueness as individuals - arises both out of 
a felt need to be for others to the exclusion of being ourselves and out of our need for 
recognition by those others.7 Likewise, Rousseau's intuitive understanding that it may be 
impossible to extricate the social from the natural or innate in man, is of profound importance 
to feminist theory. Rousseau's reductive method in the 'Discourse on Inequality' is designed to 
capture the 'natural' in human nature and thus to emphasize that it is only in becoming social 
that people become recognizably human. Until this stage is attained, until we become 
participants in social life and creators of history, we remain merely potentially perfectible 
animals.8 Even if his philosophical anthropology is thought to be unpersuasive in its attempt 
to postulate a wholly pre-social state 9, Rousseau, unlike his contemporaries, did recognize that 
I acknowledge, of course, that contemporary theorists are diligently attempting to 
avoid his collapse into a form of totalitarianism, the eradication of individuality in 
pursuit of community. The question is whether they can do so while acknowledging 
women as persons. In Ch. 3, 5, 6, and 11 I argue that they cannot. 
I should note in passing that, despite the definition of women as inherently for others 
and never for self in Rousseau's writings, I believe feminist scholarship has heretofore 
done Rousseau an injustice. To the extent that women have been unable to escape 
being for others and become for themselves as well, his observations of the plight we 
face are profound, even if he did not perceive it as such. 
Horowitz, /oc. cit., 67-85. 
But for a contrary view see C. Frayling and R. Wokler, 'From the Orang-utan to the 
Vampire: Towards an Anthropology of Rousseau' in R.A. Leigh (Ed.), Rousseau After 
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all those characteristics believed by his contemporaries to be 'natural' were cultural artifacts 
and the product of specific forms of social life. ° My concern, as was emphasized in the last 
chapter, is with the way in which the ideals of independence and autonomy he professed 
induced him to betray his own soundest instincts, both in his account of the education of 
women and the structure of family life and in the subversion of the civic republican ideal he 
sought to defend. 
Rousseau began with a clear recognition that all those faculties and capabilities which 
seemed most typical of human beings were shaped and molded by experiences and the 
conditions of social life." Thus, specifically human capabilities such as language, the use of 
tools, and rudimentary forms of communal organization were recognized as developed 
capabilities which arose out of our interaction with our physical and social environment. 
Rousseau suggests 
that men in the state of nature, having no kind of moral relations or recognized 
duties amongst themselves, could not have been either good or evil, and had 
neither virtues nor vices, unless we take these words in a physical sense and say 
that vices are qualities that may be detrimental to the individual's self-
preservation, and virtues are qualities that may be favourable to it. . 12 
Only within social life could terms such as virtues and vices acquire meaning, duties 
and obligations arise, and emotions become more complex than biologically grounded needs 
and fears. It is important to recognize that this does not imply that moral relations depend 
upon attainment of the form of life specified in the 'Social Contract'. Rather, given the state to 
which social man had already descended, given the nature of the bourgeois society of his day, 
the substitution of universalistic moral relations for the kinship relationships of his golden age 
required both a return to the self-sufficient patriarchal family and the subsequent creation of 
an authentically republican civic life. These goals, at that historic moment, necessitated the 
social contract as the only form of just civic life attainable, and it was in that respect that he 
spoke of the social contract as substituting morality for instinct.13 
Having identified the paradox of sociability, that it made possible both virtue and the 
beneficial passions and vice together with all the harmful passions including envy and the 
desire for self aggrandizement, Rousseau sought to identify a form of social life as most nearly 
Two Hundred Years: Proceedings of the Cambridge Bicentennial Colloquium, 
Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1982, 109. 
10 	See the detailed discussion of changes which accompanied the transition from 
'natural' pre-social man to fully social man in Ch. 8 and the references cited therein. 
11 	Rousseau, The Essential Rousseau, loc. cit., 173-175. 
12 	Ibid., 164. 
13 	Ibid., 18-19. 
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natural, in that it came closest to allowing the virtues to flourish, but did not yet give full scope 
for the vices which attended emotional and intellectual development. Horowitz suggests that 
Rousseau's 'golden age' represents in fact a communal economy which is organized as a 
domestic system of production whose aim is the reproduction of the family unit. 14 This form 
of communal organization was inevitably rendered obsolete by increasing specialization and 
the proliferation of needs. The social problem, then, was to recapture the solidarity and 
independence typical of this form of communal life, given that people could never return to it, 
to reconcile passion and virtue in such a way that neither was perverted. In private life, the 
problem was epitomized by the threat to independence and to solidarity posed by sexual 
passion and by love. In civil society, the problem was epitomized by conflicting interests and 
the desire of individuals to attain supremacy over others. Rousseau's solution to the problem 
posed by the 'Discourse' is the reconstruction of individual and family life foreshadowed by 
Emile and the civic union of these emotionally self-contained and self-sufficient families 
foreshadowed by the 'Social Contract'. In each the very particularity of the individual and of 
his system of needs threatened the attempted resolution and emphasized its fragility. 
Just as competing interests could not be tolerated within the political realm, 
competing interests were also intolerable within the family, and for the same reason. 
Inevitably, in the struggle for ascendancy Rousseau believed attended bourgeois society, 
men would be constrained to strive to appear as other than they were to gain the support and 
admiration of others, and this would leave them dependent upon those they sought to please. 
Within the family the political solution, the idea of total surrender, by each, to the whole 
community, was untenable. The political solution involved two critical assumptions. The first 
was that individuals might only pursue their private interests independently, and not as 
members of any larger group or faction, their non-political intercourse being as minimal as 
possible. The second was that, at the political level, their union was to be secured by an 
absolute identity of interests. These conditions were unsustainable within the family. Family 
relationships by their very nature were both intimate and particular. The sort of total 
alienation Rousseau conceived as the basis of the social contract seemed unrealizable. Yet 
unity of interests was even more critical within the family. 16 The potential for conflict was 
greater, and the involvement of the passions more intense. Unity within the family must be 
attained in a different way. If the educational project of Ensile succeeds, in ruling Sophie 
Emile rules himself, attains mastery over those characteristics of social man which might 
otherwise enslave him. Precisely in the same way, if the political project of the 'Social 
Contract' succeeds, men attain mastery over those interests and impulses which otherwise 
14 	Horowitz, /oc.. cit., 96. 
15 	Ibid., 8, especially the famous references to 'taking men as they are'. 
16 	Quite obviously, this lack of commonality must also corrupt the state, should women 
become citizens. 
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divide them and in so doing substitute unity for plurality so that the rule of the state becomes, 
identically for each, his rule over himself. 17 
If the ideal man and the ideal woman attain this unity of existence, their relationship 
will, at least superficially, be one mirroring their natural freedom. No conflict can or will arise 
between them. The competition for the recognition of others which allowed the man's 
sentiments to develop and which gave birth to discord and jealousy, and which Rousseau 
argued inevitably attended social life18, might be subverted. Once women and children 
became simply a mirror in which his legitimate interests and needs might be reflected, each 
man's interest in preserving his position within the family was equal to the real or potential 
interest of every other man, just as his interest in ensuring the preservation of his liberty and 
property was equal. The restrictions inherent in the social state would become identical for all. 
TRACING THE CONNECTIONS: ROUSSEAU'S HOLD ON THE CONTEMPORARY 
IMAGINATION 
Perhaps more than any other social contract theorist Rousseau recognized and 
expressed the paradox present at the birth of liberalism. If on the one hand, he glorified the 
individual, the 'natural man' of Emile, on the other The Social Contract came close to 
epitomizing absolute collectivism, a resolution of the problem of sociability attained by the 
eradication of the individual and his absorption by the collective. His oscillation between an 
individualism so absolute it isolated man altogether from human sociability and a collective 
existence so total and so profound that individuality was utterly sacrificed to the communal life 
has been explored through his conception of marriage and family life. The question he set 
himself to answer was this. How could individuals whose relations among themselves were 
fundamentally relationships of exchange, of instrumental reciprocity, form a community and, 
as yet, as individuals, remain free and independent? 
Hobbesian absolutism was untenable, for in the Hobbesian resolution individuals gave 
themselves up entirely to a Sovereign outside themselves as individuals, reinstituting thereby 
relationships of subordination and dependence. 19 Lockean idealism was equally untenable, 
for Lockean majority rule collapsed into what Rousseau termed 'the will of all', a resolution 
which looked only to private interests and was merely the sum of the private wills prevailing 
within the community. Harking back to ideas of natural rights foundered upon recognition 
17 	See M. Canovan, 'Arendt, Rousseau, and Human Plurality in Politics' in 45 The 
Journal of Politics 286 (1983). Canovan emphasizes that Rousseau apparently 
believed that 'any citizen thinking rationally about these shared interests must come to 
the same conclusion as any other'. See p. 291. 
18 	Rousseau, The Essential Rousseau, loc. cit., 178. 
19 	For Rousseau, at the moment at which the individual ruler of the state assumed 
sovereign power, became the author of the laws, the social pact was dissolved and the 
people were forced to obey but had no obligation to do so. Rousseau, The Essential 
Rousseau, loc. cit., 72. 
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that the natural in man could not be extricated from the social in man, from the linked ideas 
that man became human only through social relations, as a participant in history, and that 
different forms of social relations called up different characteristics in man. 
Like other early social contract theorists, Rousseau was profoundly concerned with 
the spectre of an ever-increasing conflict of wills as self-interested individuals sought to secure 
those things they desired. Unlike other such theorists, he recognized that the conflict was also 
engendered by their desire to set themselves above others and that even their desires were 
historically created, not naturally established. 20 The family, and in particular, the relationship 
between men and women reproduced this problem in miniature. If the social problem could 
be resolved in miniature, within the family, it might seem as well that it might be resolved 
within the state. As was seen in Chapter 7, both the Hobbesian and the Lockean marriage 
contracts might legitimately be almost indistinguishable from quasi-slave contracts, formed by 
the enforced submission of the wife to her husband. This solution, like their political solutions, 
was, for Rousseau, unacceptable. If their political solutions left man enslaved, subject either to 
the autocratic will of an autonomous and absolute sovereign or the arbitrary and self-
interested wills of a transitory majority of his fellow citizens, the conception of marriage as 
potentially nothing more than a slave contract left the wife in utter subjugation and the 
husband enslaved by his own authority. The alternative seemed an inevitable clash of wills, 
with husband and wife pursuing their own independent ends, each striving to appear as other 
than he or she was to attain dominion. The educational project of Emile was intended to 
bridge the chasm between the isolated independence of natural man and the need for fully 
human sociability if man was to become human and a creator of and participant in history. If 
the educational project succeeds, both Emile and Sophie remain subjectively independent in 
that both have conquered the passions which would otherwise enslave them. Both are ruled 
absolutely by virtue and by their duty, by a law which they have imposed upon themselves. 
If Rousseau's link with other early social contract theorists lies, to a far greater extent, 
in a shared perception of the conflict inevitable as self-interested individuals pursued their 
private ends and sought to set themselves above others than in his attempted resolutions, it is 
through his attempted resolutions that he has cast a profound shadow over the contemporary 
imagination. Both Rawls and Dworkin attempt, in very different ways, to recapture something 
of Rousseau's conception of civic republicanism, the sense that political decisions are or ought 
to be taken by the people as such.21 Both seek to secure and establish the independence of 
20 	The Lockean solution was equally unacceptable. Where individual self-interest 
prevailed and the members of the sovereign sought to vote their private or group 
interests rather than legislate in accord with the general will democracy was on its way 
to degenerating into mob rule. Ibid., 73 See also p. 183 where Rousseau specifically 
identifies the proliferation of needs as contributing to man's subjection and 
dependence upon other men. 
21 	Dworkin, 'Equality, Democracy and Constitution', /oc. cit., 330. 
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private communities under an umbrella of shared principles, establish space in which our 
human capacity for sociability and connection may be explored although this space has 
extended well beyond the self-sufficient families Rousseau idealized.  perhaps, 
recognizes as profoundly as did Rousseau, that to the extent that we do, in fact, endeavour to 
further our interests as we perceive them to the greatest extent possible, the potential for 
conflict and subordination permeates every aspect of human sociability. 
I want to begin to draw together the threads of arguments presented earlier and to 
establish concretely the conceptual connections between Rousseau and contemporary 
theorists. Rawls, as is well known, posits the 'thin theory of the good' as a motivational 
assumption to guide reasoning in the original position. As discussed at length in earlier 
chapters, our preference for a greater rather than a lesser share of these social goods is 
identified as both rational and shared. Our actual share of these goods provides an 'objective' 
basis for comparison among different individuals. Several features of the original position and 
the account of our rational good are remarkably similar to Rousseau's general will. First, just 
as in the community foreshadowed by the social contract, the individual, at the level of ideal 
theory, becomes utterly indistinguishable from the collective. Second, the belief in a 'universal' 
and rationally identifiable set of shared interests carries within it the essential elements of 
Rousseau's conception of the general will. Given that these interests are rationally shared by 
all within the community, it follows that the principles derived from them must also be 
acknowledged by all. To the extent that the concrete laws needed to govern the state comply 
with the principles thus established our authentic interests are furthered by them. They have 
obligatory, not merely coercive, force. 
Rawls, of course, lacks altogether Rousseau's fear of the destructive potential of 
competition and of partial societies within the state. Indeed, he affirms partial societies and 
emphasizes that it is within these partial societies that our capacity for sociability is to be 
explored. In this way, he attempts to both secure space in which our full capacity for sociability 
can be explored and to safeguard against any collapse into collectivism and tyranny. We 
explored the success of this manoeuvre earlier. In Chapter 6 I argued that, at least with 
respect to the family, it fails altogether. Given that the circumstances of justice apply within 
families, and given that the same features which are likely to corrupt our judgment more 
generally occur within families, and indeed, because of the involvement of the passions the 
conflict may be more absolute and less capable of resolution, the same standards ought to 
apply. For Rawls, as for Rousseau, unjust institutions are incapable of generating obligations. 
If Rawls' own standards are applied, many, perhaps most, families must be seen as profoundly 
22 	I think here of Rawls' conception of political community as a social union of social 
unions, and his analogy between this conception and an orchestra. Rawls, A Theory of 
Justice, loc. cit., 523-4, n. 4. 
23 	See Ch. 3 & 6. 
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unjust, and the pressure towards collectivism reappears, the extension of law to every aspect of 
life and the eradication of that sphere of personal freedom believed essential. 
For Rawls, of course, Rousseau's solution is unacceptable. His entire theoretical 
structure is intended to reconcile the idea of shared rational ends with individualism and 
independence. He explicitly limits his account of justice to 'the political' as narrowly defined. 
He assumes that even if some of the institutions comprising the basic structure are themselves 
unjust, the structure as a whole may be relatively just. He attempts to foreclose the possibility 
that the principles of justice will extend to the communities of which the social union is 
comprised by assuming (without argument) that all positions other than that of equal citizen 
and that in the distribution of income and wealth are voluntarily assumed. I argued earlier that 
these suppositions are devoid of any empirical foundation and that their collective effect is to 
render his account of distributive justice irrelevant to women. Without these assumptions, 
however, particularly given Rawls' principle of paternalism, full state intervention into the 
family appears inevitable.24 Rawls has, in fact, offered no escape from the alternatives posed 
by early social contract theory. 
If Rawls seeks to displace or decentre the conflict between the individual and the 
collective, Dworkin has confronted the legacy of Rousseau much more directly. His 
metaphorical construct of the 'community personified' owes, as he acknowledges, much to 
Rousseau's conception of the general will. 25 Like Rousseau, Dworkin recognizes that if the 
idea of the 'community personified' is to do the work required of it, provide the foundation for 
political obligations, it cannot be confined to the wider community of the state. Thus, in his 
account of associative obligations, 26 he attempts to ground all our obligations in social 
practices in which the members of the community recognize that their obligations are 
particular to the group, that they bind member to member, and that they reflect, not only 
concern for the well-being of all the members, but equal concern. Dworkin endeavours to 
forestall the slide into an absolute and monolithic collectivism by positing a distinction between 
a particular unit of responsibility, by which I mean the person or group to whose 
credit or discredit, achievement or failure, the action rebounds, and second, a 
particular unit of judgment, by which I mean the person or group whose 
convictions about what is right or wrong are the appropriate ones for us to use in 
making that assessment. 27 
He argues further that, in our culture, 'the normal or usual unit of judgment for all actions is the 
24 	See Ch. 6. 
25 	Dworkin, 'Equality, Democracy, and Constitution', toc. cit., 330. 
26 	For a complete discussion and detailed argumentation regarding this account see Ch. 
5 & 6. 
27 	Dworkin, 'Equality, Democracy, and Constitution', /oc. cit., 335. 
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individual. . .. that [each individual] must be satisfied that [he or she is] in the end acting on 
convictions [he or she has] formed .. 228 
This distinction between responsibility and judgment enables us to distinguish 
between two distinct forms of communal collective action. 
In the case of integrated collective action, while the shared attitudes of 
participants create a collective unit of responsibility, they do not create a 
collective unit of judgment: the unit of judgment remains thoroughly individual. 
In the case of monolithic action, both the unit of responsibility and the unit of 
judgment become collective. 27 
Political community, according to Dworkin, must be an integrated community, not a 
monolithic community. While, in political community, we accept collective responsibility we 
do not accept a collective unit of judgment. Dworkin argues that the fundamental principle is 
that 'in an integrated community the collective life cannot include moulding the judgments of its 
individual members as distinct from what they do'.30 Thus, at a minimum, each individual 
ought to consider himself or herself free to reflect critically upon the actions of the group and 
to challenge them. An integrated community must foster and encourage the capacity for 
critical judgment, not stifle it.31 
Even if we accept Dworkin's notion of 'integrated community' as provocative and 
meaningful, questions must arise concerning some of the suppositions upon which it is based. 
As we saw in Ch. 5, the critical element in associative community was the idea that what 
mattered was the group's assumption that its roles and rules were equally in the interests of all. 
While this seems plausible in Dworlcin's more recent examples, those of an orchestra and a 
football team, indeed, we might think it bizarre if the first violin asserted as a matter of right 
the desire to explore his or her capabilities on the flute, notions such as that of the group's 
assumption seem less plausible in other contexts, such as the family. One explanation may be 
found in the role our culture has given the family. As Dworkin recognizes, a primary function 
of the family lies in its transmission of cultural values to successive generations. 32 Whereas 
the collective existence of an orchestra is fundamentally limited to its musical functions and, 
under normal circumstances, its members become part of an orchestra voluntarily and with 
their musical skills and capabilities for critical judgment fully developed, the same cannot be 
28 	Ibid., 336. 
29 	Ibid. 
30 	Ibid., 340, n. 13. 
31 	The educational project in Emile was, of course, intended to develop just such an 
individual, one who had the capacity to step back from every involvement, whether 
with individuals or possessions, and act upon the basis of what he believed to be right. 
See Ch. 8. 
32 	Dworkin, 'Liberal Community', /oc. cit., 481. 
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said of family members. None of us commence our personal experience of family as 
volunteers nor can it be said that the skills and capabilities of all family members for critical 
judgment are fully developed. Indeed, one might quite reasonably assume, as did Rousseau, 
that the concrete capabilities required for critical judgment are acquired, at least in part, 
within the family, given its role in moral training. Given that one fundamental cultural role of 
the family is to transmit ethical values, and given that the collective life of many (perhaps 
most) families emphasizes moulding the judgments as well as the actions of (at least some) 
family members, it seems reasonable to suggest that the family may well be a monolithic 
community rather than an integrated community. 
Nothing would turn on this distinction, were it not for the role Dworkin assigns the 
`group's assumptions' in determining whether or not particular communities qualify as genuine 
associative communities capable of generating obligations inter se. We would do well to recall 
that Rousseau's account of the education of Emile and Sophie could reasonably be interpreted 
as an educational project carefully designed to generate and sustain just such a group 
assumption. If it has been successful, both Emile and Sophie will genuinely assume that the 
roles and rules involved in family life are genuinely in the interests of all, that they 
demonstrate, not merely concern for each family member, but equal concern. They will 
attempt to reproduce these roles and rules in future generations, indeed perceive them as the 
foundation of a virtuous life. Yet, and absolutely centrally, a critical element in the education 
of Sophie was the deliberately inculcated absence of the capacity for critical judgment in 
Dworldn's sense. (The same may be true of the girls in Dworldn's example of a patriarchal 
family.) That is, at least within some communities, the `group's assumption' may incorporate 
beliefs concerning appropriate roles and rules governing individual conduct which are predicated 
upon an honest and sincere belief that certain forms of critical judgment are inconsistent with 
equal concern for some family members. This danger, of course, is precisely why I insisted that 
any adequate postinterpretive justification for family practices in our culture must include a 
developed conception of equal respect, given the privacy and autonomy conventionally 
attributed to the family. 
This returns us to the precise question we considered in earlier chapters. Dworkin 
wishes to insist that political community may constrain the actions of its members, but that it 
must simultaneously foster the capacity for critical judgment, that the community must remain 
the unit of responsibility but not the unit of judgment. His own example of a patriarchal family 
suggests that a critical distinction between political community and many of the smaller 
communities within it is that while political community ought to seek to foster and encourage 
critical reflection and judgment in respect of the actions and decisions of that community, 
many of the micro-communities within it are monolithic, seek to monopolize both action and 
judgment. Undeniably, one reason to ensure that political community remains integrated 
rather than monolithic is to make possible a pluralist state and to ensure respect for many 
basic values such as freedom of religion. Again, a critical distinction must be made. In our 
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culture the family is conventionally given wide-ranging authority over the education, the 
upbringing, and the conduct of children. If the exercise of critical judgment is deemed 
inappropriate for some family members while encouraged for others, if this distinction is a key 
element in the family's culture, the capacity for critical judgment may never flourish in some 
individuals. I see little, if any, reason to assume that individuals who lack the developed capacity 
for and the opportunity to exercise critical judgment in some settings will, none the less, exercise it 
in others. 33 The point I am making is simple. If, as seems reasonable, the capacity for critical 
judgment essential to ensure that an integrated community not collapse into a monolithic 
community is acquired in large part within the family, and if this is essential to an adequate 
conception of communal life, it becomes clear that the family as an association must be held to 
the same standards as political community. No justification exists for any attempt to exempt it. 
Just as Rawls assumes that our sense of justice develops within our own families, out 
of our primary experiences, and then fails to go on to consider the conditions essential for a 
sense of justice to arise, Dworkin emphasizes the capacity for critical judgment, and more 
particularly, emphasizes that the civic republican ideal represents a worthy aspiration if we are 
careful to distinguish between communal responsibility and communal judgment, and fails to 
go on to consider the conditions essential if the capacity for critical judgment is to be a reality 
within the community. Both failures emphasize the arbitrary nature of the prevailing 
distinction between public and private and both become crucial when woman is located at the 
centre of discourse and justice for women becomes part of the critical agenda. 
HUMAN INTERESTS AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN MORALITY AND ETHICS 
Recently, Dworkin has made an interesting and provocative distinction between the 
volitional interests of the individual, those things the individual desires or wants without 
necessarily believing that he or she ought to want them or that life would be less meaningful if 
they were not desired, and the critical interests of the individual. Where our critical interests 
are at stake, we seek certain goals or ends because we believe a life without them is somehow 
impoverished.34 Thus we can say that our own past life, or that of another, is a poorer life 
precisely because of a failure to recognize certain critical interests, for example, a regard for 
friendship or for meaningful work. Dworkin argues further that we have a critical interest in 
justice, that our lives are poorer in the critical sense if our community is unjust. He continues: 
the criteria of a life good in the critical sense cannot be defined acontextztally, as 
if the same standards held for all people in all stages of history. Someone lives 
well when he responds appropriately to his circumstances. The ethical question 
33 	Rousseau's fear of partial communities, of a will which might be general with respect 
to a particular group, but partial and self-interested with respect to the whole seems 
relevant here. 
34 	Dworkin, 'Liberal Community', /oc. cit., 484-85. It should be noted that Dworkin uses 
the term 'critical interests' in preference to the more conventional 'real interests' to 
avoid any suggestion that our volitional interests are somehow not real. 
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Lc not how should human beings live, but how should someone in my position 
live? A great deal turns, therefore, on how my position is to be defined, and it 
seems compelling that justice should figure in the description. The ethical 
question becomes: what is a ggpd life for someone entitled to the share of 
resources I am entitled to have?' 
It is this sense of a worthy life that Dworkin intends his conception of integrated community to 
capture, and this interpretation of the civic republican ideal he regards as central. 
Now Dworkin is surely right in recognizing that the criteria of a good life cannot be 
defined acontextually and in recognizing that the ethical question ultimately depends upon how 
the individual's position is defined, how, in short, she is situated. Yet this renders still more 
difficult his insistence that 'felt moral constraints' somehow belong to personality as that term 
is understood by equality of resources rather than to the circumstances of the individual. 36 
Surely any given woman might well identify a profound critical interest both in ensuring that 
her children receive the care and nurturing they require and in sustaining her commitment to a 
challenging career, perhaps one in which she may ultimately make a substantial contribution to 
her community as a whole. If as Dworkin suggests, someone lives well when she responds 
appropriately to her circumstances,37 and if, at least in part because of the structure of her 
community and its assumptions concerning her position as woman and mother, her critical 
interests are in large part incompatible, not only is her life impoverished, but also it is 
impoverished by her circumstances. It is her circumstances, her concrete position as socially 
and culturally defined (most particularly by the assumptions of the various associative 
communities of which she is a part) which constrain and limit the options open to her, not a 
feature of her personality. (The same is, of course, true of her husband, however, while his life 
may well be impoverished in the critical sense by his failure to participate fully in family life, 
within existing communities he is often enriched in the material sense.) To suggest that the 
'felt moral constraints' involved are simply features of her personality, and for that reason 
irrelevant to equality as Dworkin understands it, seemingly trivializes the conception of critical 
interests, and this is even more fundamentally the case if we accept that a central element in 
the position of the individual is her entitlement to an equal share of resources. If her felt 
moral constraints must be understood simply as features of her personality which are 
irrelevant to her share of resources, and if her critical interest in 'a close relationship with [her] 
35 
36 
37 
Ibid., 503. 
Dworkin, 'The Place of Liberty', /oc. cit., 19, esp. n. 21. Even our moral obligation to 
obey the law is nothing more or less than a felt moral constraint. For the purposes of 
equality of resources, law merely puts up the cost of the transactions it forbids. 
Would Dworkin say, I wonder, that Sophie who had been deliberately deprived of the 
capacity for critical judgment, has lived an appropriate life given her circumstances, 
that she has lived as someone in her circumstances ought to live? How ought her 
position be defined? 
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children'38 cannot be reconciled with her critical interest in 'challenging work'39 outside the 
home, then her life overall is made poorer, diminished, counts as of lesser value than would 
otherwise be the case. The conflict becomes, I believe, even more acute when we acknowledge 
that she also has a critical interest in justice, and ought therefore ask herself what a good life 
would be for one who is entitled to the share of resources to which she is, as a citizen, entitled. 
The difficulty in reconciling these elements, the distinction discussed earlier between 
morality and ethics, the idea, discussed fully in Chapter 6, that even our legal obligations are to 
be perceived for the purposes of equality of resources as threats putting up the cost of the 
actions they forbid, emphasize the subtlety of Dworkin's project overall. As we saw in earlier 
chapters, Dworkin has gone to great pains to develop an account of obligations which escapes 
contract as such and which may be applied to the wide variety of associations characteristic of 
our culture, ranging from families to nation states. His account of associative obligations 
grounds his arguments for law as integrity, providing the idea of the community personified 
needed if he is to argue that a political community has principles of its own to which it may be 
faithful or unfaithful. We noted in this and earlier chapters the profound similarity between 
this conception and Rousseau's provocative notion of the general will, and found in the idea of 
the group's assumption many of the same dangers posed by the notion of the general will. 
Dworkin attempts to avert this possibility by his distinction between integrity and justice. 
Dworkin's account of associative obligations and of law as integrity must be carefully 
distinguished from the theory of justice which he is developing. In a profound and subtle 
sense, both his account of the legal obligations implicit in law as integrity and his account of 
associative obligations more generally belong to what he now terms the domain of ethics. 40 
The perceived obligations and constraints are those which would be subjectively perceived by 
an individual who sought to make his life valuable in the critical sense, an individual who was, 
in Rawls' sense, reasonable. 
The bridge between law as integrity and equality of resources is to be found in the 
idea that a just community is one which strives to treat its citizens with equal concern. 41 
Whereas our associative obligations are, insofar as we perceive ourselves to be members of 
communities which meet the test for true communities, subjectively binding, they, and the 
communities to which they belong, have no role in Dworkin's account of equality of resources. 
38 	Dworkin, 'Liberal Community', /oc. cit., 484. 
39 	Ibid. 
ao 	Ibid. Dworkin argues at p. 479 that ethics includes ideas about the sorts of lives which 
are valuable for individuals to lead, in the critical sense, while morality includes 
principles about how people should treat other people. His own example of an 
interest in a close relationship with out children as a significant critical interest 
emphasizes the difficulty of the distinction he wishes to sustain. 
41 	Our desire to pursue and realize justice, as a community, might be termed one of the 
critical interests of political community as such. 
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In equality of resources we are isolated, atomistic 'liberal' individuals, individuals who view law 
as a threat putting up the costs of the actions it forbids and whose only relationships with 
others are, ideally, exchange relationships. We are concerned with law's objective existence 
and its coercive power, not its subjectively binding force. Equality of resources is, to use 
Rawls' language, the domain of the rational. Were this not so, that sphere of moral 
independence and individual liberty Dworkin desires to affirm might well be extinguished. 
Ethics, one might say, belongs to community and to communal life, whilst morality (and 
ultimately justice) are wholly individual. 
In Chapter 6 I argued that Dworkin's interpretive project, applied to the family, 
demanded at a minimum that the group assume that its practices manifested both equal 
concern and equal respect for every family member. I argued that if the family was to be a 
'true community' it was essential that equality of resources form the basis for resource 
allocation within families and for the resolution of matrimonial disputes. This is necessitated 
both by the role of the family in the socialization of future generations and by the fact that the 
just state has no alternative but to regulate the family if it is to fulfil its obligations to 
individuals. We noted that political community characteristically relies on the family to serve a 
number of essential social roles, in socialization of future generations, in the care of vulnerable 
individuals, in resource distribution, and in moral training. As will be recalled, I argued for 
this proposition, not on the basis that the associative obligations characteristic of our account 
of the ideal family be enforced directly, but on the basis of the idea that to the extent that 
women's labour market participation is impaired by their conventionally assigned family roles 
and this renders them disproportionately vulnerable this situation exists because the system of 
baseline constraints characteristic of our culture and our legal system has given men this 
particular advantage for nothing in advance. I sought to locate the disadvantages faced by 
women firmly in their circumstances, rendering them relevant to equality of resources and 
publicly enforceable. Central to my argument is the thesis that the distinction between public 
and private characteristic of liberal theory cannot be sustained, that to the extent we attempt to 
do so we continue to deny women full personhood. In the concluding chapters I shall argue 
further that the distinction between morality and ethics drawn by Dworkin cannot be 
coherently sustained, that to the extent our conceptions of a life which is valuable in the critical 
sense involve others, it becomes essential to invoke principles concerning how those others 
ought to be treated. 
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CHAPTER 10 
GAMBLES, INVESTMENTS, AND THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERAL THEORY 
In the last chapter we began to draw together some of the diverse threads of what has 
been a very lengthy argument. So doing, I believe, we have come very close to identifying the 
necessity, for liberal theory, of the preservation of a private realm. The only alternative, it 
would appear, is the full legalization of all aspects of the human life. As we saw in earlier 
chapters, the affirmation of marriage and family life as private both militated against the overt 
intervention of law into the domestic realm and permitted, indeed ensured, that law governing 
the family mirrored prevailing ideologies and norms and enforced them indirectly. 
When we considered the resources contemporary egalitarian theory made available 
for the development of a coherent legal regime for family law, we recognized that no 
theoretically coherent justification existed for excluding the family from the realm to which 
justice is relevant. Likewise, when we attempted to use these resources to provide an 
egalitarian account of family law, we found that the emphasis upon equality, at least within this 
mode of discourse, drew us inevitably, if not to contract in the traditional sense, to an account 
in which obligations and responsibilities were spelled out and made concrete and enforced by 
the state, at least with regard to children and upon dissolution of marriage. With this 
understanding in place, and with enhanced sympathy, we returned to classic social contract 
theory in search of further insights. In the theories of Hobbes and Locke we encountered an 
oscillation between force and passion, recognized that their denial of moral standing to 
relationships outside of contract left them no alternative but to accept this oscillation or argue 
for full legalization of family life. In Rousseau, we encountered a sophisticated attempt to 
escape the draconian alternatives thus posed, and recognized that both his account of family 
life and his account of political community ultimately foundered because no alternative 
appeared to be available to an individualism so absolute it denied human sociability and a 
collectivism so profound it left no room for the individual. In the last chapter, we explored the 
profound debt modern theorists owe to Rousseau and the degree to which many of his 
perceptions continue to dominate contemporary understandings. We noted, in particular, that 
their attempt to recapture political community as fundamental communal reflected this debt 
and that the application of their accounts to the family suggested that they have not yet 
developed a viable resolution of the problem identified by Rousseau. Now it is time to 
consider the full implications of extending distributive justice to women and to the family. 
Rawls and Dworkin have been notably silent concerning gender based inequalities, 
preferring (understandably, I believe) to focus attention upon inequalities arising from racial 
discrimination or moralistic attitudes concerning sexual preferences. Rawls, quite explicitly, 
identifies inequalities arising from gender roles as voluntarily assumed, as a consequence of 
choice, and is thus able to assume that women would constitute the least advantaged group for 
the purposes of the difference principle only where they were denied access to the basic 
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liberties.' Dworkin seems also to view such roles as chosen in his account of equality of 
resources.2  Their theoretical perspectives incorporate a male norm, whether this is expressed 
in terms of status remaining constant for the whole of a human life 3, or in terms of equality 
subsisting despite increasing inequality in 'bank account' wealth. Thus, while denial of access 
to occupations which are socially coded male would constitute an injustice because it could 
only arise from a morally arbitrary characteristic irrelevant to fitness, the economic and social 
consequences of a choice to subordinate career advancement to personal relationships or to 
the demands of parenting seems not to constitute an injustice because of its implicit 
voluntariness and irrespective of its long term impact upon social and economic equality. 4 
Within the accounts of distributive justice we have examined, taken as they stand, I 
believe that, given the profound interrelationship between women's private roles and their 
public inequality, a further possibility ought to be examined. Given existing legal regimes and 
existing social conditions, it is entirely plausible to characterize marriage and child bearing as a 
gamble for women and explore the consequences of such a view within the framework of 
equality of resources. Dworkin suggests that it is consistent with equality of resources that 
individuals make more or less successful gambles and that their resources reflect this.5 
In a very real sense, marriage today is a gamble (for women) and the further decision 
taken by many women, that of subordinating their career options to their family 
responsibilities a further gamble. The magnitude of the gamble involved is reflected in 
contemporary divorce statistics. Such women have wagered their future security upon 
something profoundly fragile, human relationships. Their husbands have not gambled to the 
same extent, indeed, given the balance between risk and gain, it seems appropriate to suggest 
that they have invested in marriage, sought to maintain a relatively even balance between risk 
and gain. The economic stakes for men are comparatively low and they cannot be seen as 
having risked their future options for the sake of a present relationship. Women, regularly, do 
precisely that, particularly if they bear children. That is, women quite frequently make initial 
occupational choices, not simply upon the basis of their own talents and capabilities abstractly 
defined, but also upon the degree to which such choices are compatible with culturally 
assigned gender roles, and, when married, curtail their economic activities in order to fulfil 
Rawls, A Theory of Justice, loc. cit., 99. 
Dworkin, 'Equality of Resources', /oc. cit., 304-306. 
Women's status, after all, alters radically upon marriage. 
Very different consequences, of course, follow if we simply disregard the public 
private distinction intrinsic in such theories and rigorously apply their public principles 
to the family. See Ch. 6, and further, Ch. 11. 
Ibid., 292-294. At p. 293 Dworkin describes option luck as a 'matter of how deliberate 
and calculated gambles turn out - whether someone gains or loses by accepting an 
isolated risk he or she should have anticipated and might have declined.' 
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their culturally defined family responsibilities. If, subsequently, the relationship ends, on one 
level they may be seen to have gambled and lost and, for this reason, be thought to have no 
legitimate complaint. Divorce surely qualifies as an isolated risk anyone considering marriage 
today ought to have anticipated and might have declined, particularly as the magnitude of the 
initial wager increases. 
A question which arises is how one may distinguish between a gamble and an 
investment. Dworkin distinguishes between gambles and investments on the basis of 
willingness to compromise future security for the sake of enhanced future gain. An investment 
seeks to strike a relatively even balance between risk and gain, whereas a gamble is a decision 
which significantly compromises future security for the possibility of high stakes. 6 Can we 
make sense of the language of risk and gain in the marital context, spell out the potential gains  
and, likewise, the magnitude of the risk? Quite clearly, the issues involved are difficult to 
translate into the 'objective' discourse of economics, however an attempt to do so is both 
revealing and important. Our earlier exploration of the idea of family as a social practice, and 
our attempt to construct an ideal account of family offers one account of the potential gains. 
We noted the human need for a realm of intimacy and affect, a place where our potential for 
sociability could be explored and extended and noted as well that, for many individuals, an 
important aspect of this sociability lay in the decision to raise a family. 7 These features are 
surely, for both men and women, central among the benefits of married life. They sound, not 
in the language of economics or even instrumental rationality, but in lasting satisfaction and 
well-being. They form an important and indispensable dimension of that which Dworkin 
terms our 'critical interests'. 8 While our critical interests are, according to Dworkin, indeed 
interests, or preferences, choices we make in constructing a life we find valuable, these 
particular preferences belong to the domain of ethics, of convictions about the sorts of lives 
individuals believe it is good for them to lead. 9 Now it may well be that, for a substantial 
number of women, certain critical interests are of significant magnitude to induce them to risk 
their future economic security in order to realize their capacity for fostering and sustaining 
relationships to the greatest extent possible. ° In this sense, once the importance of our 
6 
7 
8 
Ibid., 294. Using this means of differentiating gambles and investments, it seems 
reasonable to suggest that women gamble on marriage whereas men invest in it, a 
rather disheartening conclusion. 
See Ch. 6. 
Dworkin, 'Liberal Community, /oc. cit., 484-485. See also the discussion of this 
distinction in Ch. 9. 
Dworkin distinguishes between ethics, which includes convictions about which sorts of 
lives are good or bad for individuals to lead, and morality, which is concerned with 
how individuals ought to treat others. Ibid., 479, n. 1. I do not believe this distinction 
can be coherently sustained. 
10 	I note here the connection between what Dworkin terms our 'critical interests' and 
Gilligan's account of gender differences in moral reasoning. See the discussion of 
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critical interests is acknowledged, it may be said that, in marriage, many women gamble their 
future economic security on marriage because they hope thereby to maximize their capability 
for sustaining and enhancing human relationships. Men do not gamble in this way, nor are 
they culturally encouraged to risk their future economic security for the sake of their family 
relationships, indeed they are socially and culturally discouraged from attempting to do so. 
If, leaving aside for the moment the quite reasonable possibility that women gamble 
on marriage while men invest in it," we nonetheless look at marriage as an investment in the 
capabilities of another, another difficulty appears. Marriage can be objectively characterized 
both as an investment in the skills and capabilities of another, and (particularly for women) a 
gamble upon the enduring qualities of the relationship itself. It is for this reason that the value 
of the investment is difficult to consider in isolation. A wife's investment in the skills and 
capabilities of her husband may have been well chosen and capable of yielding substantial 
rewards and her gamble upon the enduring qualities of the relationship profoundly ill-
considered.12 
Dworlcin's distinction between volitional interests and critical interests is revealing in 
this context. In a sense, those characteristics in which women may be said to invest, the future 
earning capability and career prospects of their husbands, represent volitional interests. While 
these interests are undeniably real, they are subjectively subordinated to the human 
relationships involved. The distinction between volitional interests and critical interests 
highlights the real and significant questions involved in equitable financial settlements on the 
dissolution of marriage. We can say either that a woman who has invested in the economic 
capabilities of her husband in preference to developing her economic capabilities to the full is 
entitled, whatever happens to the relationship, to a fair return on her investment, or that 'the 
possibility of loss was part of the life [she] chose - that it was the fair price of the possibility of 
gain.' She could have chosen a safer life, curtailed the time and effort devoted to her family, 
and maximized the time and effort available for realizing her own economic potential. Had 
these issues in Ch. 4 and, in particular, the argument there put that what is 
conventionally termed the priority of the right over the good (or, in the language now 
used by Dworkin, of morality over ethics) tracks and reinforces the distinction 
between public and private. Perhaps the real problem is that a coherent distinction 
cannot be sustained between, in Dworkin's terms, 'principles about how a person 
should treat other people' and 'convictions about which kinds of lives are good or bad for 
a person to lead.' Ibid., 479, n. 1. 
11 	This is the consequence of what was earlier described as a web morality, at least in a 
cultural setting where the dominant form of moral reasoning is the morality of the 
ladder. To the extent that women perceive moral choices in the context of sustaining 
relationships and enabling them to continue rather than in terms of rights and 
principles, they gamble on those relationships even where they are unaware of that 
component in decision making. 
12 	This does, of course, become particularly problematic when we consider those whose 
marriages began under the former 'fault system' for divorce. For such couples, it may 
be proper to speak of investing in a relationship and to suggest that the change to the 
new no fault regime converted an investment into a gamble. 
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she been willing to forego 'any chance of the gains whose prospect induces others to gamble' 13 
her long term prospects might well have been far brighter. 
Situating human relationships in the discourse of investments and gambles emphasizes 
the significance of the difficulty we encountered earlier in our attempt to reconcile equality of 
resources and associative obligations. 14 Earlier we noted that these accounts pulled us in 
different directions, a tension highlighted by Dworldn's characterization of felt moral 
constraints as belonging to the personality of the individual rather than to his or her 
circumstances. Working within the language of gambles and investments offers us yet another 
frame of reference in which to address this tension. If, as seems reasonable, it is characteristic 
of our culture that marriage and family relationships have very different significance for men 
and for women, and that dominant cultural paradigms encourage (perhaps compel) women to 
gamble on marriage while permitting (or compelling) men to invest in it, and if, as seems clear, 
these paradigms contribute significantly to women's economic disadvantage, a question arises 
as to how this ought to be addressed. In Chapter 6 we pursued the idea that the language of 
true opportunity costs might provide the answer. Here the language of true opportunity costs 
can be utilized to enable us to move deeper, to suggest that to the extent that our culture 
encourages women to gamble upon marriage while men invest in it, it does so simply because, 
as a group, men have never been required to pay the true costs of certain aspects of the lives 
they have chosen to lead while women are almost invariably required to do so. Perhaps the 
'system of baseline constraints' supporting the distribution of goods and opportunities 
presently in place has, in fact, given men this particular advantage 'for nothing in advance.' 15 
While this analysis of the situation seems to me to be persuasive, and to suggest that a 
government dedicated to equality of resources would be compelled to establish baseline 
constraints to ensure that costs would not be distorted in this way, this remains difficult to 
reconcile with the competing (and within Dworkin's framework, equally plausible) notion that 
the possibility of (even catastrophic) loss forms part of the price of the life many women 
choose, and of the gains inherent in it if their gamble pays off. Again, it seems that the 
language used pulls in different ways. The issue turns, I believe, upon the distinction Dworkin 
attempts to sustain between ethics and morality, and upon the idea that 'felt moral constraints' 
belong to the personality of an individual, not to his or her circumstances.16 Perhaps the 
13 	Dworkin, 'Equality of Resources', /oc. cit., 294. 
14 	See Ch. 6. 
15 	Dworkin, 'The Place of Liberty', /oc. cit., 31. 
16 	While I have, in these passages, retained the language used by Dworkin in his own 
work, it seems clear, at least if one attempts to interpret the body of his work in a way 
that preserves its claim to integrity, that 'felt moral constraints' ought to be termed 
'felt ethical constraints' and that Dworkin situates such constraints as comprising part 
of the good life for individuals. It follows that both is conception of 'felt moral 
constraints' and his account of associative obligations belong to the domain of the 
good. They are fundamentally subjective and relativistic, belong to individual 
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tensions and apparent inconsistencies we have noted arise for a very specific reason, one which 
is to a large extent submerged in the language of felt moral constraints, true opportunity costs 
and gambles. Perhaps the language of true opportunity costs, of gambles and investments of 
which individuals are unaware, of moral constraints which are no more than features of 
personality, is simply inadequate to convey what is at stake. Does it make moral sense, for 
example, to suggest that marriage can be characterized as a 'deliberate and calculated gamble' 
for women? 17  One problem with this approach is that the character of what is risked (future 
economic security) and the character of the potential gain (the full realization of certain 
critical interests) are incommensurable - simply not sufficiently of the same order to make 
comparative analysis plausible. Another problem, of course, is that marriage is not 
subjectively perceived as a gamble by many women, at least at the point of entry into a 
relationship. Indeed, if, subjectively, women did in fact come to perceive marriage as a gamble 
in which women are culturally induced to risk their wholly tangible future security for 
intangible future gains, it seems likely that far more significant numbers of women would 
endeavour to avoid the risks involved, perhaps by bargaining prior to marriage, or by 
maintaining labour market participation and demanding that their partners share equally in 
domestic responsibilities. This pulls us back to the problem we noted in Chapter 6, the fact 
that the steps needed to minimize the risks move marriage inexorably towards a model 
predicated upon exchange relationships between independent and equal individuals. It seems, 
indeed, that the steps a rational individual would take to minimize her risks in marriage 
inevitably tend towards the precise itemization of obligations and concrete assessment of the 
risks involved together with the measures required to minimize these risks. 
Perhaps we might do better if we sought to characterize what is involved as an 
insurance problem. Might we find it plausible to insist, for example, that those contemplating 
marriage purchase insurance to protect themselves against the economic consequences of 
divorce? Given contemporary statistics which suggest that roughly one-half of all marriages in 
the United States today will end in divorce 18 and that at least thirty-five percent of Australian 
marriages will also end in divorce19 it seems implausible to characterize divorce as an 
insurance problem in the strict sense, one which arises when a 'small cost purchases 
reimbursement for an unlikely but serious loss. 20  While the loss involved is indeed serious, it 
hardly qualifies as unlikely, a fact which emphasizes that insurance in the ordinary sense would 
be prohibitively expensive, being a financially disadvantageous bet for insurance companies. 
preferences rather than being, in any sense, compelled by principle. This, in turn, 
clarifies why so much turns upon the group's assumption. 
17 	Dworkin, 'Equality of Resources', /oc. cit., 293. 
18 	Weitzman, /oc. cit., xvii. 
19 	MacDonald, /oc. cit., 5. 
20 	Dworkin, 'Equality of Resources', /oc. cit., 318. 
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Indeed, given the number of women who, following dissolution of marriage, rely upon social 
welfare benefits, it would appear that the government is already acting as an involuntary 
insurer in this regard. 
Dworkin also suggests that 'we may have paternalistic reasons for limiting how much 
any individual may risk', at least with respect to certain unspecified gambles. 21 While he does 
not, in his discussion of the distinction between investments and gambles, develop either the 
nature of those reasons or the instances in which he might deem paternalistic constraints 
appropriate, it may be worthwhile exploring the potential applicability of such ideas. Recently, 
Dworkin has identified two distinct forms of paternalism. He argues that 
volitional paternalism supposes that coercion can sometimes help people 
achieve what they already want to achieve, and is for that reason in their 
volitional interests. Critical paternalism supposes that coercion can sometimes 
provide people with lives that are better than the lives thu now think good and 
coercion is therefore sometimes in their critical interests. 22 
If we make use of these brief remarks in the present context, an essential first step is to 
attempt to characterize what form of paternalism might be involved. A good example of 
volitional paternalism might well be a requirement that all employed individuals participate in 
superannuation schemes to provide for their future economic well-being, and this, of course, is 
gradually being realized in Australia. It seems reasonable to suppose that most women would 
acknowledge that a reasonable level of long range fmancial security is in their volitional 
interests (and those of their children). Thus, it might appear that compelling them to act so as 
to protect their long range financial interests could reasonably be interpreted as helping them 
to achieve what they already acknowledge to be in their volitional interests. Government 
might, therefore, be entitled to compel those planning to marry to ensure that they provided 
for their future economic well-being, whether by bargaining prior to entry into a relationship, 
by sustaining labour market participation and seeking to ensure that family responsibilities 
were equally shared, or even by purchasing insurance cover sufficient to neutralize the 
economic consequences of divorce. (That no contemporary government would find such a 
move politically feasible goes without saying.) Governments could, of course, act instead to 
radically limit the availability of divorce, perhaps restrict its availability to circumstances where 
no individual's long range volitional interests could be said to be adversely affected by it. 23 
Yet this possibility highlights a further issue. It may be much more difficult than might at first 
appear to isolate volitional interests from critical interests in this context. It seems to me quite 
plausible that while many women might acknowledge that it would be in their volitional 
21 	Ibid., 295. 
22 	Dworkin, 'Liberal Community', /oc. cit., 485. 
23 	It is worth noting that such a measure would effectively outlaw divorce where 
dependent children were involved or where husband and wife were not approximately 
equal. 
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interests to ensure that they provided for their future economic security prior to entry into 
marriage or long term relationships, many might insist that doing so would also tend to defeat 
certain of their critical interests. They might, that is, find the concrete and specific negotiation 
required negated their own conception of a life which was valuable in the critical sense, 
perhaps because it made a mockery of the trust and mutuality they hoped to find in marriage 
and family life. Similarly, because Dworkin quite properly acknowledges that 'personality is not 
fixed: people's convictions and preferences change and can be influenced or manipulated 24 any 
move to radically restrict divorce would seem to fail to show equal concern to those who no 
longer fmd given relationships to serve their critical interests even while it might equally 
reasonably be thought that tolerating pervasive inequality arising from socially constructed and 
enforced gender roles also fails to show equal concern. Dworkin emphasizes, after all, the 
central importance of 'freedom of personal, socia4 and intimate association' to his account of 
equality, identifying these domains as among those in which law ought not intervene unless 
necessary to protect the rights of individuals. 25 
Our journey through the discourse of gambles and investments has highlighted a 
number of discrete elements and enabled us to identify a number of issues much more 
concretely and in a language which, I believe, substantially clarifies what is at stake. First, in 
economic terms at least, it is entirely plausible to suggest that marriage represents a gamble 
for women and an investment for men. To the extent that conventional gender roles and the 
social structures supporting and reinforcing those roles encourage women to devote a 
substantial proportion of their time and energies to their homes and families, to the extent that 
these expectations are entrenched in market structures and reinforce the gendered character 
of the opportunities conventionally available to both men and women, women are structurally 
encouraged (and in some cases effectively compelled) to risk their future economic 
opportunities in order to fulfil their socially defined responsibility for fostering human 
relationships. The choices involved are structurally generated and reinforced. They are 
significant features of the contemporary landscape, define the context in which particular 
choices are made. 
If we acknowledge that 'someone lives well when [she] responds appropriately to [her] 
circumstances'26, it may well follow that for many women responding appropriately to their 
circumstances mandates that they devote significantly more time and energy to their family 
responsibilities than to their labour market participation. If we have over time constructed a 
social environment which defines the circumstances of men and women in very different terms, 
if the circumstances of a majority of women include the demands of the ideology of 
24 	Dworkin, 'The Place of Liberty', /oc. cit., 35. 
25 	Ibid. 
26 	Dworkin, 'Liberal Community', /oc. cit., 503. 
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motherhood while the circumstances of a majority of men include the demands of the 
breadwinner role, men and women are very differently situated and it follows that responding 
appropriately to their circumstances has a wildly different social meaning for men and women. 
It cannot be emphasized too strongly that these same circumstances cannot be isolated from 
their economic consequences. This in turn makes Dworkin's insistence that 'felt moral 
constraints . . . belong to personality' rather than the circumstances of the individual 
conceptually bizarre.27 If we accept these statements at face value, the conclusion follows that 
women are required to choose between responding appropriately to their circumstances, 
including the family responsibilities our cultural traditions assign them, and equality, while 
men are not required to make this particular choice. Just as Dworkin argues that when a 
society is substantially unjust in the way its resources are distributed (as is ours) 'people who 
are drawn to both the ideals - of personal projects and attachments on the one hand and equality 
of political concern on the other - are placed in a kind of ethical dilemma', 28 because the 
necessity of compromise 'impairs the critical success of their lives', 29 those women who attempt 
both to fulfil the ideals our social, cultural and legal traditions have insisted are appropriate for 
women and simultaneously ensure that their future economic well-being and options are not 
sacrificed are placed in a kind of ethical dilemma. The injustice, I would argue, arises not from 
the ethical dilemma itself (for surely all normal individuals confront and deal with ethical 
dilemmas) but from the fact that it is gendered. It arises, not from any special feature of 
personality, not from the tastes and ambitions of a particular individual, but from the 
circumstances in which the individual finds herself, circumstances which cannot be 
conceptually isolated from our social construction of gender. Those circumstances include, not 
simply existing legal constraints viewed as 'threats putting up the cost of the actions they 
forbid' ° but the felt moral constraints Dworkin consigns to personality, at least where these 
moral constraints have in the past, and continue in the present to be socially, economically, and 
politically constructed in ways which are significantly gendered. With respect to the 
responsibilities inherent in the social reproduction of future generations I would argue, contra 
Dworkin, that equality of resources either demands that we work towards a world in which 
these responsibilities are shared irrespective of gender or which ensures that to the extent they 
are not so shared, full compensation is available to those economically disadvantaged thereby. 
To the extent that such responsibilities are not today shared, and to the extent that women are 
significantly disadvantaged thereby, women's liberty is as significantly diminished as it would 
be by legal restrictions. While Dworkin insists that he wishes to confine his discussion of 
27 	Dworkin, 'The Place of Liberty', /oc. cit., 19, n. 21. 
28 	Dworkin, 'Liberal Community', /oc. cit., 503. 
29 	Ibid., 504. 
30 	Dworkin, 'The Place of Liberty', /oc. cit., 19, n. 21. 
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liberty to negative liberty, that is, freedom from legal constraint',31 that limitation either 
renders his account of equality irrelevant to women, or, in the alternative, destroys his attempt 
to insist that his conception of liberalism does not depend upon an atomistic conception of the 
individual. If the kind of felt moral constraints which inhibit the capacity of many women to 
compete in the labour market are simply features of personality so far as his theory of justice is 
concerned, women are implicitly encouraged to disregard these constraints to safeguard their 
long term economic welfare and to realize other goals. They are encouraged to regard 
themselves as atomistic individuals, and to make decisions and choices without regard to their 
relationships with others precisely because having regard to these relationships and the moral 
constraints which accompany them ensures, given existing social, economic and political 
structures, continuing economic and social inequality. 
Significantly, contemporary egalitarian theorizing does not endeavour to disrupt 
prevailing social structures and modes of locating individuals within the social context to any 
significant extent and it is this feature which, more than any other, excludes women from its 
theoretical ambit. The assumption that inequality can be addressed without radically altering 
the structures and contexts which generate and reinforce it, including the family, suggests a 
failure to come to terms with the fact that culturally specific forms of inequality evolve as a 
part of culturally specific social, economic and political contexts, that the relationship is 
dynamic, not static. Much (not all) contemporary inequality has arisen, not as a consequence 
of morally arbitrary differences between individuals, but as a consequence of morally 
significant choices. A perfect example of this blindness is the fact that the egalitarian 
ambitions of contemporary liberalism are strictly limited to those factors deemed relevant to 
the status of individuals as citizens. Securing to each individual equal citizenship and a share in 
the benefits of social cooperation mark the limits of a political conception of justice. As 
citizens, we are to be regarded as free and equal moral persons, while as private individuals we 
remain doctors or plumbers or labourers, or, perhaps, the wives of doctors or labourers or, if 
things go badly, welfare recipients. Neither marriage and nor its dissolution have any 
significant impact upon male status relationships while both have a major impact upon the 
status of women. It is precisely this distinction which suggests that marriage represents a 
gamble for a woman and an investment for a man. 
The increasing economic inequality of men and women even in a successful marriage 
highlights another fact, as noted in the last chapter. The nature and character of 'property' is 
again being transformed. While, in general, our legal traditions have shown a linear 
development away from conventions which fettered the alienation of property and towards a 
conception in which alienability is one of the hallmarks of property as such, the increasing 
importance of the new property suggests that this trend may be reversing itself. The new 
property is substantially inalienable, inseparable from the individual. As the legal disabilities 
31 	Ibid.,1. 
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of married women in the area of property ownership and contractual ability have been 
eradicated, forms of property have evolved which perpetuate these disabilities in practical 
terms despite formal gender neutral standards. The inalienable and individualistic character of 
the new property serves to perpetuate the dependence of women and their exclusion from 
economic equality, given existing gender roles. In the broad sense, a century after the 
enactment of the Married Women's Property Acts property remains firmly in male control. Its 
nature has undergone significant changes, while patterns of allocation and control have, in a 
broad sense, remained unchanged. 
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CHAPTER 11 
ADD WOMAN AND STIR: EGALITARIAN IDEALS AND THE CAUSES OF 
DISADVANTAGE 
LIBERAL THEORY AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE NON-POLITICAL FAMILY 
In earlier chapters I have explored the liberal 'attitude' to the family and to women, a 
task made more difficult by the virtual absence of both in contemporary theory. I have sought 
to elucidate the liberal conception of the individual and contrast that conception with other, 
more particular characters inhabiting the contemporary social, economic and political 
landscape, characters such as the employee, the mother, the father, the husband and the wife. 
Classical liberal ideals were examined and an argument put that such ideals were concerned 
with the relationships between men as public persons, that relationships between men and 
women and family relationships were largely irrelevant to such theories. Under classical 
liberal social contract theory, be it Hobbesian, Lockean, or Rousseauian, male authority within 
the household was affirmed. Families were identified through their relationship to the male 
head of the household and he was entitled to expect the state to enforce his proprietary rights 
in respect of his family as elsewhere. 
Contemporary egalitarian approaches to social justice and equality have also been 
examined. Notable features include their purported universality, the tacit assumption that the 
masculine is inclusive of the feminine, and their relegation of relationships within families, and 
therefore, of the material foundation for the inequality of women, to the non-political. It has 
been argued that their acceptance, indeed reinforcement, of the existing division between 
public and private, their assumption that gender roles are in some way voluntary or chosen, 
and their absolute disregard of the way in which women's private roles reinforce and sustain 
economic and social inequality collectively suggest that, even were their ideal theory proposals 
as they stand fully implemented by the state, because the male gender role characteristic of late 
capitalism would remain the norm, women would remain less than equal. Only when we 
rigorously and ruthlessly disregarded their attempt to confine their accounts to the political, 
narrowly defined, and insisted that the circumstances of justice applied within families as 
elsewhere, did woman become visible and the family relevant to distributive justice. 1 Equally 
significantly, when we did so, we realized that simply applying their principles to the 
dissolution of marriage was inadequate. Because of the presence of individuals within families 
who are unable to define and protect their own interests, and because the nature and structure 
of many marriages renders women disproportionately vulnerable and unable to defend their 
own interests, far more broadly based intervention seemed inevitable. In this chapter I shall 
explore the wider implications of any authentic commitment to distributive justice for women 
and examine the degree to which such a commitment can be reconciled with egalitarian 
theories. 
1 	See Ch. 6. 
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In order to fully explore these wider issues, we must return to , the way in which 
contemporary theory conceptualizes the sphere of the political and the issues which are 
subordinated or wholly disregarded in their accounts. When political relationships are defined 
as relationships 'within the basic structure of society, a structure of basic institutions we enter only 
by birth and exit only by death, . . . [a definition emphasizing that] political society is closed [and 
that] we do not, and indeed cannot, enter or leave it voluntarily . . .' the state's role in 
constructing, ordering and legitimating those relationships which are subsequently 
characterized as private and non-political is obscured. Likewise, defining 'political power . . . 
[as] coercive power backed by the state's machinery for enforcing its laws 2 conceals the degree to 
which political power and social and economic power are coextensive. While political power is 
undeniably coercive, those who wield political power also wield social and economic power and 
have frequently invoked the machinery of the state to sustain their power, including that within 
the family. The line between formal and legitimate coercion and private coercive practices is 
often blurred. The state has played and continues to play a critical role in constructing and 
defining socially and legally appropriate relationships of dependence, dictates the terms upon 
which new families may be formed and unsuccessful relationships dissolved, and defines the 
parameters of appropriate economic and social relationships between family members. In this 
way, the power of the state has regularly been and continues to be marshalled to structure, 
reinforce and legitimate private relationships which are often profoundly inegalitarian. 
THE EGALITARIAN CITIZEN, GENDER IDEOLOGY AND THE INEOUALITY OF 
WOMEN 
Rawls describes the citizen as a free and equal moral person capable of being self 
supporting over a complete life. In a similar vein, Dworlcin's model of equality of resources 
tacitly assumes labour market participation throughout adult life and explicitly notes that 
individuals whose 'bank account wealth' is diminished because they have consumed much 
expensive leisure none the less remain equal when equality is interpreted as equality over the 
entire human life. Common to both ideal theory accounts is the assumption that market 
participation is the norm, that the theoretical individual is unencumbered by responsibility for 
domestic labour and/or parenting, and that theoretically relevant inequality is the consequence 
of morally arbitrary characteristics or, in Dworkin's terms, 'brute luck'. Inequality which arises 
as a consequence of choices made 'voluntarily' by individuals becomes theoretically irrelevant, 
whether its irrelevance is signalled by Rawls' assumption that positions other than that of equal 
citizenship and that defined by the distribution of income and wealth are entered voluntarily, 3 
or by Dworkin's distinction between brute luck and option luck. 4 While Rawls identifies the 
2 	Rawls, 'The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus', /oc. cit., 242. 
3 	Rawls, A Theory of Justice, loc. cit., 96. 
4 	Dworkin, 'Equality of Resources', /oc. cit., 292-3()4. 
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monogamous family as part of the basic structure of society, 5 and thus as part of the realm to 
which justice is relevant, his analysis makes it clear that his concern is justice between families 
rather than justice within families. The family is perceived as a black box, an approach 
analogous to the conventional economic treatment of the firm. As Rawls notes, the 
monogamous family along with other major social institutions plays a critical role in 
establishing the life prospects of citizens. Taken as a whole, institutions such as competitive 
markets, private property and the monogamous family determine our expectations in life and 
favour certain starting positions over others. As Rawls also notes, however, the second 
principle of justice 'only requires equal life prospects in all sectors of society for those similarly 
endowed and motivated'. 6 Given that families shape the aspirations of the children born to 
them, and given that, as Rawls acknowledges, 'the internal life and culture of the family 
influences, perhaps as much as anything else, a child's motivation and prospects', 7 his failure to 
consider the way in which gender roles learned within the family (and reinforced within the 
wider community) have shaped the motivation and prospects of children and differentiated the 
life prospects of children even within the same family strongly suggests the irrelevance of 
justice within families, an irrelevance made explicit in his recent work. 8 In a very real sense, 
one reinforced by the suggestion that those in the original position view themselves as heads of 
family lines, what becomes relevant to justice is just relationships between families, rather than 
within them. The family remains opaque, viewed from the perspective of its head. In this way 
Rawls reveals his affmity to classic contract theorists such as Locke, Rousseau, Hobbes and 
Kant. The social contract, even in contemporary metaphorical form, signifies a contract 
between families, not individuals, and it is the heads of these families who are made present as 
the persons of theory. 
Rawls, in fact, provides the groundwork for a theoretical justification for non-
interference with the inequalities encouraged and reinforced by existing family forms. He 
argues in the context of illustrating how a hierarchical social structure incorporating a 
hereditary governing class might be interpreted as consistent with the difference principle that 
such would be justified 
if the attempt to eliminate these inequalities would so interfere with the social 
system and the operations of the economy that in the long run anyway the 
opportunities of the disadvantaged would be even more limited. 9 
Clearly, the same formulation could be used to attempt to justify continued inequalities which 
5 	Rawls, A Theory of Justice, loc. cit., 7. 
6 	Ibid., 301. 
7 	Ibid. 
8 	See the detailed analysis and discussion of these in Ch. 3. 
9 	Rawls, A Theory of Justice, loc. cit., 301. 
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operate to the disadvantage of women. All that is required is the claim, already conventional 
in countries such as Australia and the United States, that further socio-legal attempts to 
enhance equality for women will in the long term so disrupt the social system and the 
operation of the economy as to further reduce the opportunities already available to women. 
An argument of this general form would be relatively easy to develop, indeed, its premises are 
widespread in popular discourse. 
Arguments remain current that the measures required to enhance women's general 
political, social, and economic position to the extent needed to maximize equality of 
opportunity to the greatest extent possible would in the long run significantly disrupt the social 
fabric of society as a whole and cripple the economy. Consider the measures necessary to 
ensure that women like men would be capable of being self-supporting (as that phrase is 
presently understood) over the whole of their lives. Adequate paid maternity leave, paid 
parenting leave for both men and women and adequate and affordable child care facilities 
would represent minimal public commitments to equality of fair opportunity. Increased 
flexibility in both workplace and schooling hours and in the social allocation of leisure would 
enable reconciliation of parenting responsibilities with career and advancement options to a 
far greater extent than is presently possible, as would the ability to alternate periods of full and 
part time employment and periods out of the workforce without the attendant loss of benefits 
and opportunities for advancement. To bridge the gap between the public guarantee of fair 
equality of opportunity and its social reality, the family and educational experiences of both 
boys and girls would require significant alteration. Fair equality of opportunity, rigorously 
implemented, would require that both men and women perceive themselves as equally 
committed to domestic labour and parenting, just as both would also perceive themselves as 
equally committed to market activities. A social change of this magnitude requires a 
revolution in prevailing values and attitudes. It is in no sense a value neutral exercise but one 
which must ultimately, to the extent that it was successful, impact profoundly upon beliefs 
concerning appropriate roles for men and women, both within the family and within what is 
now thought of as the public sphere. While gender equality would not, of itself, require the 
abolition of the family as Rawls fears l°, it would undoubtedly require its reimagination and 
restructuring upon an egalitarian basis, with both the benefits and burdens of cooperation 
within it fairly shared in all spheres. Already, even given the modest reforms currently in 
place, many argue that enhanced employment participation by women has contributed to the 
10 	Rawls notes that 'even in a well-ordered society. .. the family may be a barrier to equal 
chances between individuals' and subsequently comments that 'even when fair 
opportunity. . . is satisfie4 the family will lead to unequal chances between individuals'. 
See A Theory of Justice, loc. cit., 301, 511. These passages, taken in context, refer to 
the fact that even among families in the same sector of society families will shape their 
children's aspirations differentially and thus, in different families, similarly endowed 
children are likely to be differentiated by their motivation and aspirations. Rawls does 
not in these passages recognize that even within the same family children are likely to 
differ in aspiration and motivation and that very often these differences are shaped by 
gender roles. 
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increasing instability of the family, that protection for women and children against violence in 
the home and the funding of facilities to enable the victims of family violence to escape violent 
relationships are destructive of family relationships and stability. Likewise, arguments are 
current that the increasing prevalence of working mothers is destructive of the stability of the 
social fabric and leads to increased anti-social activity by young people and the breakdown of 
stable family relationships. Similarly, arguments on economic grounds can be and are being 
mounted against measures essential to facilitate workplace access by women. It remains more 
practical (and perhaps more 'efficient') for business to structure opportunities along 
conventional lines. Rawls' theory provides substantial philosophical support for such 
structuring, given his stated assumption that positions other than those of equal citizenship and 
relative economic advantage are voluntarily assumed and thus need not be considered." 
Given that many, perhaps most, women cannot be described as 'economically independent and 
selcsupporting members of society over a complete life'12, and given that this is a function of 
their traditional responsibility for domestic labour and parenting and their consequent need to 
seek employment options which are sufficiently flexible to allow them to sustain a double shift, 
Rawls' citizen seemingly has only the most marginal connection to the realities of women's 
lives. 
By perceiving the family through the eyes of the head of the family line, Rawls 
obliterates the importance of justice within families as well as among families. Likewise, this 
perspective treats the family as a unity of interests represented by its head, again displaying his 
affinity with classic theorists. The costs of household labour and parenting, the differential 
allocation of resources within families, and the power differentials which accompany this 
allocation of resources are thereby located beyond or outside of analysis. While Rawls, like 
Rousseau, identifies the family as the foundation of the just state and the fundamental source 
of moral training, including the development of a sense of justice, 13 he also assumes that 
families are, in the ordinary course of events, themselves just. 14 At no time does he consider 
what a just family might look like or how the benefits and burdens of cooperation might be 
allocated within it if justice was to become a lived reality. Yet, if families are not in themselves 
just, it is difficult to understand how children can be expected to develop a sense of justice 
within them. It is not enough to assume that for the most part families are just, we must have 
11 	Ibid., 96. 
12 	Rawls, 'The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good', /oc. cit., 268. 
13 	Rawls emphasizes the role of the family as the fundamental school of justice in A 
7'heoly of Justice, loc. cit., 462-468. 
14 	Ibid., 490. In discussing the principles of moral psychology Rawls begins 'given that 
family institutions are just. . . 
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some understanding of precisely what that might mean, of the standards which apply. 15 If, as 
Rawls initially appeared to suggest, the family forms part of the basic structure of society, it 
would seen that families ought to conform with the principles set out for other aspects of the 
basic structure. This possibility is expressly disavowed by his relegation of the personal and the 
familial to the nonpolitical, and by his insistence that the standards appropriate to the basic 
structure need not apply to domains such as the familial and the personal. 16 
Significantly, in discussing the role of the family in inculcating the moral sentiments 
Rawls abandons his ostensibly gender neutral language and emphasizes the role of the family 
in teaching the 'virtues of a good son or a good daughter'. 17 The fact that, in the context of 
family life and the role of the family in fostering a sense of justice as a necessary foundation for 
the just community, Rawls abandons both his usual practice of using the masculine as universal 
and inclusive of the feminine and his otherwise gender neutral use of the word children 
suggests that the virtues of a good son and those of a good daughter are, at least in some 
respects, distinct. 18 His use of the disjunctive reinforces this perception. Similarly, he 
subsequently refers to the social ideals associated with various adult statuses and occupations, 
such as those giving content to the various conceptions of the duties of a good husband or wife, 
and suggests that learning to negotiate these and other increasingly complex social roles leads 
naturally to a morality of principles and to the capacity to act from a sense of justice. 19 This, 
15 	Olcin has developed similar ideas both in S.M. Oki, 'Reason and Feeling in Thinking 
About Justice', 99 Ethics (1989) 229 and S.M. Oki, Justice, Gender and the Family, 
New York, Basic Books, 1989. Oki, however, concludes that Rawls' theory can be 
amended to address these issues without altering its basic character whereas I 
conclude that so long as Rawls confuses his theoretical ambitions to the development 
of a purely political account which does not rely upon any wider moral theory and 
whose ruling ideal is tolerance he cannot consistently address these issues. To the 
extent that Rawls' theory is acknowledged to apply to family life, state intervention 
becomes morally mandatory and marriage is assimilated to the ordinary exchange 
relationships of civil society. See Ch. 6. 
16 	See Ch. 6 for a sustained, and I believe successful, attempt to extend Rawls' account 
of justice to the family. 
17 	Rawls, A Theory of Justice, loc. cit., 467. 
18 	Rawls earlier departed from gender neutral language in discussing the requirements 
of intergenerational justice in terms of a father justifying the selection of the principle 
of equal liberty to his son. Ibid., 208-9. 
19 	Contemporary psychological evidence suggests that Rawls is mistaken in this. While, 
indeed, a majority of men do, in fact, reason upon the basis of a morality of principles, 
a substantial number of women never move beyond what is characterized as the 
morality of association. Kohlberg has suggested that this is a consequence of women's 
familial roles and their association with those roles. Another way of putting this is to 
suggest that if we take as given Rawls' account of the development of a sense of 
justice, we must also, and crucially, recognize that while men may well develop a sense 
of 'justice' negotiating these roles, women fail to do so. It seems reasonable to 
suggest that this difference emphasizes the degree to which existing families are both 
gendered and unjust. See Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer, /oc. cit., 122. 
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however, can only be the case if such associations and the ideal descriptions of the statuses 
associated with them are themselves just. If they are not, it is profoundly unlikely that a sense 
of justice will develop within them. 
Herein lies the central problem for theorists such as Rawls and Dworkin. For both, 
institutions such as the family play an important if underdeveloped theoretical role, for Rawls 
as the fundamental source of the moral training which makes possible the development of a 
sense of justice, and for Dworkin as the ideal theory model for an account of associative 
obligations. Neither, despite the theoretical weight carried by the family, attempts to reconcile 
family roles with his account of distributive justice. If our historic practices of family and the 
roles associated with them met, as a rule, the demands of justice, this could be deemed to be 
no more than an unfortunate and inadvertent oversight. Given that our existing and historic 
practices of family cannot be shown to be just, given that rights and obligations have routinely 
been differentiated upon the basis of morally arbitrary characteristics such as biological sex, 
given that women (and children) have until very recently been unable to obtain protection 
from and redress for violence against their persons from other family members, and given that 
the benefits and burdens of social cooperation are conventionally unequally distributed within 
families, the situation is very different. 
In earlier chapters, we examined the accounts of distributive justice offered by Rawls 
and Dworkin, and attempted to reconcile those accounts with generally accepted biological 
and social facts about human societies. Such basic facts included the prolonged neoteny of the 
human species, the fact that some form of family group appears universal in human societies, 
and the fact that the sexual division of labour has, albeit in various forms, represented an 
enduring feature of human societies. 2° Facts such as these, given the structure of Rawls' 
original position, must be among those available to the parties, however, nothing in either 
Rawls' account of basic social needs or his two principles of justice acknowledges either such 
enduring features of human societies or their distributive consequences. Whether this 
particular lack arises out of inattention or conscious choice, Rawls' heads of family lines are 
explicitly analogized to fathers making choices on behalf of sons who will one day themselves 
become heads of family lines.21 Although the monogamous family22 is acknowledged to form 
part of the basic structure its internal distributive consequences are ignored. 
20 	See generally Ch. 3. 
21 	In discussing the intergenerational aspects of justice Rawls comments that 'were a 
father, . .. to assert that he would accept the principle of equal liberty, a son could not 
object that were he (the father) to do so he would be neglecting his (the son's) interests.' 
A Theory of Justice, loc. cit., 208. 
22 	Ibid., 7. I note that, while the monogamous family is both the social and legal norm in 
contemporary societies such as Britain, Australia and the United States, even within 
such societies it coexists to a greater or lesser extent with other family forms, and 
these include both serial polygamy and openly polygamous forms. 
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Similarly Dworkin, in developing his account of equality of resources, explicitly avoids 
both intergenerational considerations 	any mention of the distributive consequences of 
family life.24 Rather, he is concerned 
to distinguish fair from unfair differences in wealth generated by differences in 
occupation. Unfair differences are those traceable to genetic luck, to talents that 
make some people prosperow but are denied to others who would exploit them 
to the full if they had them. [Emphasis mine.] 
It apparently follows that differences in wealth which arise from factors other than genetic luck 
or handicaps are not unfair. The field of unfair differences in wealth is limited by two distinct 
riders, the first identifying unfair differences as those which arise as a consequence of genetic 
luck, and the second limiting them to differences which persist despite the willingness of the 
individual to exploit existing talents to the full. Yet many, perhaps most, of the disadvantages 
peculiar to women are not directly traceable to genetic luck, unless, of course, one is prepared 
to accept that being biologically female represents bad genetic luck, an irrational position. 
Rather, they arise as a consequence of our social construction of the female gender role, in 
that women's culturally assigned responsibility for parenting and household labour limits their 
capability to exploit any other talents they possess to the full. What is lacking is the explicit 
recognition that one profound source of disadvantage is concealed in the phrase 'occupation 
housewife', yet it would appear that housewives are irrelevant at the level of ideal theory. If, as 
seems likely, the social attitudes implicit in prevailing gender roles reflect underlying 
prejudices which, because of the pervasiveness of gender roles, have gone and continue to go 
unquestioned, it becomes essential to question and deconstruct them and this may be more 
difficult that it appears. Some of us, perhaps, can imagine a social world in which race is 
irrelevant. Imagining a social world in which gender is irrelevant may be more difficult, in part 
because gender and the roles and normative structures associated with it permeate every 
aspect of our lives, are fundamental to individual identity. 
23 	Dworkin relegates intergenerational considerations to a footnote in the development 
of his account of distributive justice. See 'Equality of Resources', /oc. cit., 312-313, n. 
9. 
24 	His nearest approach to discussion of the family in the context of distributive justice 
occurs in an analysis of the marginal utility of money and the reasons why individuals 
purchase insurance. He comments that 'if the loss of my house would be more than 
nine times as serious as the loss of $6000 (because, for example, I could not find or 
borrow enough money to build a suitable house, my marriage would dissolve, and my 
children become delinquent) then it is worth my while to buy the insurance, though it is a 
financially disadvantageous bet.' Ibid., 318. It does not, I believe, go too far to suggest 
that implicit in this account are conventional assumptions concerning the 
'breadwinner' role including the entitlement of the breadwinner to make and carry out 
significant family decisions. 
25 	Ibid., 314. 
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If the structural assumptions of egalitarian theory are taken as given, how ought the 
law address the nested issues of the inequality of women and family relationships? I have 
argued that for both Rawls and Dworkin the family is relegated to the private sphere, to that 
part of life where individuals realize for themselves ways of life which they find good. As 
Dworkin notes, `freedom of choice in matters touching central or important aspects of an agent's 
personal life, like employment, family arrangements, sexual privacy, and medical treatment' is 
crucia1.26 Given this, it follows that the law ought, so far as is possible, remain neutral among 
the varied ways in which family life may be negotiated and realized, unless individual practices 
of family are such as to deprive family members or outsiders of rights to which they would 
otherwise be entitled simply as citizens. Rawls suggests that neutrality as an aim of political 
liberalism ought to mean that the state should be committed to securing equal opportunity for 
citizens to adopt any permissible conception of the good and that it ought not take any steps 
intended to favour any permissible comprehensive moral stance above any other. 27 As a 
working definition of neutrality of aim I believe it likely that this would be acceptable to most 
egalitarians, particularly when coupled with basic presupposition of Rawls' form of political 
liberalism, that the ambition of political liberalism is to seek the common ground implicit in 
the public political culture and utilize this common ground in building and securing an 
overlapping consensus. 
EXIT AND VOICE: EGALITARIAN OPTIONS FOR FAMILY LAW 
What might this mean in the context of legal regulation of the family? Two basic 
historic models of family law have existed in the recent past. The model which prevailed 
during the first two thirds to three quarters of this century defined marriage as the contractual 
formalization of specific traditional gender roles and emphasized the obligations inherent in 
these roles. Exit was formally possible only where a serious breach of a specified type 
occurred and where the party seeking dissolution had neither departed from the parameters of 
his or her assigned role nor condoned the actions of the guilty party. The capacity to threaten 
exit as a means of making oneself heard within a relationship was itself gender linked, the exit 
option initially being legally more readily available to men. Those individuals who sought 
married status signified thereby their acceptance of the obligations imposed and their 
relationship was legally presumed to have been conducted upon this basis. The sole available 
remedy for deviation from these roles was judicial separation or divorce. Individual choice or 
preference was irrelevant except at the point of entry to the marital relationship and in 
determination of whether or not to exercise the option of exit, given that a legally cognizable 
breach had occurred. The traditional model explicitly sought to discourage exit and to make it 
costly for the individual at fault. The contemporary model has abandoned all reference to 
traditional gender roles although these continue to form the backdrop against which judicial 
26 	Dworkin, 'The Place of Liberty', ioc. cit., 7. 
27 	Rawls, 'The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good', /oc. cit., 262-3. 
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decisions are made. The abandonment of traditional role or status concepts, given that 
obligation and breach were perceived and defined in these terms, has been ratified by the 
elimination of the concept of fault in many jurisdictions, including Australia. In an important 
sense, the marital relationship has been redefined as an emotional or affective bond between 
equal individuals rather than as a status relationship with defmed (and hierarchical) bonds of 
obligation and loyalty. Exit has, in formal terms, become readily available as an option. 
If the models described in the last paragraph share common ground, it lies in the 
almost total absence of any attempt to ensure that both parties are equally free to make their 
voices heard within the relationship and influence its direction in critical areas. Emphasis has 
been entirely directed towards manipulation of the conditions under which exit is possible 
rather than examination of the conditions necessary for voice to be developed and sustained. 
The emphasis upon exit rather than voice both conceals intervention and does little to mitigate 
any existing power differentials within family life. We saw earlier the ways in which marriage 
has traditionally been and remains today an asymmetrical relationship, one in which, through 
time, the vulnerability of the wife characteristically increases with the duration of the marriage, 
particularly with the birth of children. In this context, work done by Hirschman on the 
complex relationship between the degree to which individuals are able to make their voices 
heard within a relationship and the feasibility of exit from that relationship is significant. 
Hirschman notes that where exit is readily available, the art of voice is unlikely to develop. 
Similarly, where the exit option is restricted or limited in feasibility, voice is unlikely to be 
effective since the threat of exit is a significant way of commanding attention and making one's 
voice heard.  the traditional law of marriage and divorce nor the contemporary no 
fault model have structured the legal regime in a way which has maximized the availability of 
voice within the relationship and ensured that it was non-differentiated by gender. Because 
men typically have greater individual access to resources and fewer domestic and parenting 
responsibilities, women are more vulnerable within marriage. Their greater vulnerability 
frequently inhibits the development of voice, and their socially constructed responsibility for 
the welfare of children inhibits it still further. These same circumstances often limit the 
feasibility of exit as a real option, even where exit is formally readily available. 
The emphasis upon exit rather than voice emphasizes the degree to which marriage is 
perceived both as private and as voluntary, as a relationship which lies outside of politics.29 It 
28 	A.O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations 
and States, Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1970, 43, 55, 83. See also A.O. Hirschman, 'Exit 
and Voice: An Expanding Sphere of Influence' in A.O. Hirschman (Ed.) Rival Views of Market 
yciety and Other Recent Essays, New York, Viking, 1986, 96. 
With respect to political relationships, both Dworkin and Rawls emphasize the critical 
importance of voice and the need for its support and protection, particularly given 
their shared understanding that no exit from political relationships is possible. Rawls 
emphasizes this in 'The Basic Liberties and Their Priority', /oc. cit., where at 39-46 he 
addresses the fair value of the basic liberties, the difference principle acting to 
maximize the capacity of the least advantaged to make use of the equal basic liberties 
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may appear that ensuring the approximate equality of voice or influence is unimportant 
precisely because of the possibility of exit, of voting with one's feet. Both Rawls and Dworkin 
emphasize the degree to which membership in political society is non-voluntary, a condition 
from which no exit is possible, even while emphasizing the voluntariness of other choices. If 
that is the case it may also be thought that the gradual historic move towards enhancing access 
to the exit option has made family law as a whole more consonant with egalitarian ideals by 
ensuring that people do, in fact, have the freedom to opt out of unsatisfactory relationships and 
explore other options. Yet this approach remains fundamentally unsatisfactory for a number 
of reasons, each of which emphasizes its conflict with other elements of egalitarian ideals. 
First, the present model allows one individual to arbitrarily impose his or her choice upon the 
other individual or individuals involved because in the context of family law exercise of the elit 
option results in the destruction of the group. Decision making can be, and often is, unilateral, 
and the no fault model does not provide a reluctant spouse with the opportunity to be heard. 
Second, because women tend to be economically vulnerable within marriage, and their 
vulnerability increases both with childbearing and with the duration of the marriage, they often 
become still more vulnerable upon dissolution of marriage, even where they have themselves 
chosen the exit option. Indeed, the increasing proportion of women electing dissolution may 
reflect their inability to have their needs recognized and met within the relationship, their 
inability to make themselves heard. In this respect contemporary family law falls far short of 
egalitarian ideals in that it fails to recognize and to compensate for the economic inequality of 
the parties and the fact that men command greater power and resources within the society as a 
whole. Where the development of voice is stifled, exit may represent the only option, despite 
the cost to both women and children. Third, the characterization of the marital relationship 
itself as non-obligatory, which is implied by the irrelevance of fault, conflicts with the moral 
emphasis of contemporary egalitarian theories. It is difficult to reconcile this perception either 
with Rawls' account of the development of a sense of justice or with Dworkin's account of 
associative obligations. on a number of distinct levels it would appear that the 
contemporary model of family law is somewhat difficult to reconcile with egalitarian ideals. 
constitutionally guaranteed. Similarly, Dworkin emphasizes the agency goals of 
politics and the need to ensure that all citizens enjoy a degree of political leverage in 
'Political Equality, /oc. cit., 21-28. 
30 	It may be, although given his profound theoretical ambiguity, it is difficult to be 
certain, that this would not pose a problem in the context of Dworkin's theory, taken 
as a whole. If associative obligations are simply felt moral constraints belonging to 
personality and pertain to the domain of ethics (the good) rather than morality (the 
right) no conflict exists. That this is the best interpretation of his work is strongly 
suggested by his comment that while many people have a moral conviction that they 
ought to obey the law (a conviction belonging to the personality of the individual) 
'legal constraints, so far as they belong to circumstances, are to be viewed as Holmes' 
"bad man" would view them - as threats putting up the cost of the actions they forbid.' 
Dworkin, 'Equality of Resources', /oc. cit., 19, n. 21. Legal constraints are only 
relevant to equality insofar as they belong to the circumstances of the individual, and 
not to his or her personality. If! am correct in this, obligations such as those involved 
in marriage, while subjectively binding, have no objective force and it is wholly 
consistent that the law fail to recognize them. 
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While it mirrors the egalitarian presumption that marriage, like other private decisions such as 
choice of religious faith or club membership, may be accounted for using the model of rational 
choice, and that it is among those ends individuals ought to be left free to revise as their final 
ends change and develop, it fails to recognize that the choices involved in family life inevitably 
and profoundly implicate others. What is at stake in family law, uniquely, is the fragmentation 
of a social group, not the departure of one individual from a fluid and ongoing voluntary 
association. 
The traditional model fares no better in egalitarian terms. First, the severe restriction 
of the exit option and the conditions imposed upon its exercise left many individuals unable to 
exit from even quite demeaning and inegalitarian relationships. This was particularly true of 
those early legislative regimes in which the availability of the exit option was differentially 
allocated by gender. Second, the profound reluctance of the law to intervene in subsisting 
family relationships to enhance the exercise of voice and to ensure that obligations were in fact 
honoured effectively eradicated the capacity of the more vulnerable partner to make herself 
heard within the marriage. This was a consequence of the fact that the obligations of marriage 
could not be enforced until separation occurred, making exit the only option, particularly for 
the more vulnerable party. Third, the intimate connection between the legal recognition of 
fault and traditional and socially enforced gender roles denied the individuality of the persons 
involved and often, even where divorce was available upon identical grounds to both spouses, 
in practice operated to favour masculine interests. An adulterous wife was far more severely 
penalized than was an adulterous husband and a wife who neglected her domestic 
responsibilities was, in practice, subject to far greater censure than was a husband who 
neglected his family or wilfully provided inadequate support. Under traditional family law 
there was effectively only one person and that was the husband. So long as the marriage 
subsisted he alone determined the domicile of the parties, he alone was entitled to exercise 
guardianship rights over the children of the marriage, he was entitled essentially absolutely to 
sexual access, and, while he was legally obligated to provide support according to his means, it 
was he who determined the level of support which was appropriate until separation occurred. 
During this same period violence within the home was legally invisible, often perceived by the 
courts as something its victim ought to accept, at least within limits, 31 and for which the victim 
bore substantial responsibility. The traditional model ratified masculine authority during 
marriage and protected its exercise. 
If neither the traditional model nor the contemporary model can be reconciled with 
contemporary egalitarian theory once it is acknowledged that women rank equally as moral 
persons it becomes important to reexamine these regimes utilizing a very different basic 
assumption. It is superficially plausible to acknowledge women as legal persons who are 
entitled to exercise rights within the public sphere and to simultaneously regard their social 
31 	Devitt v Devitt [1957] Tas. S.R. 11. 
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roles as wives and mothers as wholly irrelevant to theory, as nonpolitical and wholly private. 
Indeed, so long as men's roles as husbands and fathers are likewise privatized, become opaque 
to the law, such an approach seems fundamentally consistent with the Rawls' assertion that 
such roles belong to the nonpolitical and with Dworlcin's insistence that his account of equality 
does not represent a way of life for individuals. Indeed, Dworkin's acknowledgment that his 
associative obligations are none other than what have conventionally been described as 
'obligations of role'32  emphasizes the fact that while such obligations are subjectively binding 
they are objectively voluntary and thus may be characterized as features of personality. This is 
the precise import of the assumption that such roles are voluntarily assumed, and for that 
reason outside the scope of the egalitarian concerns of such theories. If men and women 
choose to adopt traditional roles, egalitarian theory might be thought to require only that, 
should they later desire to revise their choices the means be available for them to do so. 
Ready availability of the exit option, as under the contemporary model of family law, might be 
said to be sufficient. Just as Rawls, in discussing religious communities who choose to reject 
the values and lifestyles of contemporary society, notes that all that is required in respect of the 
education of children is that they be taught that the law will protect their exit rights from such 
communities if they choose to exercise them, so men and women must be granted exit rights 
and be aware that they have those rights. 
Under the contemporary model, perhaps significantly, it is as citizens that the law is 
invoked. Contemporary family law emphasizes the public status of the parties, not their 
private roles. They come before the court as legal persons not as husbands or wives. Children 
have also been recognized as legal persons and custody decisions must formally be made in a 
way which takes their interests into account.33 Rights and obligations are formally 
interchangeable, statutorily undifferentiated by gender. The language of fault has been 
eradicated and in its place is a discourse of irretrievable breakdown. Exit has been greatly 
facilitated, only the fact of breakdown being relevant. Yet even if the parties before the court 
are simply legal persons or citizens, formally undifferentiated by gender, an anomaly persists in 
that one party is legally entitled to impose his or her will upon the other party in those cases 
where separation is not by mutual consent. The absence of fault imposes a fictive mutuality 
upon proceedings, although, particularly where there has been a history of alleged violence or 
an injunction is sought to exclude one party from the matrimonial home the lack of mutuality 
becomes evident.34 
This lack of mutuality points to a quite fundamental difficulty in egalitarian theory. At 
the core of liberal presuppositions concerning personal relationships such as marriage is the 
32 	Dworkin, Law's Empire, loc. cit., 195. 
33 	In practice, of course, in the vast majority of cases the court simply ratifies privately 
made decisions. 
34 	Eg. Aly v Aly, (1978) F.L.C. 90-519, O'Dea v O'Dea (1980) F.L.C. 90-896. 
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fixed view that such relationships give effect to the voluntary choices of the parties. They 
epitomize those private decisions individuals make concerning an appropriate life for 
themselves, and, likewise, those decisions they are at liberty to revise. Yet to the extent that 
the individuals involved are not equally placed with respect to access to resources, are not 
equal in bargaining power, decision making is likely to become imbalanced, giving the 
preferences of one individual precedence over those of the other. Frequently the preferences 
of the more vulnerable individual are shaped both by vulnerability and by the recognition of 
that vulnerability, particularly where the effort to assert a divergent set of preferences is likely 
to increase rather than reduce vulnerability. Likewise, where the desire to terminate the 
relationship is not mutual, the potential for unilateral decision making belies the 
characterization of such relationships as voluntary, as the outcome of individual choice. If the 
traditional fault based regime, with its backdrop of virtually absolute authority in the husband 
and father is unsustainable on egalitarian grounds, its abolition provides a singular illustration 
of its attraction for earlier liberal thinkers. If authority within the family was clearly and 
authoritatively assigned, if its parameters were clearly established and its limits proclaimed, 
and provision made for its termination when that authority was, in effect, exercised ultra vires, 
beyond the purposes for which it was established, no conflict of interests could arise. The 
family might thus be said to speak with one voice. 
Once multiple voices are recognized, once the potential exists for conflict of interests 
within families as well as among families, its relegation to the private sphere is no longer 
tenable. The attempted resolution of contemporary law, the virtual elimination of restrictions 
upon exit, and the shift from formal decision making predicated upon relatively certain rules to 
discretionary decision making predicated upon broad and purportedly equitable guide-lines 
fails for two quite distinct reasons. First, where preferences diverge, where one party seeks to 
sustain the relationship where the other party seeks to determine it, the contemporary model 
encourages the legal system to enforce the preference of the individual asserting exit rights, 
thus denying the dissenting party the opportunity to continue to exercise voice within the 
relationship. Second, to the extent that choice is legally relevant only at the point of entry into 
the relationship and exit from it, to the extent that no concerted effort is made to eradicate 
existing imbalances within the relationship, thus facilitating the exercise of voice by both 
individuals upon an equal footing, the social conditions which, both historically and in the 
present, have rendered women disproportionately vulnerable remain unaddressed. Together, 
these deficiencies emphasize the significance of the failure of egalitarian theory to address the 
economic, social, and political inequality of women in other than the formal sense. This failure 
arises as a conceptual by-product of the existing theoretical division between public and private 
and the correlative assumption that private relationships, including family relationships, 
embody the preferences of individuals in respect of an appropriate life for themselves. 
It remains to ask whether an account of family law could be devised which could be 
reconciled with the theoretical ambitions of egalitarian accounts of justice, and which would 
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ensure the equality of women at least to the same extent as that of men while also sustaining 
the division between public and private. Such a task is less simple than it might appear, 
indeed, even the elucidation of appropriate criteria for such an account emphasizes the 
practical and conceptual problems involved. Can the family remain private, remain the 
embodiment of the preferences of individuals regarding an appropriate life for themselves, 
and, at the same time, be restructured in a manner which conforms to the egalitarian 
ambitions of contemporary theory? Or, perhaps, might it be the case that such theories are 
fundamentally incoherent, that the distinctions and the divisions upon which they depend 
demand the exclusion of women-as-wives even while they compel the equality of women-as-
citizens? 
Perhaps the most critical change in an authentically egalitarian approach to the family 
would be a total change of direction or emphasis. Conventionally, regimes of family law have 
emphasized the regulation of marriage and divorce, emphasized entry into and exit from 
marriage. This mode of regulation reinforces the illusion of family privacy and the prevailing 
conception of the family as a voluntary association whose structure is determined by the 
choices and decisions of family members. Little if any attention has been paid to the existence 
or development of voice within family relationships. Yet, it is in the capacity to make oneself 
heard within a relationship, to have a voice in decision making, to be perceived as equally 
entitled to participate in significant decisions and to influence outcomes that many of the most 
severe tensions occur. Women remain identified with their family roles and with the duties 
and obligations traditionally associated with those roles to a far greater extent than do men. 
This identification frequently has the consequence that their voices are discounted both in 
terms of significant family decisions regarding the allocation of resources and responsibilities 
and in terms of participation in significant economic and public institutions. Because women 
are frequently perceived as wives and mothers, their voices go unheard unless they can be 
reconciled with the traditional constraints associated with that role. 
Yet one of the hallmarks of egalitarian theory generally is its emphasis upon 
extending voice to all within the community and the intimate connection drawn between the 
capacity to exercise voice and independent access to resources. 35 Rawls emphasizes this in his 
discussion of the fair value of the basic liberties the role of the difference principle in 
ensuring this while Dworkin suggests that 'it seems unfair to ask people to accept substantive 
results they think wrong unless they have had as great a role in the decision as anyone else'. 37 
Both emphasize what Dworkin has termed 'agency goals', the capacity to make one's voice 
heard and to have an opportunity to be listened to, and both emphasize the critical importance 
35 	In many ways, this as well affirms the debt egalitarian theory owes to Rousseau. See 
Ch. 8. 
36 	Rawls, 'The Basic Liberties and their Priority', /oc. cit., 40-46. 
37 	Dworkin, 'Political Equality', /oc. cit., 18. 
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of access to resources in achieving and sustaining voice in the public sphere. Similarly, many 
of the contemporary reforms in consumer protection law, in administrative law, in corporate 
law, have been implemented with the specific aim of enhancing voice within a wide range of 
legal and institutional settings. Reforms ensuring an adequate 'cooling off' period in door to 
door sales, protection against undue influence and misrepresentation in consumer matters, 
legal protection against racial and sexual discrimination and sexual harassment have 
specifically been aimed at ensuring that disadvantaged individuals can make their voices heard 
within institutional structures and can gain redress for wrongs suffered. The emphasis is on 
individual empowerment, both ensuring that individuals are protected against the possibility 
that they will be compelled to endure wrongs in silence and offering them the opportunity to 
elect voice over exit and thus to play a significant role in modifying existing unjust practices 
rather than being compelled to choose between acceptance of what is and exit. 
One of the hallmarks of family law since its inception has been its inattention to 
agency goals. While marriage laws generally have attempted to ensure that the consent of the 
parties is freely given and untainted by fraud or undue influence, little or no attention has been 
paid to agency goals within ongoing family relationships. This inattention to agency goals 
remains a feature of contemporary regimes of family law and reflects, at least in part, our 
entrenched cultural belief in family privacy and autonomy. Speaking of wider political 
relationships, Dworkin has argued that certain structures are essential to meet the 
participatory and other substantive goals of egalitarian politics. He argues that 
the symbolic goals argue for equal vote within districts, the agency goals for 
liberty and leveragioand the choice-sensitive accuracy goal for a large degree of 
equality of impact. 3° 
How might an egalitarian regime attempt to ensure that similar participatory goals are 
realized within family life? As a symbolic goal Dworkin's egalitarian conception of equal 
concern demands both that men and women ought to have a equal voice in all significant 
family decisions because, given our culture, and in particular, given our very recent history of 
patriarchal institutions and denial of voice to women in all aspects of social, economic and 
political life, any deviation suggests that women remain of lesser importance as individuals. 39 
In discussing the agency goals of political equality Dworkin argues that these goals can only be 
served by providing 'everyone enough access to influential media . . . to give each person a fair 
chance to influence others if he or she can.' 443 He emphasizes that 'in our inegalitarian society, 
the most prominent source of inequality of access in (sic) inequality of wealth. Al Within our 
38 	Ibid., 27. 
39 	Cf. the arguments put ibid., 19-20. 
40 	Ibid., 22. 
41 	Ibid. 
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society not only do women generally have less access to resources than do men of comparable 
education and talent, but also for many women their only access to resources is both derivative 
and dependent upon the choices and decisions of others. Not only do these inequalities 
operate to deny women leverage within the public sphere, but also they operate to deny many 
women leverage within the family. Given our cultural history, the degree to which our 
practices of family and community have distorted or denied women's voices, it may be 
suggested that even equality of resources may be insufficient, that moral agency may require 
more. Dworkin emphasizes that where political decisions ought for the sake of accuracy 
reflect the distribution of preferences within the community it is important that political impact 
be distributed roughly equally between electoral districts. Where, however, some districts have 
special interests or needs which might be overridden by strict equality, equality of impact might 
be disregarded in favour of special and limited inequalities. 42 Again, given our recent history 
and practices, both those within the family and those within the wider community, women 
generally have been significantly less able to make their voices heard in many areas of decision 
making, whether such decisions involve allocation of resources within the household or wider 
communal decisions. Similarly, until very recently, married women were legally denied any 
legally cognizable voice in matters such as domicile and significant decisions regarding 
children. 
The importance of each element in Dworkin's account of political equality lies in its 
capacity to enhance and guarantee voice and thereby further the substantive goals of an 
egalitarian political process. Any egalitarian account of family, and, therefore, any egalitarian 
legal regime impacting upon the family must, I would argue, similarly act to enhance and 
guarantee voice for family members. Given our recent history and conventional practices, it is 
necessary to explore what this might mean. We cannot simply assume either that existing 
family structures are reasonably just or that, at least with respect to their adult members, they 
are voluntarily entered and therefore somehow beyond or outside of the realm where justice is 
relevant. If families are the fundamental schools of our moral life, and if, as Rawls argues 
Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought, 43 
it follows that ensuring the development of such substantive goals within the family is both 
critical to its success and endurance as a social institution and fundamental to wider egalitarian 
goals. Just as Dworkin argues that a equal vote within districts is, given our political history 
and traditions, critical, I would argue that within the family men and women must have an 
equal voice in all decisions which impact upon family life. Wider institutions might act to 
further this goal in a number of different ways. Some of the changes required appear cosmetic 
but are of great symbolic importance, others require profound alterations in existing allocation 
42 	Ibid., 25-26. 
43 	Rawls, A Theory of Justice, loc. cit., 3. 
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of resources. Because nothing of the sort has ever been attempted, or, apart from Plato, even 
seriously considered, and because little in our existing practices provides an egalitarian model 
their impact is difficult to assess. Two steps which are essential are to abandon all public 
reference to a head of household and to require the economic worth of domestic labour and 
parenting to be incorporated in the calculation of the gross domestic product. The first would 
recognize that in an egalitarian family no head of household can exist because all significant 
decisions ought to be made upon the basis of mutual consultation and negotiation between 
individuals who are roughly equal in their capacity to influence outcomes. The second would 
acknowledge the economic worth of domestic production and its contribution to the total 
productive capacity of the community while simultaneously emphasizing the almost absolute 
exclusion of women from economic power. The symbolic weight of these measures 
emphasizes the discrepancy between the symbolic affirmation of equality and social reality. To 
ratify and implement such symbolic affirmations of equality and agency, the existing allocation 
of economic and social resources must be altered as well. Among those scarce resources 
whose reallocation is critical are not only economic resources but also leisure and access to 
wider participatory opportunities. While I shall begin by looking at the redistribution of 
economic resources, I do not mean to emphasize their primacy thereby but only to 
acknowledge that access to wider participatory opportunities depends first upon access to 
economic resources and second upon the leisure to enable authentic participation. 
REDISTRIBUTION WITHIN THE FAMILY - TOWARDS AN EGALITARIAN MODEL 
Olcin44 has suggested that in those families in which the wife is wholly or primarily 
responsible for domestic and parenting labour while the husband is responsible for market 
labour employers ought to be legally required to divide all the wages paid to either equally 
between husband and wife. She argues that a requirement such as this 
would constitute public recognition of the fact that the currently unpaid labor of 
families is just as important as the paid labor. If we do not believe this, then we 
should insist on the complete and equal sharing of both paid and unpaid labor. 
. . . 
 
Iris only if we do believe it that society can justly allow couples to distribute 
the two types of labor so unevenly. 
In those families in which equal sharing of resources and power already occurs a 
proposal such as this would have no practical impact. In less egalitarian families, access to 
resources and, in particular, independent control over discretionary income45 may be critical 
in enhancing the capability of a non-wage earning spouse to insist on the right to participate 
equally in household decision making and ensuring that exit is, where necessary, practically as 
well as theoretically feasible. Negotiation is meaningful only where those concerned negotiate 
44 	Oki, Justice, Gender, and the Family, loc. cit., 170 ff. esp. 181-3. 
45 	By discretionary income I mean that portion of household income which is not 
required for commitments such as housing etc. 
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from positions of approximately equal strength. Full social implementation of this sort of 
resource sharing, of course, would require appropriate alterations to taxation and social 
welfare law, as well as to regimes of law governing dissolution of marriage. It might best be 
described as implementing the presumption of altruism conventional in accounts of the ideal 
family and giving it the force of law. 
What of its theoretical congruence with egalitarian ideals? Olcin's proposal 
emphasizes absolute equality of resources within marriage and marriage like relationships, 
altruism defined and enforced by law. It may be argued that, given the emphasis both Rawls 
and Dworkin place upon the connection between access to resources and political equality or 
voice, it is wholly consistent with the egalitarian ambitions of their theories. It is less clear 
whether it can be reconciled with other aspects of their theories taken as a whole. 
Would, for example, such a program be consistent with Rawls' emphasis upon an 
overlapping consensus, upon an account of justice appropriate for a pluralist society? The 
answer is, I think, both yes and no. Certainly nothing in Olcin's proposal is inconsistent with 
his recognition that families form part of the basic structure and represent the first, and 
perhaps most significant, source of our development of a sense of justice. Likewise, it is 
congruent with his account of the ideal conception of the family, and his comment that in this 
conception family members do not wish to gain unless they can do so in ways which further the 
interests of the rest. 46 Indeed, it might be interpreted as going some distance towards 
reconciling the profound contradiction between the ideal conception of the family and the 
social and economic reality. Whether it would be consistent with other elements in Rawls' 
theory is much more difficult to say. Among the basic political rights emphasized by Rawls is 
the right to hold (personal) property, and it may be suggested that this form of redistribution 
modifies that right in a way far more fundamental than the forms of redistributive taxation 
mandated by his theory generally. Okin's proposal severs the link between the labour of the 
individual and the social reward for that labour and is intended to do so. In that way it 
compels recognition of the social fact that the capacity of many individuals to engage in waged 
labour and to comply with the demands of the market depends in part upon their ability to 
appropriate the labour power of other individuals. On the other hand, such a program might 
be thought to simply eliminate in one limited and specific set of circumstances one pervasive 
distributive injustice, to ensure that the allocation of economic resources between husband and 
wife accords with the principle Rawls argues is fundamental and of which his theory represents 
a special case. As Rawls argues, 
All social values - liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of 
self-respect - are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any, 
or all, of these values is to everyone's advantage. 47 
46 	Rawls, A Theory of Justice, loc. cit., 105. 
47 	Ibid., 62. 
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If we consider existing distributive practices within families, and recognize that the prevailing 
allocation of domestic and parenting labour together with existing economic structures 
effectively ensures that in a majority of families men and women are not similarly situated in 
their access to economic resources, and further that, in general, men have disproportionately 
greater access to economic resources, it would appear that an equal distribution would be 
appropriate. No argument has been advanced that the existing allocation is, within the family 
context, to everyone's advantage, rather Rawls has assumed that altruism prevails and that 
family members do not wish to gain unless it is to the advantage of all. 
Doubt must remain concerning the congruence of such a proposal with Rawls' theory 
taken as a whole for two quite distinct reasons. First, he explicitly excludes associations such 
as families from the political, the domain in which justice may be thought critical, and second, 
he is at some pains to argue that political liberalism 'does not seek to cultivate the distinctive 
virtues and values of the liberalisms of autonomy and individuality'. 48 A proposal such as that 
cited might be interpreted as seeking to extend political values such as autonomy and 
individuality to the family context. Perhaps it does not go too far to suggest that it insists that 
all family members are, first and foremost, individuals to whom, as individuals, justice is due. 
In other words, it demands that, within the family as elsewhere, we 'take seriously the 
distinction between persons.'49 It would, undeniably, seek to ensure that the autonomy of 
individual women is supported by ensuring their access as of right to the material resources 
essential if they are to negotiate from an equal position. In this sense, it would undoubtedly be 
thought by some to represent an attack upon family values and upon traditional family roles 
and an extension of political values into a realm where they are at best inappropriate and at 
worst destructive. At a minimum, distributing resources in the way suggested would provide 
the material conditions essential for bargaining and negotiation on financial matters, 
suggesting that economic decisions within families ought to move closer to an idealized market 
model in which individuals bargain from positions of relatively equal strength to further their 
individual preferences. On the other hand, it might equally be argued that such a proposal 
merely seeks to compel the family as institution to live up to its ideal conception, because only 
that conception has the capacity to justify its traditional claims to privacy and autonomy, claims 
which are respected by his theory. Yet conflict inevitably arises if only because Rawls also 
seeks to insulate so far as is possible those who reject the culture of the modern world against 
intrusion by its alien values. 50 Many who reject the culture of the modern world also reject 
any effort to modify traditional gender roles or to weaken socially conventional authority 
structures within the traditional family, and Rawls affirms the validity of such roles and their 
48 	Rawls, The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good', /oc. cit., 268. 
49 	Rawls, A Theory of Justice, loc. cit., 27. 
50 	Rawls, 'The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good', /oc. cit., 267-68. 
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irrelevance to (political) justice by asserting that they are voluntarily assumed. Many more 
might be dismayed at the intrusion of values such as bargaining into family decision making. 
In that way, a proposal such as this seems both profoundly in accord with the deepest 
ambitions of his own theory and in equally profound conflict with them. Can it be, perhaps, 
that Rawls has simply failed to acknowledge the pervasiveness of gender, the fact that no 
sphere of communal life can be viewed absent considerations deriving from it? Or is it, as 
argued in Chapter 6, that once one acknowledges that justice is relevant within families, no 
theoretically compelling cut off point exists, that families ought to comply with the principles of 
justice to the same extent as other social institutions, that it is morally impermissible to 
sacrifice justice to tolerance or to privacy? 
If a note of uncertainty and ambivalence ends our appraisal of Rawls, does Dworlcin's 
more individualistic account afford a clearer vision? His own account of political equality, 
extended to family structures, offered a compelling account of the reasons it is essential that 
legislative schemes impacting upon the family and upon family relationships redirect their 
focus from manipulation of the conditions under which exit is possible to the conditions 
essential if voice is to be protected and sustained. Does his account of resource equality, an 
account which we earlier questioned because it apparently allowed little redress for 
inequalities which arise as a consequence of the social allocation of responsibility for unwaged 
labour, leave greater conceptual space? Dworkin argues that 
if government succeeds in securing for each citizen a genuinely equal share of 
resources to use as he wishes in making his life successful according to his 
lights, then once again his choices will give effect to rather than comipt what 
government has done. 51 
The structure of Dworkin's account of equality of resources emphasizes that, once the 'unequal 
inheritance of wealth and health and talent'52 have been ameliorated by redistribution so that 
approximate equality of resources prevails, the individual may 'suppose himself entitled to act 
for himself or others as he Moses' unless it is unclear what has in fact been assigned him, as 
when the abstract rights deployed conflict in some way.53 Taken at face value, Dworkin's 
account of equality of resources argues that given initial equality, the apparent inequalities 
which arise through individual preferences in work, leisure and consumption do not subvert 
the fairness of the scheme. Such choices merely reinforce what government has done, 
emphasize that the scheme is compatible with private ambition. What of a proposal such as 
that made by Oki? 
51 	Dworkin, Law's Empire, loc. cit., 299. 
52 	Ibid., 301. 
53 	Ibid., 300 
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Olcin argues that if as a society we believe that domestic and parenting labour is as 
valuable as market labour, we ought to ensure that it provides equivalent access to resources. 
In traditional or quasi-traditional families this relative equality can be attained by distributing 
earned resources equally between husband and wife. Can this be reconciled with equality of 
resources? Two problems arise immediately. First, and obviously, it is not altogether clear 
that we so believe. Indeed, if we did so believe, it seems unlikely that many currently 
entrenched beliefs, such as that the husband's earnings and property belong exclusively to him, 
would continue to prevail. Second, more critically, Dworlcin's argument for equality of 
resources depends upon the presumption that if a truly level playing field could be created the 
value of labour and goods would be just that determined by the interaction of community 
preferences, by our willingness to commit resources to secure them. Dworkin argues, as we 
saw, that if talents were equal, the resources available to an individual at any point in time 
ought to be a function of the resources available to or consumed by that individual at others, 
given an initial approximately equal division. Thus, those who choose to devote their talents to 
producing goods or services valued by others, as measured by the willingness of those others to 
commit scarce resources to acquire them, are entitled to the additional wealth at their 
disposal. The fundamental principle is that 'if people of equal talent choose different lives it is 
unfair to redistribute halfway through those lives'. 54 On its face, given that husband and wife in 
a traditional family have 'chosen' different lives and have presumably made their choices upon 
a rational assessment of the options available, Dworlcin's account would disallow the sort of 
redistribution Okin recommends. 55 As he notes, his theory, unlike equality of welfare, offers 
no rationale for 'correcting for the contingencies that detennine how expensive or frustrating 
someone's preferences turn out to be.'56 It could, however, equally be argued that the life he 
chose, the overall balance between labour, consumption and leisure, was made possible by the 
fact that she assumed primary responsibility for domestic labour and parenting, that her labour 
not only generated much of his leisure but also contributed substantially to the forms of 
consumption available to him. On that interpretation, adequate compensation for her labour 
may also be said to be a part of the price of the life he chose, and failure to compensate 
profoundly unfair. On this interpretation, Okin's proposal would simply require that he and 
others similarly situated 'pay the true cost of the lives that they lead'. 57 It would require that he 
acknowledge that the lifestyle chosen in fact imposes costs upon another and for that reason 
limits the resources which he may fairly use. What Okin's approach does not do, however, is 
value what she is able to produce by asking what resources others would be willing to commit 
to securing it. Rather, it suggests that because it is inappropriate to extend the concept of a 
54 	Dworkin, 'Equality of Resources', /oc. cit., 310. 
55 	Here I assume, for simplicity, that they have roughly equal talent. 
56 	Ibid., 288. 
57 	Ibid., 295. 
305 
market in the usual sense to the social role of wife and mother, it is appropriate to require that 
resources be distributed as if the value of her services were equivalent to the value of his and 
their preferences in terms of the appropriate mix of labour, consumption and leisure were 
likewise equivalent.58 In that sense it conflicts profoundly with the individualism of his 
underlying thesis and might be said to superimpose a flat conception of equality upon his own 
individualized account.59 While a different form of transfer payment, one which valued 
services provided in the home in terms of the market rate for comparable services acquired in 
the marketplace, would restore the individualistic structure of Dworkin's account, such an 
account, as we saw in Chapter 6, conflicts profoundly with his own account of associative 
obligations, indeed shifts marriage towards an idealized market model. 
A further question, more fundamental in its impact, is specifically compelled by the 
individualistic tenor of Dworkin's theory. Dworkin has argued that the most compelling virtue 
of his account of equality of resources is that it offers an account of equality which is capable 
of accommodating the wide diversity of tastes, ambitions and conceptions of the good life 
characteristic of societies such as ours. We ought, therefore, be able to choose, on an 
individual basis, the particular combination of work, consumption and leisure which most 
closely accommodates our individual preferences. One of the interesting characteristics of 
Okin's proposal is that it rewards one category of structurally identical choices very differently. 
Even if we suppose that the existing and pervasive inequalities in society as a whole were 
substantially moderated this particular difference would persist. Just as individuals who 
participate in the marketplace differ widely in the particular mix of work, consumption and 
leisure they prefer, so also those who work in the home have similar differences. Under 
Okin's proposal, their differences and their preferences would impact upon resource outcomes 
to a far more substantial degree than is presently the case. The preferences of the market 
participant would not only have a significantly diminished impact upon outcomes but might 
well be significantly modified by both his diminished share of the resources attained in the 
marketplace and the fact that he would be compelled to take account of the preferences of 
another individual in a unique way. This emphasizes that while equality of resources can be 
interpreted in a way which would allow room for such a proposal, on a deeper level the 
incompatibility apparently remains. His choices in work, consumption and leisure would not, 
in fact, substantially determine his bank account wealth at any point in time. Ideally, her 
choices in work and consumption would play an equal role, severing to a substantial extent the 
connection Dworkin wishes to preserve between fully individualized choices and resource 
outcomes. Redistributing earned income in this way might be said to recognize that where an 
58 	Oki, Justice, Gender and the Family, loc. cit., 181-182. 
59 	Cf. Dworkin's comparison between his own theory and that of Rawls, Dworkin, 
'Equality of Resources, /oc. cit., 340-342. 
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ongoing relationship exists 'we must act as if the concrete rights we cannot both exercise had 
not been distributed between us, and we must distribute these as best we can.' 
The arguments above have examined only one way of maximizing voice, of attempting 
to ensure the material equality essential if voice is to be sustained. Equally obviously, they 
address only one dimension of equality and only one conception of what might be termed the 
social basis for an egalitarian marriage. I have not even attempted to reconcile this form of 
redistribution with existing legal and political values, most particularly the deeply entrenched 
belief that the earnings of an individual are his to do with as he will, that they represent the 
worth of his labour. While both Rawls and Dworkin clearly recommend redistribution on 
egalitarian grounds, and apparently envision implementation through the taxation system61, 
neither wishes to break down our entrenched cultural connection between the exercise of skills 
and capabilities and energies and the rewards which ensue. It may, however, be thought that 
Okin's proposal goes rather further in that it endeavours to disestablish the relationship a 
theorist such as Dworkin desires to sustain between individual preferences in work, labour and 
consumption and the resources available to that individual at any point in time. 
OTHER APPROACHES: REINFORCING COMPLEX EQUALITY 
In the last section, one concrete proposal for enhancing the equality of women was 
examined within the forms of egalitarian discourse developed by Rawls and Dworkin. In both 
cases, upon the best interpretation of their accounts of distributive justice, adequate conceptual 
space was available. However, on quite another level, it was difficult to accommodate within 
their conceptual frameworks. Paradoxically, it seemed that such a proposal would both be 
mandated by their theories and rejected by them. For Rawls this came about because it both 
affirmed values implicit in his theory and denied others which he emphasized would not be 
violated by political liberalism, particularly given his emphasis upon the need for a stable 
overlapping consensus. For Dworkin, on the other hand, it is both implicitly recommended by 
his account of political equality and by some aspects of his account of equality of resources, but 
conflicts profoundly with its individualism, its mode of valuation and with his emphasis upon 
freedom of choice in family arrangements. 
Yet, equality of access to economic resources represents only one aspect of an 
egalitarian distribution within the family, and therefore only one element in an egalitarian 
family law. In many ways, the social allocation of leisure and of responsibility is at least as 
critical as the distribution of resources, a fact which is obscured in theoretical accounts which 
suggest that the individual balance of work, leisure and consumption may be linked to 
individual preferences. What can be said about the distribution of leisure in the family, and, 
60 	Dworkin, Law's Empire, loc. cit., 303. 
61 	Rawls, A Theory of Justice, loc. cit., 274-84; Dworkin, 'Equality of Resources', /oc. cit., 
326-27. 
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more importantly, about the degree to which this distribution is influenced by individual 
preferences? Leisure is conceptually ambiguous. In ordinary discourse, leisure time is 
discretionary time, time in which one is free from the pressure of necessary activities and 
which one may allocate as one pleases. In economic discourse, on the other hand, leisure 
denotes that time which is not devoted to earning a living or to consumption, irrespective of 
whether the activities involved are in any sense discretionary. Neither Dworkin nor Rawls 
offer any analysis of the concept, a fact which is significant in that Dworlcin's account of 
equality of resources makes extensive use of the concept and Rawls has suggested that leisure 
can, in principle, be included among the primary goods. In that regard he has suggested that 
twenty-four hours less a standard working day might be included in the index of 
primary goods as leisure. Those who are unwilling to work would have a 
standard working day of extra leisure, and this extra leisure itself would be 
stipulated as equivalent to the index of primary goods of the least advantaged. 62 
In this passage at least, Rawls adopts an economic definition of leisure, 'useful uses of time for 
purposes other than income-earning activity or the consumption of goods. 63 Dworkin makes a 
similar distinction between work, leisure and consumption. What can be said of the allocation 
of leisure within the family? In traditional households a large proportion of the housewife's 
day would, on the economic definition, apparently be characterized as 'leisure'. Child care, 
housework, meal preparation and similar activities vanish within the phrase 'useful uses of time 
for purposes other than income-earning activity'. It can thus appear that married women, on the 
whole, enjoy substantially more leisure than married men, in that, irrespective of whether they 
are housewives, part-time employees or full time participants in the labour force, women tend 
to devote fewer hours to income-earning activity. In this way, women's household labour 
becomes no more than a leisure activity. If, and the contextual evidence is strong for this 
presumption, we presume that Dworkin and Rawls do in fact make use of the economic 
concept of leisure, women's generally disadvantaged economic position is a function of their 
preference for leisure over work, and no injustice is involved. On the other hand, they may 
simply perceive no conflict between the economic definition of leisure and its ordinary usage. 
That is, for both Rawls and Dworkin, leisure may actually be that time which is not devoted to 
activities related to their professional lives or to consumption, a perception which seems 
reasonable because, for a majority of men, participation in housework, child care and 
associated activities is, in a real sense, discretionary. same is simply not true of the 
62 	Rawls, 'The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good', /oc. cit., 257, esp. n. 7. 
63 	See R.A. Musgrave, `Ma3dmin, Uncertainty, and the Leisure Trade-Off, 88 Quarterly 
Journal of Economics (1974) 624, 629 and n. 7. Cf. Rawls' discussion of the leisure 
trade-off in J. Rawls, 'Reply to Alexander and Musgrave' 88 Quarterly Journal of 
Economics (1974) 633, 653-55. 
In that respect it is worth noting that employed married men in Australia apparently 
spent somewhat less than 10% of their time on all household activities, while 
employed married women spent almost 30% of their time on such activities. Time 
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great majority of women. Most women, even those who participate full time in the labour 
market, devote a substantial number of hours to the domestic economy and this work is 
neither wholly discretionary nor income generating nor do the activities involved necessarily 
reflect their preferences, as individuals, for the utilization of that time not devoted to income 
generation. In that sense, it is irrational to describe the time devoted to housework and child 
care as leisure time. Child care, in particular, while frequently valued and enjoyed, is not 
perceived as discretionary in any sense, but morally obligatory. The fact that it can be both 
valued and enjoyed does not lessen its status as work. Many individuals both can and do take 
pleasure and pride in their work. Indeed, in a better and more nearly just world than our own, 
one might hope that this would be true of most individuals. Rather women's labour represents 
work whose surplus value has been appropriated by others. These 'others' include, not only 
their own husbands, but also those wider institutions responsible for the structure of workplace 
requirements, of professional responsibilities, and, indeed, even of institutions such as the 
trade union movement. In this context it is important to recognize that it has been estimated 
that the household labour of a full time housewife generates approximately one half the 
discretionary income of the average family in the United States. 65 Whether she has, under 
existing conditions, been allowed to perceive such as her entitlement, is, of course, a very 
different matter, as is the question of her entitlement, legally speaking, to any proportion of the 
discretionary income of the household. 
FOSTERING COMPLEX EOUALITY 
Yet, returning to the underlying emphasis of both Dworkin and Rawls upon 
generating the social, political and economic conditions essential if individual men and women 
are to develop and sustain voice within the society as a whole, it is appropriate to ask whether 
other approaches might better realize this goal. One might, for example, argue that a taxation 
rebate ought to be available to every household in which young children reside equivalent in 
value to the current market cost of child care in a child care centre.66 Such rebate ought to be 
payable to the principle carer or carers in such households. It would replace all existing family 
rebates and allowances and should incorporate provision for a national superannuation scheme 
for full time child care providers which ought to be both compulsory and fully portable thus 
enabling it to be integrated with workplace schemes. The actual amount of the rebate would 
depend upon the number and the ages of children requiring care, and it would be discontinued 
Use Pilot Survey, /oc. cit., 36. Unemployed married men devoted only 15% of their 
time to household activities while unemployed married women devoted 30% of their 
time to such activities. Perhaps more significant is the fact that where participation is 
broken down by age group, men in the child-rearing years, 25-44, spent no more than 
5% of their time on housework and child care combined, while women in the same 
age range spent between 20 and 25% of their time on those activities. See p. 39. 
65 	I. Sirageldin, Non-Market Components of National Income, Ann Arbor, Univ. of 
Michigan Survey Research Center, 1969. 
66 	In Hobart, full day care for two pre-school children costs about $200 per week. 
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when the youngest child reached the age of twelve. A child care rebate, properly designed, 
should be structured to build on social provision of six months paid non-transferable parenting 
leave to each parent of a new born (or adopted) child. Both parents are, prima fade, equally 
obligated to provide both economic support and nurturing for all those children for whom they 
are morally or legally responsible, and a just society ought to structure its principal economic 
and social institutions in such a way as to facilitate and encourage this. The existing division of 
market and domestic labour and the resultant economic inequality, I would argue, represent 
an accurate measure of one major injustice in contemporary social institutions. 
Would a program such as that sketched above be consistent with the general 
theoretical structure developed by either Rawls or Dworkin? Unlike Okin's proposal, it does 
not represent a direct redistribution between spouses which depends upon the earning capacity 
of the waged spouse. In that respect, I believe it to be preferable because it attempts to isolate 
the opportunity costs involved in parenting and to acknowledge that the social value of 
parenting is wholly independent of the earning capability of a waged partner.° Olcin's 
proposal, on the other hand, seemingly suggests that the value of domestic labour and 
parenting ought to be derived from the earning capability of a waged spouse, which seems 
counter-intuitive given that the difficulty inherent in both tasks tends to increase as resources 
diminish. (In a just society, of course, such discrepancies would not exist to the extent to which 
they do in existing unjust societies, however we are, of necessity, here considering the realm of 
partial compliance.) Underlying a partially publicly funded redistribution which recognizes 
both the opportunity costs inherent in caring for children and the fact that its present and 
future citizens are the single most important resource of any community, are two further aims. 
The first is providing tangible recognition of the fact that the community as a whole has an 
interest in the welfare of its children and in ensuring that those providing care are not, as they 
are at present, profoundly, and often permanently, economically (and socially) disadvantaged 
by doing so. The second is recognition that the community as a whole has an interest in the 
full development and utilization of all the talents of each and every one of its citizens, male and 
female. Both of these are, I believe, aims which ought to be central to any egalitarian 
society. as many women presently find it difficult or impossible to sustain development 
of their full capabilities because these are incompatible with their child care responsibilities 
and because those who work part time frequently find that their child care expenses render 
part time work economically disadvantageous even where it is essential to maintain and 
67 	Where the wage earner's income is insufficient to provide the full rebate, as is the case 
for some individuals in existing unjust societies, the shortfall would need to be met by 
the state in the form of a negative income tax. 
While it might be suggested that these aims are fundamentally perfectionist, I believe 
that they do little more than take seriously the differences between persons and the 
fact that, under favourable conditions, normal individuals do, in fact, value the 
development and exercise of a wide range of skills and capabilities, particularly when 
exercised in company with others. 
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develop skills or to sustain self-esteem, many men fail to develop their nurturing capabilities to 
any meaningful extent. Such a program, fully implemented and accompanied by structural 
changes facilitating job sharing and part time work by both men and women, and encouraging 
women's participation in further education and training would go some way towards enabling 
women not only to choose the balance of market labour, nurturing labour and education which 
best suited their needs at any point in time but also providing them with the economic power 
essential if they are to negotiate role sharing in the fullest sense with their partners. Given 
these broader egalitarian goals, each parent ought only be entitled to a rebate equivalent to 
one half the market cost of child care69, since, in a two parent household that represents the 
extent of his or her wholly individualized obligation. While this may appear counter-intuitive, 
even unjust, in that it seemingly disadvantages those individuals who assume full responsibility 
for parenting and domestic labour while their partners assume full responsibility for the 
provision of resources, I do not believe this criticism is justified. First, what I am proposing is 
not a wage for child care as such. Rather, my proposal gives priority to (at least partial) 
compensation for the opportunity costs inherent in parenting, given institutional structures 
which are not just. In a two parent family, structured on egalitarian principles, these 
opportunity costs (which are individually borne) would be shared between the parents, each 
parent having a wholly individualized obligation to provide care, just as each parent has a 
wholly individualized obligation to provide support. Where such principles are not adhered to 
(for whatever reason) neither parent is negotiating the obligations inherent in parenting fully. 
The waged parent might be said, using Rawls' phrase, not to be sharing fully in the burdens of 
social cooperation. Likewise the unwaged parent might properly be thought to have failed to 
meet the obligation to provide support. It may be, therefore, suggested that the extra support 
provided by the waged parent effectively cancels the extra care provided by the unwaged 
parent. Compensation7° is due those who attempt to fulfil their individual obligations fully 
and are disadvantaged by doing so, not to those who, for whatever reason, choose not to do so. 
It must be emphasized that a proposal such as mine is necessarily a response to existing unjust 
conditions, one which it is hoped will ultimately shift the balance towards a more equitable 
distribution of the burdens and benefits of social cooperation. Were the burdens and benefits 
69 	In existing unjust societies, of course, the market price for child care is artificially 
depressed because wages for child care workers reflect the supposition that little if any 
skill is required to care for young children. In a more nearly just society, this would 
not be the case. Such workers would be regarded as skilled professionals and salary 
structures would reflect this recognition. 
70 	Here it must be noted that I explicitly identify my proposal as compensatory (or 
redistributive) in structure. It is necessitated by the fact that, where child care is 
provided by the biological or social parents, no market in the ordinary sense exists. 
My proposal represents an attempt to minimize the opportunity costs presently 
associated with parenting without defining privately provided nurture as an 
occupational choice in the strict sense. Rather, as I shall argue subsequently, 
participation in the social reproduction of future generations on a personal level is an 
obligation which a just society would recognize and reward, and one which in no way 
depends upon biological sex or social gender. 
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of cooperation justly shared, implementation of such measures would be unnecessary. Given 
that they are not, it becomes critical to ensure that any compensatory measures do not have the 
effect of further entrenching and reinforcing existing non-ideal practices even while they 
simultaneously offer some redress for existing injustices. 
Central to the proposal put above is the fact that the proposed rebate is compensatory 
in intent and structure. It is designed to provide partial acknowledgment of the individualized 
opportunity costs inherent in parenting and the value of parenting to the community as a 
whole. As such, its quantum is linked, not to the total amount of care provided by any 
individual, but to the proportional obligation of that individual to provide care. Rather than 
provide a wage as such, it focuses upon the opportunity costs inherent in even temporary 
withdrawal from the labour market and endeavours to minimize these and encourage their 
more equitable distribution. Were it simply treated as a wage, further problems would arise 
within any egalitarian framework, including, for example, the application of equality of fair 
opportunity to services provided within the private household. In structuring my proposal 
within a compensatory framework I am attempting, arguendo, to maximize its congruence with 
the overall structure of egalitarian accounts as they stand. 
Obviously, it might be said that my proposal fails to be neutral between social 
outcomes, and this is both correct and inevitable. With respect to the family and to family 
structures, as elsewhere, neutrality does not exist. Whether we elect to modify existing 
practices and structures, or whether we elect to preserve the status quo, legal and economic 
structures inevitably constrain individual conduct and make some choices more attractive than 
are others. To believe otherwise is irrational. Against the background of social, political, and 
economic structures which have penalized departures from conventional gender roles, 
sometimes severely, and affirmed traditional gender roles, albeit to varying degrees, such a 
proposal is modest indeed. I would argue that it simply attempts to shift the balance towards 
recognition that each and every parent is obliged to provide both support and care and nurture 
for children, to ensure that the benefits and costs are fairly shared. We are here dealing with a 
proposal designed to partially redress pervasive existing injustices, not an ideal theory 
account.71 Second, if one accepts, as do both Rawls and Dworkin, that the development of 
leadership skills and capabilities and the capacity to influence others is important to the 
individual, enhances individual agency, and if, as Rawls suggests, the workplace provides one 
important setting in which these capabilities are developed and explored, it may be critical to 
71 	The underlying logic is similar to that used by Dworkin to suggest that, in the context 
of voting rights, it might be appropriate for residents of very poor urban districts to 
have greater legislative representation where it might be thought that this might 
produce more just (because more egalitarian) outcomes. Dworkin, 'Political 
Equality', /oc. cit., 6. Given our cultural history, and the social and economic 
outcomes characteristic of it, and given the evidence that women enjoy substantially 
less power in all spheres than do men, it does not seem unjust to structure a remedial 
measure to encourage a more egalitarian division of burdens and benefits. 
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the development of a sense of justice within the community as a whole that all participate to 
the greatest extent possible. Thus where, as remains the case in many families, only one 
parent participates in labour market activities, the total rebate available would represent one 
half the cost of creche care and would be remitted directly to the unwaged parent. 72 This 
follows directly from the fact that both parents have an obligation to provide care, just as both 
parents have an obligation to provide economic support. Where one parent provides full 
support while the other provides the vast majority of nurturing labour neither is negotiating 
both obligations fully. 
COMPLEX EOUALITY AND RAWLS 
Given the structure of Rawls' theory, such a program, like that advocated by Oki, 
would clearly be one which would be implemented at the legislative rather than constitutional 
phase.73 Thus, its acceptability would be determined under conditions of full knowledge of 
existing economic, social, and political conditions and the costs and strains it would impose 
upon existing institutions, including the necessity of building and/or sustaining the stable 
'overlapping consensus' of which Rawls speaks. In other words, it would represent one of a 
number of policies which might be thought to make the community as a whole more nearly 
just. Its reasonableness would depend upon whether it could be reconciled with the principles 
of justice chosen in the original position and most particularly with the overriding commitment 
to fair equality of opportunity and the substantive content of the difference principle, that 
inequalities are allowable only if allowing them will 'maximize. .. the long-term expectations of 
the least advantaged group , .74 I believe that such a proposal could be reconciled with the 
substantive thrust of equality of fair opportunity, so long as it is borne in mind that it is a 
compensatory program which is necessitated by existing structures which render parenting and 
market labour less than fully compatible and thereby vitiate fair equality of opportunity. It 
seeks to ensure that both parents have the resources required if they are to pursue 
opportunities in the community at large, be these educational, social, political or economic. 
The pursuit of opportunities is seldom, if ever, costless. My proposal endeavours to encourage 
the development of the background institutions and structures essential if equality of fair 
opportunity is to have other than rhetorical content. In this context, it must be emphasized 
that opportunities cannot be considered acontextually, that in the real world the capacity to 
pursue and make use of the opportunities theoretically available frequently depends, inter alia, 
upon socially constructed responsibilities and the constraints which they impose. 
72 	In Australia, clearly, the mechanism presently in place for the Child Support scheme 
could easily be adapted to this wider social purpose. See Child Support (Registration 
and Collection) Act 1988, Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989. 
73 	Rawls, 'The Basic Liberties and Their Priority', /oc. cit., 52, where he notes that it is 
not appropriate to incorporate provisions regulating social and economic inequality in 
a constitution. 
74 	Rawls, A Theory of Justice, loc. cit., 151. 
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Given its compensatory structure, its congruence with the difference principle may 
pose greater problems. Strictly speaking, Rawls' argument identifies homemakers as 
'voluntarily unemployed', and suggests that their 'extra leisure' ought to be treated as 
equivalent to the basic goods of the least advantaged group. It follows that no specific 
compensation is required for the disadvantages inherent in parenting in our culture and given 
our institutions. Even if we insist that what goes on in the home is work, albeit unpaid work, 
rather than leisure, and that compensation is therefore morally required, Rawls' reliance upon 
such conventional redistributive tools as family allowances and rebates for dependents 75 and 
his emphasis upon the distribution of commodities to households, not individuals, obliterates 
what occurs in the household and renders it, and the opportunity costs associated therewith, 
irrelevant to distributive justice and it is this network of linked assumptions which must be 
disrupted and destabilized. Inevitably, once we focus upon households, not only do we lose 
sight of distribution within households, but also we lose sight of the fact that within households 
are individuals who are differentially advantaged or disadvantaged. We fail, in other words, to 
take seriously the differences among persons and assume instead that those choices which 
might be thought to maximize the economic well-being of the household as a unit are in the 
individual interests of family members. It is imperative to emphasize that all the arguments 
advanced by Rawls against utilitarian assumptions within the public sphere are equally relevant 
applied to the private. Either we take seriously the differences among persons or we fail to do 
so. Where justice is at stake, an each way bet is inappropriate. 
Rawls, as we have seen, tentatively identifies the least advantaged group as unskilled 
workers or labourers. While the problematical nature of this was addressed at length earlier, 
as was his alternative formulation,76 it is worth exploring the consistency of my proposal with 
his account as it stands. If we follow him in this, and ask whether such a program would place 
this group in a position preferable to that they would occupy under a flatly egalitarian division 
of income and wealth, we note first that it might appear that the benefits are unevenly 
distributed within the class of labourers, given that we are to focus our attention exclusively 
upon the distribution of income and wealth. However, given that, according to Rawls, we 
ought to reason from the perspective of the 'representative' member of this group, it remains 
reasonable to argue (on the basis of Rawls' assumption that what is relevant is the income 
stream available to the household) that the representative unskilled worker will, during the 
course of the normal life, indeed benefit. That individual, is, if we accept Rawls' assumption, 
in no way disadvantaged, indeed my proposal appears neutral with regard to the 
'representative unskilled worker'. 
A much more serious problem arises in that, as a consequence of the present 
gendered distribution of labour and of existing social and economic structures within cultures 
75 	Ibid., 275-278. 
76 	See Ch. 3 and the discussion earlier in this Chapter. 
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such as Australia, England and the United States, my proposal is, in the real world, specifically 
targeted at enhancing the position of women and the opportunities realistically available to 
them as a discrete group. Given present social and economic structures and gender roles, my 
proposal identifies the mothers of young children as the least advantaged group. It takes a 
specific socio-historic role, one which has arisen as a consequence of concrete and specific 
social and economic developments as the benchmark. What I am suggesting is that, in fact, 
given our history and culture, women, specifically mothers of young children, must be seen as 
the least advantaged group. Their relative disadvantage can be denied only if we allow 
conventional assumptions concerning families and family roles to blind us to their very real 
disadvantages, and, in particular, their lack of individual access to many, and in some cases, 
almost all, of the basic social goods Rawls deems essential. Rawls, however, appears to rule 
out the possibility that women as a group might constitute the least advantaged group unless 
unequal basic rights were assigned upon the basis of biological sex as was, of course, the case 
in the recent past.77 At the very least, he emphasizes the use of broad traditional economic 
classifications which emphasize household income 78 in determining disadvantage and does not 
at any time consider the impact of the sexual division of labour upon access to the primary 
goods. It is in this context, of course, that equality of opportunity becomes critical. In the 
world as we know it, worker and primary parent come close to being mutually exclusive terms. 
It is irrational to suggest that offices and positions can be said to be open to all under 
conditions of fair equality of opportunity when those same offices and positions are structured 
in a way which renders them almost incompatible with ongoing personal participation in 
parenting. In practice, if not in theory, many of them are open only to those who do not 
participate in parenting to any substantive extent, and likewise parenting, to the extent it may 
be described as an office or position (albeit unwaged) is open, as a concrete and realized social 
practice, only to those who restrict their participation in the offices and positions characteristic 
of the public sphere and accept the economic and social disadvantages, including lack of access 
to the primary goods, which attend this choice. Given the central place of the principle of 
equality of opportunity in Rawls' account of distributive justice and its precedence over the 
difference principle, a way must be found of reconciling the demands of the public and private 
spheres, and, I would argue, the substantive emphasis of my proposal is structured to 
encourage just such a reconciliation. 
Further problems arise because my proposal makes no attempt to be neutral between 
social outcomes at least in respect of family roles and the choices available to adult family 
77 	Rawls, A Theory of Justice, loc. cit., 99. Rawls insists that justice as fairness ought to 
appraise the social system so far as possible from two perspectives: that of equal 
citizenship and that of the representative individual's position in the distribution of 
income and wealth. Only where unequal basic rights are assigned, on, for example, 
the basis of biological sex, need other positions (or roles) be taken into account. 
78 	Rawls refers, for example, to family allowances and to 'the usual rebates for 
dependants'. Ibid., 275-278. 
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members. On the structure outlined above, the greatest economic benefit would be realized by 
those couples who were able to negotiate role sharing sufficiently to ensure both that less than 
full day care was required by young children and that each partner maximized his or her 
individual income earning capability given the hours available and irrespective of the total 
income stream available to the household. The substantive goal emphasizes the long term 
importance of encouraging all women to develop and sustain their economic skills while 
simultaneously encouraging men to develop their nurturing capabilities and extend their 
involvement in the life and work of the household. Through economic incentives it 
undoubtedly seeks to modify the prevailing gendered distribution of labour within the society 
as a whole and to offer the greatest support to those families where all adult family members 
attempt to meet their individual economic and parental obligations to their children while also 
ensuring that where either parent devotes great majority of his or her time to a parental role 
independent resources are available to permit participation by that parent in educational, 
social and political activities, for example, by securing substitute care for some portion of the 
day. 
In countries such as Australia and the United States, the sub-group constituting 
households headed by female sole parents is the least likely to have adequate independent 
access to economic resources and is the most likely to rely, in whole or in part, upon welfare 
benefits in order to survive.79 It is, however, inappropriate to specifically target this sub-
group. The great majority of sole parents become such following the collapse of a marital or 
quasi-marital relationship or the death of a partner. Their disadvantage originates in those 
relationships and in the cultural expectations which have structured them. While, undeniably, 
disadvantage is exacerbated by the departure or death of a partner, particularly given our 
social history of inequitable division of resources upon dissolution and inadequate child 
support provisions, it is most often the consequence of earlier inequalities and not a discrete 
and isolated phenomenon. In that sense, it represents the by-product of our legal attention to 
the conditions under which exit is possible, and our total inattention to the conditions under 
which voice may be developed and sustained. 
Under my proposal, in sole parent households the full rebate would be available to a 
working sole parent. Where sole parents are dependent upon other benefits or spousal 
support for their economic resources, the full rebate ought to be available as a supplement to 
other benefits (without diminution) provided that such parents enroled at least half-time in an 
educational or training program designed to develop and enhance their capability to compete 
in the labour market, and thus to meet their obligation to provide economic support as well as 
nurturing. Despite the fact that it does not use family income as a criteria for eligibility, it does 
for these reasons seem likely that it would go some way towards meeting broader egalitarian 
79 	In Australia, on current government statistics, approximately 70% of sole parents rely 
upon welfare for the bulk of their support and 95% of those pensioners are women. 
See Women's Budget Statement, loc. cit., 208. 
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goals. Likewise, among less advantaged sections of the community, it is, in the non-ideal 
world, frequently necessary for all adult family members to work in order to secure an 
adequate standard of living for their families. Such families would be significantly benefited in 
that the full rebate would be available and the family would have the resources required to 
secure adequate care for children while endeavouring to meet its other economic needs 
overall. 
In terms of its compatibility with Rawls' theory taken as a whole, particularly the 
principle that social and economic inequalities can be tolerated, in ideal theory, only if they are 
to the benefit of the least advantaged group and attached to positions open to all under fair 
equality of opportunity, I conclude that my proposal can be reconciled with Rawls' principles 
subject to a number of critical qualifications. First, as it stands, Rawls' theory places excessive 
reliance upon a number of conventional assumptions. These include, but are not necessarily 
limited to, his presumption that the position of representative individuals can be sufficiently 
defined in terms of equal citizenship and the individual's place in the distribution of income 
and wealth, his apparent assumption that this position can be ascertained by examining 
household rather than individual income and his stated position that other roles are voluntarily 
entered and thus need not be specifically addressed. Rawls identifies 'the least advantaged as 
those who have the lowest index of primary goods, when their prospects are viewed over a 
complete life:80 Clearly, given the emphasis upon prospects over a complete life, and given 
Rawls' assumption that positions other than that of citizenship and that in the index of income 
and wealth are voluntarily assumed, a proposal giving social priority to the needs of mothers 
with young children becomes somewhat tendentious. While bearing and rearing children 
clearly imposes extremely high costs upon the great majority of women, costs which are not 
significantly shared by men, a theoretical focus upon the costs incurred by women in 
childrearing conflicts both with Rawls' emphasis upon household rather than individual income 
and with his view that other roles are voluntarily assumed. It makes a specific social role and 
one which has arisen at least in part as a consequence of a particular set of legal, economic, 
historic, and ideological conditions central. It challenges, at a fundamental level, the 
universality of his account. The economic disadvantage presently faced by women is a function 
of their socially and legally constructed roles as wives and mothers, and it is this set of 
historically contingent disadvantages which must be addressed. Prospects cannot be viewed in 
the abstract, apart from the social, normative and ideological considerations which give them 
shape and form, nor, for that matter, can factors such as motivation. In addition, implicit in 
my proposal is an assumption that individuals who did not know their gender or the gender 
roles characteristic of their society would recognize that all individuals, irrespective of gender, 
have an obligation to provide any children they may have with nurture and with economic 
support and would structure their institutions to facilitate this and ensure that none were 
disadvantaged thereby. 
80 	Rawls, 'Social Unity and Primary Goods', /oc. cit., 164. 
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Economic institutions have long been structured in a way which suggests that worker 
and primary parent are mutually exclusive terms. To a substantial extent this remains the case. 
More precisely, the fact that a majority of men are also fathers has been and remains today 
irrelevant to institutional design. The responsibility of men for their children is perceived in a 
way which suggests that it is limited to the provision of resources and it is this assumption 
which must be challenged and eradicated. In a just society, one in which all opportunities, 
including the opportunity for full participation in parenting were opportunities open to by all, 
this would not be the case. It is a measure of the injustice which permeates the basic 
institutions of our society, in the full Rawlsian sense, that no social recognition has been given 
to the fact that the vast majority of adult individuals, male and female, are, have been, or will 
become parents and are, therefore, obligated to provide their children both with economic 
support and with care and nurture. 81 In a just society, both parents would contribute 
approximately equally to the provision of support and the provision of care and nurture, and 
both would perceive their contributions in each sphere as being of equal value. In society as it 
exists today, it may be argued that the potential for motherhood and the cultural weight given 
the mother role colours the aspirations of girls and young women from childhood onwards, 
and is frequently a determining factor in directing their choices and modelling their career 
aspirations. The potential for fatherhood, as a responsibility demanding personal commitment 
and the gift of self rather than biological fact, on the other hand, continues to be marginal in 
the development and aspirations of men. Their real and significant work lies elsewhere, and in 
so far as fatherhood is relevant in shaping their aspirations, it is relevant in terms of their role 
as providers. Indeed, it is perhaps significant that, under present conditions, fatherhood as 
social practice often becomes most critical and significant to men upon dissolution of 
marriage, that is, when it comes to symbolize loss irrespective of prior active involvement in 
and personal commitment to parenting as a social practice. 
Rawls' account strongly suggests that roles such as husband and wife and indeed 
parent are wholly voluntarily chosen, and, for that reason, irrelevant to distributive justice. It is 
as if gender were an afterthought, a preference which may be disregarded in assessing the 
justice of the basic structure. Despite this, gender and gender roles have played a critical role 
in the evolution and structure of social institutions, and their role is especially conspicuous in 
the internal structure of such institutions as 'competitive markets . . . and the trionogamoris 
family' which Rawls identifies as basic.82 As Rawls acknowledges, it is to inequalities in 
institutions such as these that principles of social justice must first applied. Yet, given his 
propensity for viewing the family from the perspective of heads of family lines, given his 
blindness concerning the role of gender in structuring opportunities and disadvantages and his 
later, almost paradoxical, insistence that his principles are not intended to apply to institutions 
81 	On the costs of motherhood in Australia see Women's Budget Statement, loc. cit., 76. 
82 	Rawls, A Theory of Justice, loc. cit., 7. 
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such as the family, and given his resort to conventional economic accounts which render much 
of the work done by women, particularly mothers, irrelevant, one must conclude that he 
perceives gender roles, and the gendered family as peripheral to questions of the justice of the 
basic structure. description of such roles as voluntarily assumed irrespective of their 
social and economic consequences effectively prohibits the precise proposition for which I am 
arguing, that mothers with young children may be rationally identified as the least advantaged 
group, irrespective of the economic position of the household of which they are a part. While 
my presumption conflicts with Rawls' emphasis upon the household and particularly his view 
that the critical issue is the allocation of commodities to households, 84 it is consistent with 
contemporary social welfare statistics and the now widespread recognition that female sole 
parents are not only more likely to require transfer payments for survival than most other 
segments of the community but also less likely to better their economic position and escape the 
cycle of poverty. This, in turn follows from conventional family structures, the generally 
depressed wages available in 'typically female occupations' which have long been deemed 
appropriate in part because of assumptions concerning the family and family roles, and from 
the significant expenditures necessitated by the need to arrange substitute care for children. 
The real question is whether Rawls' theory is capable of acknowledging, at its foundation, the 
interpersonal obligations and responsibilities which might rationally be thought to follow from 
the basic facts of human existence once one adopted the appropriate perspective. 
DWORKIN AND COMPLEX EOUALITY 
What of Dworkin? On the ideal theory level, we confront a number of significant 
difficulties. His apparent acceptance of the standard economic allocation of human activities 
into work, leisure and consumption, his treatment of the concept of leisure as unworthy of 
analysis and argument, and his emphasis upon voluntariness and choice in the individual 
allocation of time to work or leisure seems also to make it difficult to reconcile his ideal theory 
account with the currently disadvantaged position of the mothers of young children. Indeed, 
on the ideal theory level families apparently do not exist, nor do, for that matter, any non-
commercial relationships between individuals. On a non-ideal level, however, the position may 
be different. Dworkin has argued that, under non-ideal conditions, programs which produce 
what he has termed 'dominating improvements' in equality are acceptable. According to 
Dworkin, taking the situation which would obtain if an egalitarian distribution of resources had 
occurred as the baseline, if a particular program reduces the overall disadvantage, both in 
83 	Ibid. Rawls assumes at pp. 7-8 that it is not necessary to consider the justice of 
institutions and social practices generally to address the justice of the basic structure 
taken as an interlocking network of discrete institutions. Rather, he is concerned with 
ensuring that the relationship between these institutions conforms to principles of 
justice. The issue of justice for women, however, requires that the internal justice of 
these institutions and practices be given primacy. A just society develops from the 
bottom up, not from the top down. 
84 	Ibid., 276. 
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terms of available resources and the freedom to make use of those resources in ways which are 
personally satisfying, of some people without creating thereby a situation in which others have 
fewer resources and less freedom than would be theirs under an ideal egalitarian distribution, 
such programs are acceptable.85 Under Dworlcin's non-ideal criteria, Olcin's program would, I 
think, fail, because it would reduce the overall resources of some individuals below those which 
they would have under an ideal egalitarian distribution. What of my argument? Presuming as 
I do that it would be, at least in part, funded by an increased and more steeply progressive 
income tax, could it be described as meeting the standards Dworkin argues are essential? If 
one accepts the propositions I have put forward, that under existing social and economic 
conditions, women are pervasively disadvantaged as a group and that these disadvantages are 
most overwhelming with respect to those women who are responsible for the care of children 
under the age of twelve, I believe it may, subject to these qualifications. I have argued that the 
disadvantages experienced by such women resound both in diminished access to resources and 
in diminished access to leisure. By leisure I mean that time available for discretionary use 
reflecting the preferences of the individual. Thus, I do not regard time required for child care 
and essential domestic tasks as leisure. I am, however, inclined to regard time allocated to 
non-essential household tasks as leisure. For women who have young families, in the real 
world, a number of options exist. They can devote themselves full time to the parental role, in 
which case their independent access to resources is likely to be minimal or non-existent, and 
their access to leisure equivalent to or less than that of their partners. They can attempt to 
balance economic activity and parenting, in which case the cost of replacement care for their 
children is likely to significantly reduce and, in some cases, nullify the gain from their 
economic activities and their available leisure is likely to be significantly reduced because they 
are likely to retain almost full responsibility for essential household labour and parenting. 
They can devote themselves full time to labour market activities, in which case their earnings 
are likely to reflect the gap between average male and female wages generally and to be 
further significantly diminished by the cost of securing appropriate care, and their leisure 
deficit is likely to approximate that of individuals without parenting responsibilities who work 
two full time jobs. 
I shall argue further that it is proper to regard women's culturally assigned 
responsibility for parenting as a 'liberty deficit' in Dworlcin's terms. The conception of a 
liberty deficit is introduced by Dworkin in the course of imagining what an ideal distribution in 
our world would look like and how we might move towards it. He argues that, in the real 
world, an individual's circumstances may be worse than justice demands in two quite different 
ways. He or she may be disadvantaged because of having fewer resources than would be 
available under an ideal distribution. Likewise, the baseline liberty/constraint system of the 
community might be unfair, depriving that individual unjustly of the ability to make full use of 
the resources which he or she does have. The distinction between these two distinct forms of 
85 	Dworkin, 'The Place of Liberty', /oc. cit., 41 ff. 
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injustice involved follows from the fact that the value of different resources to any individual 
cannot be considered independently of any existing constraints on that individual's capacity to 
make use of those resources in ways which are personally satisfying. Thus, for example, the 
value of marble to any given individual may be altered if he or she is legally forbidden to use 
that marble for satiric sculptures. Likewise, different systems of baseline constraints have the 
capacity to alter the preferences of individuals and determine even those which would be 
expressed in an ideal theory auction. The distribution of resources and opportunities cannot 
be considered in isolation but must be evaluated against the background of the liberties and 
constraints within which choices are made and opportunities pursued. As a consequence, in 
the real world, it is necessary to consider two distinct foci of disadvantage. Not only may an 
individual not have the resources he or she would have been entitled to in an ideal egalitarian 
auction, but also the liberty/constraint baseline system currently in force might itself be unfair 
in some way, as it would be if, for example, certain forms of expression were prohibited by law. 
Any given individual may be doubly disadvantaged in that the liberty/constraint baseline 
system in the community might be unfair and he or she might have fewer resources than ought 
to have been the case even under that unfair system. According to Dworkin, 
someone's liberty deficit. . . is the degree to which he is limited, in what he is 
able to do or achieve, by some constraint, compared with what he would have 
been able to do or achieve in the position defined for him by an ideal egalitarian 
distribution. 86 
In our society, I would argue, women's culturally assigned responsibility for primary parenting 
together with their culturally assigned responsibility for domestic labour constrains what they 
are able to do or achieve in other spheres of life compared with the outcomes which would 
obtain following an ideal egalitarian distribution in which responsibility for primary parenting 
and domestic labour was equally shared by men and women. The knowledge of their potential 
responsibility in these areas, responsibilities which are not to any significant extent presently 
shared by men, significantly affects their preferences in education, in employment, and in the 
pursuit of economic, social and political opportunities. It follows that the preferences actually 
expressed by women have arisen at least in part as a consequence of the liberty/constraint 
baseline system existing in countries such as Australia, England and the United States, and are, 
to that extent inauthentic. They cannot be assumed to be equivalent to those which would be 
expressed under ideal egalitarian conditions. 
It is for this reason that my account incorporates recognition of the potential impact 
of gender at the ideal theory level in equality of resources. By defining an egalitarian 
distribution as one in which male and female individuals shared responsibility for parenting 
and necessary domestic labour equally, it establishes a background constraint at the level of 
ideal theory, one which implicitly acknowledges morally binding obligations and 
86 	Ibid., 40. 
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responsibilities.87 Reasoning commences with two independent counterfactual assumptions in 
place. The first is that developed by Dworkin himself, that individuals are approximately equal 
in talent. The second acknowledges the potential obligation of all individuals to participate in 
domestic labour and parenting irrespective of biological sex. Once this second counterfactual 
assumption is in place, and we compare real world conditions with those at the ideal theory 
level, it becomes possible to recognize that the roles associated with gender in our culture do, 
in fact, impose a liberty deficit upon women. Women are, that is, constrained in what they are 
able to do or achieve in other spheres by their culturally assigned responsibility for parenting 
and household labour when we compare their present situation to that which would obtain if 
these responsibilities were equally shared by men and women. Men, on the other hand, 
appear to enjoy a liberty surplus in that they have, for the most part, been relieved of primary 
responsibility for parenting and household labour. Their choices are unconstrained by any 
personal responsibilities in that regard. I do not know whether Dworkin would find either my 
definition of leisure or my description of women's responsibility for primary parenting and 
household labour as a liberty deficit plausible. I would, however, argue that they must be so 
considered if his theory is to be understood gender neutral terms rather than as tacitly 
predicated upon the male gender role. 
A further problem arises because the examples Dworkin provides to illuminate the 
concept of a liberty deficit invariably involve legal restrictions, and indeed, he emphasizes that 
a liberty deficit 'is a loss of power, in virtue of legal constraint;' [emphasis mine] and argues 
that 'a community victimizes one of its members . . . when it imposes a liberty deficit on him.' 88 
It is not altogether clear that women's parental and domestic roles may be described as a loss 
of power arising from legal restraint in existing unjust societies. 89 They did, however, evolve 
to their present form at least in part as a consequence of legal constraints imposed by the 
common law. Those constraints were substantially continued and legally reinforced by 
traditional matrimonial regimes and they continue to exist in shadow form in contemporary 
regimes of family, taxation and social welfare law. Likewise, women's labour market 
participation today bears the scars of earlier legal regimes, under which married women were 
compelled totresign, under which female wages were significantly lower than male wages for 
equivalent work, and under which women were routinely denied entry into many forms of 
employment. Thus, by extension, it may be argued that women's present liberty deficit is in 
substantial part a consequence of earlier, incompletely relinquished legal constraints, and of 
the social mores and conventions these reinforced and were intended to reinforce. In that sense 
it is appropriate to describe women's culturally assigned responsibility for parenting and 
87 	I note here that the proposition for which I am arguing explicitly contradicts 
Dworkin's assertion that felt moral constraints are irrelevant to equality. Ibid., 19. 
88 	Ibid., 48. 
89 	Donzelot's work on soft policing seems relevant here. Generally see Donzelot, /oc. 
cit. 
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domestic labour as a liberty deficit and to argue that women's present social and economic 
victimization ought properly to be described as the logical and probable consequence of our 
culture's earlier history of legal victimization. 9° My argument may be summarized thus. First, 
our present social, political and economic institutions are, in part, the creation of our legal 
institutions. They developed within the framework the legal regime made possible. Second, 
just as the legal abolition of slavery did not eradicate (or even significantly disturb) the social 
patterns of prejudice and disadvantage associated with it, so too the gradual legal enhancement 
of women's legal rights and the gradual removal of formal restrictions and movement towards 
greater equality of opportunity have not yet made significant inroads upon the social patterns 
which were constructed and reinforced by earlier legal regimes. I believe that it follows that, 
given our concrete legal and social history, it is proper to argue that women's parental and 
domestic roles and the social and legal construction which continues to be placed upon these 
roles constitute a significant 'liberty deficit' in Dworkin's terms. Another way of expressing 
this point is to insist that existing gender roles developed and were reinforced against the 
background of legal constraints which were differentiated by biological sex and marital status, 
that these roles, together with their economic, social and political consequences, form a 
significant part of the baseline system of liberties and constraints presently in force, and that 
the disadvantages presently experienced by a majority of women are a direct consequence of 
these constraints. 
Dworkin, in developing the concept of a baseline system of liberties and constraints 
against which an ideal theory auction of resources is to be held, argues that any reasonable 
baseline would incorporate what he terms a 'principle of correction'. 91 Under the principle of 
correction freedom of choice could properly be limited where this was necessary to 
compensate for externalities which would not exist in a hypothetical auction in which 
opportunity costs would be determined under conditions of perfect knowledge and costless 
organizational transactions. Dworkin comments in this context that 
constraints on freedom of choice are required and justified . . . if they improve 
the degree to which equality of resources secures its goal, whic1A,is to achieve a 
genuinely equal distribution measured by true opportunity costs. YL' 
Thus zoning ordinances or other regulatory constraints, for example, are legitimated by the 
need for a principle of correction, in that they correct distortions in distribution which would 
not occur under conditions of perfect knowledge and costless organizational transactions. 
90 	This, of course, offers an alternative rebuttal to Dworlcin's insistence that only legal 
constraints are relevant to equality and to his dismissal of 'felt moral constraints' as 
special features of personality. See my discussion of moral constraints in Chs. 6, 10, & 
11. 
91 	Dworkin, 'The Place of Liberty', /oc. cit., 29-34, esp. 31-34. 
92 	Ibid., 32-33. 
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Likewise, he suggests, a legal stipulation that no single individual could acquire more than half 
the community's total supply of marble would be justified. While such could not be 
legitimated in an ideal egalitarian distribution, it would produce no liberty deficit in the real 
world, given that under an ideal distribution no single individual would possess the resources 
required to acquire such a supply. 93 
Similarly, it might be argued that a 'principle of correction' could justify some of the 
constraints upon freedom of choice implicit in my proposal. For example, I have argued that 
the provision for parenting leave which forms an intrinsic part of my proposal should be non-
transferable, six months leave being available to each parent. To a degree, such a provision 
implicitly constrains freedom of choice, in that neither parent would be entitled to take a full 
year of leave and no child care rebate would be available until a full year had passed unless a 
sole parent was involved. However, under an ideal distribution of resources, men and women 
would participate equally in socially necessary labour and in economic labour given that both 
have an obligation to care for their children and to secure the resources essential for survival. 
Thus, such a restriction represents an attempt to redistribute the opportunity costs implicit in 
family life and, at present, primarily borne by women, as they would have been distributed 
under conditions of perfect knowledge and authentic commitment to equality. Likewise, the 
requirement that sole parents participate at least half time either in employment or in 
programs enhancing their capacity to secure and sustain employment, while a restriction upon 
their freedom of choice, would not limit their options to a greater extent that would obtain 
under ideal conditions, given that all parents have an obligation to provide both care and 
support. Similar arguments may be put concerning the fact that the full rebate would only be 
available where both parents also participated in the labour market. Given that in a ideal 
world, the decision to bear children, while undoubtedly a choice, would represent a choice 
made equally by both parents,94 and given that such a choice would be made in full knowledge 
of both opportunity costs and benefits, and that such would, so far as possible, be shared by 
both, such restrictions are appropriate. No individual would occupy a more disadvantaged 
position by virtue of such constraints than he or she would have occupied under ideal 
conditions in which resources were distributed against the background of an auction in which 
93 
94 
Ibid., 41. 
Here, obviously, I am ignoring the disparities in power in our existing, non-ideal 
world, and ignoring the extent to which these disparities are enforced by laws such as 
those still on the books in many United States jurisdictions which guarantee the 
husband sexual access to his wife, and, in some states, de facto. Equally, I am ignoring 
imperfections in birth control methods which continue to result in a substantial 
number of 'unwanted' pregnancies. In an ideal world, perfect knowledge would 
ensure that the likelihood of pregnancy would be known and that the individuals 
concerned, in a world in which men and women were truly equal, would make a joint 
decision to have a family knowing that both the opportunity costs and the benefit 
would be equally shared. 
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the opportunity costs inherent in parenting were presumed to be equally shared. It follows 
that within a gender neutral version of Dworkin's framework no injustice is involved. 
Am I arguing then that Dworkin's full account of the implications of equality of 
resources would mandate a program similar to that described? No, not necessarily. Two 
problems arise. First, as noted above, I have incorporated at the ideal theory level recognition 
that all parents have an equal obligation to provide both economic support and care and 
nurture for their children. Second, in what he has termed the 'real, real world'95 it seems likely 
that such a program would represent, not a decision compelled by principle, but a matter to be 
weighed along with conservation, football stadiums and opera houses, and working conditions 
and hours in the scales of social policy. It is one a government might legitimately adopt, that 
is, such a program is not proscribed by equality of resources, but its merits would fall to be 
assessed upon the same basis as other choice-sensitive issues. Whether or not such a program 
is appropriate apparently is an issue 
whose correct solution, as a matter of justice, depends essentially on the 
character and distribution of preferences within the political comniunity. 96 
[Emphasis mine.] 
As Dworkin argues, in a retrospective on the Lochner97 decision, if the legislative restrictions 
on freedom of contract and hours of work overturned by the Supreme Court, had, in fact, cost 
immigrant workers their jobs, and if the state had made no compensating arrangements for 
alleviating unemployment, those workers were victimized by the statute and it follows that the 
court's decision was entirely appropriate. As he comments, 
it is wrong in principle for the state to deny people the right to work on terms 
they are willing to accept, in order to improve the economic situation of workers 
generally, unless it provides unemployment compensation or other relief for 
those who cannot obtain employment on the stipulated terms, relief sufficient to 
make their circumstances plausibly as good as holding a job under the outlawed 
terms. 98 
It is interesting to note that, under Dworkin's analysis, a slightly later Supreme Court 
decision, Muller v Oregon 99 , would have clearly been improper. The court upheld protective 
legislation applying only to women which significantly impaired their capacity to compete on 
an equal basis in the marketplace on the grounds that work under prevailing market conditions 
95 	Ibid., 173. 
96 	Dworkin, 'Political Equality', /oc. cit., 24. 
97 	Lochner v New York 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
98 	Dworkin, 'The Place of Liberty', /oc. cit., 51. 
99 	208 U.S. 412 (1908). 
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it would impair their reproductive capacity. No compensatory programs were contemplated by 
the state of Oregon to redress the economic harms legitimated thereby, indeed, it was hoped 
by many of the legislation's proponents that it would encourage women to withdraw from the 
marketplace. Dworkin is not, of course, simply arguing that Lochner was rightly decided. 
Rather, he is arguing that social legislation such as that struck down by the Supreme Court in 
Lochner represents a policy decision and not a matter of principle, and that, as a consequence, 
the Supreme Court in Lochner intervened outside the scope of its powers, as properly 
understood. The court ought not have intervened absent a clear showing that the legislation 
failed to manifest equal concern for those disadvantaged by it. issues, and by 
implication, the nature and content of all positive programs of social reform ought to be decided 
either directly by a referendum or indirectly through representatives elected by popular 
majorities. 
What I find strilcing in Dworkin's analysis is the fact that positive social programs of 
the sort struck down in Lochner and upheld in Muller together with programs such as that 
proposed above epitomize choice-sensitive issues, programs whose justice (as opposed to 
integrity) depends upon the character and distribution of communal preferences. Given that 
he also argues that equality is a moral mandate, that government has an obligation to treat 
those it governs with equal concern, it is important to understand why that should be the case. 
Two reasons are, of course, apparent from his own analysis. First, given the distance real 
world communities have to travel to attain any sort of defensible egalitarian distribution, many 
different paths might reasonably be chosen in pursuit of equality. Each would have different 
consequences, and those effects would alter the field of play upon which future choices would 
be made.1°1 Likewise, we do not know the consequences any of these choices would have on 
individual preferences, indeed 'personalities and ambitions would change as any program 
tending toward equality unfolded.' 102 Progress towards a defensible distribution is inevitably 
partial, incremental and context sensitive, and these characteristics may be sufficient to ensure 
that the choice between different programs to ameliorate existing inequalities is necessarily a 
policy decision and therefore choice-sensitive. 
In this context, it is, however, essential to recall the comments made by MacIntyre and 
discussed in Chapter 3. It is in the pragmatic world of choice-sensitive issues that the capacity 
to bargain becomes critical and it is this capacity that women and other disadvantaged groups 
have, both historically and at present, lacked. While background principles of equality clearly 
constrain the options open to the state, and prohibit direct or indirect discrimination against 
individuals or groups, the choice of options absent actual discrimination depends, not simply 
100 	Dworkin, 'The Place of Liberty', /oc. cit., 72-73. 
101 	Ibid., 43-45 
102 	Ibid., 43. 
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upon the principles themselves, but also and far more centrally upon the character and 
distribution of communal preferences and the accuracy with which the political process 
ascertains these. A great deal turns, therefore, upon understanding the role and structure of 
prejudice in gender issues and even more centrally, upon recognizing and insisting that even 
programs which apparently contain no unjust discrimination, which appear fully gender neutral 
in intent and content may nonetheless constitute unjust discrimination within in a social context 
which is substantively ordered upon the basis of conventional gender roles and in which these 
have become normative. 
JUSTICE. WOMEN. AND THE REAL REAL WORLD 
Throughout, it has been argued that the public/private distinction plays a critical role 
not only in the theoretical structure of liberalism but also in the ways in which the specific 
injustices which have arisen as part of the structural content of the feminine gender role have 
been excluded from contemporary ideal theory accounts of distributive justice. In this chapter, 
I have argued that a significant cost of this particular aspect of liberalism may be seen in the 
emphasis of legal regulation of marriage and divorce upon entry into marriage and exit from 
marriage. These aspects are fully public, a fact emphasized by the legal requirement for the 
public registration of marriages, the legal designation of appropriate marriage celebrants, and 
the public procedures essential for the dissolution of marriage. Accompanying this emphasis 
upon full public disclosure under contemporary Australian law have been the increasing efforts 
to define and identify the characteristics of de facto relationships, to ensure that such 
relationships may be publicly identified with a reasonable degree of certainty, and to assimilate 
their structure to formal marriages. Thus, entry and exit are likewise becoming public legal 
issues with respect to de facto relationships. Little, if any attention has been given to fostering 
and encouraging the conditions essential for the development of voice within such 
relationships, a fact which forms a significant contrast to the apparently increasing emphasis 
upon voice, and therefore individual empowerment, in commercial and quasi-commercial 
relationships. Within the commercial and quasi-commercial setting at least modest sensitivity 
to inequalities in bargaining power and the dangers of overreaching has become commonplace. 
Within the family, the possibility of such inequalities has been recognized only recently, and 
even today is reluctantly addressed. It seems reasonable to suggest that the emphasis upon 
redefining exit rights in the family context and the virtually total disregard of the conditions 
essential if voice is to be developed and sustained mirrors the distinction between public and 
private. From a public, liberal perspective, because such relationships have been relegated to 
the realm of private choice, the critical factor has become ensuring that exit is freely available 
should preferences change and individual ends be redefined. Earlier, of course, the emphasis 
had been upon limiting exit rights sufficiently to leave the status relationships believed to be 
inherent in marriage essentially undisturbed. In both, the emphasis upon entry and exit and 
the total disregard of voice emphasize the critical distinction between the public face of 
marriage in which legal regulation is both appropriate and critical, and the private face of 
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marriage in which direct intervention is inappropriate and such intervention as occurs operates 
through extra-legal agencies such as welfare agencies. While concern with and emphasis upon 
the conditions essential for voice to exist within the public sphere is the hallmark of egalitarian 
liberalism, no similar concern has yet been acknowledged to be appropriate within the private 
sphere. 
In their very different ways, then, both Rawls and Dworkin emphasize that their 
egalitarianism is fundamentally public, intended to govern the public relationships between 
citizens as such, and is neither intended to significantly penetrate private relationships nor 
appropriate for them. In this chapter, I have attempted to evaluate two quite different 
proposals for enhancing the equality of women within the constraints of the theoretical 
constructions offered by Rawls and Dworkin. The first mandated a compulsory redistribution 
of one-half the earnings of a waged spouse to a non-waged spouse. On the theoretical level, 
the logic behind this redistribution was to attempt to ensure that negotiations within marriage 
concerning the allocation of resources and decisions related to their allocation began from a 
equal footing. The second did not attempt a compulsory redistribution between spouses, 
although some reallocation was implicit in the fact that it would supersede all existing rebates 
for dependents. Rather, it sought to recognize the economic value of child care and the 
opportunity costs implicit in providing care and to ensure that a parent providing such care was 
not wholly deprived of independent access to resources as a consequence of providing care. It 
sought not only to enhance voice within family relationships by attempting to level the playing 
field upon which internal negotiations occur, but also through associated structural programs, 
to encourage a more egalitarian distribution of household labour and market labour within 
households. The first proposal highlighted potentially contradictory elements within both 
theories and could not be reconciled with them. The second proposal apparently failed to 
comply with Rawls' theoretical requirement that all roles other than that of equal citizen and 
that in the distribution of income and wealth are voluntarily assumed and need not be 
considered in assessing the justice of the basic structure. 
Dworkin's theory, on the other hand, offered the conceptual space to accommodate 
such a proposal, provided that certain critical terms such as leisure and liberty deficit were 
extended in ways which captured the social and institutional causes of women's pervasive 
inequality. Yet given this, another barrier appeared, one which is, I would argue, both central 
to the public/private distinction as it has developed within liberalism and central to the 
conceptual structure of egalitarian liberalism itself. Dworkin has recently argued that political 
programs ranging from those regulating wages and conditions in the workplace to those 
providing facilities represent policy decisions which, as a matter of justice, ought to be taken in 
ways which ensure that they reflect, as accurately as possible, the character and distribution of 
preferences within the political community. What he appears to be saying is, perhaps, best put 
as a series of simple, linked propositions. It is wrong for a government, which is obliged as a 
matter of political morality to treat its citizens with equal concern, to enact laws which restrict 
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individual liberty simply because the behaviour involved offends majoritarian morality or 
sensibilities. Likewise, governments ought to enact legislation proscribing racial and sexual 
discrimination in employment, in access to public facilities, in participation in public affairs. 
Acts of racial or sexual discrimination that treat some individuals as less worthy than others 
cannot be justified. As he argues, 
The principle of independence speaks to both liberty and constraint. Firs4 it 
checks the principle of correction by insisting that no baseline constraint can be 
justified as necessary to reach a result that would be reached in an auction with 
perfect knowledge and no organizational costs, if that result would be reached 
only because people's bids would reflect contempt or dislike for those who 
would be subject to or suffer disadvantage in virtue of the constraint. Next, it 
checks the principle of abstraction by endorsing baseline constraints necessary 
to protect people who are the objects of systematic prejudice i from suffering any 
serious or pervasive disadvantage from that prejudice.' [He goes on to 
analogize prejudice to physical handicaps or lack of marketable skills and 
continues:] Just as some people are at a disadvantage because the tastes of 
others do not allow their services to command a premium in the market, so 
other people suffer because they belong to a race, or have other physical or other 
qualities, that a sizeable number of their fellow citizens dislike or for some other 
reason wish to avoid. True, though equality of resources is neutral about the 
tastes that impose the disadvantage in the first case, it condemns the attitudes 
that create disadvantage in the second. But that difference means only that we 
have more reason to try to reduce the inequality that springs from prejudice 
than from other sources.  mine.] 
What Dworkin seems to be saying is that the disadvantages which stem from prejudice 
are unique and special in a way which other economic disadvantages do not share. While 
handicaps or limited skills limit the capacity of the individual to compete with others, 
disadvantages which are the consequence of deep rooted prejudices in a community which 
does not proscribe their expression deny that individual the opportunity to even attempt to 
compete. The wrong done such individuals is direct, personal and fundamental in a way which 
morally demands the intervention of a government dedicated to equal concern. Such issues, in 
Dworkin's language, are matters of principle. 
What then can be said concerning those issues which are, in Dworkin's language, 
choice-sensitive issues, matters of social policy? How are they different? First, Dworkin 
appears to be arguing that choice-sensitive issues are exemplified by issues concerning the 
allocation of scarce resources within the political community. What we ought to be seeking is 
a defensible distribution of communal resources, given the limits imposed by what would be 
technically feasible and by the historic contingencies imposed by earlier decisions. A basic 
requirement for any defensible distribution for communities such as our own is that 
103 	Ibid., 37. 
104 	Ibid. 
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no one would be forbidden by law, in a defensible distribution, to use his 
resources in whatever way he chooses, except in so far as necessary to project 
security or to correct for different sorts of auction or market imperfections. 510  
Prima facie, the proposal I have made, is in Dworkin's terms, a choice-sensitive issue, a 
decision concerning the allocation of scarce resources within the community in a way which, it 
is to be hoped, might gradually alter existing power relationships between men and women as 
well. While gender discrimination in countries such as the United States and Australia is not 
yet legally fully proscribed, let us imagine that it might be, at least in its overt forms, and re-
evaluate my proposal as it might appear in that, rather better world than our own, a world 
which, at least, complied with the demands of principle. 
I argued earlier, that, if the definition of leisure I advanced were accepted and if my 
arguments that women, by virtue of their roles in the household economy and the legal history 
which structured and supported those roles, suffered a liberty deficit were also accepted, my 
proposal was consistent with equality of resources. It would, that is, represent a defensible 
distribution, in that no individual would be made worse off than he or she would have been in 
an ideal egalitarian distribution. Given, as argued earlier, women's history generally of 
victimization by the legal traditions of our community, and given that the shadow of that 
victimization continues to colour present laws and judicial interpretations, the disadvantages 
and injustices faced by women would in many respects appear to be the consequence of 
lingering prejudice, making legal efforts to eradicate them a matter of principle in a society 
dedicated to equality. Yet, in subtle ways, prejudice seems an inadequate concept. Men and 
women characteristically live together in relationships of varying degrees of intimacy which 
are, to a greater or lesser extent, structured by obligations and expectations predicated upon 
accepted gender roles. One critical difference lies in their perceptions of their relationship to 
the domestic economy. Men tend to perceive the home as the locus of leisure, as a place 
where their needs for care and nurture will be met, and where their participation is voluntary, 
chosen by them rather than obligatory. Women, on the other hand, tend to perceive the home 
as a site of labour, not leisure. Their participation in the domestic economy is not seen as 
voluntary, but as predicated upon their responsibility for others, primarily their husbands and 
children. For women, leisure is that time which remains after they have met the needs of 
others and during which they may pursue activities which are neither related to market labour 
nor to the basic requirements of the domestic economy. Ideally, it represents time which is 
their own and during which they will not be called upon to fulfil their responsibilities to others. 
Second, men tend to perceive their family responsibilities as substantially fulfilled by their 
breadwinner role, and this perception often remains irrespective of whether or not their wives 
also participate in the labour market. Women, even where they participate in the labour 
market full time, are characteristically expected to also assume the majority of responsibility 
105 	Ibid., 44-45. 
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for the domestic economy. A final distinction is also significant. Where the traditional 
breadwinner/homemaker roles still obtain, men none the less perceive their earnings as theirs. 
In particular, men frequently still perceive themselves as entitled to have the ultimate authority 
over major purchases and, in particular, control over discretionary income. In many cases, 
while a housewife may exercise control over housekeeping funds and may assume 
responsibility for paying routine family bills, her husband nevertheless determines the 
housekeeping which is appropriate and that sum which she may have available to her as her 
personal allowance. 
Because of the role such differences play in individual conceptions of the good life, 
and because of the degree to which they- are still perceived to be naturally or morally 
determined, they reflect the shadow of a more or less shared conventional morality, one which 
was, until very recently also enforced and legitimated by law 106, and one which is being called 
into question. Now what I am arguing here is that, to the extent that the disadvantages faced 
by women may be described as a consequence of prejudice, the stereotypes and 'obligations of 
role' which perpetuate those disadvantages arise out of traditions which are fundamental to 
our culture, traditions which have in the past and continue in the present to shape and 
constrain the substantive preferences expressed within the community. In some ways, 
therefore, the real question which must be addressed is what might be termed the 'private 
enforcement of morals' and the extent to which the state may actively intervene to either 
proscribe or ameliorate such. The authority and power which was formerly legitimated and 
enforced by the power of the state is today sustained by the cultural traditions and social 
inequalities which arose out of the interaction between the state and civil society and which 
persist today. It is, that is, sustained not only by the fact that women continue to have 
significantly less access to economic resources than do men of comparable education and 
ability, although this is surely significant, but also by the fact that many men perceive 
participation in the household economy on an equal footing as a wrongful deprivation of their 
rightful leisure and traditional authority. 
In addressing the question of the enforcement of morals, and by that phrase Dworkin 
means enforcement through the criminal law, Dworkin argues that 
equality of resources aims at neutrality in a different sense: it aims that the 
resources people have available, with which to pursue their plans or projects or 
way of life, be fixed by the costs of their having these to others, rather than by 
any collective judgment about the comparative importance of people or 
106 	Some aspects of this shared morality are, of course, still legally reinforced. Taxation 
provisions such as a dependent spouse rebate and the restrictions upon the 
deductability of wages paid to a spouse, particularly where the work undertaken can 
be characterized as a marital obligation, enforce aspects of this shared morality as do 
aspects of social welfare laws. Similarly, the continuing prevalence of the traditional 
mother role in structuring judicial discourse in custody and access decisions is also a 
part of this morality, as is the fact that, in many American jurisdictions, spousal rape is 
not yet recognized as criminal. 
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comparative worth of projects or personal moralities. . . . The liberal account of 
opportunity costs. . . extends that version of neutrality to the social 
circumstances as well as the discrete resources different ways of life require for 
success. It allows each person's social requirements - the social setting he 
claims he needs in order successfully to pursue his chosen way of life - to be 
tested by asking how far these requirements can bc satisfied within an 
egalitarian structure that measures their costs to others. 1.0 
It follows from this, Dworkin argues, that while equality of resources allows no legal 
constraints which can only be justified on the grounds of religion or personal morality, 
the interests different groups have in the design of the social and cultural 
environment are accommodated because numbers will indeed count in the 
auction. 
Those who crave a homogeneous religious or cultural environment, like those who desire a life 
of connoisseurship, will find that the environment which they desire, can, if those who share 
their views are sufficiently numerous, in part be created without the aid of the criminal law. 
Likewise, those holding minority views, be they religious, sexual or cultural, will find no 
guarantee of social requirements ideal for them. As Dworkin notes, 'their prospects too, and 
for the same reason, will depend on the opportunity costs to others, neutrally judged, of what they 
want.'108 While they will be protected against the danger that the criminal law will be invoked 
against them, their capacity to generate congenial social environments will, ultimately, depend 
upon the degree to which their preferences are shared. 
I have argued above that while the restrictions which continue to prevail on the public 
roles appropriate for women and upon the opportunities abstractly available to them are 
clearly proscribed by Dworkin, as reflecting forms of prejudice untenable in a community 
governed by principle, other aspects of the disadvantages currently faced by women are 
difficult to address on conventional legal models, such as those proscribing discrimination in 
employment and housing. The basic structural cause of disadvantage in the case of women 
arises out of the content of gender roles which are normatively structured and determined 
within private communities such as the family, and, in many cases, still believed essential to the 
survival of these communities. While such roles have in the past been reinforced by law, the 
roles themselves comprise fundamental assumptions about the lives which it is proper for men 
and women to lead, and it is these assumptions which, I have argued ought to be called into 
question as a matter of justice. Our gender roles, like the sexual conduct deemed appropriate, 
are at once important elements in the conventional morality of the community and factors 
which ought to be irrelevant to our rights and obligations as citizens. As citizens, we lead a 
shadow life, devoid of gender and of sexual preferences. Discrimination on either ground 
Dworkin, 'The Place of Liberty', ioc. cit., 30-31. 107 
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ought to be proscribed, because such discrimination is predicated upon consideration of 
characteristics irrelevant to our public lives and deems our lives less worthy than those of 
others. 
Yet given that women's inequality is a consequence of the prevailing normative 
ordering of private communities and the roles believed appropriate within these communities, 
how can or ought it be recognized and addressed by a community of citizens? Both Okin's 
proposal and that I have put forward identify a particular biological fact and the associated set 
of social facts as a major source of social and economic inequality within the community as a 
whole. Indeed, I believe it correct to say that women, as a group, are today truly equal only 
with respect to basic political guarantees. With Rawls, I accept that morally arbitrary 
characteristics, including biological sex, can be neither just nor unjust. Whatever justice or 
injustice results from such characteristics lies in the social use made of them, in the way social 
arrangements are structured. In communities such as our own, the social use made of 
biological sex is embodied in prevailing gender roles. Ultimately that is the only meaning 
which can, on a theoretical level, be given to a concept such as gender roles. They are a social 
construct which makes use of the biological facts of human existence and gives these facts their 
social meaning. They are, in that way, very like other social constructs such as citizen or 
person or, indeed, Native American or Black. Where, I believe, both Okin and I part company 
with Rawls and Dworkin, lies in arguing that the conventional distinction between public and 
private has the consequence of concealing the failures in justice which arise as a consequence 
of gender roles. To the extent that, with Rawls, such roles are assumed to be a matter of 
individual choice, the injustice implicit in our social use of these roles is obliterated. Likewise, 
with Dworkin, to the extent that remedial programs which seek both to eradicate some of the 
disadvantages inherent in these roles and equally seek to gradually alter their perceived 
necessity and hence their social construction can be deemed choice-sensitive, and therefore 
deemed issues which, as a matter of justice, ought to be determined in a way which accurately 
reflects the preferences of the community, preferences which, to a substantial extent, have not 
only been shaped by those roles but also which implicitly perceive them as normatively 
appropriate, this injustice is likewise concealed. The prevailing allocation of gender roles as it 
exists in Australia or the United States today may reflect the preferences of many individuals 
within the community at large. Indeed, given the degree to which these roles are culturally 
embedded, it seems likely that it presently does, although this may gradually be changing. At 
least in the United States, and perhaps in Australia as well, a majority of community members 
likewise would prefer a ban upon pornography and the continuation or reintroduction of 
capital punishment, yet Dworkin argues that both are proscribed by principle irrespective of the 
distribution of preferences within the community. 
Where then does the difference lie? Dworkin, in company with other liberals, 
perceives the criminal law as uniquely invasive, as publicly denying the individual subject to its 
force membership in a community of equals, and this is nowhere more true than when it is 
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invoked to enforce the conventional morality of the community as is the case with bans on 
pornographic material or proscriptions against homosexual conduct. Curiously, Dworkin, in 
company with many other egalitarians seemingly does not perceive other bodies of law such as 
taxation law or family law as invasive in quite the same way, perhaps because the liberty of the 
individual does not seem to be at stake. Indeed, Dworkin argues that the taxation law ought to 
be used as the primary redistributive mechanism. Where individual liberty is not being 
obviously restricted by law, as in taxation laws where the individual remains 'free' to use that 
which is not taxed as he or she sees fit, and where conventional morality is, at most, being 
obliquely reinforced by legal provisions which seem not to restrict individual freedom of 
choice, but merely acknowledge prevailing social mores as in the deductions presently available 
for dependents, the coercive element recedes in significance and change itself seems invasive. 
To go beyond the lifting of restrictions and the affirmation of choice and implement programs 
which either reject some aspects of our conventional morality, as with Okin's, or which attempt 
to alter existing preferences by offering incentives to structure private relationships differently, 
seem also to restrict private freedoms, indeed restrict them in ways with potentially far greater 
community impact than a ban on pornography or homosexual conduct. Far more ordinary 
men and women are likely to enter marital or quasi-marital relationships and to bear children 
and raise a family than are likely ever to be affected by the criminalisation of pornography or 
homosexual conduct. Programs which seek to alter aspects of the structure of such 
relationships and the prevailing structure of family roles seem particularly invasive, perhaps 
because the family seems uniquely private and personal. Paradoxically, of course, if such 
programs did in fact reflect community preferences, there would be little need for them. If a 
majority of families were structured in a way which implemented equality of resources, if men 
and women in such families did in fact participate equally in market and household labour, if 
they perceived themselves as equally responsible for providing care and nurture and economic 
support, the question would not be one of securing distributive justice but one of ensuring that 
the law accurately reflected the preferences and the lives of the community as a whole. 
Unfortunately, there is little evidence that families are structured in this way. In other areas, 
the fact that the community as a whole prefers injustice, prefers to continue in conventional, 
albeit unjust ways, is precisely the reason Dworkin argues that prohibitions upon racial 
discrimination and capital punishment ought to be put in place, as a matter of principle, 
irrespective of the preferences of the community. In those communities where such reforms 
are most urgently needed, they conflict with majority preferences rather than embody them. 
The difference is clearly not simply a distinction between, let us say, overt sexual 
discrimination in employment or political rights and racial discrimination in the same areas. 
Nor is the distinction one which can be neatly captured as a difference, let us say, between 
discrimination in employment or education, and discrimination in other areas, even where 
reinforced by law. The distinction appears to lie in part at least in the distinction between 
regulation of and invasion into. It is permissible, even mandatory, to regulate the conditions 
under which families may be formed and dissolved. It becomes difficult to alter the social and 
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economic relationships which obtain within them unless the intervention dearly reflects the 
preferences of the community. Thus, for example, the introduction of no fault divorce law in 
California was widely touted by conservatives and liberals alike as enhancing family stability 
and fostering the conditions under which family life would accurately reflect the preferences of 
individuals. The change from the fault system to a no fault divorce at will system removed 
existing bars on the dissolution of marriage, bars which were widely flouted, and thus might be 
seen to reflect a general demand for a more equitable system, one which did not encourage 
subterfuge and mockery of the judicial process. The sorts of reform advocated by Okin and 
myself strike closer to home. 
The central issue is not, I believe, that they are in fact more interventionist with 
respect to the family and family autonomy than many existing legal provisions which are widely 
accepted, such as the rebate for a dependent spouse and, in the United States, for children. 
Nor are they more interventionist than proposals which are widely discussed, such as income 
splitting for the purposes of taxation only. The dependent spouse rebate rewards and 
reinforces traditional perceptions of appropriate family structure while income splitting is 
intended to encourage and support traditional family arrangements by providing taxation 
advantages to such families. Neither, as presently structured, attempts to redistribute 
resources within the family itself. The proposals discussed in this chapter attempt to modify 
existing economic relationships within the family and thereby gradually alter other perceptions 
concerning family roles. Okin's proposal, for example, conflicts fundamentally with the widely 
held belief that a person's earnings belong to that person and may be used as he or she prefers, 
a perception acknowledged even by Dworkin who makes exceptions only for those funds 
required for security or to mitigate market imperfections. 1°9 Here, of course, it is critical to 
ask whether women's currently disadvantaged position is primarily a market imperfection, 
which in part it surely is, or whether it is primarily a function of the way in which our society 
allocates socially necessary labour and market labour and our cultural isolation of work and 
home. Mandatory splitting, as Okin suggests, iterates a belief that we almost certainly do not, 
as a community hold, that women's household and parenting labour is equivalent in value to 
men's market labour. Instead, as a community, we regard household labour and market 
labour as incommensurable. To the extent that we, as a community, do believe that women's 
household and parenting labour is equivalent in value to men's market labour, we divorce 
value and money - leaving husbands in possession of the money and wives, if they are 
fortunate, with praise and responsibility but no legally recognized entitlement to economic 
resources. We fall back upon the culturally entrenched belief that the value of women's 
'contribution' as wives and mothers cannot be measured in monetary terms. If, as a 
community we actually believed that women's household labour entitled them to an equal 
109 	Dworkin comments that 'no one would be forbidden by law, in a defensible distribution, 
to use his resources in whatever way he chooses except in so far as necessary to protect 
security or to correct for different sorts of auction or market imperfections.' See 'The 
Place of Liberty', /oc. cit., 44-45. 
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share of family resources and an equal role in decision making, sociological evidence would 
not emphasize that women's participation in economic decision making and overall power 
within the household increases, often significantly, as they move into the labour market and as 
their earning capacity increases. Similarly, if the argument implicit in my proposal were, in 
fact, part of the existing normative structure of the community, men would already share 
equally in responsibility for domestic labour and parenting and would perceive themselves as 
disadvantaged if they did not and women would already share equally in market labour and 
responsibility for the provision of economic resources to the household and regard their 
responsibility in this regard as equally central to their role as parent. Because this is not in fact 
the case, because efforts to alter the prevailing gendered division of labour are perceived as 
threatening by many, and threatening in much the same way as legal availability of 
pornographic materials or the removal of legal proscriptions on homosexual conduct, it is clear 
that the real conflict is between the egalitarian aspirations of contemporary theory and the 
normative structures of the communities within the pluralist nation state, structures which 
interact significantly with religious beliefs and cultural traditions. Likewise, because 
suggestions that economic institutions ought to be substantially restructured to facilitate 
parenting by both men and women are still thought radical, because significant communal 
institutions remain structured around the presumption that their participants can rely upon the 
services of others in complying with employment demands, I conclude these norms are 
institutionally imbedded and reflect, not the separation of public and private as is often 
thought, but their interdependence. This normative and institutional structure was readily 
accounted for within the framework of classic social contract theory. The model of consent, 
binding individuals into hierarchically structured families and families through the social 
contract into the state provided a tight, but normatively vacuous structure, which because of its 
moral emptiness, could accommodate diversity and difference among the micro-communities 
of which the state was comprised.110 So long as consent held the key, and the circumstances 
of that consent were almost irrelevant, formal equality and liberty could be reconciled within 
one overarching grand theory. 
Egalitarian liberalism poses a very different problem. Consent is no longer critical, 
even within a theoretical structure with intimate links to the social contract tradition. The fact 
of consent no longer legitimates structures which, absent that element, would readily be 
perceived as inequitable. Likewise, with the extension of equality beyond the merely formal 
the problem resolved by classic social contract theory reemerges. First, liberty and substantive 
equality must be reconciled within a theoretical structure which holds them in equilibrium 
whether the avenue chosen is through arguing that liberty, properly understood is an essential 
element in equality, or whether liberty holds pride of place in an egalitarian distribution. 
Second, given the fact that consent has lost its theoretical power to legitimate relationships 
which are otherwise unjust, given, that is, the emergence of theoretical structures which are no 
110 	Rousseau was, of course, an exception in this regard. See Chs. 8 & 9. 
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longer normatively vacuous, a new way must be found to accommodate diversity and 
difference. The identification of the normatively laden structures of egalitarian liberalism as 
political accounts, the abolition of the earlier attempt to construct political theory within the 
framework of an overarching moral theory, represents the vanguard of this attempt, together 
with its fundamental theoretical construct, the citizen. 
I have, throughout, argued that the conception of the citizen upon which both Rawls 
and Dworkin rely is significantly gendered. Just as the basic human needs identified by Rawls 
as primary incorporate no recognition of the impact of responsibility for children upon the 
distribution of resources, the model of equality of resources adopted by Dworkin assumes 
labour market participation as the norm and offers no direct avenue for valuing parenting and 
necessary domestic labour. If, however, we excise the elements which are typical of the male 
gender role of late capitalism and substitute a model which is androgynous in character and 
which incorporates recognition of certain fundamental individual obligations further problems 
emerge. The issue of distributive justice at once expands significantly and in ways perhaps 
unforeseen, because it becomes clear that the social distribution of resources and opportunities 
cannot be isolated from the social distribution of responsibilities. Both Rawls and Dworkin 
suggest that distributive justice can most appropriately be addressed through the taxation 
system - either, in the case of Rawls, through a consumption tax, or, in the case of Dworkin, a 
progressive income tax, possibly in practice combined with other conventional avenues such as 
inheritance and gift taxes. On an androgynous model, however, it becomes essential to 
question the prevailing gendered distribution of labour within both the family and the 
community, the social construction and allocation of leisure, again within both the family and 
the community, and the interaction of both with prevailing institutional structures. Given the 
interaction of these with wider normative structures, and, particularly given the profound 
significance of such issues within many of the more or less comprehensive moral theories 
prevailing in contemporary societies, intervention is likely to be perceived as a direct attack 
upon the values of many smaller communities. While both Rawls and Dworkin make it clear 
that comprehensive theories which cannot be reconciled with liberalism have no place within 
the just community, and Rawls offers as illustrations 
a conception of the good requiring the repression or degradation of certain 
persons on, say, racial, ethnic, or perfectionist grounds or a religion which can 
survive only if it controls the machinery of the state and is able to practice 
effective intolerance 111, 
while Dworkin emphasizes that racial discrimination and capital punishment are wrong in 
principle and ought to be proscribed, both apparently assume that the majority of conceptions 
of the good life presently prevailing within liberal democracies can be reconciled with the basic 
tenets of political liberalism. Two avenues are primarily relied upon to accomplish this. First, 
111 	Rawls, 'The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good', /oc. cit., 265. 
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Rawls and Dworkin rely upon the supposition that roles other than that of citizen and those in 
the distribution of income or wealth are somehow voluntary or chosen. Such roles affirm 
individual choice and thus affirm diversity and difference. Second, for both theorists, the 
pragmatic real world decisions involved in addressing economic injustice are policy decisions 
and ideally reflect the priorities and preferences of the community. Many different concrete 
programs have the capacity to address different aspects of economic injustice, and the choice 
of an appropriate approach depends upon the existing social and economic setting. 
Social policy decisions ought to be tested against background principles of equality, 
are constrained by such principles, but the choice of particular policies, the decision to address 
one aspect of equality rather than another, to direct resources to one project rather than 
another, particularly for Dworkin, ought as a matter of justice, accurately reflect community 
preferences. This distinction is absolutely critical. At the simplest level, it emphasizes the 
distinction between the use of state power to impose the preferences of the majority upon 
dissident individuals or groups, as would be the case if pornography or homosexual conduct 
were legally proscribed, and the allocation of resources to benefit one segment of the 
community rather than another. On a second, related level, it emphasizes the role of the state 
in ensuring that basic institutions such as the marketplace, the education system, and the 
agencies of the state will not deny to any individual the opportunity to compete as an equal 
because of arbitrary characteristics such as race, religion or biological sex. Where, however, 
the line between arbitrary characteristics and social roles is blurred, and it becomes possible to 
argue that the real issue involves lifestyle choices and the complaint of injustice may be 
perceived as discontent with the consequences attending a particular, voluntarily chosen 
lifestyle, the perception is very different. 
Inequalities which arise from gender and from gender roles are, in a sense, unique. 
There are several reasons for this. First, unlike race, for example, aspects of such roles are 
conventionally thought to be voluntarily chosen. Thus it may seem that women elect to 
conform to the norms surrounding motherhood in our culture or that they consciously adopt 
conventionally feminine behaviour. Similarly, many men pursue vocations and avocations 
which epitomize prevailing conceptions of masculinity. Thus men and women may appear to 
have chosen to comply with the demands of gender roles, to have constructed their identity 
around these roles. Given the normative weight that gender roles carry, departure from them 
is often perceived as the deliberate flouting of culturally significant norms. Indeed, women 
who choose to reject the prevailing cultural image of femininity are often perceived as posing a 
social threat in much the same way as are homosexuals. They can be seen, that is, as deviants. 
Because gender permeates every institution within the community, and gender roles have their 
genesis within the family, gender norms seem, to many people, an absolutely fundamental way 
of structuring our perceptions of others and our relationships to them. They play a central role 
in the more or less comprehensive moral theories held by diverse micro-communities, in their 
beliefs concerning family, concerning the allocation of authority and responsibility. Questions 
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of gender arise in all known human communities. Even religious communities dedicated to 
celibacy are defined and constructed against the backdrop of gender and gender norms. 
Gender difference is both inclusive and exclusive. It forms a substratum underlying all of our 
relationships with others, particularly our most intimate relationships. Gender inequality 
cannot be addressed adequately on a macro-institutional level, because macro-institutional 
reforms are likely to remain ineffective unless they are accompanied both by structural 
alterations which seek to eradicate the impact of gender and by micro-institutional reforms, 
particularly within the family, structured to encourage gender role redefinition and equal 
participation by both men and women in the life and work of the family and the wider 
community. So long as opportunities remain structured around gender norms, and the 
gendered structure of the family reaffirms those norms as valid, the gradual eradication of 
discrimination against women is likely to be replaced by an almost fatalistic acceptance of the 
inability of most women to compete on an equal footing with most men. The focus returns to 
deficiencies in women themselves and what is disregarded, crucially, is the social allocation of 
responsibilities. The male norm is thereby affirmed. 
Ought issues of gender justice then, be perceived as choice-insensitive, to use 
Dworldn's terminology? Consider the argument I have put that, in an ideal egalitarian 
distribution, men and women would share equally in household labour and parenting just as 
they would share equally in market labour and the provision of resources, and that, to the 
extent to which this has not been realized, women in general suffer a profound and pervasive 
liberty deficit and are, therefore, victimized by the community at large. Does it matter that 
prevailing social and economic disadvantages are inextricably linked to attitudes concerning 
appropriate roles for men and women, that many in the community still believe that women 
ought properly be dependent on their husbands for economic support and that masculine 
authority within marriage ought not be questioned, and further, that many believe that such 
practices manifest equal concern for women as individuals? Does it matter that women have 
undeniably participated in sustaining these roles? These are, without doubt, attitudes 
liberalism must condemn if it is to live up to its egalitarian ambitions. If my arguments earlier 
in this chapter are accepted, if women have been victimized in the past by attitudes such as 
these and this victimization has continued into the present, surely it is the fact of victimization 
which is critical and not the sincerity of the beliefs held by those who might perpetuate it. 
How might the state act to eliminate such victimization, which it undeniably played a part in 
establishing and sustaining? I have already suggested some of the structural reforms necessary 
- parenting leave, the establishment of a family track in employment for both men and women 
during those years when their children are young, job sharing, career-track part-time 
employment, elimination of the dependent spouse rebate and related benefits and their 
replacement with a child care rebate. These are positive programs, programs designed to 
combat prevailing social attitudes and the disadvantages which flow from them and which are 
disproportionately born by women. They do not simply prohibit certain courses of action but 
mandate programs which are required because, given the existing distribution of social 
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attitudes, they would not otherwise be undertaken. Undeniably, such programs would be 
perceived by those compelled to take action as coercive. They are, however, neither more nor 
less coercive than the legal proscription of racial discrimination. They appear more coercive 
and more interventionist because they mandate positive action and institutional restructuring 
rather than simply eliminating one or more options. Ceasing to act is a particular way is 
always easier and more practical than initiating new programs and structures, particularly 
those which are designed to alter the status quo. 
At the present time, employment opportunities can, for the most part, be structured in 
a way which simultaneously institutionalizes gender roles in the opportunity structure and 
disregards family responsibilities and needs, even where laws prohibiting sexual discrimination 
are in place. Opportunities defined as masculine within prevailing institutions generally 
continue to be structured upon the assumption that the family responsibilities of workers can 
be disregarded in pursuit of institutional goals. Opportunities defined as feminine continue to 
be structured around the assumption that women may be employed more cheaply, that they 
are generally less reliable as employees, that they are not interested in advancement, and that 
their attachment to the workforce will remain marginal. Institutional structures both reinforce 
gender roles within families and are reinforced by them. In families in which, even where both 
adults participate in the labour market, substantial disparities in earning capacity exist, it is 
often economically irrational for the higher earning partner to restrict earning capability to 
participate more actively in family life. It is more efficient, more likely to maximize the overall 
economic position of the family, for the lower earning partner to make the adjustments which 
are necessary, thus increasing the vulnerability of that partner and minimizing the likelihood 
that the'relationship will be fully egalitarian. Likewise, the fact that the lower earning partner 
is more likely to need time off from work to meet family responsibilities both reinforces the 
perception that women are less reliable as employees and identifies her in particular as one 
whose attachment to the workforce is marginal, thus perpetuating the cycle of disadvantage. 
Disparities in income earning capacity are likely to reinforce power disparities within the 
relationship in other spheres, and to place that individual at risk, both decreasing her voice 
within the relationship and making exit substantially more costly for her. 
If, as argued above, such disadvantages flow from inegalitarian attitudes, attitudes 
which are culturally embedded in communities such as our own, and if, as argued throughout, 
legal reforms alone will proved inadequate unless and until they can be structured in a way 
which compels the implementation of major institutional reforms, are we dealing with a matter 
of principle or are we dealing with a question of social policy? Or, perhaps, are the terms 
themselves inadequate or inappropriate for the task at hand? Why does Dworkin, for 
example, perceive the criminal law as uniquely invasive? Why is the 'harm' which flows from a 
ban on pornographic material or homosexual conduct perceived to deny equal concern to 
those affected by it? Why are such 'harms' any more invasive or destructive of equal concern 
than, for example, the administrative procedures characteristic of the social welfare state, the 
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legal construction of, for example, appropriate marital relationships through the taxation 
system and taxation boards of appeal, the identification of marriage like relationships and the 
imposition of many of the consequences of legal marriage through the social welfare system or 
the courts? Does the difference lie in the fact that the criminal law is 'authentically legal' 
whereas the administrative procedures characteristic of the modern nation state are 
discretionary, enforced through broad administrative guide-lines? Can it simply be attributed 
to a distinction between prohibitive and facultative legal provisions? 
The real difference lies in the distinction between bodies of law which may be 
construed in part as conferring benefits or facilitating private activity, despite the presence of 
penal provisions, and those which definitively prohibit certain courses of action but confer no 
benefits. If I am correct in this, it offers another way of accounting for the distinction between 
issues which are choice-sensitive and those which are choice-insensitive. Choice-sensitive 
issues are those which direct resources towards certain goals and projects while directing 
resources away from other goals and projects. Broad communal goals such as increases in 
industrial productivity, reductions in unemployment or increased defence capability are typical 
choice-sensitive issues. They represent a choice, given moderate scarcity, and ought to be 
taken in the interests of the community as a whole. The interests of the community as a whole 
in turn can only be ascertained through the expression of preferences. In such issues, what is 
critical is the accurate determination of preferences within the community. A real problem 
arises in moderately unjust communities such as our own. Preferences arise within particular 
social contexts and against the background of available opportunities, social, cultural and 
religious traditions, and are, at least in part, determined by those background conditions. To 
the extent that existing societies are unjust, to the extent that the benefits of social cooperation 
are unfairly distributed, and to the extent that cultural and legal traditions deem this 
appropriate, the preferences within these communities inevitably reflect and perpetuate 
existing forms of injustice. Change, particularly change involving core elements and practices, 
becomes threatening. 
Thus, for example, a redistributive program such as that proposed by Okin might well 
be perceived as profoundly threatening. First, to the extent that existing family relationships 
are inegalitarian, a redistribution of this form would be perceived as an attack upon the self-
worth of those men who perceive the breadwinner role, together with the control of resources 
and decision making available within it, as uniquely validating their masculinity. Similarly, in 
those families whose structures are most unjust, many women might perceive a direct 
redistribution of this sort as endangering their physical safety. To the extent that this was 
feared, the benefit of such redistribution might well be nullified by their desire to keep the 
peace precisely because women have traditionally been deemed responsible for sustaining 
human relationships. Similar problems might well attend a less radical alternative, that of 
simply remitting the existing dependent spouse rebate to the spouse rather than the 
breadwinner. Likewise, the child care rebate I have proposed, together with the accompanying 
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structural changes essential might appear threatening precisely because it endeavours to 
enhance the options open to women with young families and also provide them with a measure 
of economic independence. Many men, and some women, perceive even modest economic 
independence for women as attacking the foundation of the family relationship. While 
opposition to such programs might simply reflect a communal belief that alternative goals such 
as enhancing productivity are more important, it might also reflect the preference of the 
community that existing relationships between men and women not be disturbed. 
Given that, as shown earlier, existing legal structures remain in large part inegalitarian 
in that they tacitly assume conventional gender roles and allocate the benefits of social 
cooperation in accord with the normative assumptions governing these roles, and given the fact 
that this is primarily accomplished, not through direct discrimination against women but 
through inegalitarian and often inconsistent assumptions embedded in the structure of the 
taxation and social welfare systems and the structure of family law, what remains to be said? 
First, for the most part, neither taxation law nor social welfare law overtly discriminates 
against women. Precisely the same assumptions govern those (rare) households in which the 
primary breadwinner is female as apply to the situation in which the primary breadwinner is 
male. Similarly, the Family Law Act is drafted in wholly gender neutral terms and explicitly 
authorizes the courts to consider a person's contribution as a homemaker and parent in 
property distribution upon dissolution. Questions concerning custody and access likewise 
ought to be determined solely by reference to the best interests of the child, and not by 
assumptions concerning gender roles. In actual decision making, however, the interests of the 
child are constructed against the background of appropriate gender roles and assumptions 
concerning 'normal' male and female behaviour just as decisions concerning property continue 
to be constructed against the background of assumptions concerning ownership. Difficulty 
arises because of the role played by these background attitudes in interpretation and decision-
making. Similarly, the historic reluctance of the Family Court to award meaningful levels of 
child support and spousal support, as well as the continuing debate over the appropriateness 
and level of spousal support, reflects, not the formal structure of the legislation itself, but the 
continuing communal and judicial affirmation of the entitlement of the husband to his earnings 
and the reluctance of the courts to deprive him of that to which his labour entitles him 
together with the concrete legislative intent that financial relations between the spouses ought 
to be finally determined. The inequality lies in communal adherence to two discrete beliefs 
and the interaction of these: first, that every individual is entitled to the fruits of his labour 
(and here labour clearly means wage-earning activity), and second, that a dependent spouse is 
not entitled to any reward for household labour, including parenting labour, beyond that which 
the employed spouse elects to make available. Homemaking responsibilities, and even support 
services directly related to the income earning activities of the working spouse are deemed 
obligations associated with the married state, not work for financial gain. 
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The critical point is this. To the extent that inegalitarian attitudes remain normative 
within the community at large, even laws which are on their face wholly gender neutral have 
the capacity to reinforce prevailing gender norms and are likely to be interpreted in ways 
which facilitate this. The inegalitarian attitudes thus indirectly reinforced are, of course, those 
which egalitarian liberalism condemns. However, the most significantly inegalitarian aspects 
of each of the bodies of law examined may simultaneously be interpreted as policies directed at 
wider social goals, goals which are not necessarily, in and of themselves, objectionable and do 
not necessarily conflict with equality. For example, the taxation policies discussed above may 
also be interpreted simply as recognition that families containing dependents have a greater 
need for resources and that this need ought to be recognized, particularly against the 
background of equal pay for equal work. The existing rebate system may simply have been 
adopted as the simplest and most cost efficient way of implementing this. The reluctance of 
the taxation system allow deductions for the labour of an otherwise unwaged spouse on behalf 
of the income earning activities of the waged spouse may quite plausibly be interpreted as a 
means of ensuring that the state is not fraudulently deprived of revenue, as an effort to 
eliminate the moral ha7ard implicit in recognition. The failure to allow a rebate or deduction 
for child care may be predicated upon the assumption that it is in the best interests of young 
children that they be cared for within their own homes by one of their own parents. The 
critical point is that these and similar interpretations are available and plausible and cease to 
be plausible only when we acknowledge that, irrespective of the gender neutral framework of 
the legislation, the dependent spouse is in fact a dependent wife, that her access to funds 
continues to depend upon what her husband elects to make available, and that disallowing a 
deduction for child care serves as a concrete disincentive to many women, including sole 
parents, who might otherwise enter the labour market, simply because it decreases the 
economic utility to be derived from employment, sometimes to the point where, after all 
expenses connected with employment are taken into account, no worthwhile economic gain is 
realized. In a community in which genuine role sharing existed, in which men and women 
were equally likely to participate in economic activity and equally likely to be for some periods 
of their lives dependent upon the waged labour of another, these measures would not 
necessarily be inegalitarian. In our community, in which, until very recently, women have been 
perceived as properly dependent, in which they were presumed and from time to time 
compelled to cease employment upon marriage, and in which women are culturally assigned 
effectively sole responsibility for household labour and parenting, thus imposing a double 
burden upon those who do attempt to sustain labour market participation, the position is very 
different. Measures such as these are inegalitarian because they effectively operate to 
reinforce existing inequalities and make it more difficult for them to be overcome. 
CODA 
The real question to be answered is that explored throughout this chapter. Does 
egalitarian liberalism remain recognizably liberal if assumptions concerning social 
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responsibilities are incorporated at the level of ideal theory? I have argued that, with regard to 
Rawls, that individuals who were unaware of their biological sex and of the specific gender 
roles characteristic of their culture would necessarily assume that they might, at some point 
during their lives, have children, that they would recognize that all parents are obliged to 
provide their children with both economic support and care and nurture, and that they would 
as a consequence seek to structure all their institutions in a way which would ensure that these 
basic social responsibilities were fairly shared. Likewise, I have argued that Dworkin's account 
of equality of resources is incomplete unless it incorporates an account of equality of 
responsibilities. Thus, his castaways would be compelled to recognize that equality of 
resources, even on the ideal theory level, could not be attained without building in an 
assumption that most individuals are likely to become parents and as part of their overall 
commitment to equality would wish to ensure that the obligations inherent in parenthood did 
not affect their entitlement to an equal share of economic resources. 
ADD WOMEN AND STIR: RAWLS AND OBLIGATIONS 
In attempting to ascertain the effect of incorporating, even in abstract form, 
recognition of the costs and obligations of parenthood in Rawls' account, we must return to the 
original position and the reasons why it took the form it did. In discussing the veil of ignorance 
and the necessity for it Rawls comments that 
the original position, as described, incorporates pure procedural justice at the 
highest level. This means that whatever principles the parties select from the list 
of alternative conceptions presented to them are just. Put another way, the 
outcome of the original position defines, let us say, the appropriate principles of 
justice. This contrasts with perfect procedural justice, where there is an 
independent and already given criterion of what is just and where a 
procedure exists to ensure a result that satisfies this standard. 1" 
Rawls argues that an important reason for modelling the original position to incorporate pure 
procedural justice is that this enables us to explain how the parties may be conceived as 
autonomous. He continues: 
Pure procedural justice in the original position allows that in their deliberations 
the parties are not required to apply, nor are they bound by, any antecedently 
given principles of right and justice. Or, put another way, there exists no 
standpoint external to the parties' own perspective from which they are 
constrained by prior and independent principles in questions of justice that arise 
among them as members of one society. 113 
I have argued that, even behind the veil of ignorance, the parties must be aware of the 
basic biological and social requirements for the reproduction of the species, and that, given 
112 	Rawls, `Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory', /oc. cit., 523. 
113 	Ibid., 523-524. 
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their awareness of these requirements they would seek to ensure that any responsibilities they 
might find they had to their descendants would not in any way prejudice their access to a fair 
share of the benefits of social cooperation. Does this recognition, in and of itself, suggest that 
the parties are constrained by 'prior and independent principles'? No, what I am arguing is that 
the parties themselves must, behind the veil of ignorance, acknowledge the basic biological and 
social requirements for human reproduction, that their understanding of these facts is 
necessarily relevant to the principles which they choose, and must be reflected in their choice. 
To the extent that the basic biological and social facts of reproduction imply that each 
generation will find it essential to provide for the material, social and emotional well being of 
its immediate descendants, I believe that it also follows that the deliberations of the parties will 
reflect their knowledge of these facts and their recognition of the obligations which flow from 
them. Rawls himself, in characterizing a well-ordered society, emphasizes that 
its members view their common polity as extending backward and forward in 
time over generations, and they strive to reproduce themselves, and their cultural 
and social life in perpetuity, . . . . for all are born into it to lead a complete 
4. Itfe. 11  
It surely follows from this recognition that, even behind the veil of ignorance, those who seek 
to define principles of justice suitable for regulating the affairs of a well-ordered society must 
be aware that the basic requirements of social reproduction will need, in some way, to be 
provided for and that the specific means chosen to realize this are likely to affect, perhaps 
significantly, access to the primary goods as defined. However one phrases this recognition, 
surely it implies that all individuals (given that behind the veil of ignorance they are unaware of 
both their biological sex and their social gender) would assume that they would, at some point 
during their lives, be responsible for the economic support and the care and nurture of their 
own immediate descendants, should they have any. They cannot reason without regard to the 
existence of such facts because their task is to devise principles of justice appropriate for a 
well-ordered society, and such a society, by definition, is one which strives to reproduce itself 
together with its social and cultural life through succeeding generations. It would, therefore, 
appear that their reasoning must reflect their recognition of these facts, irrespective of the fact 
that they are, at no point, acknowledged by Rawls. 
This seeming impasse may, of course, be resolved in what might be termed a linguistic 
way, by insisting that, while certain fundamental facts are without doubt an enduring and 
necessary feature of human life, they in no way affect the choice of appropriate principles. In 
essence, Rawls tacitly proceeds upon this basis. The problem with this procedure is that it 
must be seen to be inadequate once we recognize that a significant cause of the injustice in 
existing societies is a direct consequence in the social and cultural allocation of the obligations 
which follow from the basic facts of social reproduction. Given that specific gender roles are 
114 	Ibid., 536. 
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socially constructed and determined, not biologically innate, it follows that the social 
mechanisms for meeting these obligations, like other social institutions, may be just or unjust, 
and we need standards by which their relative justice may be ascertained. The justice or 
otherwise of existing family structures may, in substantial part, be ascertained by examining 
their impact upon distributive outcomes. 115 Now what I am arguing here is that rational 
individuals, unaware of inter alia their biological sex and of the prevailing social construction of 
gender roles, would wish to ensure that these 'morally irrelevant' characteristics had no effect 
upon their ultimate share of the benefits of social cooperation. 
Rawls, in addressing the role of the reasonable in a conception of fair terms of social 
cooperation, comments that 
fair twins of cooperation articulate an ideal of reciprocity and mutuality: all 
who cooperate must benefit, or share in common burdens, in some 
appropriate fashion as judged by a suitable benchmark of comparison. 116 
[Emphasis mine.] 
Among those common burdens which must be shared if this ideal of reciprocity and mutuality 
is to be attained are the obligations inherent in the social reproduction of future generations, 
the dual obligations of economic support for one's descendants and of providing one's 
descendants with physical care and nurture. It seems to me plausible that a suitable 
benchmark of comparison, given the construction of the parties as free and equal moral 
persons, and taking the potential existence of these facts, or, if the term is preferred, common 
burdens, as influencing the deliberations of the parties, would be the situation which would 
obtain if such were equally shared. Adopting a position of absolute equality as a benchmark 
has the advantage of ensuring that later, at the constitutional and legislative stages, appropriate 
guarantees can be incorporated in response to the constraints of the reasonable. This 
approach suggests that, while in a truly well-ordered community, citizens would to the greatest 
extent possible individually meet their obligations to provide any children they might have with 
economic support and care and nurture, in existing societies in which these burdens are not 
equally shared, and, as a consequence, the benefits of cooperation are unjustly distributed, 
redistribution would be required to place the parties in the position which they would have 
occupied had a just distribution taken place. This comparison, within Rawls' framework, 
would be made upon the basis of the access of those affected to the primary goods. 
With this in place, a further modification to the structure of Rawls' account becomes 
inevitable. As it stands the two limbs of his account of distributive justice are the principle of 
115 	I ignore for the present other manifestations of serious injustice within families which 
could, I believe, if the political will existed, be adequately addressed by existing 
institutions. That the political will does not exist, of course, reflects precisely existing 
preferences. 
116 	Rawls, `Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory', /oc. cit., 528. 
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equality of fair opportunity and the difference principle. On the account developed in the last 
few paragraphs, at least if we look at existing unjust societies, we recognize that not only are 
such societies stratified into broad economic groups or classes as measured by the access of 
households to income and wealth, but also each of these broad economic groups is internally 
stratified by the gendered division of labour and the economic and other disadvantages which 
attend this. Thus, we recognize that two distinct foci of potential disadvantage exist, the first 
determined by the position of each household in the wider community, and the second 
determined by the gendered division of labour within the household and the impact of this 
upon the access of individuals to the basic social goods, including, I think, the social allocation 
of leisure117 inclusion of which becomes critical for the coherence of the structure as a whole. 
Given the background constraint I argued was essential to the idea of fair terms of cooperation 
- that the burdens involved in the reproduction of subsequent generations would be equally 
shared by all who became parents, absolute equality in this respect seems an appropriate 
benchmark, particularly given that, on the whole, individuals tend to enter more or less 
intimate relationships with those of roughly similar backgrounds and education. 
A further potential difficulty arises with regard to another of the assumptions 
incorporated in Rawls' basic theory. Rawls, as is well known, assumes that the position of 
representative individuals may be sufficiently defined by the position of equal citizenship and 
their position in the distribution of income and wealth to avoid indexing problems. 118 While 
this may, and I reserve judgment in this matter, be sufficiently precise to determine the relative 
positions of Rawls' 'representative men', it appears counterintuitive once we recognize that two 
distinct foci of relative disadvantage must be considered, that determined by the overall 
position of households within the community, and that determined by the gendered division of 
labour within the community, whatever specific form it may take. Provision could be made to 
ensure equal access to income and wealth irrespective of gender at all broad socio-economic 
levels, for example the sort of redistribution suggested by Okin's proposal, without such 
redistribution in any way affecting the access of women to other social goods, particularly such 
goods as 'powers and prerogatives of offices and positions of responsibility, particularly those in 
the main political and economic institutions'. 119 One of the characteristic features of existing, 
unjust societies, is that women, irrespective of their access to income and wealth, have 
significantly diminished access to such offices when their position is compared to that of men 
of equivalent education and background. While this may, of course, suggest simply that 
women have very little interest in such offices, it may also suggest a culturally intrenched belief 
that such positions are inappropriate for women, most particularly where by virtue of such they 
117 	Here I am assuming that any reasonable account of leisure as a primary good would 
be constructed to recognize child care and essential household tasks as work. 
118 	Rawls, A Theory of Justice, loc. cit., 96. 
119 	Rawls, 'Social Unity and Primary Goods', /oc. cit., 162. 
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would exercise socially legitimate power over men. 12° What must be emphasized here is that 
unless and until culturally entrenched attitudes concerning gender and appropriate gender 
roles are significantly modified, fair equality of opportunity will remain neither fair nor equal. 
Inevitably, it will be corrupted by the inegalitarian attitudes which prevail within the 
community, and it may be, given the prevalence of such attitudes, that preference and positive 
action are essential. 
Once Rawls' account has been expanded in these ways, a further problem arises. 
While maximin may be an appropriate criterion for inequalities within the society as a whole, it 
intuitively seems far less clear that it is adequate when dealing with disadvantages arising from 
gender. First, the underlying assumption of maximin is that any inequality is acceptable only to 
the extent that such inequality is to the benefit of the least advantaged group, that is to the 
extent that their prospects given the inequality are preferable to their prospects without it. 
The supporting argument is that the more fortunate are entitled to gain from their greater 
talents and more advantaged starting positions only to the extent that allowing them to do so 
benefits the less fortunate. It seems fairly clear that the distribution of talents between men 
and women is roughly equivalent, and that boys and girls have a roughly equal chance of being 
born into generally advantaged or disadvantaged family circumstances. Gender based 
disadvantages arise, not from the 'natural lottery', nor from differences in family socio-
economic background, but from the social allocation of burdens and benefits as determined by 
prevailing gender roles. 121 They are, in other words, a consequence of culturally entrenched 
injustice. It would seem to follow, therefore, that the justification supporting maximin has no 
application to the case we are considering. It is important to be extremely precise about the 
exact parameters of my claim. Undeniably, within particular families given the prevailing 
(unjust) gendered distribution of labour, the greatest benefit in terms of the access of the 
household to income and wealth may be realized for the household if traditional roles are 
adhered to. It does not follow, of course, that this may be perceived as just. It must be 
emphasized further that in such households, disparities in individual access to the other 
primary goods are likely to be profound, indeed, are likely to be substantially greater than 
would be the case if roles were less traditional. It is as individuals, not households that people 
have access to, for example, offices and positions of responsibility. When we recognize that 
the overall economic position of any given household may, under present conditions, be 
maximized by a distribution of labour which simultaneously minimizes the access of one family 
member to offices and positions of responsibility, Rawls' assumption that access to the other 
primary goods is sufficiently correlated with access to income and wealth to avoid indexing 
120 	For an account which emphasizes male resentment of women in senior or supervisory 
positions see P.N. Graboski, 'The Harassment of Jane Hill' in P.N. Graboski, 
Wayward Governance, Canberra, Aust. Institute of Criminology, 1989, 173. 
121 	Biological sex is allocated by the 'natural lottery', so-called, while gender is entirely 
socially constructed. 
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problems may be seen to be fallacious. Once one moves from considering the individual 
household to considering the gendered distribution of labour within the society as a whole, 
given the fact that it operates more or less independently of the distribution of talent and the 
advantages of social background, there is no reason to suppose that, on the macro-institutional 
level, allowing inequalities to continue would be likely to operate to the advantage of the least 
advantaged group, even in the very long term. A significant effect of the existing gendered 
distribution of labour is the fact that women are less likely, at all levels in society, to make full 
use of their natural capacities or talents, and, in many cases, the advantages conferred by social 
background, or cultural capital, also remain underutilized. If as Rawls supposes, inequalities 
can only be justified if it can be established that allowing them will operate to the benefit of the 
less advantaged, effectively they can be justified only when it is supposed that a significant 
effect will be to increase the overall wealth of the community. Underutilizing the talents and 
cultural capital of a substantial proportion of the community seems more likely, in the very 
long run at least, to diminish the social resources available to the community as a whole and 
this diminution is ultimately likely to rebound to the disadvantage of the least advantaged 
group. 
ADD WOMEN AND STIR: DWORKIN AND OBLIGATIONS 
Dworkin's account of equality of resources incorporates very different presuppositions 
and it is therefore important to examine these features of his account in some detail. Where 
Rawls' account utilizes the device of the original position to constrain reasoning, Dworkin's 
ideal theory account offers a group of adult shipwreck survivors washed up on a desert island 
with abundant resources and no other human inhabitants. These shipwreck survivors seek to 
define a just distribution of the available resources among themselves, and Dworkin explicitly 
avoids consideration of intergenerational matters, including the question of how equality of 
resources is to be maintained if individuals remain free to give their resources to their children 
during life or after death. He argues that the 'idea of an economic market. . . must be at the 
center of any attractive theoretical development of equality of resources. ,122 While these 
castaways are fully aware of their own individual preferences, and, indeed, must be so aware if 
Dworkin's auction is to serve its purpose, they do agree than none among them has any 
antecedent claim to any of the resources and that the available resources must, therefore, be 
divided equally among them. The metric for an equal division Dworkin terms the envy test. 
Whereas the original position endeavours to ensure that reasoning is constrained by the fact no 
one is aware of his or her position, or natural attributes, or individual preferences, Dworkin's 
castaways make their decisions upon the basis of their individual tastes and ambitions, given 
the preferences of the other castaways and the opportunity costs their decisions impose upon 
others. 
122 	Dworkin, 'Equality of Resources', /oc. cit., 284-285. 
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The proposition for which I argued above, that, in the original position individuals 
unaware of their biological sex and the gender roles characteristic of their society, would insist 
that the obligations of parenthood be equally shared among all those who became parents, is 
clearly untenable in the context of equality of resources. Given that, at the ideal theory level, 
the castaways are fully aware of their own preferences, and make their decisions on the basis 
of their preferences as regards work, leisure and consumption, it appears that decisions 
regarding parenthood and regarding the ways in which parental obligations are met would 
depend entirely upon the preferences of the individuals concerned. As Dworkin notes, the 
critical distinction in his theory 
is the distinction between those beliefs and attitudes that define what a 
successful life would be like, which the ideal assigns to the person, and those 
features of body or mind or personality that provide means or impediments to 
that success, which the ideal assigns to the person's circumstances. i23 
On its face, because even at the ideal theory level all decisions are made in full awareness of 
individual ambitions and preferences, equality of resources appears substantially more hostile 
than did Rawls' account towards the proposition I am putting, that any coherent egalitarian 
account must incorporate at the ideal theory level recognition of the obligations of all 
individuals towards any children which they may have. Despite this apparent incompatibility, I 
shall argue that equality of resources in fact requires just such a background theory of equality 
of responsibilities if it is to provide an attractive theoretical model for equality. 
Let us return to the castaways or shipwreck survivors with whom we began. Dworkin 
specifies that at the very least they are to assume that 'any likely rescue is many years away'. 124 
Unless we are to also assume that these castaways are either celibate or neuter, it seems 
probable that after the initial distribution is complete and they are free to produce and trade as 
they wish, some, perhaps most, of them will, in the course of using the time available to them 
for 'leisure', form relationships and have children. 125 Certainly a 'preference' for more or less 
permanent relationships and for reproduction is one characteristic of the great majority of 
known human communities. Given that our castaways are fully aware of their existing 
preferences, and have agreed to an equal division of resources, and given that Dworkin 
specifies that the 'idea of pre-political entitlement based on something other than equality' 126 is 
incompatible with his account, how might our immigrants, realising this, ensure that such 
123 	Ibid., 303. More generally see 295-304. 
124 	Ibid., 285. 
125 	Dworkin's elaboration of the supporting principles and baseline constraints essential if 
the auction is to actually attain an equal division of resources emphasizes, particularly 
in his account of the principle of authenticity, such relational concepts as convictions, 
commitments, associations and, in particular, freedom of personal, social and intimate 
association. Dworkin, 'The Place of Liberty', /oc. cit., 34-37. 
126 	Dworkin, 'Equality of Resources', /oc. cit., 312. 
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relationships would not destroy equality of resources among them? As Dworkin 
acknowledges, equality of resources is an interpretation of a more fundamental egalitarian 
principle, that a community is required to treat each of its members with equal concern. 127 
What is required is a set of baseline requirements for our imaginary auction which serves as a 
bridge between the abstract principle of equal concern 'and equality of resources, which 
proposes that an auction under certain conditions realizes equal concern.' is through the 
construction of an appropriate baseline that this bridge is constructed. 
Earlier we identified a number of principles which are essential to the construction of 
an appropriate baseline for the auction, the principles of security, abstraction, correction, 
authenticity and independence. The principle of security refers simply to the familiar legal 
prohibitions against theft, the use of force and so on which have become conventional in 
developed legal systems. It provides individuals with the physical security and control over 
their property essential if they are to form plans and projects and carry them out. Abstraction 
is more complex. It requires that all resources be offered in their most abstract or least 
differentiated form. Thus, for example, land ought to be offered in smaller rather than larger 
lots because this enables maximum flexibility and enhances the sensitivity of the auction 
procedure to individual plans and projects. The principle of abstraction attempts, so far as is 
possible, to ensure that all resources are offered in the least differentiated and most fully 
fungible form possible. It incorporates a general presumption of freedom of choice, ensuring 
that individuals will be left free to use all the resources they acquire, including leisure, in any 
way they wish which is compatible with the principle of security. The principle of correction 
was addressed earlier. Fundamentally the principle of correction mandates constraints on 
freedom of choice where this is essential to correct for externalities such as transaction costs 
and where necessary to move outcomes closer to those which would obtain under conditions of 
perfect knowledge and prediction and devoid of organizational costs. It incorporates such 
restrictions upon freedom as zoning requirements and the restrictions on user implicit in the 
availability of nuisance actions. 
Authenticity, as Dworkin uses it, has become a technical term. A personality is 
authentic in Dworkin's terms, when it 'has been formed under circumstances. . . appropriate to 
using an auction among personalities so formed as a test of distributive equality. ,129 While this 
statement is, on its face, somewhat mysterious, what Dworkin is trying to suggest is that 
personalities formed under unjust legal constraints such as those mandating racial segregation 
or outlawing homosexual relationships are not authentic, have been corrupted by the 
illegitimate constraints in force. The preferences expressed by personalities formed under 
	
• 127 	Dworkin, 'The Place of Liberty', /oc. cit., 25 ff. 
128 	Ibid., 25. 
129 	Ibid., 35. 
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such conditions have no role in an ideal theory auction used to established an egalitarian 
distribution. Finally, the principle of independence acts both to ensure that no constraints can 
be justified 'as necessary to reach a result that would be reached in an auction . . . if that result 
would be reached only because people's bids would reflect contempt or dislike' for those 
disadvantaged thereby and to endorse the constraints essential to protect those who are the 
victims of prejudice. 13° 
Dworkin argues further that equality of resources 
aims that the resources people have available, with which to pursue their plans 
or projects or way of life, be fixed by the costs of their having these to others. . . . 
[and that it follows from this aim that] each person's social requirements. . . be 
tested by asking how far these requirements can be satisfied within an 
egalitarian structure that measures their cost to others. 131 
It follows that 'the baseline liberty/constraint system should be innocent of any constraints 
justified on grounds of religious truth or moral virtue. ,132 
At this point, it is important to return to our original question and attempt to see 
whether the basic proposition for which I am arguing might find a home within the baseline 
liberty/constraint system. I have argued that given the basic facts of human life all those who 
have children have two obligations in respect of those children, to provide for their support 
and to provide for their care and nurture. A similar proposition could, of course, be put in a 
way more congruent with Dworlcin's theory, taken as a whole, that all children have a right to 
economic support and to care and nurture from their parents. Does it make a significant 
difference whether this principle is phrased in terms of the obligations of adults to any children 
they may have or whether it is phrased in terms of the right of children to economic support 
and to care and nurture? Given the possibility of alternative accounts, this question becomes 
one of some importance. I would argue that there is a critical difference between the two 
propositions. When phrased as I prefer, as an obligation upon the part of each parent as an 
individual to provide both economic support and care and nurture, the obligation is fully 
individualized, applies equally and individually to each and every individual who is a biological 
or social parent. Where the proposition is phrased in terms of the child's right to economic 
support and care and nurture, it need not be individualized in this way. The second 
proposition slides quite easily into a subtly different formulation, that each child has a right to 
economic support and care and nurture from his or her parents, suggesting that nothing 
whatever follows from the way in which parents choose to perform this obligation. Where it is 
the right of the child which is central, so long as the child receives both support and care and 
130 	Ibid., 36-37. 
131 	Ibid., 30-31. 
132 	Ibid. 
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nurture, the particular allocation of responsibilities is irrelevant. The obligation on the part of 
the parents is not necessarily individualized, although it may be individualized where 
necessary.133 I do not believe that anything would necessarily follow from incorporating the 
second form in the baseline. The way in which the derivative obligations were fulfilled, the 
particular allocation of social responsibilities, would simply be a matter of choice and 
negotiation between the parents and any distributive consequences irrelevant to equality of 
resources. If, however, each individual were seen as potentially having an obligation to provide 
both economic support and care and nurture for any children for whom he or she was 
responsible, people would be required to assess the social requirements of the sorts of life they 
wish to lead against the costs these requirements potentially impose upon others. An 
individual who chose both to have children and to devote his or her life whole-heartedly to his 
or her chosen occupation either for the intrinsic rewards it might bring or in order to amass 
the resources needed to indulge the forms of consumption preferred would be required to 
consider the cost that this lifestyle imposed upon others. These costs would include the true 
cost of any opportunities foregone by others in order to make this lifestyle possible. Dworkin's 
baker, who chooses 'to work long hours rather than watch football on television' 134 might, for 
example, be required to take into account the costs this particular decision imposes upon other 
family members, just as he might be required to take into account the costs a choice in favour 
of leisure rather than participation in parenting and household labour might impose. His 
choices in work and leisure become, not simply individual preferences, but concrete choices 
with the capacity to impose significant costs upon others. 
Would this interpretation of true opportunity costs be acceptable within the 
framework of Dworkin's account taken as a whole? The arguments put above suggest that 
where the obligations of parenthood are not equally shared between parents, compensation is 
essential to maintain equality of resources between them. Yet, within Dworkin's theory as a 
whole, it is not altogether clear that compensation is justified. Dworkin places overwhelming 
emphasis upon individual freedom of choice. His entire account of equality of resources is 
intended to secure the greatest possible role for individual preferences in determining social 
outcomes, given the tastes and preferences of others. It is frequently asserted that the 
traditional social allocation of the obligations of parenthood in our culture reflects the 
preferences of both men and women. Women, it is argued, prefer to devote themselves to the 
care and nurture of their children while men prefer to meet their parental responsibilities 
133 	Dworkin distinguished between the consequences of the two approaches in this way. 
Arguing generally he commented: 'Duty based theories treat such codes of conduct as 
of the essence. . . . Right-based theories, however, treat codes of conduct as instrumental, 
perhaps necessary to protect the rights of others, but having no essential value in 
themselves. The man at the center is the man who benefits from others' compliance, not 
the man who leads the life of virtue by complying himself' Taking Rights Seriously, loc. 
cit., 172. 
134 	Dworkin, 'The Place of Liberty', /oc. cit., 46. 
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through the provision of economic support. If these are in fact the preferences of the 
individuals concerned, may it not be argued that no compensation is required? 135 In 
addressing the principle of authenticity, Dworkin comments that 
any auction scheme approved by equality of resources requires, for example, 
some baseline principle specially protecting the parties' freedom to engage in 
activities crucial to forming and reviewing the convictions commitments, 
associations, projects, and tastes that they bring to the auction. 16 
He acknowledges using authenticity in a special sense, one which focuses upon the absence of 
legal constraints on such activities, simply stating that for the purpose of exploring how 
government treats people as equals the exclusive focus upon legal constraints is appropriate. 
Here, I believe, Dworkin is in error. While he acknowledges that most personality-forming 
constraints are in our culture, cultural rather than legal, he suggests that our concern with 
political equality entitles us to disregard the effect of these broader non-legal constraints on 
personality formation. Earlier in this chapter I argued at length that many of the cultural 
constraints together with the preferences generated by them which are confronted by women 
today are in fact a product of earlier legal constraints and the inegalitarian attitudes these 
reinforced and justified. These 'cultural relics' are at least as likely to distort prices away from 
true opportunity costs as are existing legal constraints. Further, in the specific context we are 
considering, many of these cultural constraints are a direct consequence of the inegalitarian 
attitudes he subsequently argues are condemned by the principle of independence. 137 If this is 
the case, a very serious problem arises, one which, I believe, arises more acutely where gender 
roles are concerned than in other circumstances. Even if we accept arguendo the proposition 
that traditional gender roles together with the social allocation of resources and opportunities 
which accompanies them do represent the existing tastes or preferences of many of the 
individuals concerned, taken one by one, we are confronted by the possibility that these tastes 
or preferences are not authentic but are, instead, a consequence of the inegalitarian attitudes 
the principle of independence argues we are to condemn. What I am arguing here is simple. 
The tastes and preferences of individual men and women in respect of appropriate gender 
roles and the social allocation of resources and opportunities associated with such roles are not 
independent of the inegalitarian attitudes and beliefs which have played a role in their 
construction. Rather, those same inegalitarian attitudes reinforce and encourage the social 
reproduction of those same tastes and preferences and proclaim them normative. It would 
135 	I leave aside for the moment sociological evidence suggesting that an increasing 
proportion of women would in fact prefer that men shared equally in care and nurture 
and desire to pursue their own careers irrespective of parenthood. See A Hochschild, 
The Second Shift: Working Parents and the Revolution at Home, New York, Viking 
Press, 1989. 
Dworkin, 'The Place of Liberty', /oc. cit., 34-35. 
137 	Ibid., 37. 
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appear to follow that equality of resources cannot be neutral concerning these tastes and 
preferences, at least where they are likely 
to distort prices fundamentally, because they affect what people decide Oa 
want, and therefore change the entire bidding program they decide to pursue. 1-1° 
Yet Dworkin specifically defines his principle of authenticity in terms of the absence of legal 
constraints and for what are perhaps sound and traditionally 'liberal' reasons insists that other 
cultural and psychological constraints are irrelevant, irrespective of the extent to which they 
may distort the outcome of the auction. 
It becomes, therefore, critical to consider what some of these reasons might be. 
Dworkin himself provides only one. He insists this limitation is appropriate because the topic 
being considered is what is required if the government is to treat its citizens as equals in the 
scheme of resources it devises. Once cultural and psychological constraints upon personality 
formation are considered, it may seem that we have embarked upon a metaphysical or 
psychological account of authenticity and the information required to ascertain whether the 
principle of authenticity had been complied with would require an account of the preferences 
individuals ought to have, completely undermining the project upon which he has embarked. 
Perhaps. However before we simply assume that this restriction is reasonable and essential, it 
is well to consider precisely what is at stake. Two examples should suffice by way of 
illustration. First, to the extent that cultural traditions which are still prevalent regard 
dependence as appropriate for women, and only for women, to the extent that girls are 
encouraged from early childhood to perceive their true vocation to lie in marriage and 
motherhood, it seems entirely likely that these cultural traditions will have a profound bearing 
not only upon the choices they as individuals make in work, leisure and consumption, but also 
upon the preferences and attitudes of others towards them as occupants of various social roles. 
Likewise, to the extent that men are encouraged to perceive themselves as independent, 
encouraged to perceive their occupational choices as critical to their identity and their family 
roles and responsibilities as peripheral, these attitudes or beliefs are equally likely to have a 
profound bearing upon their choices, and upon the attitudes of others towards them. It goes 
without saying that such attitudes are likely to have a profound impact both upon the choices 
which are made in terms of work, leisure and consumption, and upon the preferences of those 
dealing with them. To the extent that such beliefs are widespread in a given community, as I 
believe they are in ours, they seem likely to have a radical impact upon outcomes in the ideal 
theory auction Dworkin proposes and upon ongoing trade thereafter. A similar argument is 
undeniably available concerning the impact of racist attitudes. For example, to the extent that 
the preferences of members of any given racial group are formed within a community that 
believes that members of that group are unreliable, or less intellectually capable on average 
than members of the dominant group, or fundamentally shiftless and happy-go-lucky, it seems 
138 	Ibid., 36. 
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likely that the preferences of many group members will be profoundly affected by beliefs which 
they have absorbed concerning the characteristics of their racial group. To the extent, if any, 
that this is somewhat less intuitively persuasive with regard to racial or ethnic stereotypes than 
with respect to gender roles, it is important to recall that the best available evidence suggests 
that our consciousness of gender and of the roles connected with gender apparently is formed 
at the same time as is our consciousness of ourselves as distinct individuals, whereas, at least in 
relatively fortunate circumstances, our consciousness of race and its consequences need not 
arise until later. There is, perhaps, one further difference which I ought to mention for the 
sake of completeness. Very often, members of racial or ethnic minorities who demonstrate 
substantial attainments in the wider community are perceived either as demonstrating the 
fallacious nature of racial and ethnic stereotypes or as truly exceptional individuals. Women 
who demonstrate equivalent attainments are not infrequently perceived as unnatural, 
unfeminine, as not properly female. Their attainments identify them as deviant, rather than 
exceptional. 
Dworkin, in addressing the principle of independence, argues that it redefines 
opportunity costs where this is necessary to protect those who are the victims of systematic 
prejudice.139 It follows that a way must be found of placing those who are victims of prejudice 
in a position which at least approximates that which they would occupy if prejudice did not 
exist. What I am arguing is that in the context of gender difference, an appropriate means of 
accomplishing this lies in recognizing that the principle of authenticity requires a very specific 
constraint. Dworkin comments that the principle of authenticity has both an active and a 
passive voice. Not only would participants want the widest possible opportunities to form and 
reflect upon their own convictions, attachments and projects, they would also desire a similar 
opportunity to influence the opinions of others. 140 Given the degree to which the gender roles 
which remain conventional in our culture affect the concrete nature of these convictions, 
attachments and projects, and given the degree to which they have in our culture determined 
the actual influence people have upon the opinions of others, the auctioneer would be required 
to correct in advance for the influence of these roles in fixing the baseline constraints precisely 
because of these cultural characteristics. A reasonably simple way of attaining this would be 
for the auctioneer to redefine opportunity costs upon the basis that the great majority of 
individuals will, at some time during their lives, be obligated to provide both economic support 
and care and nurture for their children, that is, will be in the position of sole parents who are 
139 
140 
Ibid., 37. 
Ibid., 35. I note here that Dworkin intends the principle of authenticity to provide the 
familiar liberal protections for freedom of religion, expression, and personal, social 
and intimate association. I believe, however, given the argument put in the text, that 
authenticity requires that individuals make their choices in work, leisure and 
consumption against the knowledge of their background obligation, should they 
become parents, to provide both economic support and care and nurture for any 
children they may have. Without this constraint, the gender roles characteristic of our 
culture are likely to distort prices fundamentally. 
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unable to rely upon any family support network and must plan accordingly. 141 The probability 
of parenthood and the approximate costs of raising children could surely be calculated from 
existing statistical information and from the auctioneer's comprehensive knowledge of all 
relevant particulars concerning each of the immigrants. On the ideal theory level, therefore, 
individual decisions in work, leisure and consumption would reflect these opportunity costs and 
it follows that institutional structures would develop to facilitate an egalitarian distribution of 
these costs. I believe this is implicitly necessitated by Dworkin's definition of authenticity. He 
comments that 
personalities are authentic, for our purposes, when they have been formed under 
circumstances appropriate to usim an auction among personalities so formed 
as a test of distributive equality. V+4 
Personalities constructed in terms of prevailing gender roles cannot be deemed authentic by 
this standard, tending as they do to reinforce inequality. 
It remains to consider the extent to which the• modifications argued for in the 
paragraphs above are consistent with the structure of Dworlcin's theory of equality, taken as a 
whole. Two elements of these modifications are particularly critical. First, I have argued that 
recognition of the impact of gender and gender roles upon equality of resources mandates the 
recognition of two fundamental individual obligations, the obligation to provide economic 
support and to provide care and nurture for any children one may have. Second, I have argued 
that, if Dworlcin's ideal theory auction is to provide an adequate account of true opportunity 
costs, it is essential, at least in the context of gender and gender roles, that the principle of 
authenticity incorporate the recognition that, in cultures such as our own, existing preferences 
and choices which in any way implicate issues concerning gender cannot be recognized as 
authentic because the attitudes underlying them are among those which the principle of 
independence insists that a government dedicated to showing equal concern for all its citizens 
must condemn. While these are certainly preferences and choices, to the extent to which they 
flow from inegalitarian attitudes, and to the extent that, absent those attitudes, they would be 
otherwise, they cannot be regarded as authentic. In the case of gender and gender roles at least, 
it is impossible for equality of resources to remain neutral about the tastes which impose 
economic disadvantage while still condemning the attitudes which have fonned those tastes and 
preferences. 
141 	The rationale is simple. A sole parent unable to rely upon the services of kin, a 
necessary constraint given that very often the services of female kin are relied upon 
without compensation in our culture, would be compelled to find a way of reconciling 
the support obligation and the obligation to provide care and nurture. A community 
in which individuals perceived themselves as actually or potentially having these 
responsibilities would demand institutional restructuring to make this possible. 
142 	Dworkin, 'The Place of Liberty', /oc. cit., 35, n. 32. 
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The incorporation of fundamental obligations, even abstractly defined, in a theory 
which insists upon the primacy of individual rights and their prior status to any obligations 
which may flow from those rights, while superficially inconsistent, does not, I believe, pose any 
significant theoretical problem. Indeed, it has been argued that recognition of these 
obligations may plausibly be seen as arising from the fundamental obligation of government to 
show equal concern for its citizens. Unless, that is, these individual obligations are fully 
recognized and provided for in the institutional structure of the community, government 
cannot be thought to demonstrate equal concern. The second problem is much more difficult 
and significant. If, as I have attempted to demonstrate throughout this thesis, those 
preferences and choices which currently prevail within communities such as ours concerning 
the appropriate sexual division of labour, concerning appropriate roles both within the family 
and within the wider community, are in fact a consequence of attitudes and assumptions which 
are fundamentally inegalitarian, two conclusions follow. First, the distinction between the 
tastes and preferences which prevent the services of some individuals from commanding a 
premium in the market and the inegalitarian attitudes which, at least in the case of gender, 
model those tastes and preferences may be unworkable. Second, the principle of authenticity, 
if it is to do the work required of it, cannot be interpreted simply as a justification for 
affording special protection to freedom of religious commitment, freedom of 
expression, access to the widest available literature and other forms of art, 
freedom of personal, social and intimate association,. And also freedom of 
nonexpression in the form of freedom from surveillance.'43 
Rather, at the ideal theory level, the principle of authenticity commands attention to the 
profound interrelationship between fundamentally inegalitarian attitudes and the expression of 
tastes and preferences. It calls into question, for example, protection for literature and art 
which relies for its appeal on the inegalitarian attitudes Dworkin insists equality of resources 
condemns and which effectively fosters the continued prevalence of tastes and preferences 
ultimately predicated upon inegalitarian attitudes. 144 
CONCLUSION 
While it is certainly possible to 'add women and stir', as we have seen in this chapter 
doing so alters the emphasis and direction of at least two egalitarian theories in significant 
ways. In the case of Rawls, while nothing in the construction of the original position or the 
constraints upon reasoning which prevail prohibits the incorporation of recognition of the 
distributive consequences of gender roles, inclusion renders untenable a series of critical 
assumptions upon which other aspects of his account rely and calls into question critical 
143 	Ibid. 
144 	I think here of forms of racist expression which unfortunately remain commonplace 
and also of forms of expression which rely for their appeal upon stereotypic 
characterizations of women. 
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aspects of his argument that a stable overlapping consensus is possible. Likewise, while 
Dworkin's ideal theory account of equality of resources can be interpreted in a way which not 
only allows, but requires, such recognition, recognition lays bare the intimate interdependence 
of certain inegalitarian attitudes and the expression of tastes and preferences which is intended 
to define an egalitarian distribution of social goods and resources. Many of these attitudes 
undeniably have their genesis within the private family given its primary cultural role in the 
socialization of future generations, but their ultimate expression pervades the social, economic 
and political life of the wider community. They find concrete expression in many of the 
prevailing tastes and preferences of individuals for work, leisure and consumption and for the 
forms of these which are appropriate for particular individuals. This, of course, is neither new 
nor particularly surprising. 
Quite clearly, in making these arguments, I am not reaching back to republican 
sentiments or forward to communitarian yearnings. Indeed, to the degree my arguments have 
succeeded, the foundation for communitarian yearnings has, to some extent, been undermined. 
What I have argued throughout is that the liberal faith in a coherent public/private distinction 
is, to a substantial extent misplaced, and to the extent that it is misplaced, the contemporary 
egalitarian faith in a political account of liberalism is misplaced as well. I have attempted to 
argue that the contemporary family is to a significant extent the product of the legal 
institutions and the ideologies which evolved coevally with it. The gender roles which prevailed 
in the past and those which are significant today are neither somehow the outcome of the 
interaction of individual tastes and preferences nor are they in any simple sense the outcome 
of those forms of legal regulation thought to be most characteristically law like. Rather, legal 
regulation has been subtly Influenced by ideologically based normative propositions concerning 
the family and family roles, and, in turn, prevailing ideologies have been subtly modified by 
changes in legal regimes. Further, the most pervasive forms of regulation have gradually 
ceased to substantially rely upon 'black letter law'. Increasingly, legislative regimes emphasize 
broad areas of discretion in pursuit of substantive goals (which are, in large part, ideologically 
determined). Family regulation reflects the interaction of ideological fragments which to a 
greater or lesser extent serve the perceived interests of wider institutions. Prevailing gender 
roles and the concrete tastes and preferences associated with various permutations of these in 
no sense arise autonomously and ought not be thought to be in some fundamental way an 
expression of the individual will. While, at least within more or less pluralist societies such as 
our own, gender roles are neither monolithic nor immutable and may be becoming 
increasingly variable, the construction of those roles arose out of more or less dominant 
ideologies and the shadow of these ideologies remains with us today and underlies institutional 
expectations. We have seen this in many different contexts, in the ideological definition of 
motherhood as a vocation, and the very different consequences of this for different social 
classes, in the ways in which roles such as wife, mother, father and worker have been 
constructed around networks of expectations and obligations which frame political discourse. 
Despite the increasing prevalence and breadth of legislative prohibitions of sexual 
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discrimination and/or harassment, occupational roles continue, in substantial part, to be 
predicated upon the assumption that workers are able to rely upon the domestic and parenting 
services of others. 
When we 'add women and stir', insist that the fact of disadvantage cannot be 
addressed without attention to the causes of that disadvantage and the role of law in 
orchestrating family structures and ideologies, a significant consequence is that many of the 
structural assumptions underlying egalitarian theorizing are called into question. In the case of 
Rawls, the recognition of dual foci of disadvantage calls into question both the assumption that 
roles other than that of citizen and that in the distribution of income and wealth are voluntarily 
assumed and the related assumption that the connection between access to income and wealth 
and access to the other social goods is sufficiently close for theoretical reliance upon income 
and wealth alone. Also thrown into quite fundamental question is his tacit view that most of 
the theories of the good life characteristic of contemporary pluralist communities are 
fundamentally compatible with the ideals of political liberalism. 
In the case of Dworkin, exposure of the link between inegalitarian attitudes and other 
tastes and preferences leads to recognition of the fact that, at least in the case of gender, the 
inegalitarian attitudes liberalism must condemn generate many, perhaps most, of the concrete 
tastes and preferences liberalism set out to respect. For both, I believe, our exploration into 
justice for women has emphasized the fundamental incoherence of any attempt to exclude 
justice from the family and the consequential inadequacy of their accounts of political 
liberalism. To the extent that contemporary egalitarian theories address the question of justice 
for women, take women seriously as individuals, the family and the relationships within it cease 
to be private, beyond the reach of law and justice. Once we recognize that families are 
composed of a multiplicity of independent individuals, to whom, men, women and children 
alike, justice is due, the egalitarian faith in a coherent public/private distinction vanishes. All 
that remains are actually or potentially autonomous individuals to whom justice is due and for 
whom it is long overdue. 
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